Social Relations and Social Capital in Vietnam: The 2001 World Values Survey

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In the past generation Vietnam has experienced dramatic social, economic, and political changes. North and South Vietnam became the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1975, and the Vietnamese Communist Party ruled under its continuous leadership. Beginning with the Sixth National Party Congress in 1986, however, Vietnam introduced renovation (doi moi) policies that were extended by the 1992 constitution (Turley and Selden 1993). The reforms allowed price floats, engaged private sectors into business, decollectivized farmlands, and liberalized foreign trade and investment. A series of economic, social and legal reforms have followed from the marketization of the economy. In 1999 Vietnam and the United States normalized trade relations, and Vietnamese participation in the international economy has grown steadily over the past decade. The Vietnamese are also experiencing improving living standards and the World Bank reports impressive gains in the late 1990s in raising incomes and reducing poverty (World Bank 2001). Much remains to be done, but significant change has occurred over the past decade.

This article examines the patterns of social relations and social capital in Vietnam. We inquire into whether the ongoing changes in Vietnam's economic and political situation are related to changes in social life (Gertler and Litvack 1998; Le Thi 1999; Pham Minh Hac 2001; Pham Van Bich 1999; Dollar et al. 1998). The agricultural share of the economy is decreasing, for example, while industry and manufacturing grow in economic importance (Anderson 1999). People are migrating from rural areas to the urban centers in the North and South (Central Census Steering Committee 2000). Our research asks whether these societal changes are apparently affecting how individuals are socially connected, the nature of their social group ties, and whether new forms of social capital are developing in Vietnam. We also examine attitudes toward family and gender as a possible consequence of these trends. Social change has the potential to shape the future course of Vietnamese social and political attitudes--and that is the focus of this essay.

Our analyses are based on the first scientifically-sampled national survey of public opinion in Vietnam, the World Values Survey 2001 (WVS), that was conducted by the Institute of Human Studies in Vietnam (see methodological appendix). This survey replicated the core questionnaire of the international WVS project, and also extended the Institute's own research program on "People: Goals and Driving Forces for Socio-Economic Development." This opinion survey is an especially valuable research resource because so little is scientifically known about Vietnamese attitudes on social and political issues. Among other topics, the 2001 World Values Survey inquired about family and social relations, membership and participation in social groups, and satisfaction with life conditions. This research focuses on these areas, describing contemporary opinions in Vietnam and examining how social change may affect such key features of society.

1 Forthcoming in a special issue of Comparative Sociology edited by Ronald Inglehart.
Social Relations and Social Networks

One indicator of social development comes from the patterns of social relations in a nation. Social networks are mechanisms to connect the individual to society, providing patterns of social interaction, social cues, and social identities (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Inkeles 1983; Inglehart and Baker 2000). A traditional East Asian agrarian society, for example, is normally focused around family relations (Pham Van Bich 1999). The family plays a role as a survival value, and familial ties and traditional authority patterns are emphasized within such networks. As societies modernize, work networks often become more important, as fellow employees become the significant peers in one's life. Another feature of social modernization might be the development of institutionalized social networks, such as through community groups, sports clubs or cultural groups, or other such associations. Placed against these expectations are the cultural traditions of Vietnam, in which the family plays a large and apparently continuing role as the focal point of social life. Scholars suggest that family, village and nation are closely interrelated in creating a basic structure for Vietnamese society (Hickey 1964; Nguyen Van Huyen 1944).

To map the broad contours of the actual social networks in Vietnam today, the WVS asked respondents how often they engaged in various social activities. We find that the family is the central point of social life in Vietnam. A full 59% said they spend time with their parents or relatives on a weekly basis, compared to only 32% who weekly spend time with work colleagues, or 17% with social friends. These results reaffirm Hirschman and Vu's (1996) findings that more than three quarters of Vietnamese with living parents saw them on a weekly basis; these authors concluded that this was "an extraordinary pattern of intimate family ties" (Hirschman and Vu 1996: 243). Weekly interactions in institutional social networks, such as through clubs or associations (9%) or religious groups (5%) are much less frequent.

