

Extreme support and mainstream failure:
Far right populism after the financial crisis

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Abstract: *The electoral prominence of the West European extreme right has been characterized as responding to the salience of quality of life issues and the sociocultural cleavage of “new politics.” As a result, there has been considerable scholarly disagreement about these parties’ sometimes-ambiguous economic platforms, implying their support should retrench when economic issues are salient. However, support has not obviously receded after the recent financial and Eurozone crises. This paper examines the bases of support for Western European extreme right parties (XRP) after the crises, when they might be expected to lose support because of their investment in sociocultural issues and apparently equivocal economic programs. Some discernable, though qualified, shifts in demographics are uncovered. By way of explanation, this paper draws from literature on the extreme right’s “unscrupulous populism” through which they might still capitalize on perceived mainstream party failure after the crises and maintain electoral support. The paper uses European Social Survey data to test characteristics and attitudes of extreme right voters using a series of logistic regression models for elections between 1999 and 2012 in five West European states. In this paper I argue that XRP support after the recent economic crises demonstrates a populist renegotiating of the political space and a scholarly over-burdening of the quality of life hypothesis above.*

The extreme right in Western Europe

Perhaps the greatest development in Western European party politics over the last quarter century has been the emergence and persistence of “new” extreme right parties (XRP).¹ Previous scholarship has considered West European XRP as responding to the same change in the political space that previously yielded parties of the New Left (e.g. Ignazi 1992, 2003a; Kitschelt 1995). Hence, XRP have been thought to mobilize on a variety of grievances associated with the advent of post-industrial society (e.g. Eatwell 2003; Ivarsflaten 2008; Ignazi 2003a). Scholarship has focused on sociocultural as well as economic grievances; however, mobilization on economic grievances has become particularly problematic in recent literature, given some ambiguity in extreme right economic platforms and their apparent emphasis on sociocultural issues (Ivarsflaten 2005; Kitschelt 2007).² Immigration has been the singularly most predictive grievance, especially when portrayed in sociocultural, rather than economic terms (Ivarsflaten 2008). Given this presumed investment in a noneconomic, sociocultural, cleavage, there is now a question of whether the global economic crisis of 2007-

¹ There are a variety of terms used to describe these parties: anti-immigrant parties (Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000), new radical right (Kitschelt 1995), extreme right (Ignazi 1992), radical right populist (Betz 1994), anti-political establishment (Abedi 2004), the list goes on. While there are some disagreements about terminology, most literature agrees on the included parties (Kitschelt 2007).

² Schain (2006) notes the extreme right’s role in changing immigration from a labor market question to one of national identity.

2008 and ensuing recession have shifted the issue appeal of XRPs and hence their available voters. Because it is not obviously the case that the extreme right vote share has receded, I hypothesize that XRPs have been able to instrumentally court a different constituency in the aftermath of the crises. This new constituency is likely to be economically rather than socioculturally vulnerable, and particularly disaffected with mainstream parties.

Literature has heretofore suggested XRP success only where sociocultural, quality of life, issues are salient (cf. Bale 2003; Mudde 2013; Rydgren 2010). However, another model—that extreme right populists instrumentally (i.e. non-ideologically) court voters from whatever constituency might be available—has gained purchase. XRP success has also been able to vary their appeal when politically expedient. Their populist, transient ideological commitments, and ability to capitalize on mainstream party failure (Williams 2010), suggest the potential for continued viability after the crises, despite investment in predominantly noneconomic issues. Under the populist model, the extreme right can mobilize opportunistically on a variety of grievances over time depending on issue salience. Macropolitical phenomena like the recent economic crises may instigate such a populist transition, potentially resulting in a change in XRP base of support.

The recent economic crises can be viewed as a natural experiment and functional critical test between two venerable hypotheses on the extreme right, a sociocultural one and a populist one. Given the extreme right's electoral endurance throughout the global financial crisis and Great Recession, explanations for XRP success cannot depend wholly on the salience of sociocultural issues, potentially undercutting a longstanding theory of extreme right success. Conversely, if their continued viability is due to a populist courtship of a different, economically marginalized constituency, this should be reflected in the attitudes and demographic profiles of XRP voters.

In what follows, I chronicle important changes in XRP rhetoric and support on both sociocultural and economic issues, suggesting that previously XRPs have been adept at negotiating the party space in response to changing political climates. This provides a theoretical framework that would explain continued XRP success. I will then examine whether the crisis and its aftermath have impacted the attitudes and sociodemographic profiles of XRP supporters using a series of logistic regression models for the elections before and after the financial crises in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. These states quarter a diverse group of XRPs, including the enduring *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (SVP) and *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ), the regionally bound *Vlaams Blok/Belang* (VB),³ the trendsetting *Danskfolkspartei* (DF) (Betz and Meret 2009), and the tumultuous Dutch parties.

It is hypothesized that after the crisis, economic insecurity will generate extreme right support because of perceived mainstream party failure, despite previous mobilization on sociocultural issues. Though not directly tested, this might imply that XRP voters are more sociodemographically similar after the crises. As such, this paper considers whether Ignazi's (1992) observation that XRPs gather support from "all social strata" still holds (cf. Kitschelt 1995, Ch. 1; cf. Coffe, Hendeyls and Vermeir 2007). To examine a potential shift in voter attitudes and demographics, I examine party support using several waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) for relevant elections 1999-2012.⁴

Debunking the "non-material right"

The electoral breakthrough of the French *Front Nationale* (FN) in the 1984 European Parliament election is considered a watershed moment in XRP history (Ignazi 2003a; Schain

³ For my purposes, 'VB' will refer to either or both the Vlaams Belang and the historical Vlaams Blok (disbanded after 2004), unless the distinction is crucial in a given instance.

⁴ Arzheimer and Carter (2009) and Ivarsflaten (2008), among others, also make use of ESS.

