

National district proportional representation: Coming to power in Peru and Colombia while avoiding regions¹

1. Introduction

Political representation has mostly been characterized by different trade-offs that turn it into an object difficult to assess. One of this classical trade-offs is the double nature of the national representation. As Pitkin (1967) points out, national deputies must face up to “the classical dilemma of representation” attending simultaneously to the national interest and to the district electorate that voted for them. Due to this fact, political parties have to take into account the double nature of representation, designing strategies that satisfy both regional and national demands.

The mentioned trade-off is remarkably relevance in Latin American countries. In these countries, not only does representation tend to be regionalized but also it tends to be co-opted by patrimonialist dynamics and personal engagements (Mainwaring 2006, O’Donnell 1994, Coppedge 1996, Alcántara 2001). Due to these facts, several measures have been put into practice to avoid fragmentation of politics.

The present paper positions itself in a larger research which tries to analyze in Peru and Colombia the role that regions have had in politics in the last decades. The goal of this larger research is to investigate the importance that regions have had as political actors, trying to figure out how they have articulated their strategies of representation and how they have conditioned the performance and strategies of other traditional actors. Due to certain special features of the subject, the approach selected in this larger research is historical neoinstitutionalism. We will take this perspective to analyze several periods

¹ The present paper is an initial approach to the subject. I will improve it before and after the conference.

and crucial events. Amongst the latter, we will study how certain changes in the electoral rules have contributed to a reduction in the regional fragmentation of politics.²

The goal of this paper is to analyze how the switch from a multimember district system³ to a national district proportional representation has affected the representation of regions in national politics in Peru and Colombia. Along the way, we will analyze whether the expected results of these reforms were achieved in both countries. Likewise, we will figure out what were the differences and similarities between both cases. As this is a historical neoinstitutional approach to the subject, we will place each of the cases in their correspondent temporal period. In doing that, we will observe how the reforms changed the political dynamics of each of the countries. In the case of Peru, we will study the 90s, period in which national district proportional representation was taken into place. In the case of Colombia, we will study the period going from 1998 to the present. The fact that both periods are not contemporaneous does not affect our research. First, both periods are very close to each other; second, the analysis carried out in this paper tries to observe what were the results of the reform given certain conditions. That said, the important point of the comparison shouldn't be the convergence of periods but the shared goals of the reform.

National district proportional representation is expected to encourage the degree of nationalization of politics of a country (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1995, Mainwaring, 1997). The existence of only one list for the whole country is expected to limit the localization of politics (Caramani 1994, Shugart and Carey 1992). Likewise, the maintenance of the proportional system is expected to favor the presence of minorities in Parliament. All these expected results had been taken into account by Peruvian and Colombian elites when they decided to change the electoral system. In the case of Peru, as Martín Tanaka has pointed out, "Fujimory wanted to have the control over his party and did not want to negotiate with local and regional political bosses, something unavoidable with a system of single-member districts" (Tanaka 2006:73). In the case of

² My aim is to present in the conference the frame in which this paper is embedded.

³ With multimember district system I refer to a system where deputies are chosen in regional circumscriptions and each circumscription has a number of seats.

Colombia⁴, “reformers reasoned that if legislators had wider-ranging geographic bases of support, they would focus less on parochial, clientelistic matters” (Crisp 2002:734). In both cases, even if the promoters of the reform could have more or less personal interest, the goal of the institutional change was to neutralize the power and performance of regional elites. We will test in this paper whether that goal was achieved.

Due to political parties has taken the responsibility of representation in Latin American countries, in the present paper, we will take political parties and their elites as the object of our research. In doing that, we will observe whether the new institutional frame has affected the strategies of political parties and whether it has reduced the previous regionalization of their organization. The particular goal of this work is to guess if political parties, given the electoral reform have changed their organizational strategy and the way they shape and perform their responsiveness as representatives.

Given that, the following research will be divided into two parts. In the first part, we will try to analyze what are the strategies followed by parties to design their lists and to select the candidates who will run for the congressional election within the new institutional frame. We will verify if parties continue taking into account personal and geographical relations despite the institutional change. In the second part, we will observe what has been the behaviour of representatives once they are in power. We will try to verify if they respond to the national interest or if, on the contrary, they continue attending to particular and regional behalves.

The present work is a comparative study that analyzes the results that the same institutional reform has had in two different cases. We will choose the cases according to “the most similar systems” pattern (Przeworski and Teune: 1970). In this sense, Peru and Colombia share certain features that make them very similar cases of study. Both of them

⁴ In the case of Colombia, the reform was carried out in the Upper house. This fact won't affect our research due to the fact that the Senat has been considered the main assembly of the country. It is encharge of different and important functions, among which it is responsible of the promulgation of the national budget. In this regard, when we will use the word 'deputies' we will refer to senators in the case of Colombia and congressional representative in the case of Peru. In a lot of countries of Latin America, the label of 'deputies' is used for both senators and congressional representatives.

have been characterized by a very parochial type of representation. According to Carey and Shugart's scale of parochialism (1995) and the index of level of particularism developed by the Inter-American Development Bank, Peru and Colombia are both located in the highest positions of the scales for Latin American countries. Moreover, both countries were created from the merger of different regions that possessed a high degree of autonomy prior to the state building process, so that, we can find pronounced and different regional identities within each country. Finally, both countries have changed their electoral rules on several occasions to limit the extent of the localization of politics. Among these reforms, we find the reform from a multimember district assembly to a nation district proportional representation. Only Peru and Colombia have carried out this kind of institutional reform.

The comparison of these two countries will allow us to know better what type of representation works in Peru and Colombia. This research will give us a deeper knowledge about what are the motors that push politics in these two countries. Likewise, it will offer us a more rigorous approach to the efficacy of institutional reforms in this type of countries.

2. Variables and hypotheses

In the first part, we are going to analyze how the institutional change has affected the strategies of political parties. In doing that, we will take as our dependent variable the composition of parties' lists. This variable will let us observe if parties continue taking into account regional identities or electoral domains to compose the list of candidates that will run for the congressional election.

National district proportional representation is expected to encourage the national condition of deputies. Carey and Shugart (1995) have analyzed the elements that incentive the development of a more parochial or a more national representation. Among these elements, they highlight the influence of the national district as one of the most determining conditions in national representation. In the present work, we should expect

to find a decreasing correspondence between political parties' strategies and regional enclaves.

