

Nemoto January 28, 2007

Divided Government, Internal Party Structure, and Policy Consequences:  
Distributional Politics in Korea, 1989-2005\*

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January 28, 2007

Abstract

How political factors affect the patterns of regional redistribution has been increasingly drawing scholarly attention. However, the role the executive office could play has been relatively ignored in this literature. We argue that the president with his regional preferences and the power to intervene in the budget-making process can be an influential factor in redistribution, and how he/she affects the overall outcomes could be dependent upon divided government and legislators' autonomy from party leaders. With a panel of all the municipalities in Korea from 1989 to 2005, we found that the Korean president could exert influence over redistributional spending patterns according to its regional preferences in general, especially when he/she has no constraint from outside and inside his/her party. When the Korean president is in the divided government situation, he/she needs to cut monetary benefits to his supporters in districts and the legislature. The president's preferences over regional redistribution weakened after 2000, suggesting that legislators got more autonomous with open primaries and more accountable to their voters and the result is the president's losing his/her position in this redistributional game.

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\* I have benefited comments and encouragements from Jong Sung You, Megumi Naoi, and Chihyun Chong and data collection support from Seunghyun Cho and Sangbaec Lee. I thank Horiuchi and Lee (2006) for inspiring this work.

## I. Introduction

How political factors affect the patterns of regional redistribution has been increasingly drawing scholarly attention. A wide array of theoretical and empirical literature has devoted a considerable effort to the study of this process: Ames (1995) on Brazil, Balla et al (2002), Bickers and Stein (1996, 2005), Evans (1994), Lee (2003), and Levitt and Snyder (1995) on the US, Calvo and Murillo (2004) on Argentina, Case (2001) on Albania, Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Johansson (2003) on Sweden, Herron and Theodos (2004) on Illinois, and Horiuchi and Saito (2003) on Japan. The primary attention has been paid on individuals, political groups, and their electoral and policy-seeking incentives. It is not surprising that the existing literature has placed its analytical focus exclusively on the legislative body, which in general governs the overall lawmaking process, especially in parliamentary regimes.

However, the executive office could also play a very crucial role in the budget making process. In the US, for example, the president can send a proposal to the Congress for budget allocation to an agency, and then the Congress decides whether it should approve it, amend it, or discard it in anticipation of presidential veto (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988). Presidents can also promote their legislative influence by mobilizing public appeals from society; Canes-Wrone (2001) shows that presidents succeed in increasing the budget share for their pet policies when they promote the issues in a nationally televised speech. Despite these theoretical and empirical findings, presidential influence over redistribution is rarely analyzed, except Larcinese et al (2006), who find that states that heavily supported the incumbent

president in past presidential elections tend to receive more funds. How can the executive office exert its influence over budget making and redistribution? Are there any regular patterns? What political factors give impact on those patterns, if any? These are fundamental research questions to be answered in this essay.

Our argument throughout this essay is that it is reasonable to assume that the president can be an influential factor in redistribution, but how he/she affects the overall outcomes could be dependent upon two factors – divided government and legislators' autonomy from party leaders. A president monopolizing the agenda setting power in budget making tends to be able to allocate monetary benefits to municipalities based on the strategic calculations of various political factors. One of those calculations is the previous electoral results, which the president uses as a proxy to determine targets. Another is alignment with the president: presidential followers in the legislature should generally have more access to government privileges. However, these presidential influences can wane in two phases: first, when the ruling coalition cannot contain a united majority in the legislative body, it cannot promote legislation that would harm the opposition's support bases and thus needs to provide opposing members with some compensations; and second, as the endorsing process is democratized by open competition, legislators get more autonomous from the president and thus he/she cannot discretionarily use the strategic calculations over monetary redistribution.

This argument will be tested with the sample from all the local municipalities in Korea between

1989 and 2005. Korea is the best suited to this study as the country has the centralized financial structure with the executive office exclusively holding the budgeting power. In addition, the country has been recently experiencing a transition to a more programmatic party system with the empowerment of civil society and the expanded introduction of open primaries for National Assembly candidates. The country also provides good settings for natural experiments, as divided government with a single opposition party holding a majority (2003-04), divided government with the opposition fragmented (1989-90 and 2001-02), and unified government (1991-2000 and 2005) alternated with the non-concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections.

The results are confirmatory to these theoretical predictions. First, besides socioeconomic considerations, monetary benefits from Seoul are directed to those areas politically critical to the president: municipalities get more funds if they are the incumbent president's strongholds, and if they contain relatively more legislators from presidential parties.<sup>1</sup> Second, however, these presidential factors are moderated with two factors: first, when a new type of political competition emerged after the 2000 National Assembly election, the president's calculations based on the number of votes lost their significance; and second, when a presidential coalition could not dominate the legislative body with a majority, the incumbent president's strongholds had to see their benefits cut.

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<sup>1</sup> Note that the president's strongholds tend to elect more presidential followers: The incumbent president's vote share and the share of presidential party members to National Assembly members in a given municipality are moderately correlated at 0.55. Thus we run separate models to avoid the multicollinearity problem.

This essay is comprised as the following. The second section will review theoretical arguments on redistribution, and how the presidential factor should come in to this process will be presented. The third section will delve into the Korean context, shedding the light on which factors should be significant under which occasions. Theoretical predictions will be presented and tested in the fourth section, followed by the concluding section, which will discuss the generalizability of the argument and findings and the future work to be done.

## **II. Divided Government, Internal Party Structure**

The literature on redistribution has been in bloom for decades. The debate has been so far focused on how individual legislators and political parties allocate selective goods, typically local public goods targeted at specific geographic areas. In a formal model presented by Cox and McCubbins (1986), for example, legislators are assumed to maximize their votes and will engage in allocating exclusive benefits to their core voters. A wide array of empirical findings has been presented to test the implications from these models in different contexts. Against the background of the development in the congressional studies, the redistribution literature has seen the most advanced development in the US context (e.g. Bickers and Stein 1996, 2005; Evans 1994; Lee 2003; Levitt and Snyder 1995), while significant advance has been made also outside the US context (e.g. Balla et al 2002; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Case 2001; Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Horiuchi and Saito 2003; Johansson 2003; McGillivray 2004).

Surprisingly, the empirical models to date have lacked the attention to the presidential factor in this redistributive game. The analytical focus has been exclusively on the legislature, which is understandable when considering the fact that the theoretical models were first developed with the US as a model case in mind – a country where, compared to other presidential countries, legislators exert substantial influence over budget allocation of earmarked projects through various entrenched committees. This exclusive focus on legislators might stem from the view that pork barrel politics, the electoral connection, and personal vote have been dominant ideas in the lawmaking process (Ferejohn 1974; Mayhew 1972; Cain et al 1987).