2006; Rydgren 2005a).⁵ Since its breakthrough, the ethnopluralist, anti-immigrant frame of the FN has permeated across Western Europe and XRPs fitting that profile have emerged in most Western European states (McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Rydgren 2005a).⁶ XRPs in this family have had consistent representation in national and regional legislatures and participated in various government multiple times (e.g. Austria, the Netherlands, Italy). Despite the variously unsuccessful tenures in government of the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) and FPÖ, XRPs seem better able to survive institutionalization than earlier assumed (Bale 2003), and have even outpolled their center-right competitors in Austria and Switzerland (McGann and Kitschelt 2005).⁷

This type of XRP found an available constituency after the competitive party space was altered by the circumstances of post-industrial society (e.g. Ignazi 2003a, Kitschelt 1995). Because of their novelty to post-industrial society, XRPs are positioned in diametric opposition to the ‘New Left’ the party-coordinate plane (cf. Kitschelt 1995).⁸ This positioning corresponds to the increased salience of sociocultural, ‘quality of life’ issues and attenuated influence of traditional ‘material,’ economic concerns. ‘Post-material’ values gain purchase during periods of relative affluence and security, and are expected to recede when the opposite is true (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).⁹ The societal upheaval associated with globalization, increased immigration, and European integration has had non-negligible, but non-material costs

⁵ In particular, this is when the FN most explicitly distanced itself from neo-fascism (Ignazi 2003a, ch. 5)

⁶ In this, XRPs have defied previous expectations, and emerged where it was speculated they would or could not (for the Netherlands, see Mudde and Van Holsteyn 2000; cf. Rydgren and Van Holsteyn 2004; Voerman and Lucardie 1992; for Sweden, see Rydgren 2010).

⁷ Both the Dutch LPF and Italian LN are ambiguous cases of XRPs, but are routinely considered members of that party family (Kitschelt 2007, p. 1178).

⁸ Apparently idiosyncratically, Fennema (2005) refers to “the extreme right” as those parties representing a historical continuity with fascism. Ignazi (2003a) and Betz (2005) require the new “extreme right” be manifestly anti-system and “anti-liberal” respectively. I neither endorse nor require those definitions, for reasons that should be clear below.

⁹ Although some, notably Ignazi (1992, 2003a), occasionally use the phrase ‘post-material right’ I am somewhat uncomfortable with the practice as debate continues to surround XRPs’ stake in the cleavage (Ivarsflaten 2008). As such, I will refer interchangeably to a ‘non-material’ right or to their historically greater concern for ‘quality of life’ or sociocultural issues.

for those marginalized by the novel circumstances of post-industrialism. Moreover, the decline in class voting and general weakening of party identifications, has allowed those issues unprecedented access to the political space in post-industrial democracies (Dalton 2008; Derks 2006; Ignazi 2003a). The idea that younger voters are overrepresented among the XRP electorate also supports that characterization (Arzheimer and Carter 2009).

Hence, explanations for XRP success are often expressed in terms of post-materialism. Ignazi (1992) is most explicit in this regard, referring to a “silent counter-revolution.” This characterization is supported by the idea that extreme right parties have benefited from the salience of quality of life issues (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2008), and rose to electoral prominence at approximately the same historical period as parties on the New Left. Immigration, the enduring hallmark issue of extreme right politics, has been most effective when cast as a cultural issue of national identity (Betz and Meret 2009; cf. Schain 2006; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; cf. Williams 2010), which is intrinsically linked to the distinctly post-material value of “belonging”—included alongside self-expression and individual autonomy by Inglehart and Rabier (1986). This discrete categorization is somewhat reminiscent of the Maslovian hierarchy (Dalton 2008, p. 83), belonging being located prior to autonomy, but obviously secondary to physical or economic security. Ignazi (2003b) summarizes that the non-material demands of extreme right parties

...for an (ethnically) homogenous and harmonious community, and for strong, reassuring leadership and institutions (even at the cost of reducing the ‘excessive’ individual rights) reflects the need for being taken care of, being part of an aggregate, and being provided with an identity (p. 151).

That belonging might come at the expense of individual rights further facilities contrast with the left-libertarian New Left (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Kitschelt 1995).

With the achievement of security, belonging and might be pitted against autonomy. This resonates especially well with Ignazi (2003a, 2003b), who describes XRP supporters as the identity-defending “losers” of post-industrialism, contrasted to the “self-affirming” supporters of the New Left. Rather than an alternative *to* modernity, XRPs presented themselves as an alternative *in* modernity. If the salience of economic issues rises, neither party family would be expected to benefit. If XRPs profit from the salience of sociocultural politics their support should diminish if socioeconomic issues return to the fore (in keeping with Inglehart’s scarcity hypothesis). Mainstream left parties might resurge in times of high unemployment (e.g. Golder 2003). XRP retrenchment was speculated to occur in the immediate aftermath of the Great Recession (e.g., Mudde 2013, p. 15). However, it is not obviously the case that support for XRPs has declined after the crises, a time when socioeconomic issues would seemingly be most prominent in the minds of voters.

There are a variety of interrelated reasons why XRP vote share may not have declined, even if we accept that XRPs mobilized on a post-material dimension before the financial crises. Firstly, these parties’ characteristic populism means their ideological commitments can be (and have been) somewhat transient (Williams 2010). It seems XRPs opportunistically recruit votes from available constituencies, notoriously courting more blue-collar workers throughout the 1990s as they moderated their economic message (Ivarsflaten 2005; Kitschelt 2007). Relatedly, because of the extreme right’s ability to capitalize on mainstream party failure (Ignazi 2003a; Williams 2010), they may not lose support in elections following the financial and Eurozone crises. Rather, their populism may charm a different segment of the electorate, presumably one most disenchanted with mainstream parties after the financial crisis who might be poorer or work in threatened industries. Finally, the competitive space for political parties has been indelibly

altered by the new extreme right's ascendance (Ivarsflaten 2008; Kitschelt 1995). Mainstream parties may no longer be in a position to capitalize on a resurgence of material politics, even if historically that would have been the case. The 'coordinate plane' on which parties can be placed does not necessarily resemble the left-right spectrum as it was understood before the advent of post-industrialism.

As such, scholarship on XRP's must not overburden the explanatory power of the post-material cleavage. Instead, it would be advised to pay attention to a populist or anti-establishment division, one side of which ostensibly consists in the interests and values "the common man," (cf. Abedi 2004, ch. 2), and one which was especially difficult to determine in early characterizations of the extreme right family (de Lange 2006).¹⁰ Post-material values may predict support before the crises, but the characteristics and motivating concerns of XRP voters may change post-crisis, even if the vote share of the party does not. If the extreme right is as opportunistic as the mainstream party failure hypothesis predicts, they may mobilize on economic grievances against the mainstream. This reflects the instrumental populism referenced above, and has precedent given their overtures toward and ensuing support from blue-collar workers, discussed in detail below.¹¹

Mobilization by extreme right populist parties on two dimensions

¹⁰ Abedi himself seems to derive no great utility from the populist label.

