Robert Nyenhuis

4/23/12

“The Re-election of Repression in Latin America: Fraud, Despair and Wishful Thinking”

Paper presented at the UC Irvine Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD)
California Graduate Student Democracy Conference, May 12, 2012

I. Introduction: The Endurance of Illiberal Democracies

Democracy has existed for thousands of years. Its meaning, its importance and the conditions that allow it to prosper have been debated and discussed for nearly as long. The shift from authoritarian rule to parliamentary democracy in Spain and Portugal in the mid 1970's is seen by many scholars as the beginning of a new era of global political change toward democracy. These political developments during the last quarter of the 20th century have been labeled as the "third wave of democratic expansion", an explosion of democracies in all corners of the world (Huntington 1991; 4).

Importantly, not all these democracies were created, or have evolved, alike. One unexpected development in recent history has been the emergence of governments that seem to be a fusion of democracy and authoritarianism. Scholars have sought to categorize and explain these occurrences, labeling them with descriptions like "hybrid regimes" (Diamond 2002), "illiberal democracies" (Zakaria 1997[1]), "delegative democracies" (O'Donnell 1994) and "pseudodemocracies" (Diamond 2002, 2008). The key concern of most authors is that a new crop of leaders with authoritarian tendencies has emerged under the façade of democracy.

The democratic euphoria of the post-Cold War period, which led some scholars to claim the arrival of "the end of history"[2], has dissipated and has led some researchers to speculate that an alternative political model (in opposition to liberal democratic regimes) has emerged. Latin

1 Although most scholars credit Zakaria with the coining of this term, the term was used in Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya and Jones's 1994 book *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia*.

2 Francis Fukuyama, in his 1989 *National Interest* article speculated that, "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."

America and the former Soviet Republics have witnessed the election of, and re-election of, presidents who repress the civil liberties (rights to a free press, speech and legal guarantees) of their citizens. Within Latin America, commonly cited examples include Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. Fujimori's re-election in 1995, although rife with irregularities and inefficiencies, broadly reflects the Peruvian public's consent. Chávez has been re-elected in numerous elections (some uncontested or bereft of free and fairness) and has routinely enacted his agenda through popular voting mechanisms.

Therefore, the puzzle (and the central research question of this essay) emerges, *"Why do citizens continue to vote for/re-elect leaders or political parties that repress civil liberties?"* Does the survival, via re-election, of repressive presidents reflect the desires and values of citizens? Or have the incumbent leaders or political parties restricted the electoral choices available to voters? Have other factors like economic prosperity or successful government efforts to curb crime and security threats increased the tolerance of electorates to accept repressive leaders?

Competitive elections and rights repression naturally coexist in tension, and many possible relationships between the two may occur. Free and competitive elections require there to be some civil liberties present in the country, but if leaders compromise them they may either facilitate or jeopardize their re-elections. One could imagine citizens living under an exceptionally watchful government to be more reticent to vote against the regime for fear of backlash. Or one could envision citizens to view elections, monitored by international observers and theoretically free to voice their opinions, as crucial institutions needed to mollify their living situation.

Leading democracy scholars have attempted to explain the emergence of a "democratic recession."[3] Most have focused on structural factors at the macro level: the economic conditions in specific countries—specifically when economic "crises" emerge (Diamond 2008), the decline in the degree of legitimacy conferred to political parties and political institutions (Roberts 2003), and the existence of security threats (Roldan 2010). However, very few studies have analyzed this phenomenon at the micro-level, examining voters' behavior. Further, even fewer studies have gone beyond the analysis of the emergence of these governments and instead focused on the longevity of repressive leaders or parties.[4] Using the logic that democracy is the sum of its parts, one should analyze its parts, namely the citizens. The emergence and survival of "illiberal democracies" in the past few decades and the increased sophistication and availability of cross-national opinion surveys allow for empirical testing that should provide some answers or clues to the above question.

This study focuses only on the Latin American region (Central and South America). Since 1975, the region has experienced democratization and elections have become a staple in most political systems. With these developments, Latin America seems to be a perfect laboratory for the study of repressive presidents and political parties. The few studies that have examined why citizens vote for repressive rulers have focused on only one country; Mexico (Dominguez and McCann 1996, Magaloni 2006) and Russia (Krastev 2006), or have focused on why citizens may have undemocratic political leanings (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998).[5] In

3 This term is borrowed from Larry Diamond's 2008 *The Spirit of Democracy*.

4 Of the few studies that have addressed this question, please see Smith (2005) and Magaloni (2006).

[5] Smith (2005) offers a descriptive finding of the increasing number of illiberal democracies in the region, but does not examine the causes of the phenomenon.

this study I select my cases from the entire region in an effort to capture significant cross-national variation. My dependent variable is the *re-election of repressive political leaders.*[6]

Although this paper focuses on Latin American examples, the phenomenon occurs quite regularly around the world. Many autocratic presidents and political parties in the contemporary world have perpetuated their rule even though their countries have exercised numerous elections. African examples include Senegal where the Socialist Party (PS) governed for 24 years following the introduction of multiparty elections in 1976, Tanzania where the Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party (CCM) has won all multiparty elections since 1992, and Kenya where the Kenya African National Union (KANU) ruled for 40 years (Magaloni 2006). In Asia, examples include Malaysia, where the ruling coalition, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has ruled by winning elections since 1959, and Taiwan where the Kuomintang (KMT) maintained control in multiparty elections from 1986 until 2000 (Magaloni 2006). Therefore, the findings of this paper may hold important lessons for regions across the world.

The paper progresses in the following manner: section II, that includes my case selection and a literature review that develops hypotheses aimed at answering the research question; Section III includes a qualitative assessment of the fairness and free nature of the presidential elections under examination; Section IV presents statistical tests of the hypotheses using survey data; Section V concludes with the empirical and theoretical implications of my study.

II. Identifying Repressive Leaders and Explaining Why They May Be Re-elected

A. Who are the Repressive Leaders?

[6] The justification and process of selecting my cases and the operationalization of my dependent variable are further developed later in the paper.

Repression in the contemporary world may include both the suppression of civil and/or political rights and liberties. In this essay, I solely focus on leaders who constrain or limit the civil liberties of their citizenries. The term "civil liberty" is a broad concept and may have different meanings in different countries or contexts. Usually, the umbrella term is used by scholars to include individual citizens' freedoms to speech or an open public discussion, a free press, privacy, and a fair trial with due process guarantees, the freedom of religious belief, and rights to property (Zakaria 1997, Diamond 2008). I choose to focus only on civil liberties because my research question concerns how repressive leaders retain public support in a competitive political system in which they may not only be challenged by the political opposition but may also lose an election. Leaders who repress political rights—the ability to vote and run for office, openness and competition in the electoral arena—severely (if not entirely) limit the electoral uncertainty they may face and diminish the competitiveness of the political system. In this paper, I attempt to understand why presidents are re-elected in competitive elections while they repress civil liberties. I fully acknowledge that political liberties and civil liberties are naturally interdependent—elections may not be fully fair if anti-government media outlets are closed or harassed, and when freedom of speech is restricted to such a degree that open public discussion about politics do not occur.

In this study I focus only on the executive branch of government. Throughout Latin America, countries have political systems based on a strong presidential form of government and most power resides in the executive (Vanden and Prevost 2009). Presidents usually have multiple powers including the right to invoke emergency powers, and have at times assumed dictatorial powers. Thus, a study that focuses on the repression of civil liberties in Latin America should logically focus on the executive branch. I select for study incumbent presidents

who are eligible for re-election and are then either re-elected or voted out of office, and instances when the incumbent political party's presidential candidate is re-elected or voted out of office. For a president to qualify as a case, three things all need to occur: 1) the leader needs to be elected in a presidential election, 2) civil rights scores for his/her country need to worsen (the ruler becomes more repressive) during his/her time in office, and 3) the president needs to have a chance to be re-elected in the next presidential election. I include countries that forbid their presidents to run for re-election, but I consider whether the incumbent party's candidate is re-elected. For instance, during the PRI's rule in Mexico, different presidential candidates were re-elected, but the party remained in power for decades. Therefore, if civil liberties declined during a six-year period in the PRI's rule, and its subsequent presidential candidate was re-elected, this is not only a case, but a positive case (of a repressive president/political party enduring). If, after the above six-year period, the candidate loses the election, it is a case, but a negative one.

In identifying my cases, I examine all Latin American countries' annual civil liberties scores as listed in Freedom House's *Annual Report of Freedom in the World* since 1979.[7] I choose 1979 as a starting point because this is year that the 3rd wave of democratization formally reached Latin America with democratic elections being held in Ecuador, and Peru following in 1980 (Smith 2005). I exclude those years in which countries did not hold elections or were non-democratic—in that they were ruled by the military or a dictator (i.e. Argentina from 1974-1982)—or if a country's civil rights record has not worsened (i.e. Paraguay since 1988).[8] I fully acknowledge that there are problems with the Freedom House data: both methodological issues (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Munck 2011) and concerns over the organization's impartiality

[7] The annual report lists a score for each country in the region. Country scores range from 1 (most protective of civil liberties or with the highest degree of freedom) to 7 (most repressive or with the least degree of freedom). The data is available on Freedom House's website: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439.
[8] Whether a country is democratic is a topic for another paper, but I rely on Appendix 1 in Smith (2005: 347-353) as a guide.

