PROTEST ACTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF BRAZIL

Lucas Toshiaki Archangelo Okado

ABSTRACT
Citizens in contemporary democracies incorporated protest actions in their political repertoires. Once considered as unconventional actions, demonstrations, boycotts and petitions are now widely used as a way to vocalize demands and insert them into the general political debate. Studies of protest in developed countries present the opportunity structures, the grievances, the values, beliefs and the personal resources responsible for promoting or restricting protest actions. However, in developing countries, the causes of this phenomenon are not clear. Using data from the World Values Survey project, this paper aims to verify the individual conditions that lead to political protest in the case of Brazil. The results show that deprivation does not explain the protest actions. Resources and values are the main individual factors responsible for protest actions in Brazil. The results also show a shift in Brazilian protesters’ ideology.

KEYWORDS: Political Protest. Brazil. Latin America.

INTRODUCTION

The repertoires of protest are now part of contemporary democracies. While they were once seen as unconventional actions (Barnes and Kaase 1979), protests are incorporated into the political action repertoire of citizens (Norris 2003a). Now, we live in "social movements societies" (Meyer and Tarrow 1998), and far from being a problem for democracy, protest actions represent an opportunity for improvement in contemporary democracies (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 2003a). Protest actions have served as a mean of voicing demands and a way to bring agendas into the public debate that would not have been possible in institutional political systems' inputs, generating greater pressure for accountability and government transparency (Dalton and Welzel 2013; Welzel 2013). In summary, protest actions have made more accountable governments, place agendas of minorities in the public debate and at the same time pressed for improving of democracy.

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In third wave democracies, protests were the main drivers of the democratization process (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). The former Soviet bloc and Latin American countries experienced successive waves of protest that led to the end of dictatorial regimes. Brazil was no different. The strikes in São Paulo’s ABC\(^2\) during the late 1970s and the movement "Diretas Já"\(^3\) in the 1980s mobilized thousands of citizens across the country to democratic elections and hastened the end of the dictatorial regime that ruled the country for more than twenty years. However, after these waves of protest and mass participation, many countries of the third wave experienced a reflux in political participation. High expectations of living under a democratic government have been frustrated by the low institutional performance in these countries, leading to the end of the period of "honeymoon" with democracy (Ibid 2002).

Analyzing recent events of Brazilian politics, the former spokesperson for the Lula government, André Singer, argued that the emergence of a post materialist center in the protests of July 2013 gave a new direction for the recent movement. Called before by leftist organizations with a specific agenda - to block the increase in the price of public transport - the mobilization of the middle class took the mobilization from the left and placed it into the center. Although the agenda of public transport has not been completely forgotten, other demands emerged, mainly related to improving public services and fighting corruption (Singer 2013).

This paper aims to understand which values lead to political protest in Brazil, through two working hypotheses. According to the theory proposed by Inglehart and his many collaborators, individuals who lived their first decades in an environment with material abundance would have fewer concerns about their immediate survival and can devote more time to pursue long-term goals, such as environmentalist agenda (Inglehart 1990). More educated and with greater resources, such individuals tend to participate more actively in elite-challenging repertoires, engaging more in protest activities.

\[H1: \text{The difference between the activists from the 1990s and 2000s lies in the greater weight of post materialist values among the second group.}\]

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\(^2\) Region in São Paulo city that concentrates many industries and strong unions and birthplace of Worker’s Party.

\(^3\) “Direct elections now”. Mass demonstrations for free elections occurred in the end of dictatorship regime.
The second hypothesis relates to the reorganization of Worker’s Party (PT) electoral base. With the election, the social movements that supported PT ceased to protest with the previous intensity, either by ideological identification with the party that controls the government (Torcal, Rodon, and Hierro 2015) or by the functioning of communication channels between civil society and State (Lüchmann 2007) which expanded the formal structures of opportunities for collective action. The two phenomena could produce an equalization of the ideological profile of political activists, eliminating the differences between left and right in contentious actions.

\[ H_2: \text{There is an equalization in the ideology of who participate in protest actions. Whether 1996, the protesters were more common among the leftist, in the following years this difference disappeared.} \]

This case study does not included macro variables in the models, although the literature states the relevance of them (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010; Quaranta 2015; Welzel 2013). I will try to fill this gap by periodizing the data and showing these periods interact with the results. This paper proceeds as follow: the first section deals with the theoretical framework that guides this proposal; the second section briefly discusses the Brazilian case; the next one presents the methods and data, the following section lay out the results and the paper finishes with a conclusion.