As the other national surveys in the 2000-01 WVS are completed this will provide a better cross-national context for interpreting the Vietnamese findings, but recent WVS surveys for a set of East Asian nations provide some context. The gap between family activity and participation in any other network is greater in Vietnam than in China, Japan or the Philippines—but these other nations also rank the family as the most central network. The Chinese also emphasize work networks (62%), because of the importance of work cooperatives and occupational issues; but participation in work networks is roughly comparable in Vietnam, Japan (21%) and the Philippines (34%). Friendship networks appear noticeably less important in Vietnam than in the other three nations; for instance, the Vietnamese are half as likely as Chinese and Philippine respondents to say they weekly meet with friends. It is also striking that religious networks are less often cited in Vietnam and Japan, and these networks are actually more active in China and the Philippines.

One way to assess the potential effects of social development on these social networks is to examine whether these patterns vary systematically across demographic groups. For example, if there are systematic differences by income and education levels, then we might speculate that rising social status might shift patterns of social relations in predictable ways. Similarly, we expect that farmers would follow more family-center patterns of social relations than urban workers. We also might hypothesize that younger Vietnamese might place less reliance on family ties, and be more integrated to work and friendship networks. Moreover, because Vietnam still has a largely agrarian population with modest living standards, we are able to observe a nation...
that is relatively early in the social modernization process. What are the likely consequences if social modernization continues?

Table 1 presents the relationship between a standard set of social characteristics and the frequency of activity within each separate social network. The income and education relationships are most directly related to the social modernization theme. These analyses show that higher levels of income and affluence tend to increase involvement in all social networks; family activity is higher among the better educated, as well as participation in work and friendship networks. To give a reference framework for these relationships: 55 percent of respondents with a primary schooling say they meet with their parents or relatives on a weekly basis, compared to 66 percent among with at least some college education (tau-b=.08 in Table 1). Those in middle class occupations also tend to be more active in friendship, work and social group networks. The only exception to the general social status pattern is religious activity, which displays contrasting relationships with the social status measures. Another theoretically important predictor is age, and here again we find relatively consistent results. Participation in most social networks is more common among younger Vietnamese; the only exception is the religious sector, where older respondents report more activity. There are also modest regional differences, residents of the North are relatively more likely to engage in family or friendship network activities.

Table 1. The Relationships between Social Characteristics and Social Network Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Friends</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Income</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.09*</td>
<td>.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>.13*</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>-.08*</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R's occupation</td>
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<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.14*</td>
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<td>North</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most table entries are tau-b correlations; the occupation correlation is an eta statistic. Correlations significant at the .05 level are denoted by an asterisk.

The low level of religious attachments and the pattern of relationships present a complex picture of the role of religion in Vietnamese society. On the one hand, there is a move from traditional religious values to secular-rational values among the young and better educated resulting from the Marxist-based ideology of education and the policies of the regime. On the other hand, religious activities have endured. People still talk about religious beliefs; traditional festivals are reestablished in the countryside. Most families, including communists and the
intelligentsia, have “spirituality of dwelling” or “sacred place”. Table 1 also indicates that religious networks are relatively more active in the Southern region of Vietnam. These data suggest that the role of religion may not be dependent on agrarian, industrial, postindustrial or knowledge-based economies.

These are intriguing results if they reflect a general example of the early stages of social development. Higher levels of income and education in Vietnam increases participation in an array of social networks. Development does not lead away from traditional family networks, and may actually increase the density of these networks; but at the same time there is an even greater increase in participation in work, friendship and social group networks. Thus further development in Vietnam is not so likely to exchange on set of social networks for another, but to expand the number and activity levels of the networks that connect individuals to society, and which help form their social and political identities.

**Group Memberships**

Another important theme in the literature on social development is the degree of social involvement within a society, or what is often described as a civil society (Yamamoto 1996; Abuza 2001: 12-15; Shi 1998). Participation in social groups develops the interpersonal skills that are part of the evolution of a modern society, and helps to broaden the life experiences and perspectives of group members. An active civil society also provides a training ground for developing political skills, and diverse groups may serve as agents of interest articulation within society and politics.

