SEISMIC IMPACT:
Transnational Cooperation and Effective Activism: Lessons from Three Campaigns

Abstract

While it is common knowledge that nuclear war poses an urgent existential threat to humanity activists face formidable barriers to advancing their policy preferences from a variety of military, governmental, intergovernmental and nonstate actors. This paper argues that, despite the dire geopolitical climate of recent years, several important contributions from past social movements working to change national security policy regarding nuclear weapons offer cause for hope.

It is undeniably difficult for proponents of nuclear disarmament to find silver linings in the current environment. However one significant development is the possible demise of nuclear testing as a reason for hope. This paper identifies some successes on the part of

 acknowledge:

1 Acknowledgments: This paper draws upon the writings and conversations of a diverse array of extraordinary mentors and associates [TK]


civil society activists-- notably scientists and technical experts-- in transnational campaigns for nuclear disarmament and security.

The role of civil society in nuclear disarmament and national security initiatives is often underestimated and inadequately addressed. These actors argue for a theory of social change to reduce the risks of nuclear war and take concrete steps toward a future free of nuclear weapons; reduce the lethality and frequency of conventional warfare.

Transnational civil society actors include: nongovernmental organizations, scientific, professional, and policy experts, and non-aligned activists. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that I will focus on elite strategies undertaken by epistemic actors with societal standing, such as scientists, doctors or academic researchers who used their cognitive strategies based on their expert knowledge and professional status.³

Turning Public concern into political pressure.
Activists in the antinuclear movement succeeded in creating a climate in which major nuclear arms reductions agreements could be reached. One exception is the partnership between humanitarian organizations and states to successfully negotiate the TPNW, the Landmine Treaty or the Cluster Munitions Convention.

Upon reflection (20-20 hindsight), I believe that our work did contribute to significant changes that I’d like to interrogate and posit/share: different pieces—getting recognized on the agenda, making true change⁴ in how people view nuclear weapons v. conventional weapons (indiscriminate mass casualty weapons; nuclear taboo, despite heightened risks of miscalculation and inadvertent use

Again and again, the conclusion is that the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons would be so great, we couldn't hope to cope, so we have to get rid of nuclear weapons. Despite official secrecy in the 1940s, we've known about the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons from the beginning. Scientists wrote about the catastrophic consequences even before the first nuclear weapon had ever been made.

Key is reframing from the existing national security mindset to Human Security and Humanitarian impacts, taking advantage of windows of opportunity. Ultimately-- success

³ This distinction comes from Rebecca Johnson’s study of the CTBT.

can be attributed to shifting the frame of the treaty to include the role of independent scientists and academics in antinuclear movement. This strategy has been tried with several efforts to outlaw certain inhumane weapons (Rebecca Johnson, chapter in Banning the Bang or the Bomb)?

At the Second meeting of TPNW, States parties mandated states, the International Committee of the Red Cross and ICAN and other stakeholders and experts, “To challenge the security paradigm based on nuclear deterrence by highlighting and promoting new scientific evidence about the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons and juxtaposing this with the risks and assumptions that are inherent in nuclear deterrence.”

Apart from the President who has sole authority to launch a nuclear weapon, the key actors in the United States' government with respect to nuclear policymaking encompass officials with experience in the Defense, Energy, and State Departments, as well as the National Security Council, in both civilian and uniformed military roles. This includes positions that deal with the posture and deployment of U.S. nuclear forces, as well as those focused on arms control negotiations concerning weapons systems and preventing or countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction elsewhere. Within this broad field, there is perception of a stark division between two communities. The sub-field of nuclear posture and deterrence policy, and, on the military side, the people who actually handle the weapons, was described by respondents as closed-off and highly hierarchical, tending to value long experience and insider knowledge above innovation. Respondents described this field as insulated, male-dominated, and unwelcoming, with a small group of long-time insiders controlling what new ideas and individuals would be considered. Its discourse, they said, is characterized by highly abstract logic.”