(Brysk 1994, 2009).[9] However, scholars studying repressive regimes continue to rely on Freedom House when measuring civil liberties (Zakaria 1997, Levitsky and Way 2002, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Lindberg 2006, Brysk 2008, Diamond 2008) and methodological concerns are not limited to Freedom House. Brysk (1994:683) concludes that other widely cited international sources on human rights abuses (the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International) also have a "diachronic rather than summary mandate" and rely on estimates of abuse provided by human rights groups within specific countries. In order to deal with possible inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the Freedom House data, I cross-reference the data with reports provided by the U.S. State Department (data are available for the years 1999-present), I examine the number of annual cases brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) for each country (I start my examination with the five years that precede the president's initial election and end the search on the date of re-election), and I consider qualitative reports produced by Human Rights Watch (when available).[10]

Although this cross-reference may substantiate the Freedom House data, these data sources also have their limits: the data from the US State Department are limited by the years available; one may suspect that cases before the IACHR may be dependent on the country's legal capacity (those countries with stronger legal professions and traditions may be advantaged in bringing cases before the trans-national court), I acknowledge that not all cases will be brought

[9] Gerardo Munck, in commentary for the Inter-American Development Bank database, argues that "Intercoder reliability is not reported. Moreover, though coding rules and data on each indicator are made available, and narratives that support the overall country scores are made publicly available, many of the key concepts are vaguely defined or not defined at all. No justification for the aggregation procedure is provided and no results of a robustness test are presented. The change in the number of indicators, and the rephrasing of the questions used in coding some indicators, affect the comparability of the index over time," (http://www.iadb.org/datagob/index.html, accessed 11/15/11).

[10] The State Department's annual reports (1999-2010) are available at its website (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/, accessed 11/21/11-2/28/12. Reports for the years 1970-2010 are available at The Inter-American Court of Human Rights' website (http://www.cidh.oas.org/annual.eng.htm, accessed 11/24/11-2/28/12). Human Rights Watch provides annual reports on its website (http://www.hrw.org/home, accessed 11/24/11-2/28/12). http://www.hrw.org/node/79288

before the court because the court only hears cases that have exhausted domestic jurisdiction (but this may also demonstrate that litigants lack confidence in their political system to take repression seriously); and HRW does not provide a systematized annual evaluation for each country before 1990. My major focus is not to assess *why or how* civil liberties are worsening, but rather to have a confirmation that the degree to which civil liberties are protected is worsening.[11]

Table 1 below demonstrates the seven "positive" cases of repressive re-election,[12] including the country, ruler(s) and party (ies), the years of original election, and re-election.[13] The results illustrate that four of the six cases involve the re-election of incumbent presidents, with three cases including leaders (Menem, Fujimori and Chávez) who are frequently described by scholars as "populist" operating in "hyper-presidentialist" political systems (Conniff 1999, Weyland 1999). The fact that all cases of re-election have occurred at or after1990 should suggest that future cases are possible, especially with the recent re-election of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.[14] Lastly, the cases indicate that the phenomenon of the endurance of illiberal democracy is not confined to a specific sub-region within South or Central America (although three of the six occur in the Andean region), and it occurs within two countries (Colombia and Venezuela) that have some of the longest experiences with democracies in the continent.

[11] The results of cases brought before the IACHR and reports by the US State Department largely confirm the Freedom House Scores. For Ecuador in the mid-1980s, Nicaragua in the early 1990s, and Costa Rica in the early 1990s there is a sparse amount of cases brought before the court.
[12] Full country scores are available in the Appendix, Table A, at the end of the paper.
[13] All data collected for the election results were obtained from Nohlen (2005a) and Nohlen (2005b). Although the party names for both Brazil in 1994 and Colombia in 2010 changed, I argue that votes for both Cardoso and Santos reflect a popular desire for political continuation. My justification for both is developed in section III of this paper.
[14] Possible future cases may include: Honduras, where the respect for civil liberties has worsened since 2008, and Mexico, where scores have deteriorated since 2007.

TABLE 1: CASES OF REPRESSIVE RE-ELECTION				
Country	President(s)	Party	Year Elected	Year Re-elected
Argentina	Carlos Menem	Peronist Party (PJ)	1989	1995
Brazil*	Fernando Collor de Mello, Fernando Henrique Cardoso	National Reconstruction Party (PRN), Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PDSB)*	1989	1994
Colombia	Virgilio Barco, César Gaviria Trujillo	Colombian Liberal (LC)	1986	1990
Colombia*	Álvaro Uribe, Juan Manuel Santos	Colombia First, Social Party of National Unity (PSUN)	2006	2010
Nicaragua	Daniel Ortega	Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)	2006	2011
Perú	Alberto Fujimori	Change 90/New Majority (Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría)	1990	1995
Venezuela	Hugo Chávez	5th Republic Movement(MVR)	1998	2000
CASES OF REPRESSIVE REJECTION				
Country	President(s)	Party	Year Elected	Year Voted Out
Costa Rica	Rafael Calderón Fournier	Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC)	1990	1994
Ecuador	León Febres-Cordero	Social Christian Party (PSC)	1984	1988
Guatemala	Jorge Serrano Elías	Solidarity Action Movement (MAS)	1990	1995/6
Haiti*	Jean-Bertrand Aristride	Fanmi Lavalas	2000	2006
Nicaragua	Violeta Chamorro	National Opposition Union (UNO)	1990	1996

Additionally, the table demonstrates the five cases of repressive rejection,[15] including the country, ruler(s) and party, and the years of original election.[16] The results indicate that

[15] Once again, full country reports are available in the Appendix, Table B, at the end of the paper. Since Nicaragua has a case of both re-election and rejection, its Freedom House scores are reported in both tables in the appendix.
[16] I display Haiti in this table as it fits the criteria for a repressive rejection. However, because of the tumultuous

electorates across the continent voted out repressive executives. A specific region (this time Central America) accounts for three of the four cases. The only country that has cases of re-election and rejection is Nicaragua where citizens voted for a change in the executive in 1996, but, as mentioned above, re-elected Ortega a few months ago. Unlike the positive cases, there is no temporal divide in occurrences, but again this may be a result of many countries in the region not having democratic elections until the mid-1980s. In sum, eight presidential elections were held between 1990 and 2000, in which repressive presidential leaders/political parties ran for re-election. Of those eight elections, the repressive candidate(s) won four and lost four.

B. Why are Repressive Leaders and Political Parties Re-elected?

What may account for this specific variation within a concentrated time period? What accounts for mass support for presidents that repress civil liberties? Do these leaders or parties perpetuate their time in office by manipulating elections? Levitsky and Way (2002) contend that many authoritarian leaders or governments have elections that are held regularly, for the most part competitive (in that major opposition parties and candidates usually participate), and generally free of massive fraud. International observers on the ground limit the capacity of incumbents to engage in large-scale fraud, and as a result, elections may generate considerable uncertainty. Thus, all ruling parties, even the most brutal or despotic, have to establish some sense of legitimacy to maintain mass support. Below, I review past scholarly attempts at answering the above question, and develop hypotheses that I test later in the paper.

1) *Electoral Fraud and Manipulation*

---

political history of the country and its lack of democratic institutionalization I cannot confidently claim that the election in 2006 was either free, fair, or represented a true choice or judgment by the populace.

Electoral engineering is perceived by many publics and journalists to occur quite commonly in the countries under examination (Smith 2005). For instance, in Mexico, some scholars argue that electoral abuse seemed to be a commonly used tactic by the PRI: "There is no doubt that the Mexican PRI committed electoral fraud in the 1988 presidential elections, when the party declared that the new computer system had mysteriously collapsed the night of the elections (Magaloni 2006: 5)." Castaneda (2000) and Eisenstadt (2004) both present comprehensive overviews of how the National Action Party (PAN) and other opposition political parties have dealt with electoral fraud in Mexico. However, before the debt crisis in 1982, the PRI was able to win most elections by comfortable margins and fraud played a minor role in securing electoral victories (Molinar 1991). In accordance with the above arguments that repressive presidents and political parties manipulate electoral institutions and elections, I posit that:

Hypothesis 1a: *Other things being equal, repressive presidents or incumbent political parties are more likely to be re-elected when electoral fraud is widespread.*

With the increased frequency of elections and an international community eager to send election observers to remote countries across the world, outright electoral fraud may be less common than most citizens and journalists assume. Presidents and political parties that willingly repress their citizens may wish to be more subtle, and not blatantly steal elections. Political incumbents may possibly institutionalize electoral unfairness way before the actual election day or vote count. Thus, a distinction needs to be drawn between outright fraud and the institutionalization of electoral fairness. This institutionalization goes beyond simply tampering with the ballot boxes, a repressive party's ability to create and maintain autocratic electoral institutions may be a prime factor explaining its electoral dominance (Magaloni 2006). Schedler (2002) contends that

although repressive politicians hold periodic elections to provide a veneer of democratic legitimacy, these elections are under tight authoritarian controls in which an electoral victory for the incumbent is never in doubt. Diamond (2002) argues that authoritarian leaders are most repressive when they are most politically vulnerable—when the public least supports them and one would logically expect that electoral institutions would be targeted by threatened rulers.