The Western literature on Vietnam is divided on the extent of such civil society activity in the nation. Membership in social groups has apparently ebbed and flowed over time, in part in reaction to the government's efforts to mobilize the public to participate in such organizations. While some scholars suggest that doi moi has led to the expansion of civil society as new organizations emerge to represent new interests in society (Thayer 1995; Lockhart 1997), others maintain that such social forces in Vietnam are less autonomous and assertive than the comparable social groups in Eastern Europe (Womack 1993).

To provide empirical evidence on these points, the World Values Survey asked respondents whether they were a member of a group in 14 different areas (and an additional "other" category). Figure 1 describes a Vietnamese population that is engaged in an active social life. A fifth or more of the public report they are members of a sport/recreation group, a local community group, a social welfare organization, a women's group, or a political group. There is also substantial involvement in educational/cultural groups, unions, professional association, and youth groups. The typical Vietnamese respondent reports belonging to 2.33 groups, which is significantly higher than the Chinese (.91), Japanese (1.41), or the Philippine (1.93) survey findings.3

At least in part, these patterns of group membership reflect the past efforts of the Vietnamese government to actively engage the public in social groups that were initiated and directed by the government. The Vietnamese Women's Association, the Ho Chi Minh Youth Union, the Vietnam Farmers Association, the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor and other groups have historically served as avenues for the government to communicate with key social sectors in Vietnam, and often these groups claimed large national memberships (Porter 1993: ch. 3). Participation in the Youth Union, for example, was often a route to career advancement, and
participation in such groups was encouraged. More recently the government encouraged various local cooperatives to address certain community issues. The result is a high degree of social engagement, even if it does not fully match the civil society model of democratic theory.

**Figure 1. Membership in Various Social Groups**

If we simply count the number of groups to which an individual belongs, we again find evidence that social development increases the density of social networks and civil society participation within Vietnam. Group membership is significantly higher among those who are better educated (taub=.13) and those with higher incomes (taub=.13). While it is often the case that group membership increases with age and the accumulation of family responsibilities and a career,⁴ there is no such age relationship in Vietnam (taub=.02). This suggests that younger Vietnamese are engaging in social groups with increasing frequency as part of the social development of the nation, thus group membership may grow even more in the future.
Social Trust

One of the theorized consequences of expanding social networks is that they break down parochial attitudes and lead to more cosmopolitan views of the world. In addition, extensive social network participation may weaken traditional ascriptive patterns of authority, as individuals work with others to address common interests. Of course, such effects depend on the nature and content of the interactions that occur within social networks, some of which may reinforce or diminish such patterns.

Research frequently focuses on social trust as an indicator of the content of social relations in a nation, and a potential byproduct of patterns of social capital formation. Ronald Inglehart (1997) and Robert Putnam (2002), for example, emphasize that trust in others is a key element in developing a civic culture. But it is less clear what might be expected in Vietnamese attitudes of social trust. Traditional agrarian and Confucian traditions often encourage trust in a relatively narrow circle of family and close friends, and caution about the unknown stranger. The cultural legacy of communism is also unclear, since prior research demonstrates that levels of social trust vary widely across East European nations in the 1990s (Inglehart 1997; Newton 1999). Vietnam's changing socio-economic conditions and increased interaction with the international community may also affect these orientations.

The World Values Survey contains a standard survey question tapping trust in others. The Vietnamese respondents are somewhat skeptical about their fellow man: only 41% think that most people can be trusted, while 59% say that one needs to be careful in dealing with other people. But these results should be interpreted in the context of other cross-national findings. In all the combined nations of the 1995-98 World Values Survey, only 26% of respondents said that most people could be trusted. In terms of other East Asian nations, 42% of Japanese respondents, 41% of the Taiwanese, 52% of the Chinese and only 6% of the Philippine respondents say they trust others. Thus the Vietnamese national level of social trust appears higher than some other nations at Vietnam's stage of economic development.