¹¹ It also reflects declining party identification, something speculated to be germane to XRP success (Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Ignazi 2003a). Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) note that the dominant dimension of politics can radically change between elections. This is especially relevant given the climate of dealignment, as citizens are expected to vote increasingly based on short-term issues rather than party loyalty (Dalton 2008). Extreme right parties can be more flexible in both their language and their platform, especially when they are in opposition, which is often the case (cf. McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Williams 2010). XRP's, like all parties, gain traction when 'their issue' becomes salient (Smith 2010). To the extent that they are able to own different issues at different times, it is to their advantage.

It seems that rather than a definite platform, XRP's draw votes from marginalized groups on whatever issue is salient to them (cf. Williams 2010). Although the sociocultural positions of the extreme right have been comparably more durable, there is evidence to suggest instrumental populism has been similarly germane. XRP platforms stoke broad, if unspecific, popular antipathies native to post-industrialism (Derks 2006; Hooghe et al 2002; Ignazi 2003a).¹² However, the particular motivating grievances associated with these circumstances have been subject to scholarly disagreement (Ivarsflaten 2008), and consensus on an XRP 'winning formula' remains elusive. If the populist hypothesis holds, it is reasonable to expect XRP's to mobilize on issues more closely related to economic insecurity after the Great Recession.

One particularly influential contribution to the economic explanation for XRP success is Kitschelt's (1995) "right-authoritarian" winning formula.¹³ This formula combines market liberalism with sociocultural ethnocentrism and authoritarian attitudes toward democratic participation. The market liberal dimension is integral as it coincides with the available electorate for a post-industrial XRP. Kitschelt finds that voters fitting certain socioeconomic profiles, whose industries are threatened by international competition, are overrepresented in the 'new radical right' electorate. It is precisely this economic globalization that reoriented the political space, making 'right-authoritarianism' a viable package for the vote-maximizing party.¹⁴ Kitschelt speculates that XRP voters might be more extreme in their support for market liberalism than for authoritarianism, given that, by definition, authoritarianism entails deference

¹² Ignazi (2003a) refers to an extreme right "mentality," if not an ideology proper (p.197).

¹³ Kitschelt mounts a principled defense of this terminology, though he periodically lapses in its use. I have decided to use 'extreme right' because it seems more common in the literature, and because I do not find it necessarily implies a rejection of democracy (contra Kitschelt 2007; Ignazi 2003a). Rather, I find just the opposite. The word 'extreme' should denote continuity with rather than a departure from any continuum on which parties are placed. Indeed, an extreme party should be on an extreme end of that continuum. Nonetheless, it is more or less the case that the different preferred terms refer to the same group of parties.

¹⁴ Indeed, Kitschelt (1995, p. 23) submits that "short of a major economic catastrophe," it is unlikely that right-'welfare chauvinist' parties will ever again seduce substantial portion of the electorate!

to traditional political structures, and the new radical right is, again by definition, “new” (Kitschelt 1995, p. 11).

More recent literature has questioned extreme right emphasis on market liberalism. There is some agreement that XRPs have moderated their economic platforms since their inception (e.g., de Lange 2007; Ignazi 2003a), instead using their sociocultural authoritarianism and ethnocentrism to appeal to both blue-collar workers and the *petit bourgeoisie*—voters who are divided rather than unified by the economic dimension (Ivarsflaten 2005; Kitschelt 2007).¹⁵ The departure from absolute market liberalism indicates an overture toward blue-collar workers made on sociocultural grounds and indeed evidence suggests a degree of “proletarianization” of XRPs’ electorate (e.g. Betz 2005, p. 12; Ignazi 2003a; cf. Oesch 2008). Kitschelt (2007, p.1182) acknowledges that it “was important for radical right-wing parties to suggest to manual laborers that the parties’ economic perspectives were unimportant.” Highlighting the increased salience of sociocultural issues at the expense of economic ones, Johnson et al (2005) describe a new ‘winning formula,’ combining “anti-establishment rhetoric and identitarian politics.”

Some treat this “proletarianization” as an ideological refinement, demonstrative of XRPs much more durable commitment to authoritarianism and ethnocentrism (e.g., Betz and Meret 2009). Betz (2003, p. 80) finds that XRPs’ market liberal leanings have gone by the proverbial wayside because extreme right parties never legitimately committed to such a program, but instead saw such rhetoric as a way to crack into apparently closed party system. If the new XRPs of Western Europe indeed became invested in a noneconomic cleavage it would not be surprising if their economic platforms oscillated somewhat during their maturation. Betz cites the transition of the German National Democratic Party (NPD) “from national-conservative platform to

¹⁵ De Lange (2007) indicates that the typologies presented by Kitschelt conflate libertarianism and anti-establishment populism, which coupled with instrumental moderating of economic platforms, necessitates revision.

‘German socialist’” during a period of growing support in the early 1990s as an example (Ibid. p. 81). Similarly, Westin (2003) finds the Danish People’s Party (DF) also transitioned toward an anti-immigration and xenophobic platform from one attacking the public sector in the late 1970s. Such assessments are commensurate with Kitschelt’s (1995) claim that the winning formula is historically contingent (also, Kitschelt 2007). Although there remains disagreement regarding the economic positions of XRP and the salience of those positions in the minds of voters, even if XRP are (remain?) to the right economically, it is (contrary to the above) apparently not for that reason they are labeled “extreme.”¹⁶

Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest it does not benefit XRP to mobilize on economic terms (Bornschieer 2008), which explains their prior preference for sociocultural commitments absent the apparent mainstream party failure of the Great Recession (if the sociocultural politics of XRP have also been ambiguous, that would be a strike against “ideological refinement” argument). High unemployment, for instance, correlates with increased support for left parties (Golder 2003; Knigge 1998; cf. Wright 2012). Cross-nationally, XRP have not generally mobilized on economic grievances more effectively than their competitors (Ivarsflaten 2008), and XRP support in Belgium has typically come from higher income areas (Coffe, Heyndels, and Vermeir 2007). Oesch (2008) finds that worker support for XRP is generally for noneconomic reasons (also, Ivarsflaten 2005). Rydgren (2010) concludes that the salience of the economic cleavage is one reason why Sweden did not have an XRP until recently. Golder (2003) finds that unemployment only matters when high immigration is perceived, and Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2007) indicate attitudes about immigration were most predictive

¹⁶ This is particularly interesting because Kitschelt (1995) makes the same claim about authoritarianism, indicating the importance of supply side factors and possibly supporting one of Kitschelt’s early hypotheses that there need not be a qualitative difference between XRP and center right party voters. Rather, primarily supply side issues determine what party these voters will support at the polls.

of XRP support when immigration is not couched in economic terms.¹⁷ This is one plausible explanation why in states with comparatively high unemployment (e.g., Greece) no extreme right party made sizable inroads prior to the Great Recession, whereas more fully employed states' XRPs (e.g. the FPÖ) realized electoral success (Golder 2003; Coffe et al 2007).