However, we argue that the president matters. This should hold if two assumptions are tenable – and actually the two assumptions are not so strong (cf. McCarty 2000). First, the president has some regional preferences over allocation of spending. The president is the head of the state and represents all the citizens in theory, but he/she might be elected through an election regionally skewed to some extent. When this is the case, he/she has rational reasons to allocate some portion of the national budget to his/her preferred targets (Larcinese et al 2006). Second, the president has the power to intervene in the policymaking process. Shugart and Carey's (1992) taxonomy on presidential regimes is useful in this point. Depending on various types of constitutionally provided presidential powers – exclusive rights to propose bills, especially budgets; veto and overriding; partial veto; and executive decree authority – the executive may be able to exert strong influence over the making of laws and budgets (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988;

Canes-Wrone 2001).

The above point leads to our argument throughout this essay: the executive should exert influence over redistributive spending patterns according to its regional preferences when it has relatively autonomous power, while such influence should be constrained by the executive-legislative relationship. The president can be constrained by two factors: divided government and internal party structure, which will be explored next.

First, we argue that a president should have difficulties in legislating policies when his/her party cannot form a majority in the legislature. Thus in this case he/she might want to make some concessions to the opposing parties, either by providing policy benefits to them or by reducing government privileges given to his/her followers to show conciliatory attitudes. It is true that whether divided government really gives any impact on legislative outcomes has been a matter of debate in the US context without empirical and theoretical consensus (Binder 1999, 2003; Coleman 1999; Edwards et al 1997; Kelly 1993; Mayhew 2005; McCubbins 1991). However, we see that this gap between the intuitive theoretical prediction and empirical patterns is partly caused by the definitional problem of what "important" legislations are. By primarily focusing on a straightforward, objective measure of redistribution of subsidies from the central government to local municipalities, a policy area in which a zero-sum conflict between presidential followers and the opposition force would be expected, we will be able to avoid this definitional problem.

Second, when parties are not so strongly united inside, a president as a party leader again has problems in persuading individual legislators to vote for his/her bills. If cross-voting against the majority will of parties is not so costly for individual legislators, the president might have to buy off legislative members by providing policy benefits (Alston and Mueller 2006; Evans 2004; Pereira and Mueller 2004). Legislators' incentives to vote against the will of their parties are facilitated by legislators' incentives for vote, policy, and office (Hix 2004; Nemoto et al forthcoming). For example, intraparty competition caused by open primaries, open-rule PR, and other electoral rules lead some legislators to engage in disloyal behaviors that would be costly otherwise (Carey 2007).

In sum, we can now make our theoretical propositions.

- P1. The executive should leverage its power over legislation to exert influence over redistributive spending patterns according to its regional preferences.
- P2. Divided government is one of the factors that should constrain the president by forcing him/her to make some compromise with the opposition force and/or to buy off legislative support from part of the opposition.
- P3. Decentralized, democratized internal party structure is another factor that should constrain the president by making individual legislators autonomous from his/her incentives for regional redistribution.



### III. Korean Context

#### 1. Presidential Factor in Korea

With the three theoretical propositions in mind, we now move on to the Korean presidency and its relevance to our case. The first question to be asked is whether the Korean president has regional preferences over allocation of selective goods. Our answer would be definite yes. Regionalism has been one of the critical factors in shaping political cleavages in Korea (Choi 1993; Cho 1998; Moon 2005). Empirical findings to date, although limited compared to other countries, are confirmatory to the assumption that the president has regional preferences in allocating monetary benefits (Kwon 2005; Horiuchi and Lee 2006).

The actual electoral results vividly show that regionalism is persistent in voters' behavior. Table 1 shows the vote shares of the two best presidential candidates in each metropolitan city (*teukbyeolshi* and *kwangyeokshi*) and province (*do*) from the 1987 to the 2002 presidential elections. The table shows that Kim Dae Jung continued to gain overwhelming shares of around 90% in his regions – Gwangju and Jeolla-do –, while his opponents only gained meager shares of less than 5% in the same region.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the table shows that Lee successfully inherited the conservative support bases from his predecessors, Roh Tae Woo from Daegu in Gyeongsangbuk-do and Kim Young Sam from Geoje, an island

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<sup>2</sup> Note that although not shown in Table 1, KDJ run in the 1987 election and similarly gained 85-90% of votes in his region.

near Busan in Gyeongsangnam-do. Although Lee was not from this conservative region, Lee could gather fairly huge amounts of votes there, with the margin of around 40-60 percent points against his competitors. These overall regional patterns did not disappear in the 2002 election, even though Roh Moo Hyun, the successor of Kim Dae Jung, emphasized the advantage of his Busan origin: The regional skewedness of the two's votes and vote margins stayed at the same level.

The second question that needs to be considered is whether the Korean president can intervene in the legislative process. Again, our answer would be positive. Constitutionally, the Korean president can initiate bills through the State Council (The ROK Constitution, Article 88 (3)) and veto any bills proposed by the legislature, and overriding a veto requires a two-third majority in the National Assembly (Article 53). The president has the exclusive power to formulate an annual budget, while the National Assembly can only approve it and when it cannot approve it the executive can disburse funds conforming to the budget of the previous fiscal year (Article 54). The legislature cannot neither increase the budget nor create any new items submitted without consent from president (Article 57). The president can issue decrees within the scope specifically defined in law (Article 75).

The term limit of the Korean president, combined with these preferences and formal powers, is expected to further drive the behavior. With the fixed term of five years, the Korean president cannot be reelected; he/she may only need to pursue compensating his/her followers without a much strategic thought on his/her successors. If the president could act without any constraint in the making of bills

and budgets, then he/she should allocate more money to his/her loyal supporters – core voters and core rank-and-file members in his/her own party – fairly discretionarily.<sup>3</sup>

## 2. Divided Government and Internal Party Structure in Korea

Given these powers of a Korean president, does divided government (*bunjeom jeongbu*) bother him/her? In fact, there is no theoretical consensus on this and it can be an empirical question. The weak nature of the Korean legislature and able administrative bureaucrats combined with a series of the constitutional powers lead some Korean scholars to cast skeptical views on the availability of effective checks and balances between the executive and legislature. With the relatively high share of newcomers to the assembly in every election, the weak committee system, and the limited staff resources, legislators in Korea were said to be passive and ineffective (Kang 2003; Kim and Jang 2001; Lee 2002; Lim 2005; O 2004; Park 2000, 2003).