Some empirical examples of electoral institutional manipulation include Mexico and Venezuela. Molinar (1991) argues that the Mexican PRI was able to dominate for so long because of autocratic electoral institutions—there were legal barriers that restricted the entrance of potential challengers, and the federal government and the PRI's central bureaucracy monitored and adjudicated elections. More recently, the Venezuelan electoral institutions have been heavily criticized for their perceived impartiality. During the 2004 Venezuelan Recall Referendum, in which voters decided via referendum whether or not to recall Chávez from office, both the Constitutional Chamber and national electoral council (the CNE) played significant roles in determining the outcome. The Constitutional Chamber repeatedly ruled in favor of delays to the recall process and the CNE invalidated hundreds of thousands of signatures that the opposition obtained to recall Chávez, actions that nearly all analysts viewed as favorable to the government (Kornblith and Jawahar 2005). In line with the above arguments that repressive presidents and political parties manipulate electoral institutions, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1b: *Other things being equal, repressive presidents or incumbent political parties are more likely to be re-elected when manipulation of electoral institutions is widespread.*

This hypothesis is the starting point of my study, and will be analyzed as a separate hypothesis (in section three below). If the cases that I have selected all include political incumbents who have simply manipulated institutions of electoral governance (IEGs) or committed outright

electoral fraud to such a degree as to constitute a sham electoral process, then this hypothesis will explain most of how these leaders or parties have remained in power. However, if minimal degrees of possible manipulation or fraud have occurred—usually referred to as "irregularities" by international monitoring organizations—then the research question not only becomes more complex, but also requires further analysis.

2) *Economic Success*

Long before the slogan "it's the economy, stupid" permeated American political discourse, scholars had theorized that economic growth and development is the crucial factor that determines the outcomes of elections. In one of the earliest works, Hansen (1974) argued that dominant political parties should be sustained in power when the economy grew and should be removed from office when the economy deteriorated. Hansen based his analysis on macroeconomic growth and rationalized that a country's overall economic performance would influence voters. However, more recent work demonstrates that dominant political parties can perpetuate their time in office despite poor macroeconomic performances and even prosper during periods of economic recession (Geddes 1999). Executives that embody autocratic tendencies may even be less vulnerable to short-term economic crises, in terms of electoral pressures, than their more democratic counterparts (Przeworski 2000). The Mexican PRI, after the debt crisis began in 1982, continued to govern for 18 more years even with deteriorating economic conditions (Magaloni 2006).

Some researchers have focused on the specific economic measures that may affect and, therefore, influence voters more directly. Stokes (2001) demonstrated that certain economic conditions (inflation, economic growth) weigh heavily in the minds of voters when they evaluate

both the challengers' economic policy proposals and the incumbent executive's economic performance. Some scholars contend that the poorest sectors of the population usually experience the most direct consequences of a very high inflation rate, or hyperinflation (Barr 2003), as it undermines the predictability people need to plan their daily lives (Weyland 2003). More than inflation, other economic measures like poverty are serious concerns that afflict most citizens in Latin America (Barr 2003). Magaloni (2006) argues that executives with autocratic tendencies are able maintain popular support when countries experience increased industrialization, increased employment, and increased wages. In line with the above arguments that improved economic conditions may lead to greater support for repressive executives, I posit that:

Hypothesis 2a: *Other things being equal, voters may re-elect repressive presidents or incumbent political parties when their countries experience improved economic conditions.*

I am cautious in accepting the possibility that voters may, not only be aware of the economic situation of their countries, but also be able to accurately compare it with past leaders' economic performances. Thus, I slightly modify the first hypothesis to allow for a disconnect between voters' *perceptions* of the economic situation and reality. I posit that:

Hypothesis 2b: *Other things being equal, voters may re-elect repressive presidents or incumbent political parties when they <u>perceive</u> their countries to have experienced improved economic conditions.*

A few specifications are necessary. The key question may be whether or not there is a threshold of: a) how much repression publics are willing to tolerate and still be supportive of the government, b) how much economic improvement is needed for presidents or political parties with authoritarian tendencies to remain popular and be re-elected. Additionally, there is no

guarantee that those citizens that may benefit most from economic development will necessarily vote in the presidential election. Further, even if these citizens do vote, they may not support the candidate for an array of reasons beyond the economic climate of the day. This hypothesis, however, has important implications for both the understanding of democracy and its practical application in the region. The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 2004 report *Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizen's Democracy*, an extensive survey conducted in 18 countries with over 15,000 respondents, found that 54.7% of citizens in Latin America would support an authoritarian government over a democratic government "if it resolved economic problems", and 56.3% of citizens answered that they "believe that economic development is more important than democracy (UNDP 2004: 131)."[17]

3) Social Ills

For the past few decades most, if not all, countries in Latin America have been the unfortunate victims of high levels of crime and violence in their communities. About one third of Latin Americans who live in large cities live in slums or shantytowns in which crime and violence frequently reach uncontrollable levels, and are exacerbated by the lack of police protection for many of the poorest neighborhoods (Vanden and Prevost 2009). The growing presences of organized crime and drug gangs have become staples in many countries. With a higher level of social problems, one may expect ordinary citizens to desire a greater level of control or force by their government. A fascinating study by Brinks (2008) about police killings in Argentina and Brazil demonstrated that, although there are no polls directly asking the question whether deadly force by the police is or could be justified, elected officials and public

[17] The report is available on the UNDP's website: (http://www.votb.org/elsalvador/Reports/Report_Democracy_in_Latin_America_New.pdf, accessed 11/21/11).

sentiment usually favor lethal force as a solution to crime. While deadly force by the police may represent an extreme, in line with the above arguments I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 3: *Other things being equal, repressive presidents or incumbent political parties are more likely to be re-elected when citizens perceive crime levels to have increased.*

4) Lack of Institutional Efficiency—Corruption

Manzetti and Wilson (2009) argue that political corruption has negative effects on public support for democratic institutions and this may mobilize public anger against political incumbents; in the Latin American case it has led to the impeachment of presidents in Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador. However, the authors point out that corrupt governments have the ability to remain in power, and frequently do so. Employing survey data and statistical analyses, Manzetti and Wilson find that weak governmental institutions (those that are undermined by rampant corruption) lead to a cycle of social acceptance of unscrupulous practices (bribery, clientelism, etc) at the individual level. Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998) find that increasing levels of corruption not only decrease public support for democratic governments but also increase broad acceptance of more authoritarian alternatives. The authors examine nine countries in Central and Eastern Europe and find that the higher the levels of corruption are in new democracies (Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania) the less likely individuals are to reject undemocratic alternatives (army rule, dismissing parliament, and having a strong, decisive leader). In accordance with the findings of the above scholars, I posit:

Hypothesis 4: *Other things being equal, repressive presidents or incumbent political parties are more likely to be re-elected when citizens perceive their government institutions to be rife with corruption.*

Additionally, citizens may view institutions to be corrupt because of government practices that also increase public support. For instance, in countries where governmental institutions are weak and patron-client relationships are strong, voters may be more likely to support corrupt leaders from whom they can expect tangible benefits. The ruling party may monopolize the state's resources and employ them to reward voter loyalty and punish voter defection (Magaloni 2006).

5) Political Culture Arguments

Diamond and Linz (1989), writing about the possibility of democratic consolidation in Latin America, argue that the development of liberal democracies requires that liberal values and democratic behavioral dispositions are widespread throughout the population. In a similar vein, Lipset (1994) places an emphasis on the need for the widespread acceptance of specific rights—freedoms of speech, media, assembly, religion—to facilitate societal institutions that reflect liberal democratic norms. In their seminal work, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) contend that "self-expression values motivate people to seek the civil and political rights that define liberal democracy…to demand the institutions that allow them to act according to their own choices (152)." Consistent among these scholars is the conclusion that there is a reciprocal relationship between political attitudes and political structures. In line with the above arguments that widespread liberal democratic values may lead to lower support for repressive executives, I posit that:

Hypothesis 5: *Other things being equal, repressive presidents or incumbent political parties are less likely to be re-elected when citizens express stronger preferences for democracy and the protection of civil liberties.*

6) Lack of a Strong and Unified Opposition

Electoral outcomes may also be affected by factors that do not directly pertain to the political actors in power but rather to those actors mounting a challenge. The strength or weakness of potential presidential challengers or the ability of political parties to present a viable candidate may heavily influence whether or not incumbents are re-elected. Incumbents in any political system inherently have an electoral advantage due to the sole fact of being the incumbent (name recognition, a significant upper hand in access to the media, etc) and new opposition parties who have never governed before may be at a distinctive disadvantage as they are highly uncertain entities to voters. Additionally, basic mathematical properties may favor those seeking re-election. For instance, there may be a significant lack of unity among the opposition, the competing candidates may split votes, and they may fight for the same bloc of voters. Although this may be more common in legislative elections, one could also imagine a presidential race with two, three or even four opposition challengers that could heavily favor the incumbent. In line with the logic above, I posit that:

Hypothesis 6: Other things being equal, repressive presidents or incumbent political parties are more likely to be re-elected when there is a lack of a strong and unified opposition.