In exploring the potential impact of social modernization on trust, we found that education and income differences in trust are very slight, not rising to the level of statistical significance. Age patterns are also not statistically significant. Expressions of interpersonal trust are, however, much more common in northern provinces (55%) than in central (28%) or southern (37%) Vietnam. Finally, we find a complex non-linear relationship between social capital, as represented by the number of group memberships, and social trust. Social trust is low among those who do not belong to any social group, and increases with membership in one or two groups. But among the hyperactive--those who belong to five or more groups--social trust dips to its lowest level (27% trustful). We suspect that further analyses can isolate the characteristics of the hyperactive and provide an explanation for these results.

In summary, our findings suggest that social modernization in Vietnam is affecting the pattern of social relations among the public. Although the traditional orientations toward family and community remain, modernization is broadening social networks. In addition, perhaps as the residue of the political mobilization of the past, the levels of social capital and social trust are relatively high among the Vietnamese public, especially in comparison to nations at the same level of economic development.
Family Relations and Authority Patterns

The importance of family is a historic aspect of Vietnamese society, as with many Confucian societies in East Asia. The family is a basis of economic organization in an agrarian economy, the role of the father and parents in general is reinforced by cultural traditions, and family relations provide a general model for authority relations (Pham 1999; Pye 1985). Through history and changes in political and social regimes, the centrality of the family appears to be an enduring feature of Vietnamese society.

Even though such patterns are widely cited in the literature on Vietnam, there is limited empirical research on family relations and attitudes toward the family. Thus the World Values Survey provides a valuable opportunity to systematically examine public opinion on this aspect of social life. For example, one question asked about the importance of several life domains. The family is ranked as "very important" by 82% of the Vietnamese; this is roughly comparable to the other East Asian nations in the 1995-98 World Values Survey: China (77%), Taiwan (77%), Korea (90%), and Japan (91%). Another survey question shows that most respondents (88%) think a greater emphasis on family life would be a good thing. The centrality of the family in social life and social relations is apparent throughout our survey.

However, to go beyond general impressions of the importance of family life the survey probed deeper into the values attached to family and parents, and how these orientations are translated into authority relations more generally. The Vietnamese believe in filial piety (hieu de) as the children's duty toward their parents. Traditions of ancestor worship and the acceptance of patrilineal authority further deepened the importance of the family as basis for social life. Thus, we find that almost all respondents (99%) say that parents are to be respected regardless of their qualities and faults. In another question, 97% state that "one of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud." Indeed, even in comparison to other East Asian nations in the 1995-98 WVS, Vietnam ranks the highest on respect for parents (see Figure 2). At the same time, 87% of Vietnamese say that it is the "parents' duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being."7

A common question throughout East Asia asks how social modernization might interact with the traditional importance of the family, and the images of hierarchical (and paternalistic) authority that this implies. Exposure to outside media, the pressures of contemporary economics, and other social forces are generally seen as eroding the traditional role of the family in nations across the globe, as well as East Asia.

A series of correlational analyses (not shown), suggest that social modernization has a complex relationship to family attitudes in Vietnam. Much as we observed for activity in social networks, the ascribed importance of the family actually is higher among the better-educated and higher income Vietnamese, and there is no erosion of these sentiments among the young. However, other patterns in these data suggest that the content of family relations may change--if not the importance of these relationships. The "strongest" measure of commitment to the parental family structure is the belief that parents have a duty to their children; these sentiments are significantly less common among the better-educated and younger Vietnamese. For instance, the percentage saying parents should have a life of their own rises from 4.5% among those over age 60 to 14.2% among those younger than age 30.
Changing family relations also have the potential impact to shape other social and political relationships that may have developed to reflect the hierarchical structures of the family. We find, for example, that those who believe it is a parent's duty to sacrifice for their children are slightly more likely to approve of respect for authority (81%) than those who think parents should live their own lives (73%). Similarly, the former are more likely to believe that parents should emphasize obedience in raising children (57%) compared to the latter group (45%). In addition, a belief in parental duty is strongly related to social trust ($taub=.12$). This final relationship occurs, perhaps, because a belief in parental duty and the importance of family may be linked to a view that social relationships should also be family based, and one can trust those within the family network (e.g., Pye 1985: 80). In contrast, those who are less centered on family relations may also be more cautious about the larger social network in which interactions will occur.