THE POLITICAL PROTEST

There are two main theoretical approaches in political protest studies. They developed independently with few interactions between each other until recently (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010). The first approach has a sociological view and focus on the action of social movements as object of study. With the influence of institutionalism, this approach initially studied how social movements act according to the available opportunity structures. In this perspective, the opening or closing off channels or resources can facilitate or restrict protests and influence how these collective actors choose their repertoires (Tarrow 1998).

This concept appeared in the 1970s in the United States to understand the urban revolts in the previous decade (Meyer 2015). Political opportunity structures are the institutional arrangements and political processes that facilitate or hinder social movements’ actions (Tarrow 1998). A more open political environment could facilitate
the action of social movements, since these movements have more resources to organize and less concern about reprisals. However, a very open and receptive political environment to the demands of its citizens would not offer motivations for mobilization. The cycles of protests tend not to occur at the extremes, but in a moderate opportunity policy environment. The function of protest and political opportunity structures is curvilinear (Meyer 2015).

The protest cycles begin with the increase of grievances (Idem, 2015). The feelings of grievance arise through the discrepancy between subjective expectations - or the conditions of life and personal satisfaction that she believes merit or will be able to achieve - and the objective conditions that he or she experiences (Gurr 1970). People protest because they experience a situation of relative deprivation. The literature is not conclusive in general whether grievance theory could explain the protests. In fact, the collective action theory appeared as a response to grievance theory deficiencies (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Tarrow (1998) argues that approaches that focus only on deprivation and do not take into account the political process cannot identify the cycles of protest. However, Meyer (2015) states that the increase in feelings of grievance triggers protest cycles by providing the necessary motivation for people to organize, but cannot explain them alone.

The political opportunity structures explain the phenomenon of protest action from a macro perspective. The second approach does it from an individual perspective. The concern of the first theory is to understand the dynamics of the emergence of collective action. In contrast, the studies about political participation try to understand who participates. Derived from studies of political culture of the late 1960s (Almond and Verba 1989), this approach aims to explain the constraints of political protest from individual characteristics. The theory states the main factors that explain the political protests: resources, grievance and political values (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010).

Resources are not only seen as access to material goods, but also as cognition, time availability and participation in associative networks (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Educational level has proven to be the main predictor of political participation, and an extremely consistent measure to explain activism (Almond and Verba 1989; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos 2004; Norris 2003a; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). More educated people tend to have more access to political information and seek it more frequently, which facilitates political activism. This fact
contradicts the grievance theory, since there is a relationship between education and other socioeconomic factors.

Another important participatory resource is the associative networks. Participation in associations increases social capital. As a result, people seek collective solutions to the common problems that affect them (Putnam 1993). Associations also act as mobilizing agencies, facilitating collective action and cooperation between their members (Norris 2003b). The borders that divide what is an associative resource or what is political participation are unclear. Many researchers have studied the participation in organizations as a form of civic engagement and can be totally political, not political or somewhere between two (Fiorina 2002). Norris (2003b) identifies a change in European mobilization agencies, with the emptying of traditional agencies - parties, trade unions and churches - and the emergence of more horizontal organizations. Tarrow (1998) observed the same phenomenon when he identified changes in the organization of social movements, especially with the advent of new media.

The resource theory states that individuals with a more central position in the social structure tend to participate more. Education, time, financial resources and associations facilitate political engagement. In the Latin American context, political participation is closely linked with the possession of resources. Some studies about political participation have shown that low political participation in the region is mainly due to lack of participatory resources (Okado and Ribeiro 2015; Ribeiro and Borba 2010, 2015).

Dalton et al. (2010) argued that the model of resources contradicts the grievance theory. In fact, the literature has treated both theories as competing and often mutually exclusive, but the idea of relative deprivation, a central point in the concept of grievance, is not just about the objective deprivation, but also the discrepancy between what one is expect to have or how one live, and what one actually has (Gurr 1970). In a context of high social inequality, income redistribution measures can easily generate a sense of relative deprivation, especially if providing access to goods used as a form of social distinction.