However, as Michael Latner and Anthony McGann (2005) have verified, this tendency can be disproved by the empirically testing of the mentioned correlation. The authors analyze the behaviour of parties regarding the design of the electoral lists in Netherlands and Israel, both countries with national district proportional representation. The conclusions drawn by the authors state that, even if the institutional incentives would push toward a more national tendency, the empirical testing of the latter shows just the opposite results. Parties in the Netherlands and Israel design their lists taking into account the regional support they will be able to achieve.

To test the mentioned observations, the authors propose certain hypotheses and predictions referring the possible relation between regional support and parties' strategy. We will try to replicate them for the cases of Colombia and Peru. However, unlike those authors, we will take data from two different elections. This option will allow us, not only to figure out how the real dynamics of representation are but also to predict some of the incipient results of the institutional reform. The hypotheses selected from the mentioned work, applied to our cases of study and slightly reoriented, will state that:

H1: National representation encourages the presence and influence of the capital. We expect to find an increasing number of deputies who were born in the capital and are residents of the capital. Additionally, we expect to find an increasing number of representatives living in the capital.

H2: Even if national representation creates disincentives for regional identification, regions with a strong identity will be overrepresented. The overrepresentation of certain region won't change with the institutional reform.

H3: Proportional systems encourage the representation of all the identities and all the minority groups. We expect to find a proportional number of representatives of each region according to the population of each of them. This proportionality will increase with the consolidation of the new frame.

H4: According to the logic of vote maximization, political parties will privilege the representation of regions where they have a stronger support. However, they won't waste resources in regions where they have too much or too little support. These patterns of vote maximization will be preserved on time.

H5: Proportional systems imply that each vote matters. Political parties will have an equal representation of all the regions in their lists. Previous electoral results won't affect the selection of candidates.

The second part of our paper will analyze how representatives perform once they are governing. According to the classical theories of electoral systems (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1995), we expect representatives to attend mostly to national demands as the new institutional frame gets consolidated. In this case, our dependent variable will be the initiatives and actions carried out by the deputies during their incumbency. We will relate this willingness with the origin and possible engagement existing between deputies and their native or residency regions. In this sense, the hypotheses we will analyze are the following:

H6: The number of initiatives and laws addressed to favor the deputy's region will decrease with the consolidation of the new institutional frame.

H7: With the consolidation of the new frame, the number of laws and initiatives won't be correlated with the possible underrepresentation or overrepresentation of certain regions.

In the next section, we will test the hypotheses for our two cases. In doing so, we will use several indices and different calculations to make clear the behavior of our variables. We will compare both cases trying to figure out their similarities and their differences.

3. Hypotheses testing

As we pointed out above, one of the possible effects of the national district proportional representation is the concentration of deputies in the capital, geographical center of politics and physical settlement for institutions. Nevertheless, the existence of regional identities can neutralize the weight of the capital in the selection of candidates. Finally, national district proportional representation gives the opportunity to minorities to be represented in the Parliament. For this reason, we could expect to find a proportional representation of every single region of the country. As we can see, in this case the dependent variable will be the configuration of parties' lists while our independent variable will be the weight of each of the regions. To test these three hypotheses, we will analyze the geographical origin of deputies and their stable place of working before the elections. McGann and Latner (2005) take into account the birth place and the residence place of representatives, however, in the case of the Andean countries, this second point has to be revised. Geographical conditions and communication are not as developed as in Israel or the Netherlands, so that for the most part we expecte deputies will live in the capital to attend to their political engagements. Therefore, we will contrast the origin of deputies and their previous working places with the weight each region has in Parliament. From this comparison, we will figure out if representation is concentrated in the capital (H1) or if it is widespread (H2) (H3).

The index of proportionality, calculated dividing the percentage of representatives of a region by its percentage of population, shows us that, effectively, not all the regions have the same degree of representation. Moreover, we observe that the overrepresentation of certain regions is a constant pattern throughout years.

See appendix. Table 1. Index of proportionality Colombia 2002

Table 2. Index of proportionality. Colombia 2006

In the case of Colombia, we can see that regarding the composition of electoral lists, some regions are overrepresented while others remain underrepresented. We can observe that proportionality is not reached in any of the elections, so that, we can confirm that this is a pattern that remains constant throughout time. This fact is confirmed for both birth place and working place conditions. Regarding the weight of the capital in the political representation, we observe that it is slightly overrepresented in both years (0,52-1,16/0,71-1,10), however, in comparison to the other regions, the degree of overrepresentation is not very high. In this case, we observe a remarkable difference between birthplace and working place conditions; the reason is quite straightforward due to the capital uses to be a destination for domestic migration. Finally, we can observe constant patterns of overrepresentation in several regions. In this regard, we should highlight the regions of Atlántico (2,33-2,52/1,94-1,75), Cauca (1,35-1,35/2,02-2,02), Cundinamarca (2,15-1,17/1,56-1,56), Magdalena (1,31-1,31/1,64-1,64), Norte de Santander (1,84-1,84/1,23-0,92) and Tolima (1,05-0,35/1,75-1,40). All these regions have been favored by parties in their list building. The information that we have already analyzed leads us to reject hypothesis 1 and 3 for the Colombian case. The following step is to test hypothesis 2, according to which, we should find constant patterns of overrepresentation in regions with strong identities. To test this hypothesis we will turn again to McGann and Latner's work. In this sense, the authors argue that regional identities used to emerge in the most outlying regions. This hypothesis is confirmed in the case of Colombia due to the overrepresentation of regions are in the periphery, however, this variable doesn't contribute a lot to our work. First, we find other outlying regions that are not overrepresented; second, we should investigate better the existence of regional identities in Colombia.⁵

See appendix, Table 3. Index of proportionality Peru 1995

Table 4. Index of proportionality Peru 2001

⁵ For the conference, I will try to test this variable with the existence of regionalist parties in sub national elections. At the moment, I don't have the necessary data.