Various case studies offer important lessons in thinking about how ideas get onto the policy agenda that ultimately produce positive change. Each offers insight into how to reshape the debate on nuclear weapons and to create momentum toward their elimination. In reviewing these successful strategies, it is crucial to first identify clear and achievable goals; as well as identify who you need to get on-board to advance these goals. (Of course be ambitious and authentic, but also consider initial or smaller steps or constructive propositions; unfortunately, this means recognizing that it is easier to block/tear apart an idea than to push it through from getting on the agenda, getting a decision/policy/legislation; and then implementing. Ex: efforts to stop nuclear testing that influenced President Kennedy's AU Speech.

Reframe the debate to your advantage—public fears of radioactive fallout in 1950s contributed to passage of PTB
establish your credentials- knowledge of issue, and highlight features of effectiveness:
-address a specific audience about a specific problem (include relevant info/data, but keep short)
-Design for use- articulate a clear purpose that ties into a specific policy action.
Figure out times when key decisions are made and insert your proposal/idea into the mix
Ex in Prague, President Obama has talked about nuclear weapons and he said "they're the ultimate tools of destruction" and argued that as far as the United States was concerned, and I quote: "as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. So today I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Remarkable statement by President of US. Yet, of limited significance/impact of Obama Prague Speech in 2009; did not translate into policy action (economic crisis and healthcare reform took precedence)

Include key actors and experts with specific interests and stature- professionals inside and outside government (with power to decide and authority to intervene)
- comments/support/letters/etc., from differing political parties and perspectives

Who’s voice is not in the room? *gender and diverse communities (Cohn, Acheson, Witner article)
Co-optation and hashtag activism—social media hides the disparities

Schattshneider The definition of the problem on the agenda is the supreme instrument of power—how do you describe the problem and why should we care/what can be done? (expand with Smith, p.38-41)

“There is no good reason why the U.S. should be spending on average more than it did during the Cold War,” says Chris Paine, an analyst with the NRDC’s Nuclear Program and the report’s author. “The U.S. government needs to rethink the role that nuclear weapons should play in the post-Cold War era.”

**INTRO**
In thinking about potential policy avenues to reduce nuclear dangers and war, it is useful to reflect on three remarkably distinct efforts to try to reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Ban the Bomb/antinuclear movements and countless anti-war, disarmament and peace groups have worked toward a world free of nuclear weapons, achieving remarkable breakthroughs stemming from independent scientific/technical advice that contributed to: signing of Partial Test Ban Treaty and culminating in the CTBT and TPNW, among other treaties.
(Russell-Einstein Manifesto, FAS, Sane, Pugwash, Freeze, etc) setting an important precedent and verification, as well as intergenerational capacity-building.
Sure, it’s fun to demonstrate and protest, but, need to be able to INFLUENCE/SHAPE policies and that means identifying key moments and stakeholders/powerbrokers where key decisions are made and contributing to debate among________ (know the arguments)—crucial to identify both the interests of various stakeholders and adapt your position/arguments accordingly]. Notably, rare openings or opportunities/moments/turning-points and avenues for formative decisions and events

1) Scientific Experts and technical insiders- Organize and Debate: 
   Voice/Loyalty/Exit but Don’t give up, despite initial loses—persevere and adapt 
   From the Franck Report to UN-based efforts at international control to formation 
   of Pugwash (launched after failure of wartime Atomic Scientists (Franck Report, 
   FAS, ASA, and post-WWII UN-backed efforts at international control; immediate 
   backdrop of Russell-Einstein Manifesto in 1955; worsening nuclear peril and 
   dangers of nw tests; public outcry against radioactive fallout) 
   a. Public gatherings/statements and “Track II” nongovernmental back-channel 
      and professional engagement 
   b. 1963—Kennedy and Krushchev signing of Partial test-ban Treaty (Wittner) 
   c. Success: personal relationships did prove useful in influencing arms control 
      negotiations for PTB and later in influencing Gorbachev’s advisors 
   d. 3 agendas: technical, political and ethical/normative- raised public 
      consciousness and support 
   e. Success: Culminated in series of agreements, culminating in 1995 
      Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 

