Explaining People's Participation in Public Demonstrations: the Case of the Latin American Democracies

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Abstract

In recent years the world has seen an unexpected emergence of massive social movement activity in non-Western countries. Two of those cases took place in Latin America, where the Chilean Student movement of 2011 and the Confederations Cup mobilizations in Brazil in 2013 managed to trigger the larger protests in both countries in more than two decades. Considering both cases, this paper observes at the variations of individual-level characteristics that explain differential recruitment as a consequence of those important changes in social movement activity. For that, this paper looks at the personal characteristics that are significant for engaging in protest events before and after the massive mobilizations. The findings show that before the unexpected waves of protest happened, each country had a unique combination of variables accounting for differential recruitment. However, after the protests took place, there was a convergence in terms of the relevance of biographical availability measures, specifically age and marital status, along with educational levels and personal levels of interest in politics.

Introduction

In the last 5 years the world has witnessed the emergence of unusual movements of protests in different countries. The Arab Spring and the Chilean Student

Movement in 2011, as well as the Taksim Square movement in Turkey or the protests in Brazil during the Confederations Cup in 2013, surprised the world because of their abruptness and massiveness. While all of these unexpected waves of protest sparked from small events that triggered subsequent mobilization, they are different in nature. On the one hand, the protests in the Arab countries and Turkey ultimately questioned the nature of their state regimes and claimed for more democratic spaces, if not an entire state revolution. On the other hand, the movements in Chile and Brazil focused on criticizing state policies and denouncing the stark inequalities of their societies.

These unexpected waves of violence had the potential to bring to the streets larger numbers of protesters than in a regular year. For that reason, I think this kind of massive and unforeseen protests represents an opportunity for understanding changes in individual-level characteristics that contribute to differential recruitment. That is, I argue that these massive demonstrations can change the profile or the invidivual-level characteristics of the average activist. Considering especially the protests of Brazil and Chile, which happened in democratic contexts, I explore in this paper if the massive protests had the potential to modify the individual conditions for protest. The salience of contextual risk factors affect the dynamics of mobilization (McAdam 1986), and I argue that the large numbers of these protests and the majoritarian support they garnered decreased the risks and costs for participation, as well as they increased the chances for people to weigh in.

Research accounting for individual protest participation has achieved some important developments. Different scholars have identified the relevance of interpersonal networks (Diani 2013), participation in organizations (McAdam 1986),

the access to resources (Edwards and Gilham 2013), the role of grievances (Snow 2013), contextual political opportunities (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), among others. While this body of research usually follows a more qualitative perspective, there are some examples that observe general patterns of individual-level characteristics across the population (Schussman and Soule 2005). These studies have identified the validity of biographical availability arguments, political engagement, structural availability, as well as other conditions explaining why people engage in social movement protest.

However, most of this research serves mostly the U.S. or the European experiences, leaving other global regions out of the analyses. Moreover, scholars frequently observe participation in protest for one period in time. For example, they select cases that described an important protest activity (Verhust and Walgrave 2009), but they have not observed if unusual waves of activism have the potential to change what if individual-level conditions for protest change compared to a normal year, and if they do, how.

For that reason, considering the opportunities generated by the unexpected and massive waves of protest, as well as the gap in the literature, the research question guiding this article asks if those waves of protest can modify the individual-level characteristics that explain people's participation in social movement demonstrations. To address this question I considered the cases of Brazil and Chile because, as I already mentioned, both cases happened in comparatively similar democratic environments and advocated mainly for policy changes. Additionally, the

availability of data enables me to test the same model for these two countries, allowing for within and cross-case comparisons.

Conditions Explaining Differential Recruitment

Biographical Availability

The biographical availability approach considers that life cycle matters in order to explain why people engage in social movement activity. According to this perspective, the combination of certain conditions in a person's life gives him or her more leeway or autonomy to participate in a social movement depending also on the associated risks and costs of participation (Beyerlein and Berstrand 2013). The literature documents the relevance of age, marital status, employment situation, and gender, but renders inconsistent effects across cases and contexts.

McAdam (1986) finds that having a full-time job or family responsibilities increases a person's responsibilities and makes them less available for protest participation. Considering marital status and parenthood, Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) find a negative relation between protest participation and being married and having kids. Nonetheless, Corrigall-Brown et al (2009) find that having children and being married have a positive effect on differential recruitment, while Barkan et al (1995) find a neutral relation.