If we observe the Peruvian case, we can draw quite similar conclusions to the Colombian case. Disproportionality is present in both elections while there are not great differences between birth and working place conditions. Likewise, we find constant patterns of regional overrepresentation held throughout time. We should highlight the cases of Lambayaque (1,40/2,00/2,00-1,80), Lima (1,20-1,67/1,42-1,84), San Martin (1,30-1,30/2,28-1,95), Tacna (1,59-1,59/2,38-2,38) and Ucayali (1,62-1,62/1,08-1,08). Provisionally, we cannot confirm the relationship between overrepresentation and periphery due to regions with more representatives are spread over the country. However, this hypothesis remains open waiting for a better approach. Definitively, the most remarkable difference with the Colombian case is the weight that the capital has in Peru. As we can notice, not only the capital increases its importance throughout time but also it reaches a very surprising proportion of the national representation. Indeed, 66 of the 120 deputies in 2000 have their places of work in Lima. We have to assume that Latin American countries concentrate most of their population in big cities; however, in this case, the capital concentrates more than the half of representatives in the Parliament.

Hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5 deal with the results obtained by parties in previous elections. In this case, we will try to observe if parties decide strategically over their list, taking into account previous electoral domains and better conditions for the maximization of votes. Our dependent variable will be again the configuration of parties' list; however, in this case our independent variable will be the previous electoral results.

For this second analysis, we will take the two main parties of each country. In the case of Peru, we observe a remarkable electoral support for one of the parties and a very low backing for the second one. We observe as well a raise in the number of independent candidates in the political realm; however, as they don't behave as a united actor, we cannot analyze them as a political actor. In the case of Colombia, we will analyze the Liberal party and the Conservative Party. Both parties have been the main parties for decades so that, even if recently they have lost part of their electoral support, they continue to be seen as a reference for the Colombian population.

Regarding the electoral support obtained by parties in previous elections, we will observe whether parties have change or reinforce certain patterns of regional representation. The goal of the next analysis investigates whether parties takes or not into account the favorable conditions that it has in certain region. In doing so, we will test hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5.

See appendix. Table 5. Liberal party in Colombia

Table 6. Conservative party in Colombia

The Colombian case shows us that, both liberal and conservative parties have electoral domains in certain regions. In the case of the liberal party, Arauca (48,25-58,05), Cauca (58,23-41,01), Choco (49,3-42,45), Meta (36,4-47,40), Quindio (49,2-40,60) and Risalda (56,8-64,39) can be considered electoral feuds, not the least the liberal party has reach in them almost more than the 50% of votes in both elections. In the case of the conservative party, its electoral domain would remain in Boyacá (35,6-25,58), Caldas (32,83-21,23), Huila (32,7-22,19), Norte de Santander (27,6-19,43), Tolima (23,9-17,43) and Valle (17,8-17,43).

According to our hypothesis 4, parties should include representatives of all the regions to attract voters nationwide. As we pointed out above, in proportional systems every single vote matters, so that, parties will select candidates of all the regions to spread their possibilities. However, if we observe the Colombian case, not every region has its own representative. On the contrary, only half of the regions are represented by a native or adoptive deputy (see table 1). These conclusions could lead us to the hypothesis 5, which predicts that parties select the candidates according to previous elections and to the logic of vote maximization. In this case, we neither expect to find more deputies in regions where each party have too many votes nor in regions where they have too less. Regarding the liberal party, we observe that on the whole in regions where it has a remarkable support, we don't find a proportional number of deputies. Arauca, which has around 50% of the regional vote for the liberal party, doesn't have any representative either in 2002 or in 2006. Choco, with 49,3% of the vote in 2002 and 42,45% in 2006 neither has any

deputy. Quindío and Meta follow the same patterns as the latter. This rule doesn't apply for Cauca and Risalda which have a remarkable number of native representatives. In regarding the regions with lowest support for the liberal party, we observe that they neither have a noticeable representation. Sucre and Guaviare are the regions which offer the lowest backing to the liberal party. The number of representatives coming from these regions is, therefore, very low. Finally, we can observe that the regions with a greater number of representatives have middle degrees of electoral backing for the liberal party. So that, hypothesis 5 could be tested for the Colombian liberal party.

However, we should also observe whether parties change their patterns of representation according to previous elections. In the case of the liberal party, we observe that, in the case of Boyacá, the introduction of native representatives could have increased its electoral support, so that, the inclusion of more deputies coming from this region for the next election could be explained by this fact. However, in the case of Meta, the introduction of native representatives could have increased the electoral backing for the liberal party, nevertheless they didn't include more native deputies to encourage an even higher electoral support. Certainly, it is quite difficult to test the relationship between previous elections and selection of candidates for the liberal party. Moreover, we have to be very careful with possible problems of endogeneity. For these reasons, we should focus our attention in some special regions where parties' struggle could verify the importance of the regional factor.

If we observe the regions Atlántico, Cauca and Valle, we realize that both liberal and conservative parties carry out strategies to win the electoral support of these regions. This pattern coincides with the index of proportionality where the three regions are overrepresented in all the elections and for both birth and working place conditions.

Finally, the behavioral pattern of the conservative party differs from the liberal party's one. Overall, we observe that the conservative party reinforces the regions where it reaches a higher number of votes. This tendency rejects our hypothesis 4 and 5 due to, the

maximization of votes neither will come from the marginal strategy nor from the proportionality of representatives.

See appendix. Table 7. Peru 2000 in Peru
Table 8. APRA Party in Peru

If we observe the Peruvian case, we can figure out some different patterns in comparison to the Colombian case. In Peru, the party called Peru 2000 reaches a great support during the 90s. As we point out before, this political strength came up, in some way, from the President's leadership. For our research goal, the important thing is to test if the results of the reform were those that reformers were expecting, that is to say, the limitation of regions' importance in the political realm. Said that, we should see how political parties in Peru configured their lists with regard to previous elections.

In the case of Peru 2000 we observe that, without regarding the case of Lima, representatives come from almost all the regions of the country, so that, the representation would be, more or less proportional. This outcome has its correspondence with the number of votes reached by the party in each region. So that, we could conclude for this case that hypothesis 4 would be confirmed. However, we cannot ignore the importance of the capital. Both in 1995 and 2000, half of the deputies come from the capital, does it mean that representation in Peru is certainly centralized. Moreover, we can observe that this concentration increases with time, not the least; this was the aim of the reformers.

In the case of the APRA, we can observe a different pattern. We could state that these dissimilar patterns coincide with the Colombian conservative party's strategy. The APRA, as the conservative party, was in a very weak situation, having lost most part of its electoral support in the previous years. Therefore, the strategy taken by the APRA will reinforce the regions where it has its traditional electoral enclave, that is to say, Cajamarca, La Libertad, Lambayeque and Amazonas.