The extent to which XRP platforms have crystalized as non-material 'workers' parties' is indeed contested. Instead, more recent scholarship has focused on XRPs' "unscrupulous" populism (Betz 1994; de Lange 2007; Derks 2006). The populist explanation cites changes in XRP platforms and rhetoric as wholly opportunistic without ideological consolidation (Williams 2010). The sometimes-ambiguous stances of the FPÖ's Jörg Haider lead to a more economically diverse electorate (McGann and Kitschelt 2005), and in 2004 the VB seemed to take a deliberately ambiguous stance about particular economic policies, espousing only the virtues of the "common man" (Derks 2006). These anti-establishment attitudes foment distrust of the complex and opaque welfare state and might mimic right economic attitudes (Derks 2006), even absent a principled opposition to state intervention in the economy. Consistent with the populist explanation, XRPs' instrumental tack leftward (even if not to the redistributive side of the spectrum) also fits with the findings of Van der Brug et al (2009), who discover a recent left-economic/right-immigration opening in electorates of the fifteen old EU states (cf. Bale et al 2010; de Lange 2007). The combination of populism and apparently instrumental economic commitments I hypothesize is fundamental in assessing XRPs continued impact after the financial crisis, despite prior investment in a noneconomic cleavage. Indeed, Kitschelt (1995, p. 11) speculated that only a major economic crisis might reinvigorate the electoral viability of a welfare chauvinist program.

¹⁷ As an aside, it is perception of immigration levels rather than immigration itself that seems to be more predictive of XRP support (Eatwell 2003; Golder 2003; Kitschelt 1995). This indicates the role of XRPs in generating attention for the issue.

XRPs' sociocultural commitments are best represented by their ownership of the immigration issue, as immigration is often portrayed as an issue that parties on the center right have either ignored, or from which they have retreated (Arzheimer 2009; Bale 2003; Ignazi 2003a). This "conspiracy of silence" hypothesis speaks to the same vote maximizing strategy. Immigration has been singularly dominant in extreme right party platforms (e.g. Coffe et al 2007), with some scholars referring to the XRPs simply as 'anti-immigrant parties' (e.g. Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000; Fennema 2005). Indeed, immigration has been shown to be the grievance most effectively mobilized by the extreme right (Ivarsflaten 2008) and XRPs have been instrumental in changing immigration from a labor market question, to one of national identity (Schain 2006). However, Ignazi (2003a) considered immigration to be epiphenomenal to more general insecurity native to post-industrialism (also, Derks 2006)—the sentiment preceded the new extreme right movement and it was on this sociocultural insecurity that XRPs first capitalized (Ignazi 2003a). Rather than an ideological commitment, it seems that XRPs ran opportunistically on a nationalist, anti-immigrant platform, using sociocultural rhetoric when quality of life issues were salient in the competitive party space (Kitschelt 1995).

Demonstrating the transience of XRP positions, even on immigration, Betz (2005) notes that while some XRPs in the early 1990s focused on labor immigration, later in the decade immigration was primarily discussed in terms of national identity and Western values (Schain 2006; cf. Williams 2010) to unite blue and white collar voters in support of XRPs (Ivarsflaten 2005). In France, immigrants have been mobilized against as labor migrants, then Arabs, and later Muslims, corresponding to transient popular antipathies (Brown 2006; Giry 2006, p. 91). This both serves to frame the immigration issue as one increasingly related to the sociocultural dimension of new politics than the old economic one, and one instrumentally developed. The

changing focus on immigration was instrumental given the increased salience of sociocultural conflict in the electorate (Williams 2010), specifically the salience of issues pertaining to identity.

For XRPs, this brand of anti-immigrant identity politics became especially available, in an altered form, in the early years of the 21st century. The aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York and London, the Danish cartoon affair, and the assassinations of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn saw an increase of Islamophobic attitudes (Williams 2010, Westin 2003), and a concomitant evolution of XRPs' sociocultural rhetoric (Betz and Meret 2009; Zuquete 2008). It is generally agreed that the extreme right made their anti-Islam message increasingly overt as these events unfolded. After 11 Sept. 2001 "virtually all parties and formations on the radical right made the confrontation with Islam a central political issue" (Betz 1994 qtd. in Williams 2010). Eatwell (2003) likewise characterizes the September 11th attacks as a 'godsend' to the extreme right. There is evidence to suggest immigrant Muslims increasingly preformed the role of "out-group" in the early part of the 21st century.¹⁸ Out of 9/11 emerged the requisite 'diffuse public sentiment' for extreme right populism to capitalize.

Extreme right instrumental rebranding of their sociocultural commitments is again apparent. Islam took on a central role in rhetoric after 9/11, one more central and independent than a "mere" corollary of the xenophobia that has long been associated with the extreme right (Zuquete 2008).¹⁹ Through the use of Islam as a foil, parties of the extreme right have been able to evoke both religious and liberal secular values as distinctly European, which represents a

¹⁸ Perhaps rightly, though likely with different sentiment, in 2007 Jean Marie Le Pen equated "Islam [in] the twenty-first century [to] what communism was to the twentieth." (qtd. in Williams 2010).

¹⁹ "Xenophobia has become Islamophobia for many prominent radical right-wing parties in this century," concludes Williams (2010).

departure given XRP's historically anti-system stance, and overrepresentation of the nonreligious within their electorate (cf. Arzheimer and Carter 2009; cf. Coffe 2005).