The above hypotheses provide a starting point for explaining why repressive political incumbents may remain popular. These variables, however, may interact with one another. One could expect that strong economic performance could undermine the opposition's ability to craft economic alternatives they could present during the presidential campaign; one could imagine that increasing levels of corruption or, conversely, decreasing levels of economic performance could reduce the level of public trust or confidence in the democratic system. The key point here is that voting behavior is extremely complex and cannot be explained by only one variable, but rather may be a complex interaction among many of the variables above. This is consistent with

Roberts and Wibbels (1999), who argue against any simple social cleavage or economic explanation of electoral outcomes in contemporary Latin America.

III. Qualitative Assessment of Presidential Elections

In this section I assess the fairness and free nature of the presidential elections mentioned above. So what makes an election free and fair? Some scholars place a heavy emphasis on the results. Pastor (1998) claims that an election is considered free and fair if "the major parties all accept the process and respect the results (159)." However, political actors very often play politics with election results and it is possible that the losers may accuse the winner of stealing the election even when there was broad consensus that the election was relatively free and fair. Two examples include the presidential election of Mexico in 1994 (Eisenstadt 2004) and in Nicaragua in 1996 (Booth 1998). A "free" election usually entails one in which voters have the opportunity to participate without coercion or restrictions or are able to freely choose one candidate over the other without negative consequences (Elklit and Svensson 1997, Diamond 2002); while a "fair" election is possible when candidates can easily enter the political arena, no candidate or party receives preferential treatment, and different parties and candidates can freely campaign and solicit votes (Diamond 2002). The free nature of elections relates to the "rules of the game" whereas fairness implies "impartiality," (Elklit and Svensson 1997).

Below I assess the free and fairness of each country's election in alphabetical order. I heavily rely on the earlier efforts of Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2003, 2008), and cross-

reference their analyses and judgments with other secondary sources including election monitoring results from the Carter Center, the OAS, and the European Union.[18]

COUNTRY	ELECTION DATE	ELECTION RESULT	SOURCE(S)
Argentina	5/14/1995	Successful	Szusterman (1995); Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2003)
Brazil	10/3/1994	Successful	Conniff (1999); Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2003)
Colombia	5/27/1990	Flawed	Kline (1995); Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2003)
Colombia	5/30/2010 and 6/20/2010	Successful	OAS (2010); Moreno (2011)
Costa Rica	2/6/1994	Successful	Lehoucq (1994); Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2003)
Ecuador	5/8/1988	Successful	Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2003)
Guatemala	11/12/1995 and 1/7/1996	Successful	Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2003)
Nicaragua	10/20/1996	Flawed	Carter Center (1996); Booth and Richard (1997); Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2003); Krennerich (2005)
Nicaragua	11/6/2011	Flawed	Carter Center (2011); European Union (2011); OAS (2011).
Peru	4/9/1995	Flawed	IFES (1995); LASA (1995); Schmidt (2000); Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2003)
Venezuela	7/30/2000	Flawed	Neuman and McCoy (2000); OAS (2000); Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2003)

The authors provide a comprehensive examination of presidential elections in Latin America between 1980 (or each country's first democratic election year) and 2002. They deem each election as either a success (free and fair), flawed or a failure. Of the elections that I

[18] The organization Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral (Spanish: Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance) conducted electoral observations for the following countries and years: Ecuador 1988, Colombia 1990, Brazil 1994, Costa Rica 1994, Argentina 1995, Guatemala 1995, Peru 1995. I contacted the organization but unfortunately CAPEL does not make their reports publicly available.

consider Colombia 1990, Peru1995, Nicaragua 1996, and Venezuela in 2000 are determined by the authors to have been "flawed". Additionally the 2011 Nicaraguan election suffered from serious deficiencies. Below, I examine each of the flawed elections in detail and conclude whether the elections accurately reflect the voting preferences of citizens.

Colombia 1990

On May 27, 1990, Cesar Gaviria Trujillo from the Liberal Party won the presidential election with 47.8 percent of the vote. This particular Colombian election stands out as a unique case as during the campaign three candidates were assassinated: Luis Carlos Galán was murdered in August 1989; the Union Patriotica's nominee, Bernardo Jaramillo, and the M-19 Democratic Alliance (*Alianza Democrática M-19*) candidate Carlos Pizarro Leongómez were also killed prior to the election (Kline 1995). Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo (2003) classify this specific election as flawed—mostly due to the undermining influence of the violence directed toward presidential candidates. However, public opinion data show that Gaviria's triumph generally reflects the public's desires. Public opinion polls conducted in the late summer of 1989 by the major national polling center, *El Centro Nacional de Consultoria*, showed Galán as very popular among the populace and the likely successor to Virgilio Barco (*Semana* 1989). However, Galán would be assassinated in September 1989, leaving Cesar Gaviria Trujillo to be the Liberal Party's presidential candidate. The emotional response elicited by Galán's death produced a wave of public support for the Liberal Party, and Gaviria polled at 65 percent shortly after the event (*Semana* 1989). Although public support for Gaviria would decline from its peak after Galán's death, his level of support stabilized around 45 percent in the first few months of 1990, and then steadily increased as the year progressed, and polls in mid-May showed him as the overwhelming favorite with 60 percent support (Rueda 1990*; Semana* 1990a, 1990b).

Peru 1995

This may perhaps be the most problematic election I consider. By most accounts the election was flawed, but few would argue that it was either stolen or the result was obtained only via outright fraud. Schmidt (2000) concludes that: "The 1995 election was not stolen at the ballot box, although the overall process may not have been fair enough to meet democratic expectations (117)." Specifically, Schmidt (2000) highlights that although Fujimori created seemingly independent electoral authorities after his *autogolpe* (the ONPE and RNIEC), these organizations did not function until after the election; Fujimori purged the Supreme Court who designated members of the Jurado Nacional Electoral (JNE) and the country operated with an "antiquated" voter registry which increased the possibility of irregularities. In its 1995 assessment, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) concluded that "there were irregularities in the electoral process…..[but] the electoral result should be respected. President Fujimori's triumph legitimized his tenure; especially given the overwhelming support he obtained (25)." There is no dispute that Fujimori was extremely popular at the time of the election. Data obtained from IPSOS, a major polling center in Lima, demonstrate that from January 1992 until the election in June 1995 his approval rating never dipped below 53 percent and averaged around 73 percent throughout 1995 (IPSOS 1995).[19] Apart from IPSOS, polls from other major polling firms (CPI, *Imasen, Datum*) all indicated that Fujimori would win the election comfortably with support between 44 and 55 percent, and that of his nearest challenger no higher than 29 percent (LASA 1995). Thus, although the election was flawed, I contend that his election on June 10, 1995, accurately depicts the political decisions of Peruvians.

[19] I thank Lourdes García, the director of information at IPSOS, for emailing a scanned copy of survey results.

Nicaragua 1996

By most accounts, the 1996 Nicaraguan presidential election suffered from several irregularities. What makes this especially relevant is that of the five flawed elections noted earlier, this is the only one in which the incumbent leader or party lost. On October 20, Jose Arnoldo Aleman Lacayo (AL) won with 51 percent of the vote, defeating Daniel Ortega of the Sandinistas. Booth and Richard (1997) emphasize that although serious technical flaws plagued the vote—throughout the election process from party organization and campaigning through voting and ballot counting—the election was free and largely fair. Two major issues were missing ballots and disputed counts on votes that were reported. However, the affected votes constituted less than 5 percent of the total, and if all these votes had gone to Ortega, he would still not have secured even a runoff (Booth and Richard 1997). The Carter Center, in its 1996 electoral assessment, claims that "We conclude that despite the serious shortcomings of these elections, they by and large reflected the preferences of the voters (12)." Krennerich (2005) notes that the international observers that were present noticed widespread irregularities and problems in the organization of the elections, but agreed to qualify them as correct. The Sandinistas eventually accepted the results, but only after the Alianza Liberal's vote advantage become clear. Aleman's margin of victory was 13.3 percent and Booth and Richard conclude that "error and fraud notwithstanding, a substantial majority of Nicaraguans preferred him as their president (391)."

Venezuela 2000

The 2000 re-election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, with 56.93 percent of the vote in the July 30 "mega-elections", differs from my other cases in that Chávez had not served out his original mandate. However, restrictions on journalists and civil liberties had surged in the year

and half or so of his rule before the 2000 election. The electoral process did suffer from widespread irregularities. Elections were originally scheduled for May but three days before election day a decision was made to postpone them due to a lack of preparation on behalf of the IEGs. Chávez had named an electoral council, marked by its perceived bias and ineptness, but was forced to appoint a new electoral council, more representative of all political actors and more professional (Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo 2003). Although the presidential election suffered from technical shortcomings—delays of poll openings, defects in some of the voting machines and complex ballots (Neuman and McCoy 2000)—the OAS concludes that the presidential electoral process should be considered valid as it facilitated widespread public participation, allowed diverse candidates to compete and mobilize the public (OAS 2000) and the Carter Center does not believe the irregularities affected the outcome of the presidential race (Neuman and McCoy 2000).