*

The second part of this research will try to analyze the behaviour of representatives once they are into power. The idea is to guess if they continue attending regional demands or, on the contrary, they focus their initiatives on the whole territory. In doing that, we will take as our dependent variable the legislative initiatives and laws encouraged by deputies. Once again, our independent variable will be the origin of representatives and the importance they give to their regions. Finally, we will observe the evolution of our dependent variable in the two different periods.

For the case of Peru, we calculated the percentage of bills initiated by representatives and, referring to their regions. The main problem we had to deal with was the high number of deputies coming from or working in the capital. This fact makes very difficult to discern which bills have been initiated with a more regional willing; likewise, this fact reduces the weight that bills coming from other regional deputies could have. Due to this reason, we separated the deputies into two different. In one group we located deputies from Lima; in the second group, we placed representatives coming from other regions. In this section, we will study those bills initiated by deputies from the second group and referring to their own regions. We will calculate the weight these bills have in the total of bills initiated by each of the deputies. We will take the average of this percentage to compare this variable for the two periods.

Table 9. Regional bills initiated by native deputies⁶

PERU	1995-1999	1999-2000
% regional bills	13%	7%
% national bills	93%	96%

Source: Peruvian national electoral organization (ONPE)

We should remark that Peruvian deputies initiate a great number of bills per year. This fact makes regional bills to get neutralized by national oriented bills. However, we can confirm that the number of regional bills is extremely low in comparison to the number of national bills.

We should admit that this point is a very incipient approach to the subject. The idea is to improve the measure and the hypothesis testing of the whole second section of this research. The improvements achieved will be reported in the public conference.

The points that will be taken into account in the indices building will be:

- 1) Importance of the initiatives: type of law, possible vetos...
- 2) Achievement and stability of the law: did the initiative turn into a law? Did the law endure?
- 3) Closeness to the region: We will separate between initiatives directly addressed to the regions and initiatives that could offer some advantages to the regions.

Moreover, the idea is to relate each of the initiatives and indices to the regional representation. We will correlate the regional support of candidates to their posterior policy making. In cases of strong regionalism, we expect to find a high correlation with

⁶ To build this table, I took all the bills initiated by Peruvian deputies for the periods 1995-1999/ 2000-2001. I classified them in two groups: regional or nationwide. This classification must be improved. The idea is to design a scale of importance which could measures the weighth of each initiative and the closeness it has to the particular regions.

regional bills. However, as our cases should reflect the results of the new institutional reform, we expect to find a reduction of regional initiatives as the new institutional frame gets consolidated.

Brian Crisp (2002) has carried an interested research about the subject. As we will do, he tries to test if the degree of parochialism has decreased in Colombia. However, our goal differs from his in one essential point. We want to relate the allocation of regional bills to the geographical strategies of political parties. This point takes us back to the first section of this research. The combination of both sections, and so of both dependent variables, will give us a wider approach to the regional representation issue.

For the moment, we will turn again to Brian Crisp (2002) to verify how Colombian deputies behave once they in power. The author analyzes the degree of parochialism before and after the electoral reform. The data he choses doesn't fit with our temporal period, however, his conclusions can give us an idea of the incipient results of the reform. For the conference, we will present our own data for the period we are studying.

See appendix. Table 9. Colombian bills before and after the electoral reform

Therefore, according to the author, we can observe that regional bills have been reduced with the reform. Before the institutional change, we could find 58 regional initiatives, among which, 36 were initiated by unique sponsors. Nevertheless, in the post-electoral period, we find 32 regional bills, among which, 16 were initiated by unique sponsors. These results should lead us to think that the electoral reform has reached positive results regarding deputy's behaviour. However if we go back to the first section of this research, we should remain the importance that certain regions had for political parties to choose their candidates. This special importance could bias our previous conclusions. As well, we should analyze the importance and degree of closeness that each of the bills had. We will report all this information in the public conference.

4. Conclusion

With the present paper, we approach to the importance (or not) that regions have in the cases of Peru and Colombia. Likewise, we could test the results obtained in each case after the switch from a multimember district representation to a national district proportional representation. Finally, we compared both cases trying to figure out possible similarities and possible differences.

This paper is a very initial approach to the subject. The variables tested in there are, for the moment, a possible indicator of what the tendency could be. The idea is to continue improving the theory and to treat the data that is not reported in this paper. The results will be shown in the public conference.

However, with the information reported here, we can already draw some interesting conclusions. First, we have seen that the institutional reform hasn't got all the expected results it was seeking. At least in the case of Colombia, we can observe that regions continue being a very important element in parties' strategies. As well, we observed that representation in Colombia is more widespread than in Peru. Only a little percentage of the deputies lives or works in the capital. On the contrary, the Peruvian case follows better the expected patterns of the reform. Not only representation remains certainly concentrated in the capital but also it has increased its degree of centralism with the institutional reform. We have to remain that in 2000, more than a half of the deputies came from or was established in the capital.

Regarding the behaviour of deputies after the reform, we can observe a reduction of the degree of regionalism in the policy making. In the case of Peru, the results were straightforward, however, in the case of Colombia we could verify that, even if the number of regional bills had decreased, the number of regional initiatives were still noticeable. Nevertheless, there are two points that must be carefully observed. First, we still have to check if the reduction of regionalism in policy making is balanced with an increase of nationwide oriented policies or, on the contrary, the mentioned reduction has

turn into a mere centralization of politics. In the latter case, the benefits of the reform will go only to the capital, failing to build up a nationwide policy making orientation. Second, we have to verify the importance of initiatives and bills and whether they are closer or further to regional interest.

Finally, we should point out that there are very little studies about regions and regional representation in Latin America. The present research, and its forthcoming results, tries to contribute to a better knowledge of Latin American politics and to take into scene certain actors that, until, had been put aside.