2) NUCLEAR FREEZE 
   f. Popular movement, building widespread public pressure around an 
      accessible concept (Speak truth to Power; unprecedented levels of public 
      fears of nw in Randall Forsberg); many leaders (Randy Kehler....) 
   g. Success: 1 million people to Central Park NYC; local and Congressional 
      legislation 
   h. Shortcoming: public gave up too easily when Congress and President 
      blocked action, nonetheless notable period of openness in Congress 
      (Forsberg, Magraw review of the strategic policy community, weapons 
      brokers and policy entrepreneurs) 
   i. Success: Links between nuclear weapons and deterrence of conventional 
      war (Forsberg) conventional and nuclear disarmament. 
   j. Ethical and Humanitarian focus on utility of nuclear weapons, Jonathan 
      Schell, The Fate of the Earth and the Survival of Human Life, US religious 
      leaders and Catholic bishops
k. Success: Major influence on Gorbachev's New Thinking and influence of Soviet Scientists/advisors. Went further to support eliminating categories of weapons-- INF in 1987, etc (Gorbachev’s reformist advisors incorporated ideas of: Common Security, 1982 Olaf Palme Commission Report, IMEMO, Bernard Lown, IPPNW\textsuperscript{5}

l. Reagan – Reykjavik

m. Role of peace movement in constraining Reagan; no question sig pressure

n. Global Action to Prevent War in 1990s (didn’t work—too complex and relied on WWW to organize)

o. Obama 2009 Prague Speech

3) ICAN and Campaign for TPNW

p. Build engagement and support for UN treaty in nonnuclear weapon states in hopes of pressuring for broader possibilities for action by NWS

q. Success: In addition to signatories, TK number of cities and towns on board, representing TK constituents

\textit{Success:} Transnational effort leading to Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW): Legally binding instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons

\textit{Success:} groundswell of public support for abolition of nuclear weapons

\textit{Success:} Transnational organizing and coordination with nonnuclear governments;

\textit{Limitation:} none of the nuclear weapon states or NATO members have signed the treaty or altered their policies yet.

Despite the prevailing notion that activism in this realm is futile, this paper contends that past campaigns such as the PTBT, the Nuclear Freeze Movement, and TPNW advocacy have been transformative, altering the discourse surrounding nuclear weapons and influencing policy decisions.

Each of these movements made a significant difference, at least toward their most basic goal: to mobilize people seeking to stigmatize nuclear weapons and jumpstart efforts toward their elimination.

They highlight the wide diversity of approaches that can be taken and illustrate different theories of change/successful policy alternatives

\textsuperscript{5} Evangelista, p. 376-7
None of them proved a “magic bullet,” but, in different ways, all of them offered a plausible theory of change that could potentially achieve more widespread success toward their goals.

The Quest to end nuclear weapons tests

Nuclear Test Ban: A treaty that prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons. The first such treaty was the Partial Nuclear Test Van Treaty (PTBT) which was signed in 1963 (President Kennedy American University Speech). The PTBT prohibits testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. However, it does not prohibit underground testing. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed in 1996 and prohibits all nuclear weapons testing, including underground testing.

Laura Reed 1.31.24 Outline for “Mining the Past”

Lessons of Transnational Cooperation and Effective Activism from Three Campaigns

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom holds that nuclear weapons issues are intractable, insular, and have been remarkably impervious to social movements over the past half century. This paper takes on that conventional wisdom by drawing on lessons from three case studies—the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Nuclear Freeze Movement, and the more recent activism surrounding the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)—to show that these efforts achieved noteworthy successes even if they were often more subtle in nature and didn’t lead directly to the policy outcomes they ostensibly called for.

HOW DO WE MEASURE SUCCESS?
(The Difficulties of Conventional Wisdom in the Nuclear Weapons Field)
Difficulty of measuring success related to nuclear threat.

1. Size of arsenals? They have actually shrunk dramatically from peak levels of 63,000 nuclear warheads in the world’s nuclear arsenals in 1985, to current estimates of roughly 12,500 of which 9,400 are in active military stockpiles (Kristensen, Korda, et al, FAS.org)
2. Number of nuclear weapons states?
3. Number of multilateral treaties? NPT signatories and status re: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea; distinguish military and civilian sites; CTBT signatories?