Nicaragua 2011

The 2011 Nicaraguan presidential election is marred with controversy, if not outright manipulation and/or fraud. On November 11, 2011, Daniel Ortega (FSLN) won the presidential election with 62.46 percent of the vote, more than doubling the PLI challenger (Carter Center 2011). After a two-year battle in which Ortega obtained a questionable Supreme Court decision in 2009 that allowed him to run for immediate re-election and third term, a presidential decree in 2010 that extended the top electoral council's (CSE) magistrates' terms after they had expired, the election itself suffered from a non-transparent vote, count, and reporting (Carter Center 2011, European Union 2011, OAS 2011). Not surprisingly, the opposition did not accept the elections as legitimate, small protests followed, and the PLI presidential candidate Fabio Gadea denounced the elections as fraudulent. However, the Carter Center also concludes that although the count

could not be verified, few doubt that President Ortega had won a first-round victory and the major disputes centered around the National Assembly results (Carter Center 2011).

In short, five of the above elections suffered from technical shortcomings and/or were flawed (Colombia 1990, Peru 1995, Nicaragua 1996, Venezuela 2000, and Nicaragua 2011). Secondary sources lead to the conclusion that although these elections may have been flawed, they were neither stolen or cases of outright fraud; and opinion poll data corroborate that the outcomes of these elections were not affected by irregularities and generally reflect the voting preferences of the populations. Thus, additional examination is warranted to explain why some leaders not only remained popular but were able to be successfully re-elected.

IV. Quantitative Assessment of Survey Data

A) Operationalization of Variables

In this section, I use quantitative methods to test the abovementioned hypotheses. I rely on survey data publicly available from the Latinobarometro Corporation. In a recent study that makes use of extensive survey data, Remmer (2010) employs a logit regression model to explain the odds of a positive binary outcome (voter turnout). My dependent variable is *support for leader/political party*; it is dichotomous; and similar to Remmer, I also use a logit regression model to estimate the odds that survey respondents will be more likely to support the winning candidates in the elections detailed above.[20]

In testing the economic success hypothesis, I consider two survey questions: one that asks the survey respondent how s/he would describe the current economic situation of the country,

[20] I use the statistical software package R to run the regressions. Also, I employ logistic regression code provided by Professor Daniel Gillen from the Statistics department at the University of California-Irvine. His code is publicly available at his website: http://www.ics.uci.edu/~dgillen/STAT111_202/Statistics_111_202.html.

and how the respondent would describe her present economic situation (including her family).[21] The original survey question answers ranged from very good, good, about average, bad and very bad. I re-code the responses "very good" and "good" as "good", "about average" as "ok", and "bad" and "very bad" as "bad". The responses "don't know" and "no answer" were excluded from the analysis.[22] Thus each variable is a factored ordinal measure with three levels of satisfaction. To test the social ills and corruption hypotheses, I include responses for questions asking respondents whether or not they perceive the level of both crime and corruption to have increased, decreased or remained the same. I code the responses "have increased a lot" and "have increased a little" as "increase"; I code "have remained the same" as "same"; and I code "have decreased a lot" and "have decreased a little" as "decrease." For the political culture hypothesis, I also rely on two questions. First, I examine a question that asks citizens whether they think democracy is preferable to any kind of government, whether authoritarian governments can be justified in some circumstances, or whether democracy for them does not matter. I code each response as "Democrat", "Authoritarian possible" and "Democracy does not matter." Second, I record responses for a tradeoff question: whether they think the most important issue for governments is to maintain order, increase citizen participation in government decisions, keep prices low, or protect freedom of speech. I code responses as "order", "citizen participation", "prices" and "free speech."

Although I have outlined 11 possible cases for analysis earlier in the paper, I am still in the data collection process for 5 of these cases but I present my current analysis for 6 of the cases: re-elections in Brazil 1994, Argentina 1995, Peru 1995 and Venezuela 2000; and electoral rejections in Guatemala 1995/6 and Nicaragua 1996. The analysis follows below—I divide the

[21] The full survey questions are available in the appendix.
[22] This was repeated for each variable throughout the analysis.

results for those countries in which presidents were re-elected and in which they were voted out of office.

B) Findings

Below in table 2 are the logit regression results for those countries in which presidents were successfully re-elected, the numbers presented are the estimated odds for each variable:

TABLE 2:

REGRESSION RESULTS FOR REPRESSIVE RE-ELECTIONS

COUNTRY/YEAR:	BRAZIL 1994	ARG 1995	PERU 1995	VEN 2000
(Intercept)	**4.1858*** **	**4.3573*** **	1.8174	**2.8501*** **
EconCountryOk	**0.3698*** **	**0.2733*** **	0.8087	0.7917
EconCountryBad	**0.1608** **	**0.1222*** **	**0.2188*** **	**0.3547** **
EconPersonalOk	0.8949	0.8383	0.8833	0.9721
EconPersonalBad	1.1517	0.8697	0.5555	1.2925
CrimeSame	1.0459	1.2774	**2.0442** **	1.8557
CrimeDecrease	1.3132	1.9854	1.5822.	0.8098
CorruptionSame	1.0993	1.7543	1.0865	1.0236
CorruptionDecrease	1.0883	1.2313	1.1905	**3.2090*** **
DemocracyAuthPossible	1.3249	0.7695	1.2907	**2.8844*** **
DemocracyDemNotMatter	1.2376	1.0988	1.4523	1.5458
Order-CitizenParticipation	0.6913	**0.574***	1.0028	1.1166
Order-Inflation	1.2817	1.1288	0.8675	**2.0878***
Order-FreeSpeech	0.7457	0.5337	0.9135	**4.0509** **
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**	' 0.01 '*'	0.05 '.' 0	.1 ' ' 1	
Observations:	379	579	520	630

For Brazil 1994, the regression output provides some statistical support for the economic success hypotheses. When controlling for perceptions on crime, corruption, and democratic values, the odds for citizens who view the country's economy as worsening (bad as opposed to good) are 83.92 percent less likely to be supportive of President Cardoso than those who think that the

country's economy is doing well. Although the survey was conducted eight months after the election, the data suggest that economic concerns were the main motivating factor for the public's approval of President Cardoso, and that citizens with stronger democratic values were less supportive of him. The survey data for Argentina were collected in May and June of 1995, during the last few weeks of the campaign and shortly after the election. The regression output provides strong statistical support for the economic success and democratic values hypotheses. When controlling for perceptions on crime, corruption, and democratic values, the odds for citizens who view the country's economy as worsening are 88.78 percent less likely to be supportive of President Menem than those who think that the country's economy is doing well. Additionally, the odds that citizens support Menem who believe government should allow citizens to be more involved are 43.6% less than those who believe that maintaining order should be the first priority, when controlling for macro-economic perceptions and citizen perceptions of levels of crime.

The survey data for Peru were collected in May and June of 1995, during the last few weeks of the campaign and shortly after the election. As in Brazil and Argentina, the regression output provides strong statistical support for the economic success hypothesis, but also for the social ills hypothesis. When controlling for perceptions on crime and democratic values, the odds for citizens who view the country's economy as worsening are 88.78 percent less likely to be supportive of President Fujimori than those who think that the country's economy is doing well. The odds that citizens support Fujimori who perceive crime to have remained the same (as opposed to increasing) are 104.42 percent greater than for those citizens who believe crime has increased, when controlling for economic considerations, corruption and the existence of democratic values.

The survey data for Venezuela were collected in February 2000, three months before the scheduled 2000 election (although the election would be postponed until July). Similar to the other cases of repressive re-election, the results from the regression output provide support for the economic success and social ills hypotheses. However, the significant finding (or contrast) is that democratic values mattered to Venezuelans—those who supported authoritarianism at times were much more supportive of Chávez. When controlling for perceptions of crime, corruption and democratic values, the odds of supporting Chávez for respondents who perceive the country's economy to be faring poorly are 65.43 percent less than those who perceive the economy to be doing well. When contrasting political and social order with inflation, those who prioritize inflation are 108.78 percent more likely to support Chávez. Corruption also seems to have been a motivating factor in citizens' attitudes. Those who believe corruption to have decreased are 220.9% more likely to support Chávez. When comparing individuals who hold stronger democratic values, the odds for supporting Chávez among those who think that authoritarianism is sometimes permissible is 188.44 percent higher. Lastly, the odds for those respondents who prioritize free speech over order, the odds are 305.09% higher that they are more supportive of the Venezuelan incumbent.