In summary, with continued social modernization these trends may gradually erode the authority structure of family relations, even while the social importance of family may prove more durable. And as a consequence, other aspects of Vietnamese society and politics that are connected to family authority patterns may also change.

**Gender Relations**

Another element of family life concerns the role of women in Vietnamese society. Although there is some archeological evidence that early Vietnamese tribal society was matrilineal and matrilocal, this changed with the Chinese colonization (Frenier and Mancini 1996). When Chinese warlords conquered and annexed Vietnam in 111 B.C., Chinese culture began to force itself into Vietnam,
including Confucian teachings. Many Chinese traditions of restricting women’s roles were adopted within Vietnamese society. In a classic study of Vietnamese culture, Dao Duy Anh (1938/1998) characterized the roles of the Vietnamese women in the 1930s as quite limited. Vietnamese folklore and literature also stereotype the women’s roles and place in the society: Chastity was prized; marriages were arranged; a married woman had to serve her husband and his family by maintaining housework; women ought to bear children because such is their duties (Cong Huyen Ton Nu 1973).

As Vietnamese society modernizes, it is expected that differences in gender roles will narrow. Communist ideology as well as the Laws on Marriage and the Family have attempted to promote gender equality within Vietnamese society (Pham 1999). Especially during the recent years of economic reform, women have made up a vital portion of the labor force, from agriculture to the business sector. The 1999 Census indicates that women constitute the majority of the labor force in the rural (72%) and urban areas (56%) (Central Census Steering Committee 2000). The gap between the male and female proportion of the labor force is also narrowing within the younger generations. This trend is probably due to more men shifting toward the private sector after doi moi or the closing gap in gender in education (Central Census Steering Committee 2000). For instance, in the year 1997-98, the ratio of female to male students in college was 44 percent for public and 48 percent for private universities (Pham Xuan Nam 2001).

The WVS examined gender attitudes in several areas. Several questions focused on support for a traditional role for women. For instance, a plurality (48%) believes that a man has more right to a job when employment is scarce. At the same time, a large majority claim that a woman needs to have children in order to fulfill her role (86%); however, only 16% approve of a woman being single parent. Furthermore, being a housewife is seen as just as fulfilling as working for pay (86%). Indeed, the Census finds that 50% of the urban women who were economically inactive described themselves as carrying out home duties (Central Census Steering Committee 2000). On the other hand, nearly all Vietnamese (97%) think that both husband and wife should contribute to the household income. This finding reflects somewhat the push for gender equality in the socialist regime. However, more women entering the work force does not mean their home duties are alleviated; rather, many women carry double responsibilities because they not only earn a living from work but also fulfill their traditional roles as a mother and a wife at home (Gammeltoft 1999; Trinh Minh-ha 1992).

These attitudes are not limited to Vietnam. Adherence to a traditional role for women is also common among East Asian nations based on the 1995-98 WVS. For example, a significant number of people believe that men have more right to a job than women in Japan (33%), South Korea (43%), China (42%), and Taiwan (52%). Meanwhile, the need for both spouses’ contribution to the household incomes is perceived highly in Japan (59%), South Korea (79%), China (89%), and Taiwan (90%). These sentiments reflect in part economic needs that push both spouses into the work force in both developed and developing East Asian countries.