Nuclear Taboo? Delegitimizing NW?
International tensions?  
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ Doomsday clock?  
Very difficult.  
Main point: success difficult to measure and not linear. Progresses in zigs and zags.

LESSONS: What do some of our experiences with efforts to address the nuclear threat over the past several decades teach us?

THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTIVIST EXPERTS
Activist experts have played a crucial role in pressuring governments to engage in arms control agreements which have contributed to a safer world by limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and expanding the agenda.

1. Pugwash  
2. Topics of potential technical cooperation  
3. WIIS/Women of Color Advancing Peace Security and Conflict Transformation

Notable outcomes of these kinds of efforts include limitations on nuclear testing and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits all nuclear explosions. Activists advocating for a halt to nuclear testing laid the groundwork for efforts to strengthen the NPT as well as the CTBT’s negotiation and adoption. The CTBT, once fully ratified and implemented, will help prevent the development of advanced nuclear weapons technologies and reduce the overall risk of nuclear conflict.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC PRESSURE
Nuclear weapons activism has played a pivotal role in raising public awareness about the dangers of nuclear weapons, fostering a sense of urgency, and mobilizing individuals to demand action from their governments.

1. The Nuclear Freeze Movement in the 1980s is a prime example. By organizing mass protests, educational campaigns, and grassroots initiatives, activists were able to garner widespread public support for a freeze on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons. This groundswell of public pressure influenced political leaders and contributed to subsequent arms control agreements, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 1987. The activism-driven mobilization of civil society has also influenced political narratives and policies, making government officials more accountable and fostering a global sentiment against nuclear weapons.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATIVE STRATEGIES AND OPPORTUNISM
Recent successes in nuclear disarmament activism, particularly the efforts leading to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), have contributed to the establishment of a legal framework that challenges the legitimacy of nuclear weapons.

1. Transnational advocacy networks, notably the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), played a central role in advocating for the TPNW. This treaty categorically prohibits the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons. By creating a legal framework that stigmatizes
and outlaws nuclear weapons, activists have contributed to shaping international norms and delegitimizing the possession and use of nuclear weapons, a critical step on the path to disarmament.
Nuclear weapons activism has been a persistent force throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, challenging the status quo. Despite the prevailing notion that activism in this realm is futile in light of current, this paper contends that the successes of movements such as the PTBT, the Nuclear Freeze Movement, and TPNW advocacy have been transformative, altering the discourse surrounding nuclear weapons and influencing policy decisions.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), signed in 1963, marked a significant milestone in nuclear disarmament efforts. Activists, including scientists and concerned citizens, played a crucial role in raising awareness about the dangers of nuclear testing and its environmental and health implications. By utilizing scientific evidence and public pressure, these activists contributed to the eventual signing of the treaty by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. The PTBT not only limited nuclear testing but also paved the way for subsequent arms control agreements, showcasing the impact of grassroots activism on global nuclear outcomes.

The 1980s witnessed the emergence of the Nuclear Freeze Movement, a grassroots effort advocating for a bilateral freeze on the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite facing skepticism and opposition, the movement gained widespread support, mobilizing millions of people in the United States and around the world. While a comprehensive freeze agreement was not immediately achieved, the movement contributed to the reduction of nuclear arsenals through subsequent arms control negotiations. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) signed in 1987 can be attributed, in part, to the pressure exerted by Freeze activists, underscoring the impact of civil society on diplomatic policies.

The TPNW, adopted in 2017, represents a more recent and explicit example of successful nuclear disarmament activism. Civil society organizations, including the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), played a pivotal role in advocating for the treaty. Despite opposition from all of the nuclear-armed states, the TPNW garnered widespread support, reflecting a global shift in public opinion towards disarmament. This case study illustrates how contemporary activism has been effective in challenging the nuclear status quo and creating a legal framework for disarmament, even without the immediate participation of nuclear-armed states.