Below in table 3 are the logit regression results for those countries in which presidents were voted out of office, the numbers presented are the estimated odds for each variable:

TABLE 3:

REGRESSION RESULTS FOR REPRESSIVE REJECTIONS

COUNTRY/YEAR:	NICARAGUA 1996	GUATEMALA 1996
(Intercept)	1.6056	1.7296
EconCountryOk	1.0778	0.8319
EconCountryBad	0.7122	0.8518
EconPersonalOk	0.8405	0.5667
EconPersonalBad	0.7354	**0.2487****
CrimeSame	1.1874	0.2764
CrimeDecrease	3.783	3.4104
CorruptionSame	1.6489	1.0698
CorruptionDecrease	0.6986	**3.1039***
DemocracyAuthPossible	**0.6519.**	**0.4430***
DemocracyDemNotMatter	0.8171	0.7994
Order-CitizenParticipation	0.7766	**0.4774***
Order-Prices	**0.5951****	0.5966
Order-FreeSpeech	1.4761	0.9810
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1		
Observations:	738	519

The survey data for Nicaragua were collected in September 1996, a few weeks before election. I have coded the data to reflect support for the PLC, the opposition party whose candidate, Arnoldo Alemán won the election. The surprise finding for Nicaragua is that economic considerations did not play as major a role in voters' support for Alemán as it did in previous cases. When controlling for economic considerations, crime, and corruption, those respondents who prioritize prices over order are 40.49 percent less likely to support the political challenger (and non-repressive incumbent). When respondents consider a possible trade-off between democracy and authoritarianism, the odds that respondents would support Alemán are

34.81% less for those who believe that authoritarian practices are permissible compared to respondents who believe democracy is the most preferable system.

The survey data for Guatemala were collected in September 1996, roughly nine months after the election. Therefore, similar to Brazil I have to make inferences on what the major motivations are among the public in their judgment of President Álvaro Arzú Irigoyen. In examining support for the president, the regression results offer support for the economic success, corruption, and democratic values hypotheses. When controlling for perceptions on crime and democratic values, the odds for citizens to support president Irigoyen who view their personal economic situation as worsening are 75.13% percent less than those who think that the country's economy is doing well. However, the odds of support for those who believe that corruption has decreased are 210 percent higher than those who believe corruption has increased. In a similar vein, the odds that respondents support the president who believe that authoritarian practices are permissible are 55.7 percent less than those who have the strongest beliefs in democracy. The overall takeaway point here is that economic concerns, although important in the Guatemalan context, are not the only issues that matter. Democratic values also seem to be very important.

C. Analysis

The above results should not be surprising for Brazil, Argentina or Peru. In all three countries the political incumbents produced impressive economic performances. In Brazil, Cardoso's Real Plan, instituted when he was minister of finance, reduced inflation dramatically; in Argentina, Menem entered office during an economic crisis and during his tenure inflation was contained and the economy grew at an annual rate of 6.1 percent; in Peru, Fujimori was also

able to curb hyperinflation and provide a sense of economic stability (Vanden and Prevost 2009). Perhaps as a result of these steady economic performances the opposition parties were unable to mount a serious challenge to these presidents. Cardoso did face a strong candidate in the PT's Lula da Silva but the overwhelming economic success of the Real Plan seems to have stabilized support for Cardoso. The Radicals in Argentina, a major opposition party, never fully recovered from the social turmoil that forced Menem's predecessor, Raul Alfonsin, to resign before his term in office expired (Vanden and Prevost 2009). In Peru, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Union for Peru or UPP) was never able to challenge Fujimori and his Cambio-90 movement, given the incumbent's overwhelming economic success. For Argentina, the public seems to have been cognizant of government repression. Those citizens who championed democratic values were much less likely to support the president. Thus, my analysis for these countries suggests that although some citizens held strong democratic values and were less likely to support these leaders, it seems as if voters' primary concern was economic performance.

In both Guatemala and Nicaragua, the public's desire for democratic values heavily influenced whether or not respondents supported the opposition party who defeated the repressive incumbents. For both countries respondents were much less supportive of the challenger candidates if they thought that authoritarian practices were sometimes permissible. In Guatemala, Alvaro Arzu barely defeated Alfonso Portillo (FRG - Guatemalan Republican Front), a "stand-in" candidate for the former rightist dictator and who opposed the ongoing national peace process talks—a sign of a new democratic political culture (Vanden and Prevost 2009). The national peace process and accords signed in December 1996 (by Arzu) allowed for the legal presence and political participation of leftist insurgents and reiterated the commitment to human rights and indigenous rights. In Nicaragua, it seems as if both economic perceptions (a concern

for high prices) and democratic value-based decisions propelled Alemán to victory. His liberal alliance defeated the FSLN at the municipal level and in the National Assembly and he defeated Ortega 51 to 38 percent. Alemán based his campaign on his successful record as the mayor of Managua who improved socioeconomic conditions with his public works efforts (Vanden and Prevost 2009). It seems then that after many years of political infighting voters in Nicaragua were ready to accept a candidate they perceived as being a more efficient ruler and possibly more democratic. From 1993-1995, a coalition of individuals and parties who felt that government was undemocratic and did not serve their interests drafted a constitutional reform package that would have restricted executive power and increased the amount of constitutionally-protected civil liberties. However, the executive did not promulgate the Constitutional reforms, leading to a political crisis that delegitimized the Chamorro government (Vanden and Prevost 2009).

In Venezuela both economic success considerations and democratic values affected support for Hugo Chávez. Those citizens who believed that the economy under the incumbent government had worsened very much less likely to vote for his re-election in 2000. The key finding for Venezuela is that if citizens believe that authoritarian practices may be permissible sometimes, then they are considerably more likely to support Chávez. This seems to be in line, however, with how Chávez ruled in his first two years. The new Constitution, overwhelmingly approved by the public in December 1999, provided protections for an extensive list of social and economic rights but also swept away the old institutions that served as foundations for political parties, concentrated power in the executive and by some accounts, restricted certain civil liberties like the freedom to have a free press (Vanden and Prevost 2009).

V. Conclusion

Since 1980, protections for civil liberties throughout the continent of Latin America have improved and increased, as a whole. However, this paper demonstrates that a worrying phenomenon has occurred, and with the re-election of Santos in Colombia in 2010 and Ortega in Nicaragua in 2011, continues to occur. Presidents who have repressed the civil liberties of their citizens have been up for re-election 11 times since 1980, and publics have voted them out or voted for the opposition in four of these elections. In this preliminary analysis, I have examined six cases—four in favor of repressive re-election, and two in which repressive leaders were rejected. Although more repressive leaders have been re-elected than rejected, I have found statistical evidence that citizens who hold democratic values dearly are much less likely to support these leaders. The key questions are: when do values become more important than economic concerns and how can democratic values be advanced?

I have an initial answer for the former but lack any substantial response to the latter. In the six cases that I have examined, it seems as if the *degree* of repression mattered. Using the Freedom House scores, Nicaragua and Guatemala both scored high (more repressive)—the governments who were rejected scored fives on the ratings. In Brazil (averaged 4) and Argentina (averaged 3) scores were much lower, while Fujimori curbed repression from a 5 to a 4 in 1994 and 1995. Additional analysis should be done to examine who exactly was repressed and how aware the publics in each of these countries were to the abuses. Also, consideration should be given to who exactly voted in these elections (if this data are available or trustworthy). Lastly, additional analysis should be done to see whether the historical pattern of abuses (in former dictatorships in Latin America) have any bearing to contemporary values or citizen voting behaviors. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998:195), discussing former Communist countries in the Soviet Union, Central and Balkan Europe conclude that democratic values and their

acceptance require a “lifetime of learning”, in that citizens in these countries have lived “two political lives.” The authors contend that democratic socialization requires an “unlearning” of political behavior emphasized by the old regime coupled with an adaptation to new institutions, allowing citizens to adequately compare their two political lives. They find that citizens who lived in the most repressive former Communist countries were more likely to reject undemocratic alternatives than those former Communist countries where repression was less severe.

Appendix

FIGURE A: FREEDOM HOUSE SCORES BY COUNTRY (RE-ELECTED)						
Year	Argentina	Brazil	Colombia	Nicaragua	Peru	Venezuela
1974	4	4	2	4	6	2
1975	4	5	3	4	4	2
1976	5	5	3	5	4	2
1977	6	5	3	5	4	2
1978	5	4	3	5	4	2
1979	5	3	3	5	4	2
1980	5	3	3	5	3	2
1981	5	3	3	5	3	2
1982	5	3	3	5	3	2
1983	3	3	3	5	3	2
1984	2	2	3	5	3	2
1985	2	2	3	5	3	2
1986	1	2	3	6	3	2
1987	1	2	3	5	3	2
1988	1	3	3	4	3	2
1989	2	2	4	5	4	3
1990	3	3	4	3	4	3
1991	3	3	4	3	5	3
1992	3	3	4	3	5	3
1993	3	4	4	5	5	3
1994	3	4	4	5	4	3
1995	3	4	4	4	4	3
1996	3	4	4	3	3	3
1997	3	4	4	3	4	3
1998	3	4	4	3	4	3
1999	3	4	4	3	4	4
2000	2	3	4	3	4	5
2001	3	3	4	3	3	5
2002	3	3	4	3	3	4
2003	2	3	4	3	3	4
2004	2	3	4	3	3	4
2005	2	2	3	3	3	4
2006	2	2	3	3	3	4
2007	2	2	3	3	3	4
2008	2	2	4	3	3	4
2009	2	2	4	3	3	4
2010	2	2	4	4	3	5

