

**Empowering Women:
Four Theories Tested on Four Different Aspects of Gender Equality**

Amy C. Alexander

(University of California, Irvine)

Christian Welzel

(Jacobs University Bremen)

ABSTRACT

Multiple literatures suggest that the following factors may figure prominently in explanations of women's increasing empowerment: (1) socioeconomic development; (2) rising gender-egalitarian attitudes that transform economic development into a cultural process of human development; (3) historical legacies stemming from a society's cultural and political traditions; and (4) institutional design factors. This study is the first to compare the influence of these factors across four aspects of gender equality, equality gains in basic living conditions, participation in civic actions, positional empowerment and political representation. Our measure of cultural modernity is the single most important explanation across all aspects of gender equality with socioeconomic factors and institutional design factors exerting influence on one or two aspects. Historical legacy factors fail to show up as important explanatory factors for any aspect of gender equality.

INTRODUCTION

The recent literature on rising gender equality has identified various factors that promote female empowerment (Inglehart & Norris 2003; Inglehart, Norris, & Welzel 2002; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Welzel 2003). Of the theories explored, research finds the following four factors to be particularly important: (1) socioeconomic development; (2) rising gender-egalitarian attitudes that transform economic development into a cultural process of human development; (3) historical legacies stemming from a society's cultural and political traditions; and (4) institutional design factors. However, the literature has failed to analyze the differential impact of these four factors on different aspects and stages of gender equality. Does each of these factors have the same effect on all aspects of gender equality? The literature fails to address this question. There is no study so far using all of these factors as explanatory variables in an attempt to explain different aspects of gender equality. This will be done for the first time in this study in which we distinguish four aspects (and by implication of this) stages of gender equality. Analyzing these aspects as distinct manifestations of gender equality fosters a clearer, more precise understanding of the relative influence of each of the four leading explanatory factors on the different stages. Indeed, we argue that the comparison of these factors across different stages of gender equality will enrich understanding of the roles of economic development, cultural change, historical legacies and institutional designs in empowering women.

We distinguish four central aspects of gender equality. The first aspect, gender equality in basic living conditions, is measured by the Gender Development Index, a measure of gender equality in literacy rates, educational levels, standard of living and life expectancy developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The second aspect, gender equality in civic actions, is measured by the percentage of the adult female population that has participated

in any form of civic activity, including petitions, demonstrations, and boycotts (these data being taken from samples of the World Values Surveys). The third aspect, gender equality in positional empowerment, is measured by the Gender Empowerment Index, an index of women's presence in administrative and managerial power positions.¹ The fourth aspect, gender equality in political representation, is measured by the proportion of women in national parliaments (these data being taken from the Inter-Parliamentary Union).

We consider these four aspects indicative of a logical sequence of progression in gender equality. In theory, it is reasonable to presume that early gains in gender equality take the form of women's greater equality with men in skill development and standard of living. These gains untie women from traditional household activities, setting them free to participate in greater rates in civic activities such as petitions and boycotts. In turn, a more strongly female civil society helps pave the way for more women to achieve power positions. Finally, when women enter power positions in greater numbers at a broader front, it also becomes likely that more women enter national parliaments.

As we move along this hypothetical sequence in gender equality, we consider which correlates in the literature are central explanatory factors, to what degree, and whether this remains constant. Informed by the slew of evidence presented through recent research on social modernization and gender equality (Inglehart & Norris 2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Welzel 2003), we hypothesize that economic development will explain basic early gains in gender equality, especially in the living condition aspect but perhaps also in the civic participation aspect as participation requires resources that only come with economic development. We then consider the influence of the translation of economic development into a cultural process of

¹ This measure is also developed by the UNDP.

human development which gives rise to emancipative attitudes (see Welzel 2003). We expect this to be the central predictor of gender equality in women's civic action participation as well as their broad representation in administrative and managerial power positions. Integrating women into civil society and bringing them into power positions requires not only objective factors that come with the economic aspects of modernity but also behavioral choices and career choices that are driven by subjective values, reflecting the cultural aspects of modernity. However, departing from theories of glacial economic and cultural changes, and following strong findings in research on determinants of women's parliamentary empowerment, we also hypothesize that factors particular to the political environment, measuring institutional design, will take on central relevance when evaluating determinants of women's parliamentary representation. In particular, we hypothesize that specific aspects of the political environment mediate gains in women's parliamentary representation. More strongly, institutional design can take on central relevance; institutions are capable of accelerating or restricting women's parliamentary representation regardless of the developmental conditions women face in the larger social environment.

We therefore expect that measures of economic and cultural modernity will exert greater influence on the measures capturing women's social empowerment: the Gender Development Index, the "feminization" of civil society, and the Gender Empowerment Index. On the other hand, the relevance of political factors should diminish the influence of culture and economics in predicting women's representation in parliament with institutional design becoming central to explaining this fourth stage.

This paper is organized into five parts. Part I offers a review of the literature on factors that contribute to gender equality. Part II introduces the countries and variables explored and the methods conducted to investigate the roles of these potential correlates in predicting the three

stages of women's empowerment. Our analyses are based on over 40 nations that were included in the third or fourth waves of the World Values Survey. This covers an exceptionally diverse set of nations, varying in their social conditions, political institutions, elite compositions and empowerment of women. Part III analyzes the patterns of women's empowerment and the correlates of these patterns. We conclude by considering the implications of the findings for future research on women's empowerment and societal change.

Four Explanations of Gender Equality

While there are many explanations for the status of women in society, our analyses focus on four dominant themes in the literature: (1) the classical modernization perspective that focuses on economic development, (2) the more recent human development view focusing on emancipative cultural changes that give rise to gender-egalitarian attitudes and self-expression values, (3) the historical legacies perspective which emphasizes the influence of cultural and political traditions, and (4) the institutional design perspective that is important from a political engineering perspective.

(1) Economic Modernity: The Classical Development Perspective. Focusing on economic development, the classical modernization perspective considers increases in democracy and human choice as a direct outcome of economic development (Lipset 1959; Rostow 1960; Deutsch 1964; Bell 1999 Inkeles & Smith 1974). In relation to gender equality, this approach holds that economic development is central to increasing the pool of women eligible for positions of social power. These scholars establish that increased economic development associates with a more broad based distribution of educational and occupational resources. Greater access to educational and occupational resources increases women's chances

of professional development, creating a larger pool of women eligible for power positions such as political office.