In societies with scarce resources, this grievance could provide necessary motivation for contentious actions, but the absence of participatory resources hardly allows mobilization. In advanced industrial societies, the grievance model is not significant in explain involvement in protests (Barnes and Kaase 1979). By studying a set of nineteen European countries, Quaranta (2015) found that both satisfaction with life and
satisfaction with democracy are not related to the increase in protest levels. On the other hand, in a study of protests that took place after the European recession, Vassallo and Ding (n.d.) found strong evidence that dissatisfaction with the economic situation leads people to protest.

In Latin American context, results presented by different researchers are inconclusive. While some studies found a relationship between dissatisfaction and the rise of protest actions (Booth and Seligson 2009), others indicate the relative deprivation, measured by levels of satisfaction with life, does not have connection with participation in protests (Ribeiro and Borba 2015). To be or not to be satisfied with life does not generate individual motivations to engage in contentious actions.

The last set of micro variables that explain protest actions are values. The literature treats values in two ways. The first one relates to individual position in the ideological dimension, as an explanatory factor for involvement in political protests. Individuals who position themselves on left on the ideological spectrum tend to participate more in protest actions (Barnes and Kaase 1979) when compared with who call themselves right. Flanagan and Lee (2003) show those with authoritarian personalities remains far from protest actions. However, the normalization of political protests and their incorporation into citizens’ repertoires in advanced industrial democracies (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Norris 2003a) could equalize the ideological levels of who participate in political protests.

However, according to Torcal, Rodon, and Hierro (2015), left-oriented people are still the majority among protesters. These authors claim that the government's ideological position also affects the intensity of participation. Leftist government face a reduction in protest activities from people who share the same ideology of government. By sharing a common agenda or by identification with discourse and acts, leftist people protest less against a left government (Idem, 2015).

Literature also states that self-expression values are related to higher levels of political protest (Inglehart 1990; Welzel 2013). Individuals with less materialist values, namely that direct their evaluative priorities for issues not related to survival and physical security, tend to protest more. According to Inglehart (1990), post-materialist individuals, without concerns about their own survival, may have more time to devote to long-term goals. However, in developed nations, the effects of post materialism measures tend to be smaller due to the low number of people who identify with these values (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010). In fact, when analyzing the effects of post-materialist values
and involvement in political protests in Latin America, (Ribeiro and Borba 2010) found that these measures had a very limited predictive capacity.

To summarize, two explanatory dimensions will be assumed for political protest. The first deals with the study of social movements through political processes: opportunity structures available for collective action, i.e., short-term or institutional aspects that serve as facilitators for motivation, organization, mobilization and action of social movements (Meyer 2015; Tarrow 1998). In addition to the political process, there is also a second dimension related to individual characteristics. The literature deals with the grievances, that is the feeling of relative deprivation (Gurr 1970); material, cognitive or organizational resources (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995); and values, which could be ideological leaning - left or right - (Torcal, Rodon, and Hierro 2015) or the priority of self-expression values (Inglehart 1990). In order to help applying the abovementioned theories to understand political protest in Brazil, the next section will briefly review the recent political situation of this country.

THE BRAZILIAN CONTEXT

Brazil is a young democracy of the third wave. After a twenty-years military dictatorship, this country had its first democratically elected president in 1989. Institutional approaches claim that the democratic transition was slow and gradual, with the military in charge of entire process, through successive agreements between political elites (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Popular mobilization, especially the trade union strikes in the late 1970s and the campaign for direct elections in the 1980s, determined the speed of this transition (Codato 2005), not the direction. As democratization was not a complete rupture process with the old regime, Brazilian transition was made for accommodation of new and old structures and political practices (Kinzo 2001).

The lack of congruence between the demands of Brazilian elites and population delayed Brazilian democracy and made it take ten years to consolidate (Moisés 1992). The military dictatorship was followed by a plebiscitary and populist election. The new democratic government eventually adopted extremely unpopular measures. Due to not being a break with the past and having preserved old practices, the first elected government eventually frustrated much of the expectations of Brazilian citizens. A major characteristic of the post democratization moment was a feeling of deep mistrust of the functioning of Brazilian political institutions (Baquero 2008; Moisés 1995). Involved in
a scandal of corruption, the first elected president suffered an impeachment process, supported by massive demonstrations led by young students.