When it comes to age, Schussman and Soule (2005) found that younger people are more likely to participate in social movement activity, while Beyerlein and Hipp (2009) actually found a curvilinear relation in this matter. That is, younger and older

cohorts were freed from more obligations than middle-aged adults, participating at higher rates in social movement activity.

Therefore, there is inconclusive with regards to the effects of marital status, employment, or age. However, according to some authors (Schussman and Soule 2005, Barkan and Cohn 2013), future steps in biographical availability should test its suitability on large and representative samples of people, and predict the factors that become salient at explaining their participation in protest events. Considering the original approach that a combination of factors release people from obligations making them more available, I would hypothesize that young, single and unemployed people would be more likely to participate.

Political Awareness

Political attitudes are another mechanism that explains how people's initial support translates into actual participation. Within this framework, different factors facilitate that transition between being a sympathizer to becoming an activist. Personal political ideologies is one of those factors, and at the origins of this variable is the idea that individuals will tend to participate in those organizations or social movements with similar political or ideological tendencies. Addressing the U.S. experience, scholars have found that liberals tend to participate more actively in social protest (Dalton et al 2010, Hirsch 1990). According to Dalton (2002), part of the logic for this pattern is that liberals usually challenge conventional politics and attempt to go beyond the traditional channels of political communication as a way to express their standings. However, the recent emergence of conservative and religious

political groups, such as the Tea Party in the US or the anti-immigration movements in Germany, raise questions about this liberal predominance in social protest. For that reason, in this research I will also test the relevance of personal ideologies in motivating people to protest.

The other part of the argument on political awareness relates to a general sense of interest in politics (Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1995). That is, people who are more informed about politics and who are eventually more aware of the political context will be more likely to participate. This idea goes in line with Putnam's (2000) statement that people's interest in politics is one of the preconditions for more active ways of civic and political participation. Additionally, a feeling of efficacy also contributes to participate in social movement activity, as it makes subjectively more likely the achievement of the desired goal (Gecas 2000, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

Given the availability of data, in this paper I will test the influence of personal ideological beliefs and interest in politics as a way to account for this dimension of differential recruitment. In spite of not having a measure for personal efficacy, I will test an additional variable to enrich the discussion about political awareness. The two cases included in this analysis have a diverse multiparty system organized across ideological axes, but protestors denounced mainstream politicians when they massively turned into the streets. However, political parties also have a grasp at the grassroots level and may still influence the people who identify with one of them. Therefore, I will also test the influence of personal identification with a political party as a determinant for protest participation.

Resource Mobilization

The literature also points at the possession of resources to activate individuals into activists. That is, different kind of resources can be channeled into contexts of activism making some individuals more likely to protest than others (Snow and Soule 2010). Research usually identifies three different kinds of resources as central for differential recruitment: money, education and interpersonal ties or membership to organizations.

Research has identified income as an important predictor for mobilization (Corrigall-Brown 2013) since more affluent individuals are less sensitive to the opportunity cost of allocating their free time to protest. Also, money is fungible for other resources that can release from responsibilities or favor the conditions of those individuals who are susceptible for recruitment.

Education is a less tangible resource but equally important at estimating a person's chance for participation. For example, Wilkes (2004) finds a positive relation between educational levels and probabilities to protest. More educated people have more tools to analyze their context and to know where to direct their grievances or goals.

Income and educational attainment are important components of socioeconomic status (SES). Putnam (2000) and Verba et al (1995) have found a positive relation between SES and different forms of participation, ranging from more traditional political engagement to memberships in civic associations and social movements. That higher participation in organizations creates more interpersonal

ties that may be activated to motivate individuals to join a social movement (McAdam 1986, Barkan and Cohn 2013). Being a member of an organization enables individuals to access a network of people that may reinforce callings for protest activity, either by a direct influence on the individual by a personal invitation to protest (Schussman and Soule 2005), or by coercing participation by different rationales (Snow and Soule 2010). Regardless of the particular motivation placed on the individual, this literature shows the relevance of participating in organizations as a way to build interpersonal networks and have higher probabilities to participate in protest events. In consequence, I expect more affluent, educated, and organizationally active individuals to be more likely to join a public demonstration.

Costs and Risks of Participation

Related to the idea of differential recruitment, the incorporation of costs and risks of participation influences people's decision to participate in a social movement. Original assertions of recruitment based on a rational choice approach (Olson 1965) realize the judgments individuals make in terms of realizing potential losses or contextual dangers associated with protesting. Departing from a strict rational perspective, the presence of costs and risks remains as an important one in the literature.