5. Appendix

Table 1. Index of proportionality Colombia 2002

REGIONS	Population	%	2002		PROP	Work place	%	Popor
			Birth	%				
AMAZONAS	80360	0,17						
ANTIOQUIA	5750478	12,52	12	12	0,96	12	12	0,96
ARAUCA	282302	0,61			0,00			0,00
ATLÁNTICO	2365663	5,15	11	12	2,33	13	13	2,52
BOLÍVAR	2229967	4,86	2	2	0,41	2	2	0,41
BOGOTÁ	7117984	15,50	8	8	0,52	18	18	1,16
BOYACA	1411239	3,07	6	6	1,95	6	6	1,95
CALDAS	1170187	2,55	3	3	1,18	3	3	1,18
CAQUETA	463333	1,01			0,00			0,00
CASANARE	325713	0,71			0,00			0,00
CAUCA	1363054	2,97	4	4	1,35	4	4	1,35
CESAR	1050303	2,29			0,00	2	2	0,87
CHOCO	413173	0,90			0,00			0,00
CORDOBA	1392905	3,03	4	4	1,32	2	2	0,66
CUNDINAMARCA	2349578	5,12	11	11	2,15	6	6	1,17
GUANIA	43314	0,09			0,00			0,00
GUAVIARE	133236	0,29	1	1	3,45	1	1	3,45
HUILA	994218	2,16	2	2	0,92	2	2	0,92
LA GUAJIRA	524619	1,14			0,00			0,00
MAGDALENA	1403318	3,06	4	4	1,31	4	4	1,31
META	771089	1,68	1	1	0,60	1	1	0,60
NARIÑO	1775139	3,87	2	2	0,52	3	3	0,78
NORTE DE SANTANDER	1493932	3,25	6	6	1,84	6	6	1,84
PUTUMAYO	378483	0,82			0,00			0,00
QUINDIO	613375	1,34	1	1	0,75			0,00
RISALDA	1024362	2,23	3	3	1,35	3	3	1,35
SAN ANDRÉS	83491	0,18			0,00			0,00
SANTANDER	2085084	4,54	5	5	1,10	3	3	0,66
SUCRE	868648	1,89	3	3	1,59	2	2	1,06
TOLIMA	1312972	2,86	3	3	1,05	1	1	0,35
VALLE	4524678	9,85	8	8	0,81	6	6	0,61
VAUPES	33152	0,07			0,00			0,00
VICHADA	97276	0,21			0,00			0,00
TOTAL	45926625	100,00	100		0,00	100		0,00

Source: Done with data from: Corte Nacional electoral Colombia
 Registradur'ia Nacional
 Gobierno de Colombia

Table 2. Index of proportionality. Colombia 2006

REGIONS	Population	%	Birth	2006		Working place	I. prop
					%		
AMAZONAS	80360	0,17					
ANTIOQUIA	5750478	12,52	14	14	1,12	14	1,12
ARAUCA	282302	0,61			0,00		0,00
ATLÁNTICO	2365663	5,15	10	10	1,94	9	1,75
BOLÍVAR	2229967	4,86	1	1	0,21	1	0,21
BOGOTÁ	7117984	15,50	11	11	0,71	17	1,10
BOYACA	1411239	3,07	3	3	0,98	3	0,98
CALDAS	1170187	2,55	3	3	1,18	3	1,18
CAQUETA	463333	1,01	1	1	0,99	1	0,99
CASANARE	325713	0,71			0,00		0,00
CAUCA	1363054	2,97	6	6	2,02	6	2,02
CESAR	1050303	2,29	1	1	0,44	1	0,44
CHOCO	413173	0,90			0,00		0,00
CORDOBA	1392905	3,03	4	4	1,32	3	0,99
CUNDINAMARCA	2349578	5,12	8	8	1,56	8	1,56
GUANIA	43314	0,09			0,00		0,00
GUAVIARE	133236	0,29			0,00		0,00
HUILA	994218	2,16	3	3	1,39	3	1,39
LA GUAJIRA	524619	1,14	1	1	0,88	1	0,88
MAGDALENA	1403318	3,06	5	5	1,64	5	1,64
META	771089	1,68	1	1	0,60	1	0,60
NARIÑO	1775139	3,87	3	3	0,78	3	0,78
NORTE DE SANTANDER	1493932	3,25	4	4	1,23	3	0,92
PUTUMAYO	378483	0,82			0,00		0,00
QUINDIO	613375	1,34	1	1	0,75	1	0,75
RISALDA	1024362	2,23	2	2	0,90	2	0,90
SAN ANDRÉS	83491	0,18			0,00		0,00
SANTANDER	2085084	4,54	6	6	1,32	5	1,10
SUCRE	868648	1,89	1	1	0,53	1	0,53
TOLIMA	1312972	2,86	5	5	1,75	4	1,40
VALLE	4524678	9,85	6	6	0,61	5	0,51
VAUPES	33152	0,07			0,00		0,00
VICHADA	97276	0,21			0,00		0,00
TOTAL	45926625	100,00	100	100	1,00	100	1,00

Source: Done with data from: Corte Nacional electoral Colombia
 Registraduría Nacional
 Gobierno de Colombia

Table 3. Index of proportionality Peru 1995

REGIONS	POPULATION	%	Birth	1995		Working place		I prop
				I. prop	%	N° representatives	%	
AMAZONAS	389700	1,49	1	0,83	0,56	1	0,83	0,56
ANCASH	1039415	3,97	4	3,33	0,84	2	1,67	0,42
APURIMARC	418882	1,60	3	2,50	1,56	1	0,83	0,52
AREQUIPA	1140810	4,36	5	4,17	0,96	4	3,33	0,76
AYACUCHO	619338	2,37	2	1,67	0,70	1	0,83	0,35
CAJAMARCA	1359023	5,20	6	5,00	0,96	6	5,00	0,96
CALLAO	813264	3,11	3	2,50	0,80	1	0,83	0,27
CUSCO	1171503	4,48	5	4,17	0,93	3	2,50	0,56
HUANCAVELICA	447054	1,71	1	0,83	0,49			0,00
HUANUCO	730871	2,79	1	0,83	0,30	1	0,83	0,30
ICA	665592	2,54	2	1,67	0,65	3	2,50	0,98
JUNIN	1091619	4,17	4	3,33	0,80	4	3,33	0,80
LA LIBERTAD	1539774	5,89	9	7,50	1,27	3	2,50	0,42
LAMBAYEQUE	1091535	4,17	7	5,83	1,40	10	8,33	2,00
LIMA	7819436	29,90	43	35,83	1,20	60	50,00	1,67
LORETO	884144	3,38	5	4,17	1,23	4	3,33	0,99
MADRE DE DIOS	92024	0,35	1	0,83	2,37	1	0,83	2,37
MOQUEGUA	159306	0,61	1	0,83	1,37	1	0,83	1,37
PASCO	266764	1,02			0,00			0,00
PIURA	1630772	6,24	5	4,17	0,67	4	3,33	0,53
PUNO	1245508	4,76	3	2,50	0,52	1	0,83	0,17
SAN MARTIN	669973	2,56	4	3,33	1,30	4	3,33	1,30
TACNA	274496	1,05	2	1,67	1,59	2	1,67	1,59
TUMBES	191713	0,73			0,00			0,00
UCAYALI	402445	1,54	3	2,50	1,62	3	2,50	1,62
TOTAL	26154961	100,00	120	100,00		120	100,00	