Others note that higher levels of economic development bring more social services to societies. Through their alleviation of the costs in labor and time of everyday responsibilities associated with care giving (e.g., child-rearing, domestic work), increases in these services free up time for social pursuits in women's lives. Several studies confirm these hypotheses, demonstrating that developmental measures such as countries' levels of non-agricultural development, per capita gross domestic product, women in the workforce and women college graduates positively influence the percentage of women in their parliaments (Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1981, 1987; Siaroff 2000; Welch & Studlar 1996).

(2) *Cultural Modernity: The Human Development Perspective.* A more recent theory emphasizes the conversion of economic development into a cultural process of human development that gives rise to an emancipative worldview, reflected in self-expression values that emphasize human choice and autonomy, including the choices and autonomy of women (Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Welzel 2003; Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann 2003). This rise in emancipative orientations develops mass expectations targeted at making elites responsive and inclusive. In this way, rising emancipative values lead to increases in women's empowerment throughout society (Inglehart & Norris 2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2005) and in parliament (Welzel 2003; Inglehart, Norris & Welzel 2002).

At its core, the human development perspective links social modernization to emancipative values through changes in existential constraints. The theory highlights changes in modern societies particularly conducive to women's empowerment and therefore establishes a link between cultural modernity and publics that value greater equality between genders.

Ultimately, Welzel (2003) ties the modern human resources crucial to the human development sequence to economic development. But in this view the effect of economic development is more indirect.

Inglehart & Norris (2003) find that cultural modernity holds real, positive consequences for women. When controlling for alternative hypotheses, their measure of attitudes toward gender equality is the sole predictor of the proportion of women in parliament. In later work, Inglehart & Welzel (2005) modify these findings. It is not so much gender-egalitarian attitudes in particular but the broad emancipative implications of self-expression values in general that positively predict gender empowerment.

In summary, modernization comes in many forms. While all the measures reviewed here relate in some fashion to women's empowerment, the strongest, most consistent findings show that gains in gender equality are most dramatic in countries with high levels of development and strong emancipative values. Thus, measures of economic development should strongly relate to the measures of women's empowerment. We also expect measures of cultural modernity to strongly associate with the dependent measures. With respect to relationships between these two processes, given that the human development approach stresses the role of increasing human resources in expanding the scope of social inclusion and human choice, we expect that economic modernity will more strongly explain the initial stage of women's empowerment while cultural modernity will become more central to explanations of the higher stages.

(3) *Historical Legacies.* The human development perspective and the classical modernization perspective offer theories to explain why modern societies are more conducive to gains in gender equality. This section on cultural and institutional path dependency presents

historical legacies potentially capable of affecting the improvement modernization brings to women's social and political status.

The developmental trends of social modernization may face legacies of path dependent cultural and institutional organization that affect societies' abilities to improve women's lives (Krasner 1984; Skocpol 1992). Researchers note that the emergence of institutions, whether cultural or the result of policy, sometimes consists of types of social organization that have a continuing and somewhat determinant influence on phenomena relevant to those institutions far into the future (Peters 1999). This influence can take the form of an inertial tendency where institutions affect relevant phenomena that would have otherwise changed due to other social forces, like modernization. We consider four measures of path dependent processes highlighted in the literature as those capable of affecting gender equality: Protestant religious traditions, a long tradition of female suffrage, a state tradition of investing into welfarism rather than coercive forces, and a tradition of leftist dominance in government formation.

Depending on the nature of their traditions, religions vary in opportunity for women's emancipation. For instance, relative to other religious heritages, scholars find that a Protestant religious heritage improves the status of women in a country (Inglehart & Norris 2003; Inglehart, Norris & Welzel 2002; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1987). With its tradition of sectarianism and volunteerism, Protestantism holds a tradition particularly hospitable to democratic values, such as respect for individualism, reciprocity and popular sovereignty.

Researchers also approach the impact of religious legacy on women's empowerment through measures of publics' levels of secularization (Inglehart & Norris 2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2005). As societies secularize there is greater deference to rationality and expertise, and this typically gives rise to the modern state and widespread social services. The secularizing

trend typically occurs from the pre-industrial through the industrializing phase of modernization. During this transition, traditional units restrictive of women's development such as the family and the church lose their authority as individuals place greater emphasis on rationality and individualism. Scholars working with the World Values Survey have developed a value dimension for capturing this transition to secular, rational values. Studies find positive relationships between this and measures of women's empowerment (Inglehart & Norris 2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2005).

In addition to religion, path dependent processes with respect to women's suffrage policy may affect the potential to increase gender equality in particular societies. Suffragist policy represents instances when elites and dominant political groups open the system of political representation to former, politically constructed out-groups. Countries with earlier suffragist policies for reforming women's formal political exclusion are likely to have a stronger institutional legacy of women's formal political inclusion. Several studies hypothesize and establish a positive link between earlier suffragist policy and women's empowerment in parliament (Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Moore & Shackman 1996; Ramirez, Soysal & Shanahan 1997; Rule 1981).

State-financed welfarism policy is another tradition that research on gender equality highlights as central to societies' progress in gender equality. Much research confirms that a key barrier to women's full social inclusion and autonomy has been and continues to be institutional arrangements that restrict the state's role in caretaking and domestic responsibilities (Hirschmann 2001; Liebert 1999; Sainsbury 1996; Tronto 2001). Welfare policy is capable of alleviating these barriers by expanding the scope of the state's involvement in these everyday household necessities through, for instance, state supported childcare.

Others scholars focus on the degree of exclusivity between state welfare investments and military investments in explaining the positive role welfare policy plays in women's lives (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). This trade-off in state policy with respect to welfare verses power orientations is additionally relevant for gender equality. Investments into coercive state power are investments into activities that are largely male-dominated (working against female empowerment) while investments into social welfare favor activities in which women play a more prominent role (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Thus, state legacies with respect to welfare policies are an additional form of historical institutionalism that could potentially offset the empowerment modernization brings to women.