Both terms are analytically different. We can define risks as an anticipated danger associated with the participation in a social movement (McAdam 1986). As Snow and Soule (2010) point out, risks can be direct or indirect. The former refers to the immediate threats an activist can experience at the movement of his or her

participation (e.g. police repression), while the latter are those potential threats derived from participating in the movement but that are not experienced in the place and time of the collective action (e.g. surveillance). Certainly, the perception of risk is contextual, as some polities are more repressive or welcoming to participation than others. Something similar happens with the costs of participation, which refer to the use of resources (time, money, energy, etc.) required to participate in a social movement. While the direct costs of participation deal with the resources an individual spends at participating in a movement (travel expenses, time), the indirect costs consider the opportunity cost of being part of a mobilization, as well as other less tangible costs such as social stigmatization.

Research on this field addresses the combination of different levels of risk and cost associated to social movement activity, along with their impact on differential recruitment. For example, McAdam (1986) shows that individuals in the Freedom Summer Project faced high risks and costs of participation, and those who participated actually did it after being exposed to a gradual process of integration and resocialization, which evidenced strong interpersonal ties. In a different study, Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) observe that biographical availability was more important for high-cost, while value commitments were more important for high-risk activism. Tindall 2002 departs for the low-high dichotomy and introduces a more nuanced low–medium risk/cost activism. According to the author, people's participation in those kinds of protests had more to do with the presence of weak ties to other activists and not so much with reintegration and socialization.

Considering this nuance introduced by Tindall, I argue that the massive protests that occurred in Brazil and Chile had low-medium costs and risks. In terms of costs, the protests demanded intensive participation during a few hours and in certain days of the month. The protests did not request an intense and long-lasting commitment to an organization, and the protest did not impede activists to join in other personal activities throughout the day. Additionally, most of the protest took place in urban and densely populated areas, which are favoring conditions for people to access more rapidly into rallies and marches. In terms of risk, both cases of protest faced police repression, which at times was totally disproportionate. However, those actions of severe repression affected only a small fraction of the protesters. For example, in June 17th of 2013 more than one hundred thousand people marched in Rio de Janeiro, and just 10 of them reported injuries caused by the police action[1]. The case of Chile is similar, as in June 30th of 2011 eighty to two hundred thousand people marched in Santiago, but the police detained only 38 activists[2]. Therefore, I argue that the big numbers of activists gathered in Brazilian and Chilean cities decreased the risks of participating in protests since the presence of more adherents made it more unlikely to be the target of disproportionate repression or imprisonment.

The cases

[1] http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2013/06/1296922-no-rio-3-foram-baleados-durante-protesto-10-seguem-internados.shtml

[2] http://www.lanacion.cl/intendencia-no-autorizara-mas-marchas-en-la-alameda/noticias/2011-06-30/184921.html

In this section I narrate the main trajectories and developments of the Chilean and Brazilian social movements. For that I start by presenting the scenario before the massive protests showing the economic, social and political situation for each country, and then I introduce the circumstances in which each social protest took place. In general, we can observe the following features of the selected cases. First, they happened in a stable context where they did not seem likely to happen. Second, they describe a rapid growth and gained an important public opinion support. Third, activists were active in several cities in each country. Finally, both movements became resonance boxes for several groups that were no part of the initial group of protesters, and that expanded the organizational and social base of the movement.

Chile 2010-2012

Historically, the Chilean population has had an important participation in social movements. Prior to the protest events that took place in 2011, the most important and massive demonstrations happened during the 1980s. Back then, great protests took place along the country claiming for the end of the dictatorship and the advent of democracy. However, after the democratic restoration in 1990 the participation in social movement decreased as well as the membership in grassroots organizations was relatively low (UNDP 2008). People still mobilized during those years, but protests never reached a national scope again. High school and university students managed to interrupt that inertia by calling to massive rallies and protests in 2006. Between April and June of that year hundreds of thousands of students protested advocating for the strengthening of the public education system in different Chilean

cities. These public demonstrations garnered media attention, but they shrank after the government provided an institutional solution to the movement goals. People's mobilization after 2006 remained comparatively low and steady as the years before.

In 2010 the political and social scenario remained calmed. That year a new center-right coalition won the ballotage after 20 years of Concertación's (certer-left coalition) governments. Regardless of that significant political change, where were not special alterations to the social, political and economic scenario during that year. For example, most of the political agenda focused on the setting-up of the new coalition in the government, as well as the reconstruction tasks caused by the earthquake that hit the country in February. The country's economy was expanding after a year of economic contraction caused by 2009 international crisis. Inflation was over control and the economy started generating new jobs after the short economic contraction.