Source: Done with data from: Consejo Nacional Electoral Peru
Gobierno Peru

Table 4. Index of proportionality Peru 2001

REGIONS	POPULATION	%	Birth	2001		Working place	%	I prop
				I prop	%			
AMAZONAS	389700	1,49	2	1,67	1,12	2	1,67	1,12
ANCASH	1039415	3,97	5	4,17	1,05	3	2,50	0,63
APURIMARC	418882	1,60			0,00			0,00
AREQUIPA	1140810	4,36	6	5,00	1,15	6	5,00	1,15
AYACUCHO	619338	2,37	1	0,83	0,35			0,00
CAJAMARCA	1359023	5,20	5	4,17	0,80	2	1,67	0,32
CALLAO	813264	3,11	3	2,50	0,80	1	0,83	0,27
CUSCO	1171503	4,48	3	2,50	0,56	2	1,67	0,37
HUANCAVELICA	447054	1,71			0,00			0,00
HUANUCO	730871	2,79			0,00			0,00
ICA	665592	2,54	4	3,33	1,31	1	0,83	0,33
JUNIN	1091619	4,17	2	1,67	0,40	2	1,67	0,40
LA LIBERTAD	1539774	5,89	3	2,50	0,42	3	2,50	0,42
LAMBAYEQUE	1091535	4,17	10	8,33	2,00	9	7,50	1,80
LIMA	7819436	29,90	51	42,50	1,42	66	55,00	1,84
LORETO	884144	3,38	3	2,50	0,74	2	1,67	0,49
MADRE DE DIOS	92024	0,35			0,00			0,00
MOQUEGUA	159306	0,61			0,00			0,00
PASCO	266764	1,02			0,00			0,00
PIURA	1630772	6,24	5	4,17	0,67	5	4,17	0,67
PUNO	1245508	4,76	5	4,17	0,87	5	4,17	0,87
SAN MARTIN	669973	2,56	7	5,83	2,28	6	5,00	1,95
TACNA	274496	1,05	3	2,50	2,38	3	2,50	2,38
TUMBES	191713	0,73			0,00			0,00
UCAYALI	402445	1,54	2	1,67	1,08	2	1,67	1,08
TOTAL	26154961	100,00	120	100,00		120	100,00	1,00

Source: Done with data from: Consejo Nacional Electoral Peru
Gobierno Peru

Table 5. Liberal party in Colombia

LIBERAL						
	% votos1998	%rep birth	%rep work	% votos 2002	% rep birth	% rep work
AMAZONAS	45,9	0,00	0,00	19,55	0,00	0,00
ANTIOQUIA	43,8	17,02	17,02	27,44	16,67	16,67
ARAUCA	48,25	0,00	0,00	58,05	0,00	0,00
ATLÁNTICO	38,43	8,51	12,77	31,81	11,11	11,11
BOLÍVAR	51,2	4,26	4,26	27,47	0,00	0,00
BOGOTÁ		2,13	14,89		27,78	27,78
BOYACA	27,32	4,26	4,26	33,55	5,56	5,56
CALDAS	27,43	2,13	2,13	30,76	5,56	5,56
CAQUETA	32,5	0,00	0,00	23,63	0,00	0,00
CASANARE	67,12	0,00	0,00	10,40	0,00	0,00
CAUCA	58,23	4,26	4,26	41,01	11,11	11,11
CESAR	30,76	0,00	2,13	14,39	0,00	0,00
CHOCO	49,3	0,00	0,00	42,45	0,00	0,00
CORDOBA	55,1	2,13	0,00	34,24	0,00	0,00
CUNDINAMARCA	24,5	17,02	12,77	34,06	5,56	5,56
GUANIA	30,7	0,00	0,00	24,17	0,00	0,00
GUAVIARE	19,7	2,13	2,13	23,19	0,00	0,00
HUILA	28,6	0,00	0,00	26,99	0,00	5,56
LA GUAJIRA	54,8	0,00	0,00	18,76	0,00	0,00
MAGDALENA	19,6	6,38	4,26	26,69	0,00	0,00
META	36,4	2,13	2,13	47,40	0,00	0,00
NARIÑO	22,3	2,13	2,13	35,33	0,00	0,00
NORTE DE SANTANDER	35,4	4,26	4,26	33,59	5,56	0,00
PUTUMAYO	22,8	0,00	0,00	47,40	0,00	0,00
QUINDIO	49,2	0,00	0,00	40,60	0,00	0,00
RISALDA	56,8	6,38	4,26	62,39	5,56	5,56
SAN ANDRÉS	51,2	0,00	0,00	20,76	0,00	0,00
SANTANDER	32,6	2,13	2,13	29,98	5,56	5,56
SUCRE	24,6	2,13	0,00	14,19	0,00	0,00
TOLIMA	27,8	6,38	2,13	37,50	0,00	0,00
VALLE	34,5	4,26	2,13	32,47	0,00	0,00
VAUPES	21,8	0,00	0,00	33,59	0,00	0,00
VICHADA	33,2	0,00	0,00	31,70	0,00	0,00

Source: Done with data from: Corte Nacional electoral Colombia
 Registradur'ia Nacional
 Gobierno de Colombia