Finally, an important role has been assigned to the traditional dominance of leftist parties. Through their role as gatekeepers, political parties act as mediators of women's potential to seek and win elective office (Caul 1999; Kunovich 2003; Kunovich & Paxton 2005; Norris & Lovenduski 1993; Sanbonmatsu 2002). Party elites act as gatekeepers via the crucial role they play in the processes of candidate recruitment and selection (Norris 1993, 1996; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Gallagher & Marsh 1988). In evaluating characteristics of parties that impact the recruitment, selection and support of women political elites, researchers highlight the importance of party ideology and women's involvement in party leadership (Caul 1997, 1999, 2001; Kunovich & Paxton 2005; Studlar & McAllister 1991; Welch & Studlar 1996). Scholarship generally shows that leftist parties are more likely to recruit women and to adopt strategies to ensure more women candidates, which increases women in party leadership positions (Caul 1997, 1999, 2001; Matland 1993). Other scholars show that more women in party leadership positions associates with the adoption of more strategies to empower women within the party and the election process (Kunovich & Paxton 2005).

In summary, there are few studies that systematically, comparatively test the role of these path dependent processes next to other competing explanations of women's empowerment. It is therefore difficult to hypothesize what role these factors will play and when in women's increasing empowerment. While it is not clear how these processes will perform relative to other explanations or at what stage in gender equality factors will become more or less relevant, research does tell us that Protestant or secular societies should positively associate with measures of gender equality, societies with a longer history of women's female suffrage should positively associate with the three stages of gender equality, and greater welfarism should positively correlate with gender equality.

(4) *The Institutional Design Perspective.* While theories of modernization emphasize the impact of economic resources and values on women's empowerment in society and historical legacies emphasize the impact of cultural and political traditions, researchers typically stress other factors to explain the representation of women in government. These researchers highlight the relevancy of the characteristics of political institutions as causal factors.

This literature holds that variation in institutional characteristics mediates mass support for women's empowerment and the pool of women eligible for political office in ways that either enable or constrain women's attainment of political leadership. Three aspects of the political system find support in this literature: the strength of democracy, the electoral system, and gender electoral quota systems.

In comparison to autocracies, it is not surprising that scholarship on explanations of women's social and political empowerment highlight the role of democratic institutions. The argument is rather straightforward. The oppressive, unequal treatment of women clashes with the democratic idea of human equality (McDonagh 2002; Welzel 2003). As societal foundations that

preserve and socialize free and equal citizenship, democratic institutions supply women with more rights and more channels for making their voices heard. Research indeed shows that the strength of countries' democratic traditions empowers their women (Inglehart & Norris 2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2005).

Researchers have also considered the impact of institutional variation within democracies on women's political representation. Most prominent among the arrangements considered is the influence of electoral systems. Electoral systems affect women's paths to parliament by structuring party elites' incentive or disincentive to run women candidates. In this line of research, the most persistent finding is the consistent, positive impact of proportional representation systems (PR) on the percentage of women in parliament (Castles 1981; Darcy et al. 1994; Duverger 1955; Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Lakeman 1994; Norris 1985; Paxton 1997; Rule 1994, 1987, 1981). Studies hypothesize that PR systems positively affect the percentage of women in parliament because these electoral systems have a higher number of seats per district and offer parties a greater chance of winning more than one seat per district. This results in greater turnover of officeholders and reduces the costs of increasing women's elite status by sacrificing the seat of an incumbent male (Rule 1994). The result is parties that are more likely to concern themselves with a ticket balanced according to gender. In addition, through greater district magnitude and party magnitude, parties are more likely to choose candidates down the party list, who are typically women (Matland 1993; Rule 1994).

The positive impact that PR electoral systems make on women's recruitment is crucial. Due to differences in socioeconomic status, occupational choice and family responsibilities, in comparison to men, women candidates are likely to have greater difficulties in becoming eligible and aspiring political candidates (Darcy, Welch & Clark 1994; Kenworthy & Malami 1999;

Norris & Inglehart 2003). In this case, women are less likely to pursue political office and are likely to be lower on candidate lists if they choose to run. Thus, because PR electoral systems increase women's chances of recruitment and electability despite lower placement on candidate lists, these electoral systems provide greater opportunity for the election of women.

Finally, with PR electoral systems, the greater incentive to balance tickets gives parties greater opportunity to promote gender as an option for challenging other parties. This typically results in a contagion of promotion of women's inclusion across parties as elites attempt to equalize the playing field by avoiding the appearance of their party's marginalization of women voters (Matland & Studlar 1996).

In addition to the role of electoral rules, gender electoral quota systems are institutional mechanisms that consistently, positively mediate the conditions and attitudes that structure women's leadership potential. Indeed, researchers studying the recent proliferation of quota systems throughout the world have referred to quota systems as "the fast track" to the equal political representation of women (Dahlerup & Freidenvall 2003). Beginning with Norway, over the last three decades, several societies have witnessed the introduction of some form of a gender electoral quota system in their political bodies for improving the status of women. These quota systems take the form of a constitutional amendment, electoral law or party policy. Scholars generally find that the stronger the gender electoral quota system the greater the level of women's percentages in political office (Dahlerup 1998; Dahlerup & Freidenvall 2003; Caul 1999, 2001; Kolinsky 1991; Matland 1993; Studlar & Macalister 1998).

The attributes of democratic institutions, electoral systems, and the degree to which countries adopt gender electoral quota systems are the aspects of political systems supported in the literature that enhance our understanding of institutional designs that improve or hinder

women's presence in political office. Scholars generally describe the role of institutional actors as a mediating role whereby variations in these aspects of political systems structure support for women's political empowerment and the actual empowerment of women in other areas of society in ways that facilitate or restrict women's proportions in political office. To date, however, no studies have employed a comparative design that assesses the impact of the same cultural and political predictors on different aspects of women's empowerment to confirm the relative degree to which the political environment matters with respect to women's attainment of positions of political leadership. Employing such a design, we hypothesize that the political environment mediates women's broader social opportunity to lead. As the explanation shifts from the Gender Empowerment Index to the percentage of women in parliament, political institutions will take on greater explanatory weight.

Taking the literature as a whole, progress in economic modernity, cultural modernity, together with favorable political and cultural traditions, as well as various institutional design factors are the likely correlates of various aspects of gender equality. What is less clear is the degree to which these four factors uniquely influence different aspects of gender equality. To move forward, it is therefore useful to ask whether and to what extent the relative influences change as we move from analysis of lower to higher stages of gender equality. Do the type and influence of correlates shift, increase or diminish? Is it the case that conditions in the political environment become more important when accounting for variation in the percentage of women in parliament?