Meanwhile, another group of scholars see that divided government should bring about a political chaos in which different branches engage in bitter political competition with each other for some policy issues (e.g. Jaung 2000, 2001), and the result is the governability crisis represented by the decreasing approval ratio of president toward the end of the term (Mo 2002). The history after the democratization in 1987 is also confirmatory to the view that the president with the minority status actually had

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<sup>3</sup> Kim (2000) notes that, despite his pledge to breaking away from regionalism, Kim Dae Jung actually privileged bureaucrats and politicians from his own land – the Jeolla area.

policymaking problems and thus had to step up efforts to gain a majority: For example, when Roh Tae Woo could not secure a majority in the National Assembly, in order to address this legislative problem, Roh merged his party with the two opposition parties to form a united majority. Similar events could be found in 1992, 1996, 1998, and 2005, when the presidents approached the opposition force to achieve the majority status in the legislative body.

The point is that, even if the Korean executive office possesses enormous administrative and formal resources, it has to forge enough support from the legislature to get bills and budgets passed. This is why the executive oftentimes faces difficulties in dealing with some policy issues and different presidents sought ways to secure the majority status in the assembly. The gap between the intuition drawn from theoretical implications and the empirical question will be bridged by analyzing a purely zero-sum policy area given the budget constraint.

Another proposition that needs to be considered in light of the Korean context is whether the internal party structure in Korea gives autonomy to individual legislators. The electoral system before 2004 was a majoritarian one, as single-member districts (SMDs) comprised 224 to 253 of the total seats, while the remaining seats (46 to 75) were proportionally divided according to how many seats each party won in SMDs and given as a "bonus." The 2004 election employed the new two-ballot mixed-member system, whereby 243 were elected from SMDs and 56 from a nation-wide closed-list proportional representation bloc. Despite this change, the overall trend has not changed: still 80% of legislators are

elected from SMDs.

SMDs are known as cultivating personal vote (Cain et al 1987), and Korea is not an exception in this regard (Yoon 2002). However, with nomination procedures highly centralized in a few party bosses at least before 2000, individual backbenchers could not be autonomous from leaders (Hong 2000). This suggests that the followers of the president as a party boss were highly appreciated, possibly with substantial benefits from Seoul. Reflecting this point, saying no to any policy positions decided by party leaders was virtually impossible (Jin et al 2002).

The situation favorable to the autonomy of individual legislators gradually started to emerge from 2000, with two exogenously originated events that were hardly traced from individual legislators or party leaders. One event was the empowered civil society's engagement in electoral activities: In an attempt to encourage the better accountability of legislators to their constituents and to eliminate the traditional corrupt relationship between politicians and core supporters, a federation of 460 civic groups disclosed in January 2000 the list of 102 National Assembly candidates that they believed would not be endorsed in the coming 2000 election to be held in April. Of the 102, 48 could not receive endorsements from the parties. Furthermore, the federation again disclosed the list of 86 candidates that should not come back to the assembly. This blackballing activity (*Nakcheon Undong* and *Nakseon Undong*) left a considerable impact on the elections, as 59 in the final list could not be reelected (Kim 2000). Another event was politicians' counter-response to the civil society's demands for the better accountability: the introduction of

open, fair, and democratized nomination procedures. The ruling Millennium Democratic Party was first to introduce an open primary (*kyeongseon*) for a presidential candidate in the 2002 election. Open primaries are now considerably widely used by each of the major parties: for example in the 2004 election, 34.2% of the Uri Party's candidates were elected from open primaries and 61.4% of the candidates elected through the open process won the elections (Jeon 2005).

With these changes exogenously introduced to the internal party structure after 2000, slight but important changes have evolved in party discipline. In a stark comparison to a work done three years ago by Jin et al (2002), Lee (2005) shows that the parties increasingly allow cross voting by legislators. The implication is that in terms of budget policymaking as well, legislators may leverage their newly given autonomy to constrain the president's discretionary decisions.

In sum, we have seen that the Korean president should have regional preferences over allocation of selective goods to municipalities, and he/she should possess the wide-ranging constitutional and administrative powers to intervene in the legislative process. However, divided government and legislators' autonomy could constrain the president's incentives for regional redistribution in the Korean context. Here we reach three hypotheses to test:

H1. As an overall trend, the Korean president would exert influence over redistributive spending patterns according to its regional preferences: *The larger number of the incumbent*

*president's supporters, in terms of both voting and legislating, in an area, the larger amounts of money the area should receive.*

H2. The Korean president with a minority in the legislature would have to moderate his/her regional strategy as he/she has to make some compromise with the opposition force. Given the budget constraint, we would expect: *With divided government, the larger number of the incumbent president's supporters in an area, the smaller amounts of money it will receive.*

H3. After 2000, the president's influences over regional redistribution would be moderated, as legislators got more autonomous from the president: *With the increasing autonomy of legislators, even the president with a majority would not be able to allocate money according to his/her vote shares; rather, the partisanship would matter much more.*

#### **IV. Data Analysis**

##### 1. Unit of analysis

The data analysis will assume the following equation:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta X_{ij} + \gamma Z_{ij} + \delta_i + e_{ij}$$

where  $Y$  is our main dependent variable to be explained below,  $X$  is a set of our major independent

variables,  $Z$  is a set of controls,  $\beta$  and  $\gamma$  are sets of estimators,  $\delta$  is the random or fixed effect, and  $e$  is the residual. Unit of analysis ( $ij$ ) is defined here as a municipality-year: city (*shi*), county (*gun*), and ward (*gu*, of metropolitan cities); and the observed period is from 1989 to 2005.<sup>4</sup> As of 2005, there are 232 municipalities.<sup>5</sup> The models we used are random-effect or fixed-effect time-series models.<sup>6</sup>

## 2. Dependent Variable

The main dependent variable to be tested is the logarithm of the total amount of subsidies per capita each municipality received from Seoul in a given year for both general and special accounts (*ilban* and *tenkbyeol hwegyeye*). As Figure 1 shows, the amounts weighted with the total population in the municipality have great variations. The top beneficiary in this redistributive game is Ulleung-gun, a county made of small islands 270km away from Pohang. The county with only 9,550 residents received 10.9 million won per capita. The worst is Seocho-gu in Seoul, where one person received only 50,000 won. As the distribution is somewhat skewed – a majority of the municipalities received less than two million won per capita while only a handful gained more than six million won per capita –, the value is logarithmically

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<sup>4</sup> Note that this is the fiscal year, whose budget is legislated in the end of the last calendar year.