This transition is also apparent given the change in how Muslim immigrants and their decedents have been rhetorically targeted. In the 1970s and 1980s, 'Muslims' were primarily addressed in national or ethnic terms rather than religious ones (e.g., 'North African' rather than 'Muslim' in the French context), which changed dramatically in the 21st century (Brown 2006). Using newspaper articles in 2002-2003, Byng (2008) finds a similarly increasing prejudice against the *religious* identity of American Muslims. Heretofore only peripheral in XRP programs (Arzheimer and Carter 2009, p. 989), the role of Christian imagery in extreme right rhetoric also increased (Zuquete 2008). Even in highly secular societies like Denmark and Norway, religious imagery ('Christian Europe') was adopted by XRP's (Betz and Meret 2009; Ignazi 2003a, p. 222). The most recent FN manifesto from 2007 similarly regards religious difference as the biggest problem as regards Muslim immigrants to France (Williams 2010). Additionally, adopting religious imagery can be seen as instrumental particularly as the allegiance of religious voters to Christian-Democrat or conservative parties wanes, given the that religiosity is an overriding predictor of right ideology (Arzheimer and Carter 2009).

Moreover, the portrayal of XRP's as anti-system, or illiberal, can no longer be accepted uncritically, despite previous characterizations of them as such (Betz and Johnson 2004; Ignazi 2003a, 2003b). Their participation in government and growing—albeit thoroughly Islamophobic—defense of liberal values makes that a tougher sell (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Mudde 2007). For instance, the FPÖ's Haider criticized Islam at being at odds with Austrian values towards women (Betz 2003), and during the French headscarf affair feminists and the FN were reasonably similar in their treatment of Muslims as a monolithic anti-modern

foil (Scott 2009). Filip Dewinter's claim of his VB that "we are the defenders of Western civilization, with its two pillars: Judeo-Christianity and the heritage of the ancient Greece" (Zúquete 2008) represents a noteworthy rhetorical expansion for a party identified with Flemish nationalism and historically anti-Semitism.²⁰ The LPF, which coalesced with the Christian Democrats and conservative liberals in the Netherlands in 2002, was also manifestly "liberal" in a variety of ways (Akkerman 2005; Rydgren and Van Holsteyn 2004; cf. Fennema 2005). Even the most radical parties like the VB champion liberalism while castigating Islam as incompatible with European values (Betz and Meret 2009). Rydgren and Van Holsteyn (2004) speculate that the quasi-liberal frame defining the LPF might proliferate across Western Europe, as other XRP frames have done previously (Rydgren 2005).

Even the comparably durable sociocultural commitments of the new right have been subject to opportunistic changes. Historically important features of XRP platforms have diminished and new ones have come to the fore. There is reason to suspect that after the financial crisis, similarly widespread hostility toward 'those responsible' might be translated into XRP support among an anxious population, this time capitalizing on socioeconomic marginalization. XRPs are hypothesized to continue mobilizing through "unscrupulous use and instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment and their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense" (Betz 1994).

The platforms of populist parties necessarily fluctuate with both public dissatisfaction and issues on the mainstream agenda (Williams 2010). The extreme right is noteworthy for its indirect influence on policy even when it is not in government (or even parliament, as is the case in Germany and Britain) (Schain 2006; McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Westin 2003; cf. Dalton

²⁰ Williams (2010) notes the "enemy-of-my-enemy" convenience in replacing Jews with Muslims as the out-group of choice for Western European XRPs

2008, p. 127). The populist right transitions away from issues that mainstream parties succeeded in addressing, toward issues the mainstream is unable to successfully handle, as with immigration (Williams 2010).²¹ The financial and Eurozone crises are thought to represent mainstream party failure *par excellence*, so it would be consistent with previous changes to see XRPs mobilize on that issue, and thereby motivate different concerns.

Furthermore, evidence suggests that a change was due. Even emphasis on immigration has waned (Williams 2010). In part, immigration has been deemphasized in favor of an emphasis on cultural identity and national security in the 21st century. Additionally however, many mainstream parties are now proposing plans not altogether dissimilar from the ones previously proposed by their system's corresponding XRP, indicating "mainstream party success" and necessitating a change (ibid.).²² Even with reference to portraying "Islam is incompatible with European values," mainstream parties (both right and center-left) have appropriated the message of the extreme right (Yilmaz 2011). Likewise, Bale (2003) notes the symbolic resolution of certain sociocultural issues owned by the extreme right, and therefore theorizes that XRPs vote share will diminish. Thus, even without the financial crises, it appears XRPs might have cause to adjust their platforms. With the crisis, such a transformation may be over-determined. The plasticity of XRP platforms is likely responsible for their continued success despite the economic crises of Western Europe. There is reason to suspect XRPs will refocus their programs in a manner consistent with their aforementioned populism despite their historically ambiguous economic platforms.

²¹ Indeed, this is also in part how parties of the New Left entered party systems (Abedi 2004). Had emergent post-material values been immediately coopted by the mainstream parties at the time, anti-establishment parties, be they left, right, or center, would not have gained traction.

²² Mudde (2013) indicates that social democratic parties have shown a tendency to move rightward on immigration *only when* there is a successful extreme right party present [my italics] (cf. Bale et al 2010). Center right parties seem to be moving in that direction almost irrespective of XRP performance and have thoroughly legitimized the message of their XRP competitors, radicalizing discourse and polarizing the party system (e.g., Bale 2003; Ignazi 2003a).

Data and Methods

Though not yet thoroughly studied, the literature on XRPs implies that their support should retrench after the financial and Eurozone crises because they have not historically benefited from the salience of the economic dimension of politics (cf. Bale 2003; Mudde 2013, to some extent Rydgren 2010). I have hypothesized that this need not be the case. Rather, dissatisfaction with mainstream parties and the XRPs' ability to both maneuver and define the competitive space provides them something of an opportunity. Table 1 presents the parties included in the analysis, which represent widely agreed upon XRPs running in elections 1999-2012. The total vote share of these parties is indicated in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows no obvious increase or decrease in extreme right vote percentage since 1999. Where multiple parties are present for a single election, their vote totals are aggregated. For instance, both the Austrian FPÖ and BZÖ are included in 2006 and 2008.

Table 1 about here

Figure 1 about here

I analyze sociological and attitudinal characteristics of voters in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland using all available rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), from 2002-2012.²³ The French FN is noticeably absent from the list, but the desired data for France is not currently available, and the French extreme right has been most noteworthy for its impact on presidential elections, which presents some problems for comparison. I hypothesize that the attitudinal and demographic characteristics of these voters, which comprise the

²³ <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

independent variables, will reflect different grievances after the financial crisis and demonstrate XRP's instrumental populism. If extreme right voters look attitudinally and demographically different after the crises than they did before, my hypothesis will be supported.