Data and Methods

To assess the degree to which economic modernity, cultural modernity, historical legacies, and institutional design uniquely influence different aspects of gender equality, the first step was to

identify the nations for analyses. Freedom House designates approximately 120 countries as electoral democracies. Confining our investigation to countries considered minimally democratic ensured that we could reasonably compare political systems and parliamentary representation across nations while at the same time preserving substantial variation between countries with respect to the strength of democracy.

Our analyses focus on gender equality in four areas. The first measure is the Gender Development Index compiled by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This index captures early gains in gender equality in basic living conditions, accounting for inequalities between women and men with regard to life expectancy, literacy rates, educational attainment and standard of living. The second stage of gender equality occurs when more women become active outside the household and enter civil society, making their voices heard in public. This stage is measured by the percentage of women who indicate their participation in boycotts or demonstrations. The third stage of gender equality, the Gender Empowerment Index, measures women's broad positional empowerment, indicating the degree to which women have entered administrative and managerial positions and have equal pay.² The fourth measure of women's empowerment accounts for women's representation in the national parliament.³

When we observe country positions in our dataset according to the levels of gender equality for each of the four indicators, there are some shifts and consistencies worth highlighting. There are many shifts in country positions from one to another area in gender equality. For instance, Honduras, South Africa and Mozambique show scores below the 25th percentile on the Gender Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Index, but their

² The UNDP also compiles data for this measure.

³ We take percentages of women in parliament from the Inter-Parliamentary Union for the latest election data available on the lower house.

percentages of women parliamentarians are above the 75th percentile. On the other hand, Great Britain and the United States position in the 90th percentile in their scores for gender development and women's civic participation and above the 75th percentile for gender empowerment, but they score nearer to the 50th percentile in their percentages of women in parliament. Japan and France also score in the 90th percentile on the Gender Development Index and yet Japan scores in the 25th percentile for the percentage of women in parliament and France just above this. Peru scores just below the 25th percentile on the Gender Empowerment Index and below the 50th percentile on the Gender Development Index but scores around the 80th percentile with respect to the percentage of women in parliament. Mexico positions below the 25th percentile in women's civic participation and positions above the 75th percentile in the percentage of women in parliament.

Overall, however, despite some interesting country shifts across the indicators of gender equality, each of the dependent measures correlates significantly and positive with each other. Indeed, we note important consistencies by country scores and the aspects of gender equality. For the most part, nearly all of the Protestant European and English-Speaking Democracies score above the 75th percentile on all four measures of gender equality. Furthermore, Nigeria, Mongolia and India consistently score below the 25th percentile on all measures of gender equality while Croatia, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia and Malta (among others) consistently occupy positions in the middle chunk of the distributions. It is therefore not surprising to note that each of the dependent measures correlates significantly and positive with each other.

As one might expect, the broad social measures of women's empowerment, the Gender Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Index, show the strongest correlation at .79. The relationship between the Gender Empowerment Index and the percentage of women in

parliament follows at .73. The correlations between women's civic participation and the broad social measures of women's empowerment come in third and fourth in correlational strength. Women's civic participation correlates with the Gender Empowerment Index at .66 and with the Gender Development Index at .65. The final relationships, between the Gender Development Index and the percentage of women in parliament and between women's civic participation and the percentage of women in parliament, lessen dramatically. Yet, these variables continue to correlate significantly at .38. between the Gender Development Index and the percentage of women in parliament and at .47 between women's civic participation and the percentage of women in parliament. Thus, while both of the broad measures of gender equality exert some influence on the percentage of women in parliament, the Gender Empowerment Index appears to be the best predictor, at least at the bivariate stage. In addition to this, positioning most strongly in correlational strength between women's empowerment in living conditions and women's positional empowerment, women's civic participation seems to exert the greatest influence in the diffusion of women's status broadly throughout society.

The correlational results between the four indicators suggest that the four aspects of gender equality, each important in their own right, build on each other in improving women's social status. Women who share greater equality with men with regard to literacy rates and life expectancy, are likelier to be active in civil society. These women in turn have a greater chance to achieve higher positions in their careers. And, in societies where women and men share greater equality in management positions and salaries, they are more likely to share greater equality in national parliament. It is therefore crucial to ask what explains these stages. Are the different aspects of gender equality derivative of the same exogenous influences? Is it possible to engineer accelerated achievement of the fourth stage institutionally? As we concentrate on

exogenous influences on these four aspects of gender equality, we do not try in the following analyses to explain one aspect of gender equality by another aspect of gender equality. Instead, we investigate those societal and political factors that develop this sequence of empowerment, viewing gender equality as a multi-staged process and investigating those factors that drive improvement along this sequence.

Table 1 introduces the independent variables we draw on to measure explanations of gender equality. The table presents the distribution of scores per variable for our sample of countries. In addition, to offer some perspective with regard to each of these scores, under each value, the table lists a country in our sample that approximates each score.

To measure economic modernity, we compiled data per country on the percentage of personal computers per 1,000 inhabitants, and the per capita gross domestic product. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is the measure studies use most frequently to measure levels of development. However, while levels of per capita GDP measure levels of economic development rather unspecifically, measures of the distribution of information technology, such as personal computers, capture the level of advancement toward knowledge economies in particular. It is in this transition in which the growingly cognitive demands of the working environment make the male advantage in average physical strength lose its importance (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).

<insert Table 1 here>

Variation in cultural modernity is measured in several ways. In the broadest terms, recent research on modernization, democratization and cultural change highlights two value dimensions particularly indicative of cultural modernity: secular-rational values and self-expression values (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Secular-rational values are supposed to become prominent in the industrial phase of modernization. These values do not yet call into question traditional authority

patterns, including patriarchy, but simply give authority orientations a more rationalistic legitimation. Self-expression values, by contrast, are the hallmark of postindustrial society. These values question authority in general and this includes the traditional authority of men over women outside the household. Rising self-expression values have a broad emancipative impetus, emphasizing human autonomy and choice.⁴ The measure of both secular-rational values and self-expression values are a one-factor solution based on attitudes measured through the World Values Survey.⁵ We suppose that self-expression values in particular are strongly positively associated with each measure of gender equality.

A more specific cultural variable is attitudes toward gender equality (Inglehart & Norris 2003). The gender equality scale is a close replication of the scale used by Inglehart & Norris. This scale represents a factor analysis ran over four component variables measuring attitudes supportive of gender equality in the World Values Survey.⁶

There are also several measures of historical legacies. Our measure of the strength of a Protestant culture is based on the percentage of Protestants in each society, reflecting the finding that Protestantism has been repeatedly found to be a religious tradition that is particularly conducive to gender equality.