Although the Vietnamese are more likely to think that a woman needs to have children, the majority in other East Asian nations share these views: Taiwan (52%), China (67%), to Japan (72%) and South Korea (72%). On the same note, approval of women as single parents is still low in these nations, while belief that being a fulfilling role remains common.8

Another aspect of gender roles involves politics. The majority of Vietnamese WVS respondents say that men are better politicians (56%). These biases in opinions also appear in the composition of political elites. For the term 1997-2002, for example, only 118 out of the 450
Congress representatives (26%) are women. Female local officials for the term 1999-2004 are still scant with 23% at the provincial level, 21% at the district level, and only 16% at the ward level (Pham Xuan Nam 2001). Several communist nations of Eastern Europe had a quota on women’s representation, but there is not yet such quota in the Vietnamese political system.

Despite the conservative outlooks on women’s roles in the Vietnamese society, the WVS also found strong rejection of the statement that education is more important for boys than for girls (76%), compared to 63% in Japan, 63% in South Korea, 76% in China, and 78% in Taiwan. This may reflect the high value attributed to education by social norms in East Asian nations, which transcend gender lines. Yet, recent Vietnamese census results still show a significantly higher proportion of females are literate or hold only a general level of education, and the number of females without an education is nearly twice that of males (Central Census Steering Committee 2000). In short, gender equality in education falls short of social norms in Vietnam.

We speculated that social modernization may attenuate support for a traditional role for women; and we test this hypothesis in Table 2. Education is clearly related to perceptions of gender relations. Among those with no or little education, for example, up to 54% think that men have more right to a job, and this drops to only 33% among the college-educated (tau-b = -.11). Other relationships in terms of social class, income, and gender are less clear. Age differences are also surprisingly modest; only on issues of the political role of women and education for women are younger Vietnamese distinctly more supportive of women. North/South regional differences are often statistically significant, but their pattern is varied. We suspect that more detailed multivariate analyses, including urban/rural differences and occupational patterns, may underlie some of these regional variations. In general, traditional sentiments toward women’s place in the Vietnamese society remain rigid but tend to soften in some areas among the better-educated and the more affluent.

Table 2. The Relationships between Social Characteristics and Gender Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Men right to job</th>
<th>Women need children</th>
<th>Approve single parent</th>
<th>Women housework</th>
<th>Both spouses contribute</th>
<th>Men better pols.</th>
<th>Educate boys</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>.06*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.09*</td>
<td>-.05*</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.07*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>-.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.09*</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.07*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
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</table>

All table entries are tau-b correlations; the occupation correlation is an eta statistic. Correlations significant at the .05 level are denoted by an asterisk.
Conclusion

Vietnam is a society and political system in the midst of change. While Vietnam's economic development remains limited, the *doi moi* reforms have begun to transform the structure of the Vietnamese economy and social structure. With these reforms have come a steady growth of the private economy, a movement from the countryside into the cities, and growing trade and social exchanges with the rest of the world (Dollar et al. 1998). This article described some of the structural features of contemporary Vietnamese society through the 2001 World Values Survey, and examines how these social forces are affecting the Vietnamese public.

Reflecting the traditions of many other East Asian societies, we find clear evidence of the continuing centrality of the family in Vietnam today. Family ties remain the center of social networks for many individuals, and respect for parents is virtually universal. Our data suggests that social modernization is not so much eroding these traditional family-based networks, but expanding social relations to include other social networks, such as work and social group networks. The better-educated and the young, for example, are more densely connected in a range of social networks including and extending beyond the family. Indeed, one of the striking cross-national patterns is the extensive level of group membership reported by the Vietnamese. Even though scholars remain divided on the social and political implications of these group networks, their importance is likely to increase as a consequence of Vietnam's continuing social modernization. Group membership does not necessarily fit the civil society model found in other developing nations, but the existence of such extensive networks creates such a potential.

The strength of family traditions in Vietnam may also explain attitudes toward gender relations. Despite the economic and social advances that women have made in the past generation, support for full gender equality is still lacking. Most Vietnamese, including both men and women, still ascribe to a traditional role for women: believing that a man has more right to a job and that housework for a wife is just as fulfilling as paid employment. The majority of Vietnamese also say that men are better politicians. Although there is some evidence that social modernization will attenuate these orientations, the evidence of even more limited than for our social network analyses. These patterns may underscore Pham's (1999: ch. 5) conclusions that the concept of gender equality may be difficult to develop in a society that accepts Confucian traditions, the centrality of family, and the associated patterns of authority relations.