The levels of social protest were not particularly high compared to the preceding years. With the exception of an environmental protest that took place in August of 2010 with most of its protesters in the capital, there were not other significant marches or demonstrations. This does not mean that other protests or rallies did not take place in the country after 2006 at the grassroots level. For example, different groups conduct ritualized marches such as the labor, the student, the indigenous or the sexual minorities movements. However, they were not as massive as those of 2006, were not steady or sustained throughout the year, and did not reach presence at the national level.

This situation changed in 2011, where different local and national level mobilizations caught the political agenda and the media attention. There was a

notorious increment in the frequency and participation of protests and marches within the country (Segovia and Gamboa, 2012). For example, just in Santiago's Metropolitan region the number of authorized marches went from 134 in 2010 to 240 in 2011. According to the Ministry of Interior information, an approximate number of 6000 protests and/or marches took place that year in the country, estimating the total number of participants in two millions. That is a significant figure in absolute and relative terms, considering that Chile's population reaches seventeen million people.

The major force driving protests in 2011 was the student movement, which conducted the largest protests since the democratic restoration in 1990. The main actors behind the movement were CONFECH, a national level organization grouping student councils from the oldest Chilean universities, along with other organizations created by high school students. The goals of the movement were pretty succinct: free education, ban profit-seeking practices from the educational system, democratization, put an end to the students' debt crisis, financial sustainability and equal access to education (CONFECH 2011). The movement claimed for a structural reform of the Chilean education system, and denounced both the government and the political opposition for their lack of commitment to provide a better education for the country.

The student movement was active in several cities along the country and attracted an important and majoritarian support from the population according to different surveys (Adimark 2011). Part of this support was the consequence of a disproportionate use of force by the police (such as in the August 9th protests), the incapacity of the government to deal with the crisis, but also by the ability of the movement leaders to frame their demands as a social imperative based in the deep

inequalities of Chilean society. Most observers noticed that most of the protesters were high school and university students. However, media coverage and other observers reported how adults and the elderly also favored the protests. In fact, that support also made people from older age groups to join the demonstrations.

The government's erratic management of the situation enabled protesters to maintain their activities over seven months. During that time different guilds and unions adhered or supported the students' goals, such the national union of workers, the union of teachers, among others. This expansion of social support also correlated with an expansion of goals as well. For example, although the movement had a defined core of demands, different allied groups participating in the protests also advocated for carrying out important constitutional reforms[3] while others even called for a constitutional assembly.

The students were particularly active between June and September. After that the movement managed to be incorporated in the negotiations for the 2012 national budget. By December the academic year was reaching its end and the last protest, very small in numbers, took place.

The other national protest that year was an environmental march called by different local and national organizations against a hydroelectric project in the south of the country. During the month of May, which was crucial for the future of the project, the organizers called for demonstrations in 25 Chilean cities[4]. However, this

[3] http://www.latercera.com/noticia/educacion/2011/06/657-372741-9-secundarios-entregaran-petitorio-al-subsecretario-de-educacion.shtml

[4] http://www.latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2011/05/680-366447-9-convocan-a-marchas-en-25-ciudades-contra-hidroaysen-para-el-21-de-mayo.shtml

movement was not successful at deploying other massive and consistent demonstrations during the rest of the year.

At the local level other kinds of unusual protest occurred during this year. In January people from Punta Arenas, in Chilean Patagonia, protested against the end of governmental oil subsidies. After almost a month of protests and other public demonstrations, national and local authorities solved the conflict. Between June and August local protests took place in Calama, in the north of Chile, where its inhabitants advocated keeping higher revenues from local mining activities.

As this case represents, Chile experienced important protest events in all its major cities during 2011, and in many of them those public demonstrations took place several times throughout the year. Also, and specifically addressing the student mobilizations, the movement was capable of widening its social base of support by including more demands and gaining the sympathy of most of Chilean society. Therefore, the probabilities of participating in the movement also increased, either by the influence of interpersonal networks or organizational affinities, as well as by the extension of the movement goals.

Brazil 2012-2014

Just like in Chile, the raise of people's protest was unexpected and massive. However, before the big marches and demonstrations happened and for the last 20 years, the Brazilian political, economical and social environment remained quite stable. Brazil experienced an important economic development since 2003, which was

momentarily interrupted by the effects of the international economic crisis of 2009. However, that crisis did not stop Brazil's economic growth in the subsequent years. By 2012 the economy kept developing although it started showing signs of stagnation and loosing part of its dynamism.