In the following years, reforms were conducted in the State organization during the following years. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the new elected president, opened the economy, lowering barriers to imports and reducing the role of the State in the economy, through privatizing State companies and deregulating public services. The “Real Plan⁴” ended the rising prices inherited from previous governments, but was not able to deal with the unemployment in the period. In the 1990s, the agreements signed with international financial institutions forced Brazil to expand educational opportunities, universalizing high education. In terms of state organization, the reform granted more autonomy to states and city governments, exempting the central government from maintain public services or sharing the responsibility of them with the others members of federation (Kugelmas and Sola 1999).

Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, from the Worker’s Party, succeeded the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Identified with the left and supported by social movements, “Lula” won the presidency with a center left discourse. His actions in the government maintained the previous macroeconomic policy, but he had been widely favored by the commodities boom in the early 2000s (Carneiro 2012). This boom allowed for the implementation of social programs, such as "Bolsa Família⁵", the expanding of college education and a slight reduction in income inequality. His government also saw a short period of full employment, allowing for the increase of consumption of the working classes through the valorization of the minimum salary and available credit. Such measures have led to the emergence of a "new middle class" (Neri 2011) in Brazil, employers in jobs that require little qualification, which was integrated into the consumer market, either through credit or increased supply of formal jobs.

In 2005, high-ranking officials of the government were involved in a grand scheme of corruption and vote buying in Congress, the "Mensalão". This scandal had great repercussions in the media (Miguel and Coutinho 2007) and almost cost Lula’s re-election. The success of social programs and the smooth running of the economy ensured broad support among low-income voters and Lula won the election for another term. However, this scandal has produced profound changes in Brazilian politics. The largest

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⁴ A set of economic measures to reduce the rising prices.
⁵ Social program that pays a monthly fee for low-income families, requiring recipients to maintain all their children under 15 years in school.
of these, no doubt, was the reorganization of Worker’s Party (PT) supporters. The PT became one of the pillars of the Brazilian party system after the return to democracy because it is the party with the most consistent social base among the electorate (Singer 2012).

The successive cases of corruption involving high officials of the party and the government led the more educated middle classes to stop identifying with the PT. On the other hand, the success of social programs implemented during the Lula government has built a solid identification with the Worker’s Party among the poorest (Carreirão 2008; Veiga 2007). There was a loss of support in middle class sectors, especially in the Southeast, PT’s birthplace, and the migration of this support for the PT from the most disadvantaged sections, leading the party to build a solid foundation in the poor communities of Brazil.

Among the institutional reforms undertaken by PT, it is also worth mentioning the model of public policy councils and conferences, inspired by the participatory budgets of PT municipal governments. These instruments aim to elaborate and discuss public policies in different areas such as health, education, human rights, youth and others. This participatory model is an old demand from social movements that emerged during the democratization period (Lüchmann 2007) and are important because they are spaces for voicing demands and institutional interaction between government and civil society. Being an instrument that combines political participation and representation, it is less expensive for social movements to carry their participation into these places than electing representatives to public offices. Even foreseen in the Constitution promulgated in 1988, this participatory model has taken shape and expanded to several areas from the 2000s onward.

Driven mainly by high commodity prices, Brazil has experienced a period of successful economic development, reducing inequalities and increasing the average education of the population. Parallel to this, a left government with strong ties to social movements implemented new channels of dialogue between the state and civil society. Finally, this same government reorganized the party identity in Brazil by changing its own base of supporters. In this context, it is important to understand who were the people protesting in the nineties and who are going to the streets now.
METHODS AND DATA

To establish the differences between individuals who protested in 1996, 2006 and 2014, we used the WVS data on Brazil. The study includes three waves, collected in 1996, 2006 and 2014. The period covers important events described above: the 1990s, the period of the realignment of PT's bases and the recent events. As a measure of protest, we used three variables that report participation in demonstrations, petitions and boycotts. These measures are common in studies of protest (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010; Quaranta 2015; Vassallo and Ding n.d.), and recurrent in the literature. However, unlike these studies, the choice here was due to no aggregation of these variables. We analyzed each protest action for the three time points described above. The three time points differ among themselves in the size of sample. I weighted the sample to 1000 cases, respecting the sex proportion of Brazilian population.