The social bases of these attitudes suggest that the continued social modernization of Vietnam will change many of these attitudes and values, albeit in complex ways that do not signal a single pattern of change. For instance, modernization may not diminish the importance of the family social network in absolute terms, but it may stimulate other social connections that begin to rival the influence of family. Moreover, many of the differences in these attitudes across social groups are quite modest, as Vietnam remains a relatively homogeneous society. But the long-term impact of *doi moi* and social modernization may be to increase this diversity, accentuating the trends we have described here.
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Methodological Appendix

The survey was conducted in September-October 2001 using a multi-stage area probability sample with a designated random walk household selection at the last stage. The Institute for Human Studies in Vietnam conducted the project and fieldwork under the direction of Dr. Pham Minh Hac.

In the first stage, we stratified provinces by the eight census regions and selected twenty provinces on a basis proportional to population. Within these provinces 99 districts were randomly selected, and two villages or town were selected from each district. In the final stage there were 200 primary sampling units; within each sampling unit the interviewer conducted a designated "random walk" to select five households. Within each household the interviewer selected the adult with the nearest birthday. The response rate was approximately **xx** percent. The sample consists of 1,000 respondents distributed proportionately throughout Vietnam to be representative of the adult population. In comparison to 1999 census statistics (Central Census Steering Committee. 2000), the survey closely represents the population on several standard demographic measures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Census</th>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Census</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>19.4%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td>13.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Coast</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Highland</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>No education</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong River Delta</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower sec.</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>Upper sec.</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The statistical sampling error of this study is approximately 3 to 4 percent. This means that national percentages in this report are likely (95 percent of the time) to be within +/- 4 percent of the actual population percentages. In addition, one should also consider that this was the first application of national probability sampling on a political attitude survey in Vietnam. The Vietnamese population also is unfamiliar with the survey methodology, and some respondents may feel hesitant to express their opinions fully. So it is possible that non-sampling errors are also present in these data even though the Institute for Human Studies expressed their willingness to take extraordinary care to follow scientific procedures.

Additional information on the Vietnamese survey, the English and Vietnamese language questionnaires, sampling design, and information on the World Values Survey project is available on our project website: [www.democ.uci.edu/democ/archive/vietnam.htm](http://www.democ.uci.edu/democ/archive/vietnam.htm)

2/10/02
References


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Endnotes

We would like to thank Ronald Inglehart and the Institute for Future Studies in Sweden for their support of the Vietnamese survey. We also gratefully acknowledge Dorothy Solinger's advice on the interpretation of some of our findings.

1 The question wording is: "I’m going to ask how often you do various things. For each activity, would you say you do them every week or nearly every week; once or twice a month; only a few times a year; or not at all? Spend time with a) parents or other relatives, b) with friends, c) socially with colleagues from work or your profession, d) with people at your church, mosque or synagogue, or e) socially with people at sports clubs or voluntary or service organization.

2 The family is cited as a weekly activity by 90% of the Chinese, 50% of the Philippine sample, and 49% of the Japanese respondents.

3 We should also note that membership in a group does not mean that all members are actively participating in group activities. In Vietnam and the other WVS nations it is common for only about 10 percent of group members to describe themselves as active participants.

4 For example, there is a significant positive relationship between age and group membership in Japan (.19) and the United States (.07).

5 The question wording is as follows: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?"

6 The percent who said other life domains were very important is as follows: work (57%), politics (39%), friends (22%), religion (10%), and leisure (7%).

7 The question wording is as follows: "Which of the following statements best describes your views about parents’ responsibilities to their children: a) Parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being, b) Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children, or c) Neither?"

8 Approval of single parenthood is low in China (6%), Taiwan (11%), Japan (17%) and South Korea (31%); while that a housewife is a fulfilling role is common: China (69%), South Korea (89%), Taiwan (86%), and Japan (90%).