<sup>5</sup> Note that 139 municipalities in the sample experienced during the period mergers, abolitions and consolidations, and separations. Some municipalities disappeared during the period because of mergers or abolitions, while other municipalities were newly created during the period. Thus the panel is unbalanced in nature. Refer to the Appendix 1 for how units are defined.

<sup>6</sup> Although not shown in the models, we include year dummies for 1989 to 2005. Testing time-series models for fixing the municipality-specific effect is ideal, but as many variables are unchanged during the observed period (e.g. the president's vote share cannot be changed for five years), fixed-effect models are not very efficient in this case. Thus the results are complemented with random-effect models.



transformed. The data is from various issues of *Jibang Jaejeong Yeongam* [Local Finance Yearbook] published annually by the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs.

### 3. Independent Variables

Our main independent variables are (i) the president's vote share; (ii) the share of presidential party members to legislators elected in a municipality; and (iii) a dummy for divided government. A fairly straightforward measure, the president's vote share is the share of the incumbent president's votes in a given municipality. Our general prediction about this variable is positive, but how it works is conditional upon the relationship between the executive and legislative bodies. The data is from the National Election Commission of Korea (<http://www.nec.go.kr/>).<sup>7</sup>

The share of presidential party members to legislators elected in a municipality measures the number of presidential party members elected in a given municipality divided by the total number of National Assembly members elected in the same municipality.<sup>8</sup> This variable captures the appeal of an individual legislator as a legislative partner of the president. The data is also from the National Election Commission (<http://www.nec.go.kr/>), as well as various issues of *Kukhwe Kongbo*, a daily newsletter that

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<sup>7</sup> Note that we conducted necessary transformations on those municipalities which experienced mergers, abolitions, and consolidations.

<sup>8</sup> Note that districts can be divided into four categories: (1) a single municipality directly corresponds to a single electoral district; (2) a municipality is divided into several districts; (3) several municipalities compose a single district; and (4) several municipalities are mixed up and then divided into several districts. For the type (2) municipalities, I combined districts to assume that one municipality has multiple legislators; for the type (3) municipalities, I assume different multiple municipalities have one single common legislator. For the type (4) districts, see the Appendix 2 for the coding rule.

contains information on legislators' new entry to the assembly through by-elections, retirement from the assembly, and termination (mainly due to decease), as well as party switching. This variable should work positively basically when the government holds a majority.

A dummy for divided government is also straightforward: it takes the value of 1 if the ruling party was in a minority in a given year. Presidential coalitions were in the minority status when they legislated the budget for 1989, 1990, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. As our hypotheses state that the presidential factors should be conditional upon divided government, the interactions between this dummy variable and the above two variables will be also incorporated.

#### 4. Control Variables

A range of controls will be included in the model: a dummy for whether a legislator belongs to the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts; the dependency ratio (the population aged 14 and under and the population aged 65 and over, divided by the working-age population); the population density (thousands per km<sup>2</sup>); the average number of family members; the ratio of the first industry workers<sup>9</sup>; the fiscal capacity (the independent revenue source of a municipality divided by the total revenue); the bond dependency ratio (the local bond ratio to the total revenue); a dummy variable for metropolitan cities (Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, Daejeon, and Ulsan); and a dummy variable for Seoul.

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<sup>9</sup> The data on farmers and fishers is available in a census conducted once every five years and the latest survey data on 2005 is still not available, so the data we used for 2005 reflects the value in 2000.

A dummy for whether a legislator belongs to the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts

(*Yesan Kyeolsan Tenkbyeol Uiwonhwe*) is added to test the claim that interest groups and legislators intensively lobby members of the committee to increase the budget amounts for their desired policy areas (Park 2003). The variable is coded 1 if a municipality contains a member in the committee, and otherwise 0. The data is taken from committee minutes recorded during the deliberation period from October 1, when usually the government submits its budget proposal to the assembly, to December 31, the final day for legislating the budget.<sup>10</sup> This variable is expected to be positive.

The socioeconomic controls are taken from the National Statistical Office website (<http://kosis.nso.go.kr/>) as well as *Si, Kun, Ku Juyo Tonggye Jipyoo* [Major Statistical Indicators of Municipalities] published by the NSO and various issues of annual yearbooks published by provincial governments. The fiscal variables are taken from the aforementioned *Jibang Jaejeong Yeongam*.

Summary statistics and pairwise correlation coefficients are presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.

## 5. Results

Results for the entire period are given in Tables 4. First of all, the overall performance of the

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<sup>10</sup> Note that the constitutionally given deadline is sometime around early December, but since 2001 the deliberation process has taken much longer time and usually the legislation of the budget cannot occur until late December. Committee minutes are available at the Korean National Assembly website (<http://search.assembly.go.kr/record/>).

estimation is fairly good, with the variables explaining 83% to 90% of the variations in regional transfers.

The second point is that many of the controls showed statistical significance in reasonable ways.

The signs for the variables "Density" and "First Industry Workers" suggest less populated and less urbanized areas tend to receive more funds from the capitol; the sign for the variable "Family Members" indicates that funds are targeted at areas where there are relatively more households, suggesting the efficiency in allocating funds; the fiscal situations of a municipality matter in a way that fiscally unhealthy local governments with more debts tend to be more dependent upon transfers from the central government; and densely populated, highly urbanized cities have their own fiscal resources so that they are less likely resort to the capitol.

Thirdly and most significantly, the presidential factors do significantly matter throughout the models, confirmatory to our H1. Controlling for socioeconomic variables reasonably and significantly relevant to fiscal allocation, the president's vote share and the presidential followers ratio as well as their interaction terms with a divided government dummy are all statistically significant at the 5% level. The signs for the variables suggest two things: first, the president can allocate more money to regions where he/she has more supporters, when he/she secures a majority in the legislature; and second, the president has to reduce fiscal benefits to his/her regions and provide more money to the opposition's strongholds, when his/her party is in the minority status in the National Assembly. What is more important is that all of the four different presidents with different regional backgrounds – Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993) from

Daegu in Gyeongsangbuk-do, Kim Young Sam (1993-1998) from Geoje in Gyeongsangnam-do, Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) from Mokpo in Jeollanam-do, and Roh Moo Hyun (2003-) from Gimhae in Gyeongsangnam-do<sup>11</sup> – seemed to engage in almost the same behavior.