In addition to the values, control variables will be included in the models. The theory points to the impact of resources (education, income and participation in political organizations) and grievance (life satisfaction). Socioeconomic variables such as gender and age were also included in the models. To test these two hypotheses, logistic regression models were constructed for each of the three modes of participation in the different years in which data was collected.

The dependent variable was recoded as a binary. The original question\(^6\) offered as an answer a third option "would participate." As the interest here is to find out what are the characteristics of the people who took part in these modalities of participation, this response was recoded together with the answers "did not participate". The odds ratios of the models describe the probability of taking part effectively in some of these actions and not the intention of participating in them.

We divided the following section into three parts. The first presents a descriptive analysis of the data found, mainly to test the first hypothesis. The second part contains the statistical model that describes the characteristics of people who engaged in protest. Finally, one last part will present an overview of the results and make a broader discussion concerning the institutional changes in recent years.

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\(^6\) “Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it:”
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Contrary to the global trend of increase in protest actions (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Norris 2003a), the use of these types of repertoires is decreasing in Brazil. Since 2006, the number of people who reported having participated in demonstrations fell constantly. More respondents participated in demonstrations\(^7\) in 1996 (24.8%) than in subsequent years - 18.3% in 2006 and 16.4% in 2014. The participation in petitions\(^8\) and boycotts\(^9\) increased in 2006, but decreased in 2014 to levels below from 1996. In general, this means that Brazilians are protesting less.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Demonstrations</th>
<th>Boycotts</th>
<th>Petitions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994-98</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
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<td>2005-09</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-14</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-98</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
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<td>2005-09</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
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<td>2010-14</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
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<td>1994-98</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
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<td>2005-09</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-14</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
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The discrepancy with the global trend of increasing of protest actions seems to be a Latin American trend. With the exception of Chile, where there are constant increases in three WVS waves in the analyzed period, all other countries - Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay - have a standard reduction more or less identical to Brazil on this type of action. In Argentina, the demonstrations remained constant, with a slight variation between 2006 and 2014, but between the margins of error in the survey. Mexico had a significant growth in participation in demonstrations in 2006, but a fall to the same levels before the last survey carried out by WVS. Uruguay and Peru had a dramatic increase in 2006, but a significant decrease in 2014. This decrease, however, did not represent a return to previous levels.

This data suggests that this type of political participation in Latin America relates to cyclical aspects of politics or economics. Whether protest in advanced industrial societies the protest is in citizens’ everyday repertoire, in developing countries this type of political participation is more subject to period effects (Norris 2003b).

\(^7\) \(X^2 = 26.4\), \(p < 0.01\).  
\(^8\) \(X^2 = 29.1\), \(p < 0.01\).  
\(^9\) \(X^2 = 8.8\), \(p < 0.05\).
Age has an ambiguous relationship with political participation. Political Behavior studies have two different interpretations. The first one states that the relationship between political participation and age is curvilinear (Milbrath 1965). This approach argues that the differences in the life cycle affect the distribution of participatory resources (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). On the other hand, there are interpretations that emphasize differences in socialization processes. Political socialization in different periods would lead to the existence of different political generations (Inglehart 1990; Putnam 2001). Inglehart states that there is a change in priorities of individuals occurring through generational exchange.

The data about the relationship between age and demonstrations seems to support the idea of generations, but not the Inglehart-thesis. In 1996, the age cut is clear: as we age, people stop participating. The same was not true in the other years. Since 2006, political participation seems to have equalized in relation to age. One hypothesis for this phenomenon is the end of the dictatorship period and the role that street demonstrations had in the democratization process. Inglehart and Catterberg (2002) argue that citizen participation had a key role during the third wave of democratization, to which Brazil belongs. However, the negative returns in institutional performance of the new regime were not consistent with the expectations of citizens; the result was the end of the "honeymoon" period. As these countries develop, therefore, political participation will equalize with the increase of post-materialist values among people from these countries. We cannot confirm the generational change. What happened was a greater participation of young people in the events that led to the democratization process, especially the impeachment of President Collor in 1992. However, in subsequent years, in terms of age, participation in demonstrations equalized between age cohorts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 - Age and Reported Protest Actions In Brazil: 1996, 2006 and 2014</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demotions</td>
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<td>15-29</td>
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<td>30-39</td>
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<td>40-49</td>
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<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
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<td>60+</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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The same phenomenon can be observed in signing petitions. In 1996, the younger age cohorts reported more participation in this type of repertoire than the older ones, thus creating a generational effect. The most engaged group had socialized in the transition period between dictatorship and democracy. However, in subsequent years the levels of participation among age cohorts became very close.