FIGURE B: FREEDOM HOUSE SCORES BY COUNTRY (REJECTED)					
Year	Costa Rica	Ecuador	Guatemala	Haiti	Nicaragua
1974	1	4	3	6	4
1975	1	4	3	6	4
1976	1	4	3	6	5
1977	1	4	4	6	5
1978	1	4	4	6	5
1979	1	2	5	6	5
1980	1	2	6	6	5
1981	1	2	6	6	5
1982	1	2	6	6	5
1983	1	2	6	6	5
1984	1	2	6	6	5
1985	1	3	4	6	5
1986	1	3	3	4	6
1987	1	3	3	5	5
1988	1	3	3	5	4
1989	1	2	3	5	5
1990	1	2	4	4	3
1991	1	3	5	7	3
1992	1	3	5	7	3
1993	2	3	5	7	5
1994	2	3	5	5	5
1995	2	3	5	5	4
1996	2	4	4	5	3
1997	2	3	4	5	3
1998	2	3	4	5	3
1999	2	3	4	5	3
2000	2	3	4	5	3
2001	2	3	4	6	3
2002	2	3	4	6	3
2003	2	3	4	6	3
2004	1	3	4	6	3
2005	1	3	4	6	3
2006	1	3	4	6	3
2007	1	3	4	5	3
2008	1	3	4	5	3
2009	1	3	4	5	3
2010	1	3	4	5	4

CASES BROUGHT BEFORE THE IACHR (http://www.cidh.oas.org/annual.eng.htm):

ARGENTINA:

1985-1 (the rights of presumption of innocence), 1986-0, 1987-0, 1988-2 (freedom of association), 1989-3 (right to a fair trial, right to free and fair police investigation, right to freedom of thought and expression), 1990-6 (five cases of illegal detention and/or unlawful deprivation of liberty and extortion, equal protection and right to property), 1991-3 (two cases involve fair trial and judicial protection, rights to judicial guarantees and freedom of expression), 1992-2 (violation of the rights to judicial guarantees and freedom of expression, right to a fair trial), 1993-0, 1994-7 (two cases involving the censorship of journalists, five cases involving the right to a fair trial), 1995-2 (held in custody without a sentence, illegal detention and torture).

BRAZIL:

1984-0, 1985-0, 1986-0, 1987-0, 1988-1(1right to fair trial and judicial protection), 1989-0, 1990-0, 1991-2(right to fair trial and judicial protection), 1992-2(due process, and judicial protection), 1993-2(due process, and judicial protection, (freedom of thought and expression), 1994-2(one for the right of protection from arbitrary arrest, one against police brutality).

COLOMBIA:

1981-0, 1982-13(13 cases of illegal detentions), 1983-0, 1984-1(arbitrary detention),1985-1 (right to assemble and form a political party), 1986: 1(violation of right to property), 1987-20(20 cases of unlawful seizure and detainment, judicial guarantees and protections), 1988-40(39 cases of police brutality and harassment, some of which led to death, 1 case of illegal detention), 1990-43(lack of judicial protections or guarantees, led to disappearances).

COSTA RICA:

1984-1989: 9 total (all deal with the right to a fair trial), 1990-1992-0 total, 1993-1(right to a fair trial), 1994-0.

ECUADOR:

1979-1984: 0 total, 1985-3(citizens were arrested and held incommunicado), 1986-0, 1987-1(and the right to due process and judicial protection), 1988-0.

GUATEMALA:

1985-0, 1986- 21(detained illegally and arbitrary arrest), 1987-4(detained illegally and arbitrary arrest), 1988-0, 1989-2(illegal detention, 1990-2(lack of judicial guarantees), 1991-2(arbitrary arrest and lack of impartial trial), 1992-1(freedom of association), 1993-7(police intimidation and harassment, denial of legal protection, police brutality, two cases of freedom of association), 1994-2(unlawful detention, intimidation), 1995-1(lack of judicial guarantees).

NICARAGUA:

A) Violeta Chamorro

1985-1, 1986-1(judicial guarantees), 1987-1992- 0 total, 1993-1(fair trial, freedom of association), 1994-1995-0 total.

B) Daniel Ortega:

2002-1(irregularities and the failure to render a final judgment in the criminal proceedings), 2004- 1(violation of due process), 2007-1(free and fair trial and lack of judicial protection). In Freedom House's "Freedom of the Press 2011" publication, the organization claims that Ortega targets the independent press, frequently uses libel laws against journalists, and some has barred some journalists from covering certain stories. There were few reports of physical attacks against journalists, but media organizations were subject to harassment by both government and private actors (http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/nicaragua). The US State Department's "Country Report on Human Rights Practices" for nearly every year of Ortega's rule has cited the following violations in Nicaragua: the occasional unlawful killings by security forces, harsh and overcrowded prisons, increasing violence against women, discrimination against ethnic minorities and indigenous communities, unlawful arrests and harassment by police, and limitations on free speech and media (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160471.pdf).

PERU:

1986-44(all cases of illegal detention and lack of judicial guarantees, some led to death), 1989-1(illegal detention and lack of judicial guarantees), March 1990-2(illegal detention and unlawful arrest); April 1990-1 (torture), June 1990-1(illegal detention). The cases in 1986 stem from the former administration's repressive tactics in its activities conducted to eliminate *Sendero Luminoso*.
**Start of Fujimori's time in office: July 1990-2(both cases during Fujimori's rule and involve the right to judicial protection), 1991-3(two for the right to personal liberty, one for the right to due process of law and the right to judicial protection), 1992-6(one for the right to equal protection before the law, two cases were arbitrary detention and subsequent holding incommunicado, one arbitrary removal from office, two for the right to a fair trial), 1993-1 (violated the right to private property, the right to a fair trial and the right to judicial protection), 1994-5(the right to a fair trial, and the right to judicial protection). Human Rights Watch in their 1992 report "Peru: Civil Society and Democracy under Fire" detail the many abuses in 1991 and 1992 and highlight arbitrary detentions, censorship and intimidation of the press, and numerous other, more violent physical abuses. In a July 1995 report, the organization claimed that "not a single person charged with terrorism or treason in Peru since new laws were implemented in 1992 has received a fair trial (1995:2).

VENEZUELA:

1993-1(Freedom of Thought and Expression), 1994-2 (both violating the rights to a fair trial), 1995-1 (the right to a fair trial), 1996-0, 1997-0, 1998-0, 1999-4(the right to a fair trial and the right to due process), 2000-1(right to freedom of thought and expression). The US State Department reported that security forces regularly made use of arbitrary detentions; tortured and abused detainees during arrests, the government frequently pressured the media (including verbal

and physical attacks on journalists) but did not censor books, films, internet access, academic freedom (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/835.htm). The government's security forces did, however, violent quell student demonstrations (in 1999).

FREEDOM HOUSE:

Freedom of expression and belief (independent media, academic freedom, religious freedom), associational rights (assembly, demonstration, public discussion, free trade unions), protection from unjustified imprisonment, exile or torture? Right to own property, personal social freedoms, free from economic exploitation.

http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2011/checklist-questions-and-guidelines

LATINOBAROMETRO QUESTIONS:

Economic Success

In general, how would you describe the present economic situation of the country? Would you say that it is very good, good, about average, bad, or very bad?

[1] Very good
[2] Good
[3] Neither good nor bad
[4] Bad
[5] Very bad
[8] Don't know (don't read)
[0] No answer

In general, how would you describe your present economic situation and that of your family? Would you say that it is very good, good, about average, bad or very bad?

[1] Very good
[2] Good
[3] About average
[4] Bad
[5] Very bad
[8] Don't know (don't read)
[0] No answer

Social Ills

From the list of issues that I am going to read out to you do you think they have increased a lot or a little, or have decreased a lot or a little or have remained the same in the last 5 years?

Crime:

[1] Have increased a lot

[2] Have increased a little

[3] Have remained the same

[4] Have decreased a little

[5] Have decreased a lot

[8] Don't know (don't read)

[0] No answer

4) Lack of Institutional Efficiency—Corruption

From the list of issues that I am going to read out to you do you think they have increased a lot or a little, or have decreased a lot or a little or have remained the same in the last 5 years?

Corruption:

[1] Have increased a lot

[2] Have increased a little

[3] Have remained the same

[4] Have decreased a little

[5] Have decreased a lot

[8] Don't know (don't read)

[0] No answer

5) Political Culture Arguments

a) Which of the following statements do you agree with most?

[1] Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government

[2] In certain situations, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one

[3] To people like me, it doesn't matter whether we have a democratic government or a non-democratic government

[8] Don't know (don't read)

[0] No answer

b) In your opinion, which of these things would you say is the most important? And which is the next most important?

[1] Maintain the nation's order

[2] Increase the participation of citizens in important government decisions

[3] Beat price rises

[4] Protect freedom of speech

[8] Don't know (don't read)

[0] No answer

Bibliography:

Booth, John A. 1998. "Electoral observation and democratic transition in Nicaragua." Electoral observation and democratic transitions in Latin America. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.