That economic boost, complemented by comprehensive social programs such as *Bolsa Família*, had enabled 38 million of Brazilians to leave poverty and other 40 million to become, statistically speaking, members of the Brazilian middle class in the last decade (Sweet 2014). The PT social programs did not just reduced poverty, but also had deep impacts in Brazilian society. For example, compared to the beginnings of the PT governments in 2003 the national inequality had decreased (Lustig et al 2013), and other sensible areas such as education and health indicators also improved (Castineira et al 2009, Sweet 2014). President Rouseff continued these policies and complemented them by creating two new programs expanding public housing projects and house equipment.

The Brazilian political system also described a tendency towards continuity before the protest. From 2003 the Workers Party (PT) had uninterruptedly governed the country and President Dilma Rousseff won the second round of elections for her first term in 2010 with a 56% of the votes. The political discussion at that time focused on the internal struggles in the ruling coalition and important corruption accusations that emerged in 2012. The most important of them, the "*Mensalão*" involved leaders of the PT and other parties belonging to the ruling coalition. This scandal was institutionally channeled by the Justice system and attracted media and public opinion attention. Despite the relevance this event had in Brazilian politics, it

did not significantly hit the popular of support for the PT (Melo and Santos 2013) or the president (Datafolha 2013).

Therefore, the economical, social and political scenarios seemed promising or at least within "normal" boundaries by 2013. The long lasting stark social disparities and segregation (Friendly 2013) was still a feature in Brazilian society and other important movements such as the Landless Workers (MST) maintained their activism. Nonetheless, before the massive protests of 2013 started there was not an obvious juncture triggering a change in people's likelihood to protest.

By 2013 the tensions generated by the expensive infrastructure investments required for organizing the Confederations Cup, the World Cup and the Olympic Games started to emerge. The abundant use of public resources for those improvements along with other social consequences such as the dislocation of communities (Zimbalist 2011) were important parts of those debates. However, the spark of the protest came from a different source. On early June 2013 the Free Fare Movement (hereafter MPL), a loosely federated group advocating for a better public transportation system in different Brazilian cities (Keck 2013), protested against a 7% increase in the fares of Sao Paulo's the metro and bus system. That hike represented an especially important burden for the working poor (Sweet 2014).

The initial protest conducted by the movement started growing and attracting media attention. Observers noticed that the bulk of those protesters were students and activists with a very defined goal. As the protests slowly grew in numbers, they also faced the military police's disproportionate use of force, which in turn increased people's sympathy for the movement. If by June 13th there were hundredths of

thousands of protesters across the nation, by the end of the month millions of Brazilians were in the streets (Saad-Filho 2013).

As the protests became more popular, it also did the demands of the participants. Now there was a wide range of interests represented in the streets, going from the original claims for a better public transportation system, to criticisms for the international games taking place in the country, the government, corruption, etc., to the promotion of sexual minority rights, abortion or constitutional amendments (Saad-Filho 2013). Different observers also noticed that now the protesters had also changed, identifying more "middle class" (Mische 2013) activists in the streets. In fact, different surveys showed that most of the protesters were financially more secure than the average Brazilian citizen (Sweet 2014).

An important group of the protesters denounced the Brazilian institutional political system and declared themselves apartisan (Mische 2013). This does not mean that all protestors were alienated from political parties. As Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2014) show, the activists felt actually more identified with parties located at the left of the PT and most mainstream organizations. The lack of sympathy for mainstream parties Clashes and additional tensions within the movement started when some PT and other mainstream party members protested along with the rest of movement.

By the end of June the government, which seemed surprised and paralyzed by the protests, met with the MPL leaders and agreed on giving an institutional solution to the movement demands. By July the movement as a whole declined. The MPL was

not organizing marches anymore, the movement splintered into different groups according to their own interests and the number of protestors decreased.

Data and Methods

Most research explaining people's participation in protest events relies on case study approaches (Schussman and Soule 2005, Somma YEAR), or in a quantitative approach but usually following a single national case. In this case, I test different conditions explaining people's participation in protest in for two cases in four different contexts. I ran the model for Brazil and Chile a few months before and after they experienced the large social protests that were unusual to their recent history of social movement activity.