The boycotts show a different pattern. People who reported participating in this form in 1996 were located in central age cohorts. The relationship here is very close to that described by Milbrath (1965): it is low among young people, grows among middle age and falls back in old age. However, in the following years - 2006 and 2014 - the participation in this repertoire equalizes, but at lower levels to 1996.

Although the relationship between post-materialism and age is apparent, it does not indicate a generational overlap. The expectations about growth in the number of individuals with self-expression values cannot be confirmed, since the rate remained stable throughout the study period - 11.6% in 1996, 10.9% in 2006 and 11.2% 2014. The low number of individuals who identify themselves with these values does not confirm that participation in political protests in Brazil is a product of value change, as argued by the human development theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Previous studies have pointed to the low impact of this variable on protests in the context of Latin America (Ribeiro and Borba 2010) and recent data from the last wave of the WVS confirm of this argument.

Graph 1 – Age and Post-Materialism in Brazil (1996-2014)

Hypothesis one was not confirm. Regarding the improvement in the quality of life of Brazilians in the analyzed period, there was no significant increase in the numbers of
post-materialists to produce changes in political participation patterns. However, these values influence political participation in boycotts and marches until 2006, and individuals who have these values have more likely to sign a petition to every year. The change in patterns of participation described in advanced industrial societies, driven by changes in the individual priorities, does not happen in Brazil.

The descriptive analysis of the data suggests a generational cut in political participation. Young people socialized during the 1990s appear to be more likely to participate in demonstrations. Table 2 suggests the inexistence of replacement of new activists in subsequent years, or this type of repertoire is less frequently for younger age cohorts than in previous years, contradicting most studies in developed countries (Norris 2003b). Unfortunately, to separate effects of age and generation period is a daunting task, since generation is the product of age and period (Glenn 1976; Inglehart 1990). The statistical model does not describe generational effects, so we could not measure its effects.

The other individual characteristics show an ambiguous relationship with the protests in Brazil (Table 4). Education correlates with the activation of these types of repertoires. The higher the education level, the greater the ability to process political information and the greater the civic skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). This increases the chances of the individual to engage not only in protests, but also in other types of political activism, as demonstrated by previous studies (Almond and Verba 1989; Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010; Quaranta 2015). Brazilian data confirms this statement, since education closely related to all forms of political protest in all years studied here. The more educated Brazilians tend to protest more.

Ideology appears to be an important predictor for demonstrations. In 1996, the effect is clearer than other years. We can clearly identify that leftist people protested more during that year than rightist ones. That year, 35% of people who identified as leftist or extreme leftist reported participation in demonstration. On the opposite of the ideological spectrum, only 14% of those who positioned themselves as rightist and 16% as extreme rightist went to the streets. In other years, the participation in this repertoire did equalize with a slightly higher proportion of leftist in demonstrations. People who identified as center protested less in 2006 and 2014 compared to those on the left and the right.

Signing petitions seems to be a related ideology phenomenon. In 1996, there was a tendency of the center to participate in this type of repertoire, as the percentage of people
participating decreases in both extremes. In other years, the trend was equalization participation, with a slight advantage for people who identify in the left field.

Table 3 - Ideology and Protest Actions In Brazil (1996, 2006 and 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Demonstrations</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Petitions</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ext. Left</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ext. Right</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Righ</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Finally, ideology seems to be more related to boycotts than the other two modes of participation studied here. In all the years analyzed, there seems to be a slight preponderance of people who position themselves as leftists. The difference is greater in 2006, which appears more clearly that who identifies on this ideological field tends to share more this type of action. Because it is activity with a greater capacity for personal initiative and more diffuse targets - not necessarily the government - the interference of the ideology of the ruling party does not seem to be important. Boycott is the most stable repertoire among the three analyzed in this paper.