⁴ This value dimension measures priorities with respect to economic and physical security, feelings of satisfaction with one's life, attitudes with respect to homosexuality, and attitudes with respect to trust in other people.

⁵ This measure is composed of the following attitudinal measures: importance of God, strategies for raising and socializing children, and attitudes towards abortion, national pride, and respect for authority.

⁶ (1) "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do." (2) "When jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women do." (3) "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl." (4) "If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?"

We measure the endurance of female suffrage by drawing on a study by Ramirez, Soysal & Shanahan (1997). Ramirez et al. determined the timing of women's suffrage in a cross-national study of 80 nations. We draw on this research to construct our measure.

To capture societies' legacy with respect to welfarism, we update a measure that captures a state's inherited welfare orientation versus power orientation. Following Inglehart & Welzel (2005), this is measured through the level of public welfare investment minus military investment.⁷ This measure is indicative of the state's inherited welfare vs. power orientation such that the social welfare orientation is stronger the more welfare investments are pursued at the expense of military investments while the state power orientation is stronger the more it is the other way round.

The last legacy factor we use is the traditional dominance of left party control over government. We expect the number of years of left party government control to be positively correlated with each aspect of gender equality as the emancipative impetus of traditional leftist ideology makes parties of this spectrum particularly sensitive to gender equality issues.⁸

To measure institutional design, we compiled data on the strength of democracy, type of electoral system, and type of gender electoral quota system. We determined the strength and depth of democracy per country based on the civil liberties and political rights measures provided by Freedom House. Values scored higher represent higher levels of democratic quality. We recorded data on average district magnitude to capture differences in countries' electoral

⁷ Indicators of welfare spending are state expenditures for health and education as percentage of GDP taken from the 1998 Human Development Report. Military expenditures are measured according to state expenditures for the army as a percentage of GDP taken from the 1998 Britannica book of the year.

⁸ Using the Database of Political Institutions, we measured the years between 1975 and 2004 that a left party was the major party in control of government.

system. Based on the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's (IDEA) website, we measured countries' level of gender quotas.⁹

Correlates of Gender Equality

We hypothesize that economic modernity will have the dominant influence on basic achievements in gender equality with regard to literacy rates. Then we suppose that economic modernity will share a strong influence with cultural modernity when it comes to explain female participation in civil society, for this is an aspect of gender equality that does not only require economic achievements but also modern role orientations and motivations. Next, we expect cultural modernity indicators to show the dominant influence on gender equality with regard to women's empowerment in leadership positions largely writ. Finally, we expect that institutional design factors will take on greater explanatory weight as prediction shifts from broader measures of women's empowerment to the measure of women's presence in parliament. Table 2 presents correlational results, giving us a first assessment of these hypotheses based on the simple bivariate correlation between predictors and the empowerment measures.

<insert Table 2 about here>

Looking at correlates of gender equality across all dependent variables, we find in each of our four groups of explanatory variables at least one showing a consistently significant correlation with all four dependent variables. Among the two economic modernity indicators, both are highly positively and significantly correlated with all four measures of gender equality, though for the first three aspects of gender equality, per capita GDP is the strongest correlate. For gender equality in basic socioeconomic aspects, per capita GDP is the strongest among all

⁹ This was coded 0 if the country was not listed on the site, .25 if one party instituted quotas, .5 if two parties instituted quotas, .75 if three parties or more instituted quotas, and coded 1 if quota laws were instituted nationwide.

correlates. All three indicators of cultural modernity are highly, significantly and strongly, positively correlated with all four measures of gender equality. Somewhat surprisingly, the most specifically gender-egalitarian attitude is not the strongest correlate. Instead, self-expression values, which measure emancipative attitudes in a broader sense that goes beyond gender equality, show the strongest correlations among all independent variables with three of the gender equality aspects. As it seems, a broadly emancipative climate appears to be even more important for achievements in gender equality than gender-egalitarian attitudes in a more specific sense. Among the historical legacy factors, the years under female suffrage and the legacy of state welfarism show consistently significant and strongly positive correlations with all four aspects of gender equality. The Protestant tradition, by contrast, is significantly correlated with only two of the gender equality aspects. Among the institutional design factors, the scope of civil liberties shows the most consistently significant and most strongly positive correlations with all four aspects of gender equality. As suspected, other more specific institutional factors, namely proportional representation, district magnitude, and gender electoral quota, show significant correlations only with the representational aspect of gender equality.

These findings suggest that in order for the status of women to rise in societies from greater socioeconomic equality to greater equality in civil society to management positions, higher levels of economic development and cultural modernity are conducive. Modernization, particularly in the form of rising self-expression values, becomes crucial for higher levels of gender equality throughout society.

Further indicative of this explanation, while the strength of association between self-expression values rises when the focus moves from socioeconomic gender equality to positional gender equality, the strength of association between these two dependent variables and the

measure of secular/rational values actually decreases in the transition. This also resonates with the human development perspective. Recall, the secular/rational value dimension corresponds to changes taking place earlier in modernization when countries are industrializing while the self-expression value dimension captures value transition most acute when societies are transitioning from industrial to postindustrial status.

Apart from civil liberties, institutional design measures consistently correlate positively and significantly *only* with parliamentary gender equality. Furthermore, while nearly all other measures consistently culminate in associational strength with the Gender Empowerment Index, across the board, these associations diminish in strength with women's presence in parliament. Also important, the measure of civil liberties diminishes in association dramatically (from .75 to .24) when correlating with the percentage of women in parliament, falling behind the associations that district magnitude, proportional representation and gender electoral quota are now showing.

These results support our hypotheses. Beyond increases in societal conditions, particular aspects of the political environment matter with respect to the level of women's presence in positions of political leadership: societies' electoral systems and implementation of quota systems structure women's opportunity to lead.

Multivariate Analyses

Although these correlations make sense, they are not fully conclusive. Several explanatory variables overlap with each other; for instance, GDP per capita is linked to self-expressive values, while these values in turn are related to civil liberties and state welfarism. The question then remains what happens when we partition the variance among variables, controlling for competing hypotheses?