The data used in this paper comes from the Latin American Public Opinion Survey (hereafter LAPOP) for the years 2010, 2012 and 2014. LAPOP is a nationally representative survey, polling individuals in 23 countries of the Americas through personal interviews. The surveys cover both urban and rural areas and selects non-institutionalized voting-age adults within each country. This research only includes the cases of Brazil and Chile. The sample size for the former was 1,500 observations for 2012 and 2014, while the sample size for the latter was 1,965 for 2010 and 1,571 for 2012. Therefore, the Chilean observations were weighted to 1,500 observations as a way to have comparable results with Brazil.

Dependent variable

The independent variable in the model is the individuals' self-declared participation in a protest or a public demonstration in the last twelve months from the moment of the survey. As this is a dummy variable coded as 1 if respondents declared their participation in a protest, and 0 otherwise. The percent of respondents in the sample who declared participating in a social movement for each country and year is the following:

Table 1. Sample Participation in Protests and Public Demonstrations (in percentages)

	Chile 2010	Chile 2012	Brazil 2012	Brazil 2014
Participation in Protests	3.7%	9.1%	4.5%	7.7%

Independent Variables

Biographical Availability

Arguments on biographical availability reflect the individual's leeway to participate in a social movement by virtue of their relatively lighter responsibilities. Observing some of the most salient dimensions on this theory tested by other research (Nepstad and Smith 1999, McAdam 1998, Schussman and Soule 2005, among others), and the accessibility of appropriate indicators, I selected three variables from this perspective. The first one is age, which is a continuous variable ranging from 16 to 101. The second one is marital status, a dichotomous variable dividing respondents between being single (reference category) or being married or in a legalized partnership. The last one is employment, which is also a dichotomous variable categorizing respondents between those having a job (full-time or part-time) and those who does not (reference category).

Resource Mobilization

This approach considers that the ability to channel or use certain resources can improve an individual's likelihood to participate in a social movement. Verba et al (1995) identified socioeconomic status as a key variable explaining why people participate in social movements and traditional political activities such as voting. I use two different variables to account for that concept. The first one is income, which has been pointed out as a key element explaining differential recruitment (Corrigal-Brown 2013). This is an ordinal variable that ranges individual's earnings into deciles based on the currency and income distribution of each country. The second one is education (Wilkes 2004), which is an ordinal variable considering how many years of schooling an individual completed. The last one is people's participation in organizations, which is an additive variable that considers if individuals participate in meetings of one of the following activities or organizations at least once or twice a year: community organizing, religious groups, parents' associations at school, community improvement or a political party.

Political Engagement

There is a cognitive and evaluative dimension of protest participation that relates to how individuals assess their environments and foresee the consequences of their engagement in social movement activity. Previous research has considered the relevance of of political interest (Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1995), the access to information, and the sense of political efficacy and receptive political attitudes (Paulsen 1991, McAdam 1988) when individuals engage into protest.

However, as Dalton (2002) and Schussman and Soule (2005) argue, there are other conditions that may also influence people's participation in protests such as their ideological standing, being liberals more likely to participate in social movements. In an additional note, literature on Latin American democracies shows how there is an important trust gap between citizens and different political institutions (political parties, the National Congress, the justice system, etc.) that may also influence people's decision to go to the streets. Considering the explosive growth in numbers of the protests in the two analyzed cases, as well as the antipartisan attitude of the protesters reported by different observers, as well as the institutional gaps documented in the region, in this analysis I include four different variables: interest in politics, identification with a political party, personal ideological affinity, and trust in political institutions. The latter is a latent variable constructed after the standardized merge of six observed variables. It captures people's trust on the following political institutions of a country: the justice system, the National Congress, the national government, the political parties, the President and the municipal government. They all share the same initial wording, which is "to what extent do you trust the (institution)." This variable is coded from lower to higher levels of trust. Table 2 reports the factor loadings and consistency scores for this variable.

Table 2. Factor and Cronbach's Alpha Levels+

	Chile 2010		Chile 2012		Brazil 2012		Brazil 2014	
	Factor	Alpha	Factor	Alpha	Factor	Alpha	Factor	Alpha
Political Trust	2.01	0.78	2.34	0.82	2.05	0.78	1.84	0.79

+These latent variables were standardized around a mean value approximate to 0 and +- one standard deviation.