However, we have rational reasons to suspect our independent variables should work differently in different periods. To further test our hypothesis 3, we divided the observations into two periods: the pre-2000 period, when party members were much more dependent upon party leaders and therefore presidents, and the post-2000 period, when the rise of civil society as an effective checking and monitoring organization started to make legislators more autonomous from the influences of their bosses. Table 5 shows the results for fixed-effect estimations. Important to note is that some variables were dropped due to the estimation inefficiency, so random-effect models will be complemented with this later. Despite this caveat, the effect of the president's vote share on the budget loses significance in the 2000 period, while it is not the case with the presidential members ratio and the interaction term between the president's vote share and a divided government dummy. This is consistent with the view that the president is no longer autonomous enough to discretionarily allocate money to his/her region, while legislators are now more powerful than before to demand more money to their districts if they have a majority in the legislative body.

Table 6 compares the results for random-effect estimations. They look consistent with the

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<sup>11</sup> We already noted that, although Roh Moo Hyun is from Gyeongsangnam-do, his support base was in Jeolla-do as he was a successor of Kim Dae Jung.

findings in Table 5. That is, when legislators achieve more autonomy from the president, the president's vote share loses its significance.

Overall, panel estimations are confirmatory to all of our hypotheses. Specifically, we have found that the Korean president could exert influence over redistributive spending patterns according to its regional preferences in general, especially when he/she has no constraint from outside and inside his/her party. When the Korean president is in the divided government situation, he/she needs to care about the opposition, by cutting monetary benefits to his supporters – both voters and legislators. The change after 2000 is significant, in that the effect of the president's vote share on regional redistribution disappeared. Legislators got more autonomous with open primaries and more accountable to their voters and the result is the president's losing his/her position in this redistributive game.

## **V. Conclusion**

We started this essay with discussing the presidential factor in redistribution. We pointed out that this relative ignorance about the president may be partly because of the literature's focus on the US case. However, in different contexts, there are multiple reasons to believe that the executive can be an influential figure in this politics: the president may have regionally skewed support bases; and the president has various types of political powers to intervene in the budget making process. The implication is that, if there would be a presidential factor, it should be constrained by two institutional settings: divided

government and legislators' autonomy.

This theoretical implication is tested with the Korean context. In Korea, people oftentimes complain about the nature of the "imperial presidency" resulting from the formal powers given to the president and the lack of expertise in legislators, but the actuality might be different when we pay attention to a policy area where a zero-sum conflict would be expected. As long as a majority is required to legislate budgets, the president has rational reasons to forge consensus with the opposition when he/she lacks a majority in the legislature. In addition, the empowerment of civil society, which now consistently monitors legislative activities, legislators have to become more accountable, thereby forcing the legislative body to convert from a mere rubber stamp to a more autonomous policymaking entity. The president's factor in redistribution could be further curtailed.

With all the municipalities throughout the country from 1989 to 2005, we have found that our panel estimations are efficient, and in general confirmatory to all of our hypotheses. Specifically, we have found that the Korean president could exert influence over redistributive spending patterns according to its regional preferences in general, especially when he/she has no constraint from outside and inside his/her party. When the Korean president is in the divided government situation, he/she needs to care about the opposition, by cutting monetary benefits to his supporters – both voters and legislators. The change after 2000 is significant, in that the president's preferences over regional redistribution disappeared. Legislators got more autonomous with open primaries and more accountable to their voters and the result

is the president's losing his/her position in this redistributive game.

Concluding this essay, we provide research orientations going forward. First, the theoretical implication can be tested with another issue: cross voting and defection behaviors. With the electronic voting introduced in 2000, individual legislators' voting records are now easy to collect. How they vote, how they oppose, and how they are rewarded if they can keep loyal to party leaders are potential topics to be researched. Also, given party switching has been the norm in Korea, defection behaviors are another topic to be considered. As we argue elsewhere (Nemoto et al forthcoming), defection can be caused by a mix of different incentives for vote, office, and policy. How these incentives shape the incentives for legislators to switch their party affiliations should be explored.

Second, the theory can go beyond Korea. With the right understanding of country-specific contexts, we could generate different predictions about different presidential regimes. Cases are abundant in Latin America, where the redistribution literature is only in its developmental phase.



**Table 1: Presidential Candidates' Vote Shares, 1987 to 2002**

	1987 Election			1992 Election		
	RTW	KYS	Margin	KYS	KDJ	Margin
Seoul	29.43%	28.64%	0.80%	35.99%	37.31%	1.32%
Busan	31.65%	55.18%	23.53%	72.65%	12.41%	60.24%
Daegu	69.80%	23.97%	45.83%	58.86%	7.73%	51.13%
Incheon	38.74%	29.53%	9.21%	36.76%	31.32%	5.44%
Gwangju	4.77%	0.51%	4.26%	2.11%	95.12%	93.01%
Daejeon	25.34%	21.66%	3.68%	34.69%	28.33%	6.36%
Gyeonggi-do	40.66%	27.02%	13.64%	35.80%	31.50%	4.30%
Gangwon-do	57.94%	25.50%	32.43%	40.79%	15.24%	25.54%
Chungcheongbuk-do	45.67%	27.50%	18.18%	37.53%	25.55%	11.98%
Chungcheongnam-do	25.50%	15.62%	9.88%	36.15%	27.94%	8.21%
Jeollabuk-do	13.71%	1.46%	12.25%	5.61%	88.01%	82.40%
Jeollanam-do	7.96%	1.12%	6.83%	4.15%	91.07%	86.92%
Gyeongsangbuk-do	64.83%	27.51%	37.32%	63.57%	9.45%	54.12%
Gyeongsangnam-do	40.38%	50.27%	9.90%	71.46%	9.13%	62.34%
Jeju-do	48.47%	26.08%	22.39%	39.32%	32.38%	6.94%
Standard Deviation	0.19	0.16	0.13	0.22	0.30	0.34

	1997 Election			2002 Election		
	KDJ	LHC	Margin	RMH	LHC	Margin
Seoul	44.30%	40.40%	3.90%	51.00%	44.70%	6.30%
Busan	15.10%	52.60%	37.50%	29.60%	66.30%	36.60%
Daegu	12.40%	71.70%	59.30%	18.50%	77.10%	58.60%
Incheon	38.00%	35.90%	2.10%	49.50%	44.30%	5.20%
Gwangju	96.30%	1.70%	94.60%	94.70%	3.60%	91.10%
Daejeon	44.40%	28.80%	15.60%	54.70%	39.50%	15.20%
Ulsan	15.20%	50.70%	35.50%	35.00%	52.40%	17.50%
Gyeonggi-do	38.70%	35.00%	3.70%	50.30%	43.90%	6.40%
Gangwon-do	23.30%	42.40%	19.10%	40.90%	51.80%	10.80%
Chungcheongbuk-do	36.70%	30.20%	6.50%	49.80%	42.40%	7.40%
Chungcheongnam-do	47.20%	23.00%	24.20%	51.40%	40.60%	10.80%
Jeollabuk-do	90.70%	4.50%	86.20%	90.70%	6.10%	84.60%
Jeollanam-do	92.90%	3.10%	89.80%	92.20%	4.60%	87.60%
Gyeongsangbuk-do	13.40%	60.60%	47.20%	21.30%	72.20%	50.90%
Gyeongsangnam-do	10.80%	54.00%	43.20%	26.70%	66.60%	39.90%
Jeju-do	39.80%	35.90%	3.90%	55.30%	39.40%	15.90%
Standard Deviation	0.29	0.2	0.32	0.24	0.23	0.31

Note: RTW = Roh Tae Woo, KYS = Kim Young Sam, KDJ = Kim Dae Jung, LHC = Lee Hoi Chang, RMH = Roh Moo Hyun

**Table 2: Summary Statistics**

	Obs	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Total Subsidies per capita (log)	4115	12.01	1.34	6.37	16.24
President's Vote Share	4115	0.41	0.24	0.019	0.97
Presidential Members Ratio	4115	0.52	0.48	0	1
Budget Committee Membership	4115	0.22	0.48	0	1
Dependency	4115	0.43	0.064	0.26	0.65
Density	4115	3.87	6.61	0.018	35.15
Family Members	4115	3.21	0.43	2.25	7.32
First Industry Workers	4115	0.27	0.26	0	0.74
Fiscal Capacity	4115	0.41	0.19	0.078	0.99
Bond Dependency	4115	0.028	0.050	0	0.76
Metropolitan	4115	0.28	0.45	0	1
Seoul	4115	0.099	0.30	0	1

**Table 3: Pairwise Correlation**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(1) Total Transfers per capita (log)	1.00											
(2) President's Vote Share	0.099*	1.00										
(3) Presidential Members Ratio	-0.050*	0.55*	1.00									
(4) Budget Committee Membership	-0.035*	-0.037*	-0.0052	1.00								
(5) Dependency	0.29*	0.077*	0.011	-0.021	1.00							
(6) Density	-0.56*	-0.042*	-0.041*	0.028	-0.62*	1.00						
(7) Family Members	-0.58*	-0.14*	0.066*	-0.0067	0.13*	-0.058*	1.00					
(8) First Industry Workers	0.44*	0.017	0.025	-0.078*	0.48*	-0.57*	0.13*	1.00				
(9) Fiscal Capacity	-0.58*	-0.053*	0.035*	0.057*	-0.22*	0.27*	0.17*	-0.59*	1.00			
(10) Bond Dependency	-0.054*	-0.042*	0.056*	-0.011	0.12*	-0.18*	0.18*	0.022	0.072*	1.00		
(11) Metropolitan	-0.48*	-0.052*	-0.062*	0.030	-0.59*	0.74*	-0.054*	-0.57*	0.13*	-0.27*	1.00	
(12) Seoul	-0.45*	-0.032*	-0.032*	-0.0010	0.48*	0.73*	-0.12*	-0.34*	0.21*	-0.18*	0.54*	1.00

Note: \*p&lt;0.05

**Table 4: Time-Series Estimates with Fixed and Random Effect**

	FE	FE	RE	RE
<b>President's Vote Share</b>	<b>0.073**</b> (0.028)		<b>0.075***</b> (0.028)	
<b>Presidential Members Ratio</b>		<b>0.060***</b> (0.014)		<b>0.065***</b> (0.47)
<b>Divided Government</b>	<b>-0.27***</b> (0.039)	<b>-0.077***</b> (0.029)	<b>14.87***</b> (0.17)	<b>1.74***</b> (0.048)
<b>President's Vote Share * Divided Government</b>	<b>-0.15***</b> (0.047)		<b>-0.17***</b> (0.047)	
<b>Presidential Members Ratio * Divided Government</b>		<b>-0.057***</b> (0.024)		<b>-0.068***</b> (0.024)
Budget Committee Membership	-0.0057 (-0.012)	-0.0063 (0.012)	-0.0099 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.012)
Dependency	-0.15 (0.21)	0.17 (0.21)	0.23 (0.18)	0.24 (0.18)
Density	-0.034*** (0.0067)	-0.034*** (0.0067)	-0.036*** (0.0041)	-0.036*** (0.0041)
Family Members	-0.31*** (0.040)	-0.29*** (0.040)	-0.34*** (0.037)	-0.33*** (0.037)
First Industry Workers	0.42*** (0.12)	0.44*** (0.12)	0.64*** (0.076)	0.65*** (0.76)
Fiscal Capacity	-2.02*** (0.084)	-2.02*** (0.083)	-2.04*** (0.069)	-2.03*** (0.069)
Bond Dependency	-0.67*** (0.13)	-0.67*** (0.092)	-0.66*** (0.13)	-0.66*** (0.13)
Metropolitan	-0.23** (0.093)	-0.23*** (0.092)	-0.64*** (0.050)	-0.63*** (0.050)
Seoul	(Dropped)	(Dropped)	-0.59*** (0.083)	-0.58*** (0.083)
Constant	12.93*** (0.23)	14.65*** (0.18)	(Dropped)	13.03*** (0.20)
Obs	4115	4115	4115	4115
Adjusted R2	0.83	0.83	0.90	0.90

Note: Year dummies not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1.

**Table 5: Time-Series Estimates with Fixed Effect, Comparing before and after 2000**

	1989-2000	1989-2000	2001-2005	2001-2005
<b>President's Vote Share</b>	<b>0.053*</b> (0.031)		<b>0.14</b> (0.26)	
<b>Presidential Members Ratio</b>		<b>0.048***</b> (0.015)		<b>0.085**</b> (0.037)
<b>Divided Government</b>	<b>-1.27***</b> (0.071)	<b>-1.53***</b> (0.062)	<b>(Dropped)</b>	<b>(Dropped)</b>
<b>President's Vote Share * Divided Government</b>	<b>-0.28***</b> (0.081)		<b>-0.26***</b> (0.079)	
<b>President's Vote Share * Presidential Members Ratio * Divided Government</b>		<b>-0.11***</b> (0.033)		<b>-0.13***</b> (0.041)
Budget Committee Membership	0.0097 (0.014)	0.0090 (0.014)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.026 (0.019)
Dependency	-1.31*** (0.30)	-1.25*** (0.30)	0.059 (0.51)	0.43 (0.50)
Density	-0.030*** (0.0083)	-0.030*** (0.0083)	0.0068 (0.0045)	0.0012 (0.0045)
Family Members	-0.30*** (0.045)	-0.28*** (0.044)	-0.69** (0.28)	-0.67** (0.28)
First Industry Workers	0.52*** (0.14)	0.53*** (0.14)	-2.41*** (0.60)	-2.30*** (0.60)
Fiscal Capacity	-2.01*** (0.099)	-2.00*** (0.099)	-3.44*** (0.18)	-3.51*** (0.18)
Bond Dependency	-0.85*** (0.14)	-0.86*** (0.14)	-1.11*** (0.42)	-1.17*** (0.42)
Metropolitan	-0.021 (0.10)	-0.013 (0.10)	<b>(Dropped)</b>	<b>(Dropped)</b>
Seoul	<b>(Dropped)</b>	<b>(Dropped)</b>	<b>(Dropped)</b>	<b>(Dropped)</b>
Constant	14.75*** (0.23)	14.84*** (0.23)	16.51*** (0.87)	16.37*** (0.86)
Obs	2949	2949	1166	1166
R2 (Overall)	0.72	0.72	0.02	0.10


Note: Year dummies not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1.

**Table 6: Time-Series Estimates with Random Effect, Comparing before and after 2000**

	1989-2000	1989-2000	2001-2005	2001-2005
<b>President's Vote Share</b>	<b>0.051*</b> (0.031)		<b>0.011</b> (0.11)	
<b>Presidential Members Ratio</b>		<b>0.054***</b> (0.015)		<b>0.081**</b> (0.036)
<b>Divided Government</b>	<b>-0.15***</b> (0.049)	<b>-0.21***</b> (0.038)	<b>17.94***</b> (0.49)	<b>(Dropped)</b>
<b>President's Vote Share * Divided Government</b>	<b>-0.31***</b> (0.080)		<b>-0.26***</b> (0.079)	
<b>Presidential Members Ratio * Divided Government</b>		<b>-0.12***</b> (0.033)		<b>-0.13***</b> (0.040)
Budget Committee Membership	0.0030 (0.014)	0.0023 (0.014)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.019)
Dependency	-1.25*** (0.25)	-1.18*** (0.24)	-0.0087 (0.38)	0.14 (0.38)
Density	-0.036*** (0.0043)	-0.035*** (0.0043)	-0.045*** (0.0064)	-0.046*** (0.0068)
Family Members	-0.32*** (0.041)	-0.30*** (0.039)	-1.24*** (0.14)	-1.25*** (0.15)
First Industry Workers	0.69*** (0.081)	0.71*** (0.081)	0.19 (0.23)	0.012 (0.23)
Fiscal Capacity	-1.96*** (0.076)	-1.95*** (0.076)	-2.83*** (0.13)	-2.92*** (0.13)
Bond Dependency	-0.77*** (0.13)	-0.77*** (0.13)	-0.84** (0.41)	-0.93** (0.41)
Metropolitan	-0.64*** (0.053)	-0.63*** (0.052)	-0.70*** (0.071)	-0.70*** (0.075)
Seoul	-0.84*** (0.084)	-0.83*** (0.083)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.11)
Constant	13.70*** (0.23)	13.56*** (0.23)	(Dropped)	17.90*** (0.51)
Obs	2949	2949	1166	1166
R2 (Overall)	0.89	0.89	0.87	0.86

Note: Year dummies not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1.

**Figure 1: Regional Redistribution in Korea, 2005 (Total Subsidies per capita in Million Won)**



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## **Appendix 1: On Mergers, Abolitions and Consolidations, and Separations of Municipalities**

In Korea, 139 municipalities experienced any of mergers, abolitions and consolidations, and separations from 1989 to 2005. Those municipalities which experienced abolitions and consolidations and separations are in Appendix Table 1.

On merged municipalities. Their observation ends in the year prior to the mergers and a new observation of the merged unit starts from the year of the mergers. For example, Gyeongju-si in Gyeongsangbuk-do was merged with Gyeongju-gun in 1995. In this case, Gyeongju-si prior to 1995, Gyeongju-si after 1995, and Gyeongju-gun prior to 1995 are all regarded as separate units of analysis.

On abolished and consolidated municipalities. Their observation ends in the year prior to the abolitions and consolidations and a new observation of the merged unit starts from the year of the abolitions and consolidations. For example, Boryeong-si in Chungcheongnam-do was born in 1995 from the merger of Dacheon-si and Seosan-gun. In this case, Boryeong-si started the observation in 1995 as a separate unit of analysis, while both Dacheon-si and Seosan-gun end the observation in 1994.

On separated municipalities. The original municipalities' observation ends in the year prior to the separations, while the observation of the new municipalities starts from the year of the separations. For example, Yeonje-gu in Busan was born from part of Dongnae-gu in 1995. In this case, Yeonje-gu starts its observation from 1995, while Yeonje-gu prior to 1995 and Yeonje-gu after 1995 are regarded as separate units of analysis.

The independent variables (the president's vote share and the presidential members ratio) reflect these transformations. In the case of Gyeongju-si, the president's vote share for 1995-98 is calculated based on the combination of the incumbent president's votes in Gyeongju-si and Gyeongju-gun in the 1992 election. In the case of Yeonje-gu, the corresponding part of the incumbent president's votes in Dongnae-gu in the 1992 election is subtracted.

**Appendix Table 1**

Year	Municipalities	City/Province	
1995	Seongdong-gu	Seoul	Separated Gwangjin-gu
1995	Gwangjin-gu	Seoul	Born from Seongdong-gu
1995	Gangbuk-gu	Seoul	Born from Dobong-gu
1995	Dobong-gu	Seoul	Separated Gangbuk-gu
1995	Guro-gu	Seoul	Separated Geumcheon-gu
1995	Geumcheon-gu	Seoul	Born from Guro-gu
1995	Dongnae-gu	Busan	Separated Yeonje-gu
1995	Nam-gu	Busan	Separated Suyong-gu
1995	Buk-gu	Busan	Separated Sasang-gu
1995	Yeonje-gu	Busan	Born from Dongnae-gu
1995	Suyeong-gu	Busan	Born from Nam-gu
1995	Sasang-gu	Busan	Born from Buk-gu
1995	Gijang-gun	Busan	Born from Yangsan-gun
1995	Nam-gu	Incheon	Separated Yeonsu-gu
1995	Yeonsu-gu	Incheon	Born from Nam-gu
1995	Seo-gu	Gwangju	Separated Nam-gu
1995	Nam-gu	Gwangju	Born from Seo-gu
1995	Pyeongtaek-si	Gyeonggi-do	Merged with Songtan-si and Pyeongtaek-gun
1995	Chuncheon-si	Gangwon-do	Merged with Chuncheon-gun
1995	Wonju-si	Gangwon-do	Merged with Wonju-gun
1995	Gangneung-si	Gangwon-do	Merged with Myeongju-gun
1995	Samcheok-si	Gangwon-do	Merged with Samcheok-gun
1995	Chungju-si	Chungcheongbuk-do	Merged with Chungwon-gun
1995	Jecheon-si	Chungcheongbuk-do	Merged with Jecheon-gun
2003	Goesan-gun	Chungcheongbuk-do	Separated Jeongpyeong-gun
2003	Jeongpyeong-gun	Chungcheongbuk-do	Born from Goesan-gun
1995	Cheonan-si	Chungcheongnam-do	Merged with Cheonan-gun
1995	Gongju-si	Chungcheongnam-do	Merged with Gongju-gun
1995	Seosan-si	Chungcheongnam-do	Merged with Seosan-gun
2003	Nonsan-si	Chungcheongnam-do	Separated Gyeryong-si
2003	Gyeryong-si	Chungcheongnam-do	Born from Nonsan-si
1995	Gunsan-si	Jeollabuk-do	Merged with Ogun-gun
1995	Iksan-si	Jeollabuk-do	Merged with Iksan-gun
1995	Jeongeup-si	Jeollabuk-do	Merged with Jeongeup-gun
1995	Namwon-si	Jeollabuk-do	Merged with Namwon-gun
1995	Gimje-si	Jeollabuk-do	Merged with Gimje-gun
1998	Yeosu-si	Jeollanam-do	Merged with Yeochon-gun
1995	Suncheon-si	Jeollanam-do	Merged with Seungju-gun
1995	Naju-si	Jeollanam-do	Merged with Naju-gun
1995	Pohang-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Yoengil-gun

1995	Gyeongju-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Gyeongju-gun
1995	Gimcheon-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Geumleung-gun
1995	Andong-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Andong-gun
1995	Gumi-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Sonsan-gun
1995	Yeongju-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Yongpung-gun
1995	Yeongcheon-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Yoengcheon-gun
1995	Sangju-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Sangju-gun
1995	Gyeongsan-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Gyeongsan-gun
1995	Changwon-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with part of Changwon-gun
1995	Masan-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with Geoje-gun and part of Changwon-gun
1995	Jinju-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with Jinyang-gun
1995	Gimhae-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with Gimhae-gun
1995	Miryang-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with Miryang-gun
1995	Ulsan-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with Ulsan-gun
1995	Yangsan-gun	Gyeongsangnam-do	Separate Gijang-gun

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## **Appendix 2: The Coding Rule for the Cases in which Multiple Municipalities Are Mixed up and then Divided into Multiple Districts**

In Korea, districting is based on administrative municipalities. However, some of electoral districts for the National Assembly do not directly correspond to municipalities. As we noted in the essay, if a district has multiple municipalities, then each of the municipalities is simply assumed to have a single common legislator. If a municipality contains multiple districts, then the municipality is assumed to have multiple legislators. The case we have to discuss is what to do with multiple municipalities that are mixed up and then divided into multiple districts. Those municipalities are listed in Appendix Table 2.

Actually those are the cases in which a single municipality does not have enough residents to constitute an electoral district and thus a portion of neighboring municipality is added to form an electoral district. For example, Gangseo-gu is a scarcely populated ward in Busan, and thus the election commission added a portion of Buk-gu to Gangseo-gu to form a district dubbed "Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Eul." Therefore we assume a legislator elected from Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Eul to be accountable for both Buk-gu and Gangseo-gu. Similar adjustments are made to other municipalities.

**Appendix Table 2**

Year	Legislator(s) elected at this (these) district(s)...	In this city/province...	Should be accountable for this (these) municipality(ies)
2004	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Gap	Busan	Buk-gu
2004	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Eul	Busan	Buk-gu, Gangseo-gu
2004	Haeundae-gu=Gijang-gun Gap	Busan	Haeundae-gu
2004	Haeundae-gu=Gijang-gun Eul	Busan	Gijang-gun, Haeundae-gu
2004	Seo-gu=Ganghwa-gun Gap	Incheon	Seo-gu
2004	Seo-gu=Ganghwa-gun Eul	Incheon	Seo-gu, Ganghwa-gun
2004	Pohang-si Buk-gu + Pohang-si Nam-gu=Ulleung-gun	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Pohang-si
2004	Pohang-si Nam-gu=Ulleung-gun	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Ulleung-gun
2004	Jeju-si=Bukjeju-gun Gap	Jeju-do	Jeju-si
2004	Jeju-si=Bukjeju-gun Eul	Jeju-do	Jeju-si, Bukjeju-gun
2000	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Gap	Busan	Buk-gu
2000	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Eul	Busan	Buk-gu, Gangseo-gu
2000	Haeundae-gu= Gijang-gun Gap	Busan	Haeundae-gu
2000	Haeundae-gu= Gijang-gun Eul	Busan	Haeundae-gu, Gijang-gun
2000	Seo-gu=Ganghwa-gun Gap	Incheon	Seo-gu
2000	Seo-gu=Ganghwa-gun Eul	Incheon	Seo-gu, Ganghwa-gun
2000	Pohang-si Buk-gu + Pohang-si Nam-gu=Ulleung-gun	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Pohang-si
2000	Pohang-si Nam-gu=Ulleung-gun	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Ulleung-gun
1996	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Gap	Busan	Buk-gu
1996	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Eul	Busan	Buk-gu, Gangseo-gu
1996	Haeundae-gu= Gijang-gun Gap	Busan	Haeundae-gu
1996	Haeundae-gu= Gijang-gun Eul	Busan	Haeundae-gu, Gijang-gun
1996	Gyeyang-gu=Ganghwa-gun Gap	Incheon	Gyeyang-gu
1996	Gyeyang-gu=Ganghwa-gun Eul	Incheon	Gyeyang-gu, Ganghwa-gun
1996	Pohang-si Buk-gu + Pohang-si Nam-gu=Ulleung-gun	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Pohang-si
1996	Pohang-si Nam-gu=Ulleung-gun	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Ulleung-gun