To create robust multivariate regression models in a sample with no more than 50-60 cases when survey data are included, we must limit the number of independent variables. To do this in a meaningful way, we relied on the theoretical distinction between variables taking different types of explanations into account as well as on the correlation results. As a rule, each regression should include at least one variable from each of the four types of explanatory approaches. Next, it should always include that variable from an explanatory approach which showed the most significant correlation with the respective aspect of gender equality. Third, as variables in the socioeconomic modernity approach as well as in the cultural modernity approach are more closely correlated among each other than are variables within the other approaches, we always only include one variable from both the socioeconomic and cultural modernity approaches, even if other variables of these two approaches also show strong correlations with a given aspect of gender equality. From the historical legacies and institutional design approaches we include as many variables of each approach as there are variables whose correlation with a certain gender equality aspect surpasses the .005-level of significance. These rules lead to the selection of independent variables for the gender equality aspects as indicated by the gray shadings in Table 2.

Finally, we run each of the four models twice: in the first version we include all variables indicated by gray shades in Table 2 using the “enter method” which does not deselect any variable but always estimates all effects simultaneously. Given the size of our sample this can still lead to collinearity problems or too many insignificant effects. Thus, in a second round we run the same regression using the “stepwise procedure.” This method selects the model that explains most of the variance with the smallest possible number of significant variables. This helps identify which variables are really needed most to explain a given aspect of gender

equality. As this cannot be decided on purely theoretical grounds, a deselection procedure along statistical criteria is appropriate, employing a survival-of-the-fittest strategy among competing explanations. Table 3 presents the separate regression analyses for the four dependent variables.

<insert Table 3 about here>

Explaining Gender Equality in Living Conditions. While many of the explanatory factors looked like promising predictors of gender equality in bivariate analysis, this changes dramatically in the multivariate results. Beginning with analysis of the first stage of gender equality, equality in basic living conditions, only two predictors reach significance: the level of per capita GDP and the scope of civil liberties. Thus, as hypothesized, increases in per capita GDP increase gender equality in living conditions. However, somewhat unexpected, wider civil liberties also explain these initial gains. This can mean that even if a society gets richer, patriarchic structures that restrict gender equality in basic living conditions can be more easily preserved when civil liberties are limited. Good examples of this pattern are oil-exporting countries such as Saudi-Arabia. They are rich but restrict civil liberties and hence limit gender equality gains in women's basic living conditions. Furthermore, as hypothesized, the measure that captures cultural modernity, mass values conducive to gender equality, fails to explain variation in the socioeconomic aspect of gender equality. These results come even clearer to the surface when running the stepwise regression procedure: all effects, except per capita GDP and civil liberties, are deselected. This reduction of effects is not at all paid with a loss of explained variance. In fact, the model is more reliable as the number of cases at which it applies doubles from 45 to 89.

Explaining Gender Equality in Civic Participation. We hypothesized that once economic modernization has helped to increase women's basic living conditions, this aspect of modernity

is not determinant of whether women go beyond their household roles and participate in civic activities. Female participation in civic activities is more a matter of cultural choices, for which a certain degree of cultural modernity must be reached. Indeed, as we can see, the emphasis a society places on self-expression values creates a cultural climate that encourages women to participate in civic activities. In fact, a society's overall emphasis on self-expression values is the only effect reaching significance in the fully inclusive model. This remains in the stepwise procedure which deselects all effects, except that of self-expression values. Beyond self-expression values, no other factor adds anything significant to explain female participation in civic activities. Most surprisingly perhaps, not even wider civil liberties contribute to greater female participation in civic activities when self-expression values are taken into account. Obviously, cultural values encourage or discourage female participation in civic activities more than do institutional opportunity structures. This is plausible because internalized values are intrinsic while institutional incentives are extrinsic to human motivations and because intrinsic motivations, like self-efficacy beliefs, are stronger regulators of human behavior than extrinsic incentives (Bandura 1989).

Explaining Gender Equality in Positional Empowerment. The story changes somewhat when we examine the Gender Empowerment Index. As hypothesized, cultural modernity in terms of a society's emphasis on human self-expression significantly explains variation in female positional empowerment. But, the scope of civil liberties reaches significance as well. This is also the result of the stepwise procedure, which deselects all effects, except self-expression values and civil liberties. Why civil liberties do not provide an additional explanation next to self-expression values when it comes to female participation in civic activities while they do so when it comes to female positional empowerment is not entirely clear to us. Apparently, when

driven by strong self-expression values, women do participate in civic activities no matter how wide the given scope of civil liberties. But to bring women into power positions more than self-expressive motivations are needed. This also requires a legal opportunity structure, as reflected in civil liberties, which women can reliably employ to their advantage. Thus, limited civil liberties do not hinder women in a self-expressive society from participating in civic activities, yet wide civil liberties do help women in a self-expressive society to reach power positions. For the first achievement, women can simply override male resistance, insofar as there is any, because it is primarily to their discretion whether they participate in civic activities in a self-expressive society. For the later achievement, getting into power positions, arrangements beyond women's control limit empowerment outcomes. Here women face a male-dominant system of gate-keeping and organizational culture and therefore seem to need the additional help of a legal framework of rights in order to succeed. Civil liberties obviously are a good proxy for a legal framework of anti-discrimination rights in a more general sense.

Explaining Gender Equality in Political Representation. With respect to female representation in national parliaments, the fully inclusive model covers only 37 cases and only one effect, a larger district magnitude, reaches significance (but only at the .05-level). Obviously, the fully inclusive model explains too few cases with too many variables, producing instable results. Accordingly, the picture changes considerably in the stepwise procedure, which deselected all effects, except self-expression values, the district magnitude and proportional representation. This finding confirms our hypothesis that when it comes to the specific aspect of female political representation, specific institutional design factors loom larger. Districts of a larger magnitude and electoral regimes based on proportional representation contribute significantly to greater female representation in parliaments. Interestingly, however, self-expression values continue to

show the most significant and strongest positive effect even on this aspect of gender equality. Thus, under the same electoral rules, a stronger emphasis on self-expression values brings more women into parliaments. Regardless of type of electoral system or quotas, women will still perform moderately well in parliamentary attainment in societies with higher degrees of mass concern for human autonomy and choice. Cultural change offsets the negative effects that First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral systems and small district magnitudes exert on women's representation in parliament; emancipative values positively moderate a political environment inhospitable to increases in women's parliamentary presence.