Table 6. Conservative party in Colombia

CONSERVADOR						
	% votos1998	% rep birth	% rep work	% votos2002	% rep birth	% rep work
AMAZONAS	37,8			31,84		
ANTIOQUIA	10,13	4	4	1,05	11,11	11,11
ARAUCA	16,24	0	0	6,65		0,00
ATLÁNTICO	22,45	16	12	1,6	11,11	11,11
BOLÍVAR	21,4	4	8	12,36	5,56	5,56
BOGOTÁ		4	12		0,00	0,00
BOYACA	35,6	8	8	25,58	11,11	11,11
CALDAS	32,83	0	0	21,23	5,56	5,56
CAQUETA	7,9	0	0	16,41	0,00	0,00
CASANARE	2,87	0	0	2,39	0,00	0,00
CAUCA	6,67	4	4	2,39	11,11	11,11
CESAR	9,3	0	0	4,9	0,00	0,00
CHOCO	4,8	0	0	10,38	0,00	0,00
CORDOBA	21,6	8	4	13,52	5,56	5,56
CUNDINAMARCA	11,3	4	0	11,88	0,00	0,00
GUANIA	6,8	0	0	18,32	0,00	0,00
GUAVIARE	19,8	0	0	12,22	0,00	0,00
HUILA	32,7	4	4	26,19	5,56	5,56
LA GUAJIRA	6,5	0	0	4,96	0,00	0,00
MAGDALENA	18,7	0	0	1,33	0,00	0,00
META	6,8	0	0	8,55	0,00	0,00
NARIÑO	11,3	0	4	14,82	5,56	5,56
NORTE DE SANTANDER	27,6	12	12	17,43	0,00	0,00
PUTUMAYO	18,5	0	0	14,07	0,00	0,00
QUINDIO	3,2	4	0	5,74	0,00	0,00
RISALDA	18,5	0	0	8,5	0,00	0,00
SAN ANDRÉS	2,9	0	0	4,24	0,00	0,00
SANTANDER	7,8	16	16	14,82	16,67	16,67
SUCRE	12,6	0	0	9,3	0,00	0,00
TOLIMA	23,8	0	0	17,43	5,56	5,56
VALLE	17,8	12	12	17,43	5,56	5,56
VAUPES	7	0	0	17,43	0,00	0,00
VICHADA	1,6	0	0	2,75	0,00	0,00

Source: Done with data from: Corte Nacional electoral Colombia
 Registradur'ia Nacional
 Gobierno de Colombia

Table 7. Peru 2000 in Peru

	PERU 2000					
	% vote 1990	% rep birth 1995	% rep wor 1995	% vote 1995	% rep birth 2000	% rep wor 2000
AMAZONAS	2,7	1,39	1,39	65,26		
ANCASH	27,3	2,78	1,39	61,12	2,78	2,78
APURIMAC	26,06	2,78	1,39	68,96	0,00	
AREQUIPA	34,99	4,17	4,17	31,35	5,56	5,56
AYACUCHO	5,58	2,78	1,39	73,57	2,78	
CAJAMARCA	40,84	5,56	5,56	74,75	8,33	5,56
CALLAO	37,65	4,17	1,39	0	5,56	2,78
CUSCO	37,44	2,78	2,78	61,59	2,78	2,78
HUANCAVELICA	24,44	0,00	0,00	72,5	0,00	0,00
HUANUCO	25,77	1,39	1,39	73,4	0,00	0,00
ICA	52,46	1,39	2,78	62,46	2,78	5,56
JUNIN	9,8	5,56	5,56	77,1	2,78	2,78
LA LIBERTAD	11,98	6,94	1,39	57,21	0,00	2,78
LAMBAYEQUE	33,61	5,56	6,94	62,27	11,11	11,11
LIMA+EXT	31,64	30,56	43,06	63,25	36,11	41,67
LORETO	12,7	2,78	4,17	59,95	0,00	0,00
MADRE DE DIOS	31,64	1,39	1,39	62,23	0,00	0,00
MOQUEGUA	45,85	1,39	1,39	62,31		0,00
PASCO	16,17	0,00	0,00	66,11		0,00
PIURA	39,21	4,17	2,78	65,3	5,56	5,56
PUNO	6,38	1,39	0,00	63,83	2,78	2,78
SAN MARTIN	51,32	4,17	2,78	63,36	5,56	2,78
TACNA	13,14	2,78	2,78	67,45	2,78	2,78
TUMBES	25,12	0,00	0,00	66,88	0,00	0,00
UCAYALI	15,55	4,17	4,17	76,57	2,78	2,78

Source: Done with data from: Consejo Nacional Electoral Peru
Gobierno Peru

Table 8. APRA Party in Peru

	APRA					
	% vote 1990	% rep birth	% rep work	% vote 1995	% rep birth	% rep work
AMAZONAS	34,43			7,77	16,67	16,67
ANCASH	36,11	14,29		8,74		
APURIMAC	12,16	14,29		2,21		
AREQUIPA	15,21			1,38		
AYACUCHO	12,78			1,72		
CAJAMARCA	45,47		14,29	4,20		
CALLAO	17,14					
CUSCO	15,51			2,47		
HUANCAVELICA	8,29			1,27		
HUANUCO	17,70			1,97		
ICA	27,89		14,29	5,69		
JUNIN	6,63			1,08		
LA LIBERTAD	60,69	14,29	14,29	15,84	16,67	16,67
LAMBAYEQUE	43,64	14,29	14,29	8,31		
LIMA+EXT	22,64	28,57	28,57	3,26	50,00	50,00
LORETO	21,07	14,29	14,29	5,01	16,67	16,67
MADRE DE DIOS	24,96			9,13		
MOQUEGUA	32,28			2,85		
PASCO	11,26			1,49		
PIURA	31,86			5,39		
PUNO	17,44			1,64		
SAN MARTIN	30,91			6,19		
TACNA	18,18			1,60		
TUMBES	30,10			6,60		
UCAYALI	15,46			1,97		

Source: Done with data from: Consejo Nacional Electoral Peru
Gobierno Peru

Table 9. Colombian bills before and after the electoral reform

TABLE 3 Bill Targets Before and After Electoral Reform

	Pre-Reform Congress (1986–1990)	Post-Reform Congress (1994–1998)
Nationally Targeted Bills		
Number Initiated	219	417
Number of Unique Sponsors ^a	114	77
Sectorally Targeted Bills		
Number Initiated	137	187
Number of Unique Sponsors ^a	68	62
Regionally Targeted Bills		
Number Initiated	58	32
Number of Unique Sponsors ^a	36	16
Locally Targeted Bills		
Number Initiated	75	75
Number of Unique Sponsors ^a	76	33
Individually Targeted Bills		
Number Initiated	18	18
Number of Unique Sponsors ^a	23	13
Total Number of Bills and Sponsors		
Number Initiated	507	729
Number of Unique Sponsors ^a	317	201

Source: Crisp (2002)

References

Alcántara, Manuel. (2001): *Partidos políticos en países andinos*. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca.