The following table shows the interactions between these variables in a logistic regression model (Table 4). Besides ideology, age and post materialistic values, other variables are included, as relevance pointed by literature.

Table 4 - Political Protest in Brazil - 1996, 2006 and 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Demonstrations</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Petitions</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Boycotts</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>-37%</td>
<td>-49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Satisfaction</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>124%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>220%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Organization</td>
<td>152%</td>
<td>103%</td>
<td>158%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM values</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0,14)</td>
<td>(0,15)</td>
<td>(0,16)</td>
<td>(0,12)</td>
<td>(0,12)</td>
<td>(0,12)</td>
<td>(0,25)</td>
<td>(0,2)</td>
<td>(0,28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-19%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-23%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0,07)</td>
<td>(0,08)</td>
<td>(0,08)</td>
<td>(0,06)</td>
<td>(0,07)</td>
<td>(0,06)</td>
<td>(0,12)</td>
<td>(0,11)</td>
<td>(0,15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-95%</td>
<td>-96%</td>
<td>-96%</td>
<td>-72%</td>
<td>-35%</td>
<td>-76%</td>
<td>-99%</td>
<td>-95%</td>
<td>-99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0,6)</td>
<td>(0,68)</td>
<td>(0,76)</td>
<td>(0,52)</td>
<td>(0,51)</td>
<td>(0,58)</td>
<td>(1,07)</td>
<td>(0,9)</td>
<td>(1,38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0,18</td>
<td>0,15</td>
<td>0,15</td>
<td>0,17</td>
<td>0,12</td>
<td>0,13</td>
<td>0,13</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1000 (1996); 1000 (2006); 1000 (2014).

For all forms of protest, education remained significant in every year, confirming the expectations described in the literature. The more educated people are more likely to join protest actions in Brazil. After education, post materialist values appeared as the variable that shows most significance. The self-expression values are significant in all forms of participation; even though did not prove effective effect in explain the demonstrations and boycotts in 2014.

Participation in political organizations is also an important predictor of political protest. It explains the engagement in marches and petitions, but the associative resources do not show significance for participation in boycotts. Perhaps boycotts are a political repertoire that do not depend on collective action, but personal initiative. Participation in political organizations has no effect on the explanation of engagement in this repertoire.

Life satisfaction did not relate to greater or lesser degree of political protest. This result confirms previous studies in Latin America about the low effects of grievance on participation in protest (Ribeiro and Borba 2010). People who are not satisfied with their lives are not necessarily those who protest most strongly.

Age also was not significant. Unlike the scenario described by Inglehart (1990) for Europe, there is no change in evaluative priorities among Brazilians. In advanced industrial societies, the change in values priorities that have primarily affected the younger generations. This has contributed to redefine the way that young people relate themselves to politics. Created in an environment with greater abundance of resources than previous generations, these young have more tendency to participate in elite challenging repertoires.

However, in Brazil, only a small portion of individuals has post-materialist values. Data shows that they represent a little portion of the population, which has remained stable over the years. The economic growth in the analyzed period did not contribute to
increase the number of post-materialists in Brazil. Perhaps inequality breaks the effects of growth in income per capita and prevents the growing of post-materialists in Brazil.

There is a positive effect between participation in protests and possession of post-materialist values, but the data shows that people who identify with these values represent a small proportion of the population, which has not increased over the years. Though been a small portion among Brazilians, our models indicate the post-materialists tend to protest with more intensity than materialist individuals do. This does not mean that they are sufficient to transform the way that Brazilians participate politically. However, as theory predicts, this group tends to engage with more intensity than the rest of the population. Even being a portion of elite with high economic resources, the possession of these values alone produces a positive effect on involvement in protest actions, given that subjective income does not produce significant effects on the participation in the analyzed repertoires.

We can say that the second hypothesis does confirm. Being on the right of the political spectrum reduces the chances of engaging in demonstrations and boycotts, but only in 1996. In 2006 and 2014, this variable is no longer significant. This change is consistent with the election of a center-left government, which reduced the intensity of mobilization from leftist people.