For one of the aspects of gender equality, female participation in civic actions, we have also individual-level evidence, which allows us to explore the mechanisms leading to greater gender equality in more detail. At the societal-level, we found that in nations in which people on average place more emphasis on self-expression values, rates of female participation are higher. But does this mean that women with stronger self-expression values are more strongly motivated to participate in civic actions such as petitions, demonstrations and boycotts? And how do economic development and civil liberties act on such a motivational effect in case it really exists. Remember that the societal-level in Table 3 found both economic development and civil liberties to be insignificant. Yet this might look different if we use a multi-level model to explore how societal-level variation in economic modernization and civil liberties acts on the individual-level effect of self-expression values on civic participation. This is shown in Table 4 in two models, one for the entire sample of the World Values Survey, and another only with the female half of this sample. There are no noteworthy differences in the effect structure between these two models.

<insert Table 4 about here>

Table 4 reveals the following insights. There is a universal individual-level effect of self-expression values on women's participation in civic activities irrespective of a society's economic modernization and its scope of civil liberties. Apparently, women with stronger self-expression values are always more motivated to participate in civic actions. Still economic modernization, but not civil liberties, yields societal-level effects of its own on female participation in civic actions, increasing a society's average level of female participation in civic actions. Moreover, economic modernization (but again not civil liberties) interacts positively with the effect of self-expression values on women's participation in civic actions. In other words, even though the individual-level effect of self-expression values on civic participation is generally positive and significant across the board, it is not at all invariant. On the contrary, the effect varies systematically with societal-level properties, becoming stronger with economic modernization. Put differently, women's self-expressive motivations translate more easily into civic participation in more economically advanced societies (but not in more liberal societies). Hence, women's individual-level values interact with a society's economic modernity to "feminize" civil society.

Conclusion

Rather than evaluating a range of explanatory approaches from the limited standpoint of one kind of empowerment in women's lives, we tested theories from the vantage of viewing women's empowerment as a process whereby earlier gains precede later gains and correlates potentially emerge or shift in these transitions. The investigation improves our understanding of societies' gains in gender equality by highlighting emergence and change in the influence of economic modernity, cultural modernity, historical legacies, and institutional design as explanations moved

from gender equality gains in basic living conditions, to participation in civic actions, to positional empowerment to political representation.

In the transition to societies whose women are equal with men with respect to literacy rates, education levels, life expectancy, and standard of living, the conditions that matter are those associated with liberal institutions and, as hypothesized, economic modernity. The supposedly later cultural change towards self-expression values is not a determinant of women's achievement at this most basic stage of gender equality.

The picture changes when considering gender equality in civic actions. Here economic modernity is still significant but now the cultural impact of self-expression values looms larger: female participation in civic actions is more a matter of culturally motivated choices than of objective socioeconomic factors. However, we demonstrate in a multi-level model that economic modernity still matters in that this interacts positively with the individual-level effect of women's self-expression values on their participation in civic actions.

In the transition from this stage to greater levels of gender equality in positional power, the relative importance of effects changes again. Economic modernity is now out of the picture and what matters is cultural modernity in terms of self-expression values and again liberal institutions indicating the scope of civil liberties.

In the final stage assessed, the explanatory story gives more weight to more specific institutional design factors beyond liberal institutions. Especially a larger district magnitude and electoral systems with proportional representation contribute significantly to increase female representation in parliaments. But still self-expression values exert a strong and significant influence of their own.

As a whole, historical legacy factors (which appeared promising at the level of bivariate correlations) never show up as important explanatory factors for any aspect of gender equality. The variance entailed in religious, statist, and democratic legacy elements is entirely absorbed by other factors. For all aspects of gender equality, it is one or two modernity factors or a combination of a modernity factor with one or two institutional design factors that provides a satisfactory explanation. Among the modernity factors, economic modernity is relevant in the first two stages of gender equality while cultural modernity has the lead in the second to fourth stage. In general, it seems to be the single most important factor for all aspects of gender equality. Among the institutional design factors, liberal institutions are very significant in the first three stages (indirectly, as an interaction effect, also in stage two as the multi-level model has shown). In stage four, where the variation is limited to societies that are anyway rather liberal, more specific institutional design factors become important. In conclusion, most aspects of gender equality can be sufficiently understood as a combination of developmental forces with institutional engineering. Historical legacies, by contrast, do not seem to matter much.

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Table 1. Cross-National Descriptives Measuring Developmental, Cultural, Historical and Institutional Factors

Independent Variables	Min Value	25 th Percentile	Mean Value	75 th Percentile	Max Value	N
Internet Access	.00 (Burundi)	.70 (Sri Lanka)	11.74 (Namibia)	109.78 (Czech. Rep.)	1218.42 (Finland)	83
Per Capita GDP (1998)	458.00 (Sierra Leone)	2765.8 (Indonesia)	9042.18 (Antigua)	14373.3 (Slovenia)	33505.00 (Luxembourg)	119
Gender Equality Scale	-.31 (Nigeria)	-.01 (Japan)	.20 (Croatia)	.38 (France)	.89 (Iceland)	60
Self-Expression Values (World Values Survey)	.18 (Serbia)	.37 (Taiwan)	.48 (Malta)	.59 (Belgium)	.74 (Sweden)	63
Secular/Rational Values (World Values Survey)	.18 (Ghana)	.32 (Ireland)	.44 (Albania)	.53 (Luxembourg)	.78 (Japan)	62
% Protestants minus Muslims	-99.80 (Turkey)	.00 (Mongolia)	15.49 (Latvia)	39.78 (N. Zealand)	99.00 (Tuvalu)	114
Years Female Suffrage	28.00 (Portugal)	48.00 (Benin)	60.66 (Indonesia)	73.75 (Spain)	111.00 (N. Zealand)	80
Welfare Orientation	-1.58 (Bangladesh)	-.57 (Mexico)	.18 (Brazil)	.85 (Austria)	1.83 (Sweden)	45
Strength of Democracy (Freedom House 1998)	-.96 (Serbia)	8.0 (Moldova)	9.28 (Venezuela)	11.00 (Great Britain)	12.00 (Switzerland)	120
Average District Magnitude	-	1.0 (U.S.A)	8.72 (South Korea)	11.20 (Poland)	44.40 (South Africa)	91
Gender Electoral Quota System (IDEA)	-	.00 (Finland)	.41 (India)	.81 (Norway)	1.00 (Costa Rica)	118
Years Left Party Control (1975-2004)	-	.00 (Nigeria)	10.27 (Moldova)	16.75 (Costa Rica)	28.00 (Poland)	92