The XRP's I have selected have been among the largest and most influential over the last decade. Pim Fortuyn's eponymous list is sometimes discounted as an XRP (Kitschelt 2007) however, Rydgren and Van Holsteyn (2004) indicate that Fortuyn drew support from similar constituencies as other XRP's, even if there were differences on the supply side. Because this paper is concerned with motivations and characteristics within the (in this case Dutch) electorate, the inclusion of the LPF should be unproblematic. There can also be little doubt of Fortuyn's anti-establishment populism (de Lange 2007). Because this study focuses on attitudes and characteristics of voters, selecting only successful cases of XRP's is justified and will not matter at microlevel analysis (Arzheimer and Carter 2009).

The predictor variables, presented in greater detail below, were included in several logistic regression models, performed on several waves of ESS data in one of the above countries from 1999-2012 (Table 1). These variables include measures of subjective and objective economic wellbeing, attitudes toward immigrants, influence over one's workday, trust in political institutions, and respondent's age. Each model contains the same battery of predictor variables, with a dichotomous dependent variable indicating a vote for an XRP in Table 1. Non-voters were dropped from the analysis. The advantage in this, rather than aggregating the data from multiple elections, is that the circumstances surrounding each election are different and those circumstances might be obscured should elections be combined. For instance, that the model works less well in the Dutch 2003 election than the Dutch 2002 election may reflect the turbulent government tenure of the then rudderless and defunct LPF. The positive outcome (i.e.,

a vote for an XRP) is not so rare that running the model for each election should create bias, as most XRPs receive at least 70-90 votes per sample electorate, and sometimes many more. Because the ESS is run every two years and elections are generally not held that frequently, I use the first data set to be fully collected after an election. The exception is the 2012 Netherlands case. Because certain respondent's data were collected before the parliamentary election and part were collected after, I remove from analysis those interviews that took place in August and September 2012.

The set of predictors employed is fairly standard and follows from the literature above. I control for age given the importance of political dealignment, but also expect age to be relevant to extreme right support during the Great Recession because of the disproportionate effect of unemployment. Any positive relationship with age and an extreme right vote may be evidence of a successful XRP transition toward issues salient to older voters (Ignazi 2003a), or continued dealignment among the traditional center right electorate (Arzheimer and Carter 2009). Age is measured as a continuous variable presenting the respondent's age in years.

Immigration is historically the most powerful predictor of extreme right support in the literature. It has been demonstrated perceptions of immigrants rather than any absolute number of newcomers is most predictive of extreme right support (Golder 2003; Kitschelt 1995). As such, I use attitudinal data contained within the ESS. The ESS contains several measures of attitudes toward immigrants that mostly correlate rather highly with each other. Two such measures are questions about whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy, or whether they undermine or enrich culture, to respondents give a number 1-10. These measures are highly correlated during the first five waves of the survey (always above .5, and up to .7), and therefore were combined into an immigrant attitudes index. If immigration has come to represent the

rightist stake in the sociocultural cleavage, it could be expected to lose salience after the financial crisis, insofar as the socioeconomic cleavage reemerges. Attitudes about the economic impact of immigrants might gain importance after the crisis, to the extent that XRPs continue to own the issue of immigration. However, it is not possible with the ESS data here to parse whether it is attitudes about the economic or the cultural impact of immigrants that are most predictive of XRP support because the variables are so highly correlated. When the attitudinal measures are disaggregated and run neither is consistently nor interestingly more predictive than the other, and the significance of both are diminished. As such, I expect the immigrant attitudes index to remain significant and negative both before and after the crisis.

I have combined variables for trust in parliament and trust in the European parliament into a third variable for the same reason. Although they are arguably conceptually distinct (see Kitschelt 2007 for a discussion on EU attitudes and the extreme right vote), they are not the singular variables of interest for this particular study. If “trust in institutions” is significantly lower in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it will be interpreted as supporting the mainstream party failure argument outlined above. I expect the long-standing Euroskepticism of the extreme right and the complicity of mainstream parties as regards European integration to lead to this variable being negatively predictive (cf. Bale 2003). To the extent that anti-establishment populism is constitutive of XRP positions, trust in institutions should be significant in the negative direction more often than not. However, disenchantment after the Eurozone crisis in particular may increase its magnitude.

Because occupational factors were central to Kitschelt’s seminal analysis, I have also included a subjective measure (again, 1-10) of how much influence respondents feel they have over the structure of their workday. I expect influence over one’s workday to be negatively

associated with extreme right support in keeping with the authoritarian attitudes dimension described by Kitschelt and above. This variable should reveal the predictive power of an “authoritarian” workplace environment. It is of theoretical importance for that reason, and if it becomes more consistently predictive after the crises, it might indicate an occupational realignment (postulated partially by the proletarianization argument above) of voters and that XRP no longer draw votes from “all social strata.” Again however, insignificance is not a death knell for this study because subjective feelings of influence over one’s workday are at best an imperfect proxy for occupationally derived authoritarian attitudes.

Most central to this analysis, I include three economic predictors. Those are *comfort with one’s present income* (on a four point scale), *satisfaction with the economy* (10-point scale) and *reported income* (12-point scale). These variables do not suffer from the same high correlation as attitudes toward immigrants or institutions and all three fit comfortably within the models. I expect each to become negatively predictive of an XRP vote after the crisis and generally remain insignificant before the crisis given my earlier emphasis on the sociocultural commitments of new XRPs. However, there is also a possibility that they will be *positively* correlated with XRP support before the crises, insofar as the prominence of the sociocultural dimension of politics depends on relative economic security. If significant and positive before the crisis, this subhypothesis (suggested by Coffe et al for the Flemish VB) is supported.²⁴ However, a positive relationship between the economic predictors and an XRP vote is likely to be of a comparatively smaller magnitude.

Results

²⁴ If significantly positive after the crisis, this hypothesis is supported at the expense of my own. Finding relative affluence correlated positive to XRP support is also consistent with the post-material hypothesis above.

The results of the logistic regression analysis are mixed and reported in Table 2 below. Several hypotheses enumerated above find provisional confirmation, and suggest directions for future research. There were 20 elections that have import for my research question, grouped by country presented in Table 2. As indicated above, each logistic regression was run on the ESS data available most immediately after the year the election took place (for instance, the Dutch election of May 2002 was measured using data gathered in the fall of 2002, the Dutch election of 2003 was measured using data from the fall of 2004).

Table 2 about here.

Age is predictive in the expected direction six times, and significant in the reverse direction once, which may be anomalous, or may bespeak the greater electoral support enjoyed by the Swiss SVP than most other XRP. Of the six correctly predicted cases, half occur before and half occur after September 2008. The magnitude of the coefficients does not indicate any sizable change in the effect of age over time in predicting the odds of a vote for the extreme right.

Immigration is always significant and usually very much so. The one exception is in the Netherlands in 2003, which is more likely to do with the context of that election than any instrumental transition away from immigration issues by the LPF, hence the utility in observing individual elections rather than aggregate data. Above it was suggested that immigration might cede its leading status in XRP programs (Williams 2010), but negative attitudes still clearly predict XRP support. A more in depth study may be able to better assess exactly how immigration was used in the platforms of these XRP from one election to the next, but negative

attitudes toward immigrants, broadly speaking, remain by far the best predictor of a vote for an XRP. Future scholarship on the subject will need to look at supply side elements, as the attitudinal measures are, for the most part, too highly correlated to effectively contain within the same model. Again, coefficients both before and after the financial crises are on the same order of magnitude.

For the most part I have treated the extreme right as a party family, and implicitly argued that these parties should behave in a similar way regardless of national particularities. The trust in institutions variable seems to support an alternate view (corroborated by Arzheimer 2010) that national circumstances are (still) very much relevant in XRP support. It does appear that XRP voters have lower trust in national and European parliaments. However, it is only in Belgium that the trust in institutions variable is always negatively associated with XRP support. This seems likely due to the nationalist commitments of the Belgian (or, more appropriately, Flemish) VB, whereas other XRPs are not so regionally bound (the Italian *Lega Nord* is missing from my analysis due to data limitations). Perhaps it is also due to the proximity of EU headquarters. It is also plausible that due to the SVP, and to a lesser extent, the FPÖ's tenure in government, they are more so identified with the national establishment than other legislatures' perennially oppositional XRPs.

The variable measuring perceived influence in one's workday decisions does not seem to have any strong explanatory power in this model. It is only significant at $p < .05$ twice, and both times in the reverse direction. It was left in the model for the theoretical reasons and its contribution is peripheral to my overall analysis. Future research concerned with occupation as it relates to authoritarian attitudes will have to paint with a finer brush, so to speak. Indeed, workday influence was intended to be a proxy for occupation, and is apparently not a very good

one (if one is still convinced that there is a relationship). An increased emphasis on occupation (and, relatedly, unemployment) would be better accommodated by a different data set, or by a model dealing almost exclusively with those matters. To the extent that workday experience reflects economic discomfort, the three economic predictors addressed below should subsume the effect.

Finally, of the three variables that most directly test my hypothesis, two of them suggest interesting conclusions. It appears that the timeline of the Eurozone crisis does not map neatly on to the models in Table 2. In analyzing these data, it might be worth reporting three potential start dates for the financial crises under consideration, which might effect elections after August 2007, Fall 2008, or October 2009. Although I have hypothesized that economic factors would become significant during the great recession and Eurozone crisis (that is, in late 2009), it appears that income especially becomes significant in the fall of 2007, two years prior to my prediction. However, rather than rejecting the hypothesis outright, it can be rescued if this finding corresponds to the outset of the banking crisis. There is certainly an increase in incomes' negative association with an XRP vote after August 2007, after the first indications of meltdown.²⁵ Income is significant at $p < .05$ in the expected direction four times after that date, and zero times before (if $p < .1$ is used, it is significant five times after and once before). This increased significance is seemingly due to increased magnitude than decreased standard errors, which is intuitively appealing.

This study focused entirely on microlevel, demand side responses to hypothesized changes in party strategy. As such, the foregoing conclusions would require further verification with supply side data on party rhetoric or manifestos to endorse entirely, which is beyond the

²⁵ <http://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/2012/aug/05/economic-crisis-myths-sustain>

purview of my project here.²⁶ Much depends on when the extreme right was first able to appropriate economic insecurity from mainstream parties. It is however apparently the case that at income has become negatively correlated with extreme right support in a way it was not during the earliest years of the 21st century.

The more subjective measure of “satisfaction with the economy” is, like income, significant less often than it is not. What is most noteworthy about this variable is that it is *positively* associated with an XRP vote four times before the Eurozone crisis, perhaps indicating support for the post-material explanations of the new XRPs offered in the first section (cf. Coffe et al 2007). However, after Fall 2009, *dissatisfaction* with the economy is significantly predictive of XRP support in two cases. While not indisputable support for my hypothesis, these findings at least suggest that future research might be conducted in this area. Unfortunately for this study, but perhaps fortunately for the wellbeing of western democracy, comfort with one’s income level does not seem to be predictive of far right support.

Conclusion

I hypothesized that the extreme right parties of Western Europe might court different voters marginalized by the financial and Eurozone crises than they did previously. Or at least, that different concerns would motivate the same voters to vote for an extreme right party. There is support for this hypothesis presented above, but more in depth research on the subject should be conducted. Income (which is not attitudinal) becomes more significant after August 2007, and satisfaction with the economy (which is attitudinal) is only negatively predictive after Fall

²⁶ This is especially the case because the quantitative classification of manifestos, most notably by the comparative manifestos project is not particularly well suited for an analysis of the far right (Kitschelt 2007)

2009. There is no indication that attitudes toward immigrants are any less predictive now than they were previously, although an examination of party rhetoric might indicate an increased link between immigration and economic issues, rather than an emphasis on national or European identity. It is also clear that the specifics matter both across time (i.e., elections) and space (i.e., idiosyncratic national factors still seem to be predictive as regards trust in institutions). Most clearly however, XRPs are not going away after the financial crisis due to resurgence of socioeconomic concerns and XRPs' previous commitments to a sociocultural dimension of politics.

Future research might also consider the problem of equifinality (alluded to but not addressed with reference to the trust in institutions variable in the Belgian case above). Certain extreme right parties have emerged out of the financial crisis that do not much resemble their pre-crisis counterparts. It would be a stretch consider the Greek Golden Dawn as a post-material party. Although it retains the anti-establishment and anti-immigrant qualities characteristic of most XRPs, the dose makes the poison. Their manifesto is steeped in the language of National Socialism, being both explicitly anti-liberal but also anti-communist.²⁷ There is an affirmation of the state that distinguishes it from other XRPs' populism, and a biological rather than ethnopluralist nationalism, characteristic of the old rather than new right (cf. Akkerman 2005). Rhetorically, the manifesto is polemical and grandiose, demonizing rather than criticizing the extant political class. Many of its concerns are also thoroughly 'material.'²⁸ My analysis of extreme right parties rests on the assumption (albeit, an assumption countenanced

²⁷ A quote from the translation describes the requirement for a 'Golden Dawner': I embrace the third major ideology of history, the one that is the most rooted in the history of my people. Opposed both to communist internationalism and universalism-liberalism. Found at <http://xaameriki.wordpress.com/the-manifesto-of-golden-dawn/>

²⁸ Ibid.

by a good deal of mainstream literature) that they are more or less all alike, future research might examine the disparate effects of the economic crises and how that is reflected in the party structure.

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Table 1. The extreme right parties of Western Europe 1999-2012

Country	1st election	2nd election	3rd election	4th election	5 th election
Austria	2002 <i>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</i> (FPÖ)	2006 FPÖ; <i>Bündnis Zukunft Österreich</i> (BZÖ)	2008 FPÖ; BZÖ	--	--
Belgium	1999 Vlaams Blok (VB)	2003 VB	2007 Vlaams Belang (VB)	2010 VB	--
Denmark	2001 <i>Danskfolkspartei</i> (DF)	2005 DF	2007 DF	2011 DF	--
The Netherlands	2002 <i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i> (LPF)	2003 LPF	2006 LPF; <i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i> (PVV)	2010 PVV	2012 PVV
Switzerland	1999 Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)	2003 SVP	2007 SVP	2007 SVP	--

Figure 1. Percent vote for XRP, 1999-2012




Table 2. Motivating characteristics and attitudes impact on extreme right vote.

	Age (years)	Immigrant attitudes index	Trust in institutions	Income	Comfort	Workday influence	Satisfaction with economy	Pseudo R ²	n
Pre-Crisis									
Switzerland 1999	.037** (.012)	-.142*** (.039)	-.008 (.034)	-.076 (.094)	.115 (.247)	.090† (.053)	-.009 (.080)	0.0825	777
Belgium 1999	-.051* (.021)	-.294*** (.066)	-.094* (.040)	.153 (.122)	.277 (.339)	-.105† (.061)	-.048 (.105)	0.2639	470
Denmark 2001	-.001 (.015)	-.166*** (.046)	-.083* (.034)	-.130 (.098)	-.087 (.317)	-.090 (.056)	.043 (.102)	0.1373	602
Netherlands 2002	-.014 (.011)	-.224*** (.033)	-.032 (.024)	-.011 (.067)	-.388* (.177)	.092* (.046)	-.073 (.066)	0.1307	852
Austria 2002	.018 (.012)	-.252*** (.049)	-.048 (.034)	.057 (.106)	-.336 (.239)	.018 (.060)	.136 (.095)	0.1549	606
Netherlands 2003	-.019 (.014)	-.101† (.054)	-.105* (.043)	-.066 (.118)	-.134 (.296)	.055 (.073)	.050 (.124)	0.0715	1063
Switzerland 2003	-.002 (.006)	-.250*** (.026)	-.014 (.021)	-.088 (.056)	.105 (.145)	.045 (.034)	.025 (.054)	0.162	742
Belgium 2003	-.034*** (.009)	-.236*** (.034)	-.127*** (.024)	-.121† (.072)	.209 (.172)	-.041 (.034)	.270*** (.071)	0.1856	1037
Denmark 2005	.008 (.009)	-.186*** (.033)	-.048† (.025)	-.048 (.065)	-.522** (.199)	.041 (.047)	.188* (.075)	0.1277	1003
Austria 2006	-.010 (.009)	-.210*** (.036)	-.051* (.025)	-.050 (.077)	-.057 (.192)	.003 (.043)	-.030 (.068)	0.145	757
Netherlands 2006	-.027** (.010)	-.260*** (.045)	-.077* (.031)	-.042 (.068)	-.097 (.249)	.005 (.052)	.111 (.083)	0.1499	1141
Belgium 2007	-.018* (.007)	-.181*** (.031)	-.101*** (.023)	-.093 (.059)	.541** (.173)	.003 (.034)	.157* (.064)	0.1341	1099
Aug-07									
Denmark 2007	.000 (.007)	-.171*** (.028)	-.068** (.022)	-.125** (.048)	.158 (.197)	-.023 (.040)	.124* (.053)	0.1219	1078
Switzerland 2007	-.006 (.006)	-.253*** (.033)	-.083*** (.023)	-.129** (.050)	.449* (.188)	-.012 (.037)	.021 (.054)	0.1826	599
Sep-08									
Austria 2008	-.024*** (.007)	-.274*** (.032)	-.115*** (.023)	-.049 (.074)	-.315* (.153)	.062 (.043)	.165** (.064)	0.2741	740
Oct-09									
Belgium 2010	-.020* (.010)	-.221*** (.044)	-.067* (.030)	-.150* (.075)	.147 (.207)	-.006 (.044)	.068 (.088)	0.1416	1007
Netherlands 2010	-.021** (.007)	-.331*** (.035)	-.043† (.024)	-.069 (.049)	.032 (.165)	-.064† (.034)	.040 (.075)	0.2012	1076
Switzerland 2011	-.003 (.007)	-.081** (.030)	-.003 (.006)	-.104† (.055)	.287 (.213)	.111* (.046)	-.158* (.068)	0.0503	629
Denmark 2011	.011 (.007)	-.152*** (.025)	-.004 (.005)	-.103* (.046)	.067 (.192)	.048 (.047)	-.140** (.053)	0.1306	1187
Netherlands 2012	-.007 (.011)	-.185*** (.051)	-.128*** (.036)	-.058 (.087)	.014 (.283)	.042 (.058)	-.016 (.108)	0.2066	605

Results from logistic regression on ESS data 2002-2012. Coefficients and standard errors reported. * p significant at .05. ** p significant at .01. *** p significant at .001. † p significant at .1