Be audacious
Be literate and don’t shy away from details
It’s up to citizens to build public pressure – increase and diversify
Be creative about finding work-arounds to make inroads to intractable problems

We need all of these- here are

How do we know we are having success in making a safer world
# weapons—hugely reduced
Doomsday clock—Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
Importance of activist experts:
Pugwash- benefit of off-the-record meetings; Also known as Track 1.5 and Track 2; Ex: Pugwash- early mtgs contributing to PTBT and shift in ABM debate; culminated in CTBT- technical success, despite failure to ratify

None of these metrics are adequate- complicated twists

Unexpected success—Pugwash
Hammered out technical issues/details- arms control
Hard to measure, but able to undertake

Nuclear freeze- mass public pressure, constrained
Public mobilization
In the streets
Also—FreezeVoter 84 and legislative efforts – didn’t change US laws, but

1985 NPT Freeze in Geneva—culminated in permanent extension of the NPT in 1995

Third: used transnational legal frameworks to make progress
Nations prohibiting nw

Need to sequence and make strong
Very complicated

How to understand failure

Arms control agreements
Public awareness and pressure
Transnational legal frameworks for disarmament

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SEISMIC IMPACT—Reassessing the successes and failures of key activist efforts to reduce the nuclear threat [arms race during the 1980s] and to advance/promote best practices for citizenship in the nuclear age
By Laura W. Reed

The surprising success of the movie “Oppenheimer”, released in the summer of 2023 offered a glimmer of renewed public engagement with the terrifying
threat posed by nuclear weapons. The current conventional wisdom holds that despite notable grassroots efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and reduce the threat of nuclear Armageddon, these campaigns failed to achieve their stated aims of changing policy.

It is true that these efforts failed to achieve their ambitious goals, such as “halting the nuclear arms race.”

BUT, as I will show, a closer look suggests that these efforts SUCCEEDED in more ways than they are often credited for—and in more ways than we may have thought at the time. Importantly, they succeeded in ways that hold lessons for today:

1. These efforts expanded the scope of serious debate based upon seeking accurate information, credible sources and a call to action which, in turn, wound up opening up possibilities for subsequent positive and feasible policies that still made a substantial difference.
2. [fix] Key limitation was ideological atmosphere of adversarial cold war mindset of antagonism and rivalry, “Us versus them” or addressing nationalism/ethnocentrism
3. Consider: the nuclear arms race and tensions in the 1980s that culminated with the end of Cold War. Reduction in sheer number of warheads, etc. etc.
4. These efforts brought in a much wider and more diverse crop of experts, inspiring and widening the number of people—women, religious people, diff races/a generation or cadre of rising experts and most notably experts/academics with technical knowledge who could and did engage on the subject.
5. These efforts, while focused initially/primarily on US policy, had broad global implications that wound up leading to significant changes that contributed to reducing the risk and preventing nuclear war.
VITALLY IMPORTANT NOTE: Social Movements ebb and flow. The fact that things feel worse now—that we are in a low ebb—in NO WAY diminishes this argument. On the contrary, IT MAKES IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT that it is made and heard now so that the lessons CAN HELP REBUILD THE NEXT SOCIAL MOVEMENT addressing these issues—a movement that may well have significantly more success in achieving its goals, in part by learning the lessons you are trying to impart!

Key now is to interrogate and emphasize practical steps and concrete solutions that will provide we the people agency—so people feel it’s worth their time and effort to get involved and advocate for change in terms of arms control and disarmament treaties, nonproliferation efforts and diplomatic initiatives that can move us to a safer world. This requires challenging the Orwellian propaganda and rhetoric that clouds our amazing opportunity to get people better informed with accurate information, credible sources, and a call to action.

Part 1: Against a backdrop of heightened tensions in the 1950s, a group of elite scientists organized a series of meetings that offered an innovative model for advancing nuclear disarmament. Drawing upon the Russell-Einstein Manifesto urging .... a small group of high-level scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain met informally to brainstorm about ideas to pursue arms control. These particular scientific activists were known as Pugwash (named for the location of the first meeting that was held in Pugwash, Nova Scotia). Importantly, the group’s participants did not represent their respective governments in these discussions and the meetings.

The Legacy of the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and a series of failed negotiations for International Control of nuclear weapons. Intense hostility and ideological divide