Table 2. Four Gender Equality Aspects and their Correlates

CORRELATES:	GENDER EQUALITY in ...			
	... Living Conditions (Gender Development Index 2002)	... Civic Participation (female participation in civic actions 1995-2001)	... Power Positions (Gender Empowerment Measures 2004)	... Political Representation (female representation in parliaments 2006)
<i>(1) Socioecon. Modernity:</i>				
- PCs per 1,000 inhabitants	.67*** (69)	.77*** (48)	.80*** (60)	.58*** (70)
- Per capita GDP in PPP 1995	.78*** (89)	.77*** (48)	.80*** (75)	.46*** (105)
<i>(2) Cultural Modernity:</i>				
- Secular-Rational Values	.59*** (55)	.55*** (56)	.56*** (56)	.34** (58)
- Gender Equal. Attitudes	.62*** (54)	.65*** (54)	.77*** (54)	.63*** (57)
- Self-expression Values 1989-95	.77*** (55)	.78*** ^{a)} (56)	.82*** (56)	.63*** (59)
<i>(3) Historical Legacies:</i>				
- Percent Protestants 90s	.16 (87)	.55*** (55)	.52*** (73)	-.01 (109)
- Years since Female Suffrage	.55*** (75)	.53*** (48)	.55*** (60)	.42*** (77)
- State Welfareism	.68*** (76)	.63*** (53)	.73*** (65)	.46*** (80)
- Years of Left Party Control	.14 (81)	.22 (51)	.33** (69)	.30** (88)
<i>(4) Institutional Design:</i>				
- Political Rights 1994-98	.65*** (89)	.56*** (56)	.66*** (75)	.15 (115)
- Civil Liberties 1994-98	.72*** (89)	.60*** (56)	.75*** (75)	.24** (115)
- Combined CL & PR 1994-98	.70*** (89)	.60*** (56)	.73*** (75)	.20* (115)
- District Magnitude	-.02 (79)	.01 (49)	.18 (65)	.44*** (87)
- Proportional Representation	.20* (89)	.03 (56)	.20* (75)	.42*** (87)
- Gender Quota	.08 (89)	-.10 (56)	.02 (75)	.29** (114)

Entries are Pearson correlations with number of nations in parentheses. *Significance levels:* * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001. Grey shade: inclusion in regression models of next table.

^{a)} A measure of self-expression under exclusion of civic actions is used.

Table 3. OLS-Regressions Explaining Different Aspects of Gender Equality

PREDICTORS:	DEPENDENT VARIABLES: Gender Equality in ...							
	... Living Conditions (Gender Development Index 2002)		... Civic Participation (female participation in civic actions 1995-2001)		... Power Positions (Gender Empowerment Measures 2004)		... Political Representation (female representation in parliaments 2006)	
	'Enter'	'Stepwise'	'Enter'	'Stepwise'	'Enter'	'Stepwise'	'Enter'	'Stepwise'
- PCs per 1,000 inhab.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	.20 (.71)	<i>Deselected</i>
- Per capita GDP	.35* (2.03)	.51*** (4.03)	.29 (1.35)	.32* (2.13)	.03 (.15)	<i>Deselected</i>	_____	_____
- Self-expr. Values	.19 (1.16)	<i>Deselected</i>	.50*** ^{a)} (2.92)	.56***^{a)} (3.76)	.37* (2.20)	.51*** (4.81)	.32 (1.02)	.55*** (4.67)
- Percent Protestants	_____	_____	.07 (.56)	<i>Deselected</i>	.10 (1.05)	<i>Deselected</i>	_____	_____
- Years since Fem. Suffr.	-.02 (-.16)	<i>Deselected</i>	.02 (.15)	<i>Deselected</i>	.04 (.37)	<i>Deselected</i>	.05 (.27)	<i>Deselected</i>
- State Welfare-rism	.06 (.44)	<i>Deselected</i>	.16 (.94)	<i>Deselected</i>	.11 (.81)	<i>Deselected</i>	.05 (.22)	<i>Deselected</i>
- Civil Liberties 1993-97	.35* (2.46)	.41** (3.21)	-.13 (-.76)	<i>Deselected</i>	.38** (2.81)	.45*** (4.29)	-.01 (-.05)	<i>Deselected</i>
- District Magnitude	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	.34* (2.31)	.34** (2.63)
- Proportional Represent.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	.24 (1.65)	.26* (2.07)
- Gender Quota	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	.14 (1.00)	<i>Deselected</i>
Adjusted R ²	.75	.76	.65	.67	.78	.79	.44	.50
N	45	89	44	55	42	56	37	50

Entries are standardized regression coefficients with T-values in parentheses. _____: not included for reasons of insignificance in bivariate correlations. '*Deselected*': excluded by stepwise regression procedure. *Significance levels*: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

^{a)} A measure of self-expression values under exclusion of civic actions is used.

Table 4. Multi-Level Models Explaining Female Participation in Civic Action

	<i>DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Participation and Readiness to Participate in Petitions, Boycotts, and Demonstrations (9-point ordinal scale)</i>			
	Entire Sample		Female Subsample	
	Coefficient (T-Ratio)		Coefficient (T-Ratio)	
<i>EFFECTS:</i>				
Intercept (<i>Fixed Effect</i>):	0.686560***	27.498	0.593169***	25.439
<i>Individual-level Effect (general slope):</i>				
Self-expression Values ^{a)}	1.038535***	17.498	1.053435***	19.376
<i>Societal-Level Effects (intercept variance):</i>				
Per Capita GDP 1998	0.000017***	3.989	0.000017***	4.264
Civil Liberties 1994-98	0.004491	0.144	0.000150	0.005
<i>Cross-Level Interactions (slope variance):</i>				
Self-expression values*Per Capita GDP	0.000038**	3.118	0.000046***	3.935
Self-expression Values*Civil Liberties	0.036353	0.488	0.034047	0.492
	151,266 level-1 units (individuals) in 57 level-2 units (nations)		76,885 level-1 units (women) in 57 level-2 units (nations)	
Error reduction referring to base model:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level 2: 65.3% - Level 1: 7.6% 			
^{a)} A measure of self-expression values under exclusion of civic actions is used.				