The change in the activist profile appears to be related to the behavior. One possible explanation for the results above is the changes in the ideological profile. The decrease of the number of people who identify themselves as leftist or the increase of rightist could influence the results of the model. What happens is the opposite: the leftist have remained stable during the three surveys, while the rightist has decrease between 1996 and 2006. On the other hand, the center increased proportionally to the reduction of the right, as shown in Chart 2.
Two hypotheses can explain this finding. The first is the ideological identification with the government. When a leftist government controls the office, people who are positioned congruently with it tend to reduce their participation in protest actions (Torcal, Rodon, and Hierro 2015). This does not mean they cease to protest, they only reduce their participation. The explanation for this lies in the congruence between the ideology of the ruling party and the activist’s, since it may be less encouraging to protest against someone who shares the same political convictions. Another possible explanation may be the implementation of policies that meet the interest of this group.

In Brazil, we also hypothesize the expansion of the right participation through institutional mechanisms that do not necessarily relate to traditional political representation spheres. This hypothesis is in dialogue with the structures of political opportunities available for social movement actions (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 1998). Granted by the 1988 constitution, the public policy councils and conferences became popular between 2003 and 2011. This period held 82 national conferences, many of which with local, regional and national stages (Souza et al. 2013). These conferences are for dialogue between the government and civil society and aim to: 1) define public policy guidelines, 2) evaluate programs, 3) vocalize demands groups, 4) discuss and decide on public policy councils and 5) review participation instruments (Souza 2012).

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10 The conferences covered various topics: education, health, human rights ... For more details on the topics see Souza et al. (2013).
The public policy councils and conferences can be responsible for the leftist’s decreasing activism, as they serve as a space for inserting demands in the public debate. Participation in these spaces is less bureaucratic and the action of social movements less costly. Even without decision power, these spaces served for the elaboration of public policies and the inclusion of social movements’ agendas on them.

An example of the interaction between these councils, conferences and social movements is the agenda of MST’s education in the countryside. The MST supports PT governments since Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva’s election in 2002. In the government’s composition, many party leaders with strong ties with the movement held positions in office, representing new opportunities for MST action (Campos 2015).

These opportunities have resulted in national public policy conferences. One of the agenda of peasant movements in Brazil, in addition to access land, is the improvement of living conditions on the rural settlements. They demand more access to public services. Better conditions to access education services are part of MST agenda. The National Education Conference - CONAE - held in 2010, was an opportunity for the movement to insert their agenda. The final document of CONAE and the National Education Plan bill contemplated many aspects demanded by MST about education in the countryside (M. A. de Souza and Marcoccia 2011).

Conclusion

The model demonstrate that protesters’ profile in Brazil does not vary much from advanced industrial societies. The more educated people still more mobilized. Possession of post-materialist values is also recurrent among those who participate in protests. Dalton et al. (2010) suggest that grievances could be an important variable to explain political protest in developing societies, which could not be confirmed.

If the activist profile are similar to each other, why participation rates are lower in developing countries? One possible answer would be the inequality and lack of resources. Ribeiro and Borba (2015) also raise this possibility, they defend the idea that Latin Americans do not participate because they lack the necessary resources to do.

Another point of disagreement is the activist ideology. In 1996, the protesters positioned themselves on the left, but in the following years, this difference disappeared.

11 Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Landless Workers’ Movement)
12 Document that governs the educational guidelines in Brazil, describing actions and goals to achieved, established every decade.
Two hypotheses can explain this phenomenon. The first is the idea that the ideological congruence with the government demobilizes the left (Torcal, Rodon, and Hierro 2015). In developed countries, when left-wing parties run the office, there is a tendency to decrease the intensity of the participation of people who identify themselves in this political field (Idem, 2015).

Another possibility are the political opportunity structures (Tarrow 1998) that opened to Brazilian social movements with the Workers’ Party victory. Since 2002, the models of councils and conferences of public policies have opened a space for social movements to vocalize their demands and insert them in the public debate. Many of these demands eventually turned into bills or transformed into official documents, such as the example of education in the countryside mentioned above.

Additional studies should be conducted to deepen the discussion. For now, we needed to study other Latin American countries to verify if this shift in the ideological activist profile happens in other countries of the region, and to what extent the opportunity structures or ideological identification with the government influence the activist profile.

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