Grievances

Grievances are pervasive to every society (Snow 2013), but as such, they are a necessary but not sufficient condition to stir a person's participation in a social movement. However, the perception of experiencing a situation that threatens to worsen life conditions or to disrupt taken for granted activities, along with comparison and subjective processes, are important to increase a person's motivation to join a social movement. Therefore, considering that the two cases in this study recently went trough a year of economic contraction and that there is a tendency towards economic stagnation, I included a variable accounting for economic safety. This variable is the respondents' answer to the question if their economic conditions have changed in the last twelve months.

Data Analysis: Variation in Protest Participation

As the review of each case exposed, there are multiple factors that explained why the protests in each country emerged and grew, such as leadership skills, framing, repression, etc. However, these massive protests also lowered the costs of participation at the individual level and changed the profile of the average person participating in protests and demonstrations. Table 2 reports the results of the logistical regressions conducted in each country before and after the massive and national-level demonstrations happened.

Table 3. Logistic Regression Analyses Predicting Participation in Protest Events

	Chile 2010	Chile 2012	Brazil 2012	Brazil 2014
Political Engagement				
Political Trust	**.607***	**.383*****	.804	.751
	(.138)	(.068)	(.155)	(.126)
Interest in Politics	**1.765****	**1.359***	**1.977*****	**1.379****
	(.330)	(.197)	(.295)	(.162)
Ideology	1.023	**1.222*****	1.045	1.054
	(.056)	(.065)	(.051)	(.048)
Partisan Identity	**2.315***	1.148	.979	1.383
	(.866)	(.362)	(.290)	(.351)
Grievances				
Financial Strain	1.008	.924	1.048	1.039
	(.284)	(.207)	(.204)	(.158)
Resource Mobilization				
Income	1.047	.924	1.030	.988
	(.074)	(.040)	(.042)	(.029)
Organizations	**1.435****	1.165	**1.486*****	**1.515*****
	(.189)	(.127)	(.166)	(.135)
Education	1.015	**1.236****	1.076	**1.181*****
	(.067)	(.076)	(.050)	(.043)
Biographical Availability				
Age	**.943*****	**.962*****	.980	**.968****
	(.013)	(.009)	(.011)	(.009)
Marital Status	.842	**.498****	.585	**.539****
	(.258)	(.119)	(.169)	(.127)
Employment	1.022	1.246	.648	.837
	(.336)	(.330)	(.450)	(.202)
Constant	.033	**.011*****	**.001*****	**.014*****
	(.045)	(.011)	(.002)	(.012)
N	1669	1208	1216	1220
Pseudo R2	.1850	.2592	.1223	.1526

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Results in Odd Ratios

The results in Table 3 show the differences in the profile of the average protester before and after the presence of massive mobilization within and across cases.

Addressing the Chilean case first, the data shows that under regular conditions of protest such as the ones for 2010, the variables associated with political engagement describe an important influence. People who have higher levels of trust in the country's political institutions are less likely to protest, while people with higher levels of interest in politics and personally identified with a political party are more inclined to participate in public demonstrations.

The resource mobilization conditions are not so influential as a whole in the model, and just the individuals' participation in organizations has a positive impact with higher levels of mobilization. Something similar happens with the biographical availability approach, where there is a negative tendency between age and protest participation. Contrary to previous research (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006), this tendency is linear which is the same one as described by Schussman and Soule (2005). The linear tendency between age and protest participation remains constant for the three models where this age is significant.

In 2012, the individual-level characteristics of the average protestor in Chile show some changes. Trust in institutions and personal interest in politics remain significant and with the same directionality as in 2010, but know partisan identity is not longer significant and was replaced by personal ideology. That is, more leftist people tended to participate in the protests of 2011.

The resource mobilization segment also showed variations. Participation in organizations stopped being significant and now educational levels are important to explain differential recruitment. That is, more educated people were more likely to engage in social movement activity. The biographical availability variables also varied.

Age maintained its negative influence on the dependent variable, but now also marital status became significant, meaning that single persons were more likely to protest than the married ones.

The case of Brazil also shows variations from one model to the other. In 2012, only two variables in the entire model showed statistical significance. Here, only people who were interested in politics and participated in organizations had more likelihood to participate in protest events.

However, the scenario shows variations after the presence of the big protests and rallies of 2013. By 2014, people who were interested in politics remained more likely to participate in protests, maintaining its role as the sole significant variable of the political engagement section. However, now the resource mobilization and biographical availability groups become more salient. Participation in multiple organizations remains significant, but now also more educated people tend to participate in social movements. The biographical availability acquires more relevance and age and marital status have significant effects. Now younger and single people have higher chances to engage in protest.