Alcántara, Manuel. (2004): *¿Instituciones o máquinas ideológicas? Origen, programa y organización de los partidos latinoamericanos*. Barcelona: ICPS.

Arian y Weiss (1969): "Split-ticket voting in Israel". *Western Political Quarterly*, 24. pp: 375-389.

Barrios, Franz (2005): *Propuesta autonómica de Santa Cruz*. Cochabamba: Plural Editores.

Beramendi, P. (2004): Instituciones políticas y desigualdad de renta: el caso de la descentralización, *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, 10, 81-110.

Boisier (2004): "Desarrollo Territorial y Descentralización: El desarrollo en el lugar en las manos de la gente". *Eure*, Vol 1, nº 90, pp:27-40.

Bresser Pereira, Luiz Carlos (1999): *O público Não-Estatal na Reforma do Estado*. Río de Janeiro: Editorial Fundação Getulio Vargas.

Caramani, D (2004): *The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Carey, John and Shugart, Mathew (1995): Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote. A rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas. *Electoral studies* 14, 4, pp: 417-439.

Chandler, William and Chandler, M (1987) "Federalism and Political Parties". *European Journal of Political Economy*, 3, nº.Special Issue 1+2, pp: 87-109.

Colino, César (2001): *La integración europea y el Estado autonómico: Europeización, estrategias y cambio en las relaciones intergubernamentales*, en Closa, Carlos (2001): *La europeización del sistema político español*. Madrid: Istmo

Coppedge, Michael (1996): A deficit of democratic authenticity: Political Linkage and the Public in Andean Politics. *Studies in Comparative International development*. 31. Vol 3. 32-55.

Crisp, Briand (2002): Institutional Engineering and the Nature of Representation: Mapping the effects of electoral Reforms in Colombia. *American Journal of Political Sciences*. Vol 46, 4, pp: 733-748.

Jones, Mark and Mainwaring, Scott (2003): "The nacionalization of parties and party systems". *Party Politics*. Vol 9, 2, pp: 139-166.

Elazar, D. (1991): *Exploring Federalism*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Faletti, Tulia (2005): "A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective". *American Political Sciences Review*. Vol 99,3, pp: 427-346.

Galindo, Mario y Blanes, José (1993): *Las regiones hoy. Desequilibrios institucionales y financieros*. La Paz: CEBEM.

Gibson, Edward (2004): *Federalism and democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Jordana, Jacint (2001): "Relaciones intergubernamentales y Descentralización en América Latina: Una Perspectiva Institucional". *Social Institute Development INDES-BID*. Working paper.

Latner, Michael and McGann, Anthony (2005): Geographical representation under proportional representation: the cases of Israel and Netherlands. *Electoral Studies*, 24, 4, pp: 709-734.

Lee, Adrian (1988): "The Persistence of Difference: Electoral Change in Cornwall", *Political Studies Association Conference*, Plymouth

Lijphart, Arend (1994): *Electoral systems and party systems*. New York: Oxford University Press

Mainwaring, S. y Scully, T. (1995): *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott (1997): Multipartism, Robust Federalism, and Presidentialism in Brazil. In *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Ed, Scott Mainwaring and Mathew Schugart . New York: Cambridge university Press.

Mainwaring Scott (2006): *The crisis of democratic representation in the Andes*. Standford: Stanford University Press.

Méndez, Mónica (2004): *Federalismo y partidos políticos*. Barcelona ICPS.

Montero, A. y Samuels, D. (eds.) (2004): *Decentralization and democracy in Latina America*. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Molina, Carlos Hugo (2006): Las Mancomunidades Municipales: Una Alternativa para el Desarrollo Territorial. *CEPAD*, 41.

North, Douglas (1990): *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economical Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo (1994): Delegative democracy. *Journal of democracy*. 5. vol 1:

O'Neill, Kathleen (2004): "Decentralization in Bolivia". En Montero, Alfred y Samuels, David (2004): *Decentralization and democracy in Latin America*. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Oñate, Pablo. y Ocaña, Francisco (1999): Análisis de datos electorales. Madrid: CIS.

Paramio, Ludolfo (1999): "Las dimensiones políticas de las reformas económicas en América Latina". *Zona Abierta* 88-89. pp: 5-74.

Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune: (1970) *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger Publishing.

Pitkin, Hannah (1967): *The concept of representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Riker, W (1964): *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*. Boston: Little Brown.

Samuels, David (2002): "Presidentialized parties". *Comparative politics*.

Samuels, David y Mainwaring, Scott (2004): "Federalism and Territorial Politics in Latin America en Gibson, Edward (2004): *Representing Regions: Federalism and Territorial Politics in Latin America*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Shugart, Mathew and Carey, John (1992): *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smiley, D. (1987): *The federal condition y? Canadá*. Toronto: Mc Graw Hill.

Stepan, Alfred. (1999): "Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S model". *The Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 19, n°4, pp:19-34.

Strom, Kaare (1990) : "A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties". Vol 34, n 2, pp: 565-598.

Ruiz, Leticia (2006): "Coherencia partidista : la estructuración interna de los partidos políticos en América latina". *Revista española de Ciencia Política*, 14, pp: 87-104

Taagepera, Rein and Shugart, Mathew (1989): *seats and votes*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Tanaka, Martin (2003): From Crisis to Collapse of the Party Systems and Dilemas of Democratic Representation: Peru and Venezuela. In *The Crisis of Democratic representation in the andes*. Scott Mainwaring. Standford: Standford university Press.

Véliz, Claudio (1984): *La tradición centralista de América Latina*. Barcelona: Ariel

Willis, E., C. Garman y S. Haggard (1999). "The politics of decentralization in Latin America". *Latin American Research Review*, 34, pp: 7-50.

Weingast, Barry (1995): “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development”. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. Vol 11,1, pp:1-31.

Watts, R. L. (1999): *Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s*, Kingstin: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations.

Websites

www.iadb.org

www.onpe.gob.pe

www.registraduria.gov.co

www.cne.gov.co

www.peru.gob.pe

www.gobiernoenlinea.gov.co

www.pdba.georgetown.edu