Booth, John A. and Patricia Bayer Richard. 1997. "The Nicaraguan elections of October 1996." *Electoral Studies* 16, 3:386-393.

Brinks, Daniel. 2008. The Judicial Response to Police Killings in Latin America: inequality and the Rule of Law. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brysk, Alison. 2009. *Global good Samaritans: human rights as foreign policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brysk, Alison. 1994. "The Politics of Measurement: The Contested Count of the Disappeared in Argentina." *Human Rights Quarterly*. 16, 4: 676-692.

Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 2010. "Structural Reform and Governability: The Brazilian Experience in the 1990s" in *Democratic governance in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

Carrion, Julio F. 2009. "The Persistent Attraction of Populism in the Andes," in *Latin American Democracy: Emerging Reality or Endangered Species?*, edited by Richard L. Millett, Jennifer S. Holmes and Orland J. Perez. New York: Routledge.

Carter Center. 2011. *The November 2011 Elections in Nicaragua: Study Mission Report.* Atlanta: The Carter Center.

Carter Center and Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government. 1997. *The Observation of the 1996 Nicaraguan Elections*. Atlanta:The Carter Center.

Castañeda, Jorge G. 2000. *Perpetuating power: how Mexican presidents were chosen*. New York: New Press.

Chaffee, Wilber Albert. 2009. "Brazil" in Politics of Latin America: the Power Game, edited by Harry E Vanden and Gary Prevost, 3rd edition. New York: Oxford University Press.

Conniff, Michael. 1999. "Brazil's Populist Republic and Beyond," in *Populism in Latin America*, edited by Michael L. Conniff. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.

Diamond, Larry. 2009. *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free SocietiesThroughout the World*. New York: Times Books, 2008.

Diamond, Larry. 2002. "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes." *Journal of Democracy.* 13,2: 21-35.

Diamond, Larry and Juan J. Linz. 1989. "Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy In Latin America," in *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Domínguez, Jorge I., and James A. McCann. 1998. *Democratizing Mexico: public opinion and electoral choices*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Eisenstadt, Todd A. 2004. *Courting democracy in Mexico: party strategies and electoral institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elklit, Jørgen and Palle Svensson. 1997. "What Makes Elections Free and Fair?" *Journal of Democracy* 8: 32–46.

Echegaray, Fabián. 2005. *Economic crises and electoral responses in Latin America*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Ellner, Steve. 2003. The Contrasting Variants of Hugo Chavez and Alberto Fujimori.*Journal of Latin American Studies*. 35, 1: 139-162.

European Union. 2011. "Misión de Observación Electoral Nicaragua 2011: Declaración preliminar,"November 8, 2011, accessed on February 14, 2011, http://www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/other/moeue-nicaragua-preliminar-08112011_es.pdf

Freedom House. 2012. "Nicaragua: Freedom of the Press 2011," http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/nicaragua, accessed 2/13/2012.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" *The National Interest*. Summer 1989: 1-18.

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?" *Annual Review of Political Science.* 2 (1).

Hansen, Roger. 1974. *The Politics of Mexican Development*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hartlyn, Jonathan, Jennifer McCoy and Thomas Mustillo. 2003. "The 'Quality of Elections' in Contemporary Latin America: Issues in Measurement and Explanation." Paper prepared for delivery at the XXIV International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Dallas, Texas, March 27-29, 2003.

Hawkins, Kirk. 2003. "Populism in Venezuela: The Rise of Chavismo." *Third WorldQuarterly* 24, 6: 1137-1160.

Human Rights Watch. 1995. "Peru: The Two Faces of Justice." *News from Americas Watch*. 7, 9: 1-52.

Human Rights Watch. 1992. "Peru: Civil Society and Democracy under Fire." *News from Americas Watch*. 4, 6: 1-33.

Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late TwentiethCentury* . Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

IFES. 1995. *Peru: April 1995 Electoral Assessment*. Washington: IFES.

IPSOS. 1995. "Aprobación de Alberto Fujimori como Presidente de la Republica." Lima: Apoyo Opinión y Mercado S.A.

Kline, Harvey F. 1995. *Colombia: democracy under assault*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Kornblith, Miriam, and Vinay Jawahar. 2005. "Elections versus Democracy". *Journal of Democracy.* 16, 1: 124-137.

Krastev, Ivan. 2006. "New Threats to Freedom. Democracy's Doubles". *Journal of Democracy*. 17, 2: 52-62

Krennerich, Michael. 2005. "Nicaragua" in Elections *in the Americas: A Data Handbook, Volume 1 (North America, Central America, and the Caribbean)*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Latin American Studies Association (LASA). 1995. "The 1995 Electoral Process in Peru: A Delegation Report of the Latin American Studies Association." Pittsburgh, PA: LASA.

Lehoucq, Fabrice Edouard. 1994. "The Costa Rican General Elections of 6 February 1994," *Electoral Studies*, 69-72.

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism" *Journal of Democracy*. 13,2: 51-65.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1994. *Political man: the social bases of politics*. Baltimore: Hopkins.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for autocracy: hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Manzetti, Luigi and Carole Wilson. 2009. "Why do corrupt governments maintain public support" in *Corruption & democracy in Latin America*, edited by CharlesBlake and Stephen D. Morris. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Moreno, Erika. 2011. "Colombia's 2010 presidential and legislative election" *Electoral Studies* 30: 571–575.

Munck, Gerardo L. and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices". *Comparative Political Studies* 35, 5: 5-34

Neuman, Laura and Jennifer McCoy. 2001. *Observing Political Change in Venezuela: The Bolivarian Constitution and 2000 Elections.* Atlanta: The Carter Center.

Nohlen, Dieter. 2005a. Elections *in the Americas: A Data Handbook, Volume 1 (North America, Central America, and the Caribbean).* New York: Oxford University Press.

Nohlen, Dieter. 2005b. Elections *in the Americas: A Data Handbook, Volume 2 (South America).* New York: Oxford University Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*. 5, 1:55-69.

Organization of American States (OAS). 2011. "OAS Permanent Council Hears Reports by Electoral Missions in Guatemala and Nicaragua," November 15, 2011, accessed February 14, 2012, http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-958/11.

OAS. 2010. *Informe Final de la Misión de Observación Electoral de la OEA sobre la elección presidencial y segunda vuelta presidencial celebradas en la Republica de Colombia el 30 de mayo y el 20 de junio de 2010*. Washington: OAS.

OAS. 2000. *Electoral Observation Mission in Venezuela: 200 General Elections*. Washington: OAS.

Pastor, Robert A. 1998. Mediating elections. *Journal of Democracy*. 1: 154-163.

Przeworski, Adam. 2000. *Democracy and development: political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990*. Cambridge [U.K.]: Cambridge University Press.

Remmer, Karen. 2010. "Political Scale and Electoral Turnout: Evidence From the Less Industrialized World." *Comparative Political Studies* 43(3)275-303

Roberts, Kenneth. 2003. "Social Correlates of Party System Demise and Populist Resurgence in Venezuela." *Latin American Politics and Society* 45, 3: 35-57.

Roberts, Kenneth M., and Erik Wibbels. 1999. "Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations". *American Political Science Review*. 93 (3).

Roldan, Mary. 2010. "Maintaining democracy in Colombia through political exclusion, states of exception, counterinsurgency, and dirty war," in *Violent Democracies in Latin America*, edited by Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein. Durham: Duke University Press.

Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. Democracy and its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies. Cornwall: Polity Press.

Rueda, María Isabel. 1990. "¿Quién gana quién pierde?" *Semana*, March 19, 1990, accessed February 8, 2012, http://www.semana.com/opinion/encuestas-quien-gana-quien-pierde/47327-3.aspx

Schedler, Andreas. 2002. "The Menu of Manipulation". *Journal of Democracy*. 13, 2: 36-50.

Schmidt, G. D. 2000. "Delegative Democracy in Peru? Fujimori's 1995 Landslide and the Prospects for 2000". *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*. 42: 99–132.

Semana. 1989. "Y ahora, ¿Qué?" September 25, 1989, accessed February 8, 2012, http://www.semana.com/especiales/ahora/27088-3.aspx

Semana, 1990a. "Los muertos que vos matáis," February 26, 1990, accessed February 8, 2012, http://www.semana.com/nacion/muertos-matais/46639-3.aspx

Semana, 1990b. ¿Fujimori o Harakiri? May 28, 1990, accessed February 8, 2012, http://www.semana.com/nacion/fujimori-harakiri/46983-3.aspx

Smith, Peter H. 2005. *Democracy in Latin America: political change in comparative perspective*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Stokes, Susan C. 2001. *Mandates and Democracies, Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Szusterman, Celia. 1995. "The 1995 Argentine Elections" *Electoral Studies* 109-116.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2004. *Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizen's Democracy*. New York: United Nations.

US Department of State. 2012. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices," http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/, accessed 2/14/2012.

Vanden, Harry E., and Gary Prevost. 2009. *Politics of Latin America: the power game*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." *Foreign Affairs*. 76: 22-43.