Comparing across cases, we can observe that personal interest in politics is the only significant variable for all the four models. Looking at the cases separately, we can observe that Chile and Brazil had different significant conditions explaining differential recruitment in years of regular activism. Nonetheless, after experiencing the massive protests the profile of the average protester changed in both countries, converging into some general patterns. Now younger, single, more educated and more politically aware individuals were more likely to join the protests.

Discussion

The use of a more case-based analysis can provide a deeper understanding of the changes in the variables in the different models. Dealing first with the political engagement variables, we can observe that people's trust in political institutions is consistently a significant variable in Chile before and after the large protests, whereas in Brazil that is not a variable to consider. A potential explanation for this difference is that Chile reports lower levels of institutional corruption (Transparency International), whereas Brazil consistently shows more frequent and widespread corruption scandals (Weyland 1998). Therefore, for Chileans their opinion about political institutions can actually affect their interest for protesting, while for Brazilians institutions would not be a part of that judgment at all.

Something similar happens with the political identities and personal ideologies. Chile has a more institutionalized party system compared to the rest of Latin America (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006), and some groups such as the Communist Party, had an important leverage at the grassroots level. However, as it was noted in the case description for both cases, political affiliations did not seem to be influential along with antipartisan discourse of the largest protest events. In the case of Chile, partisanship was replaced by personal ideologies. In the case of Brazil, partisanship and personal ideology were not influential, which is a finding that goes against what Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2014) found. Finally for this model, people's interest in politics is a significant variable in all models and confirms the results of previous research (Verba et al 1995).

Resource mobilization variables also described some interesting patterns. Membership into different organizations is a distinctive feature of Brazilian protesters, and falls into the argument made by Mische (2008) about the role of people participating in different groups in order to motivate different people to join protest events. Also, the Brazilian protests managed to call diverse organizations to the street, whereas in the Chilean case the students had the leading role and the allied organizations provided a symbolic support but not necessarily file and rank activists.

Measures of SES also show mixed results. Income is not significant in any model, but education becomes important after periods of massive mobilization. This suggests that an absolute understanding of socioeconomic status in terms of higher income and education do not entirely predict participation in protest. The expansion of education may explain why more educated but not necessarily more affluent people participate in the protests.

The biographical availability variables show how age is an important predictor of differential recruitment. As it was already mentioned, there was a linear relation between age and participation in social protest for the three models where this variable was significant. This means that at least in the case of Brazil, where age was not significant under normal circumstances of mobilization, the increment in the number of protesters at the national level enabled younger cohorts to participate in higher proportions in social movement demonstrations. Additionally, marital status became a significant factor explaining differential recruitment for both national cases after going through periods of massive mobilization. If we complement the effects of age and marital status, we can see that the idea of being young and more autonomous

from family obligations has a positive effect in protest participation, which confirms previous findings (Corrigal-Brown 2013).

Finally, the presence of economic strain expressed in a gradual worsening of personal economic conditions was not a significant variable in none of the models included here.

Conclusion

This research stated that countries going through periods of massive and unexpected mobilization could actually change the profile of the average protester. While I do not claim that all the members in the sample of non-institutionalized adults actually participated in the Student Movement of Chile or in the Confederations Cup Protests in Brazil, certainly most of the population of protesters did. Those big protests took place important urban spaces and attracted a strong legitimacy measured by public opinion support, which lowered and those big numbers. The political and social salience of those protest waves certainly reshaped the social mobilization tendencies for both countries.

This paper finds that the increment in social movement activity had its correlate in changing the individual-level characteristics that explain differential recruitment. For both Brazil and Chile, we can observe a convergence in terms of the variables that predict participation in protests. Particularly, biographical availability contributes with two variables, age and marital status, which have a negative influence in the likelihood to protest. Other dimensions such as resource mobilization only have an impact with the years of education, which is a less tangible variable, and

political engagement only in terms of individual interest in politics is consistent across all models.

This kind of cross-movement and nationally representative data has a potential for disentangle large patterns of individual-level characteristics that explain why people join social movements. However, researchers should analyze and conduct this data analysis carefully. Different conditions such as framing or political opportunities also explain the emergence of social movements, and in each country the political opportunity structure and the levels of social mobilization vary. The cases selected in this research shared similarities in terms of patterns of social mobilization, and also had overall similar political systems and economic tendencies. Therefore, while the comparisons within and across cases could report differences in terms of the salience of variables, we should include in those contrasts what contextual conditions are shared or not and which ones remain stable as a way to validate those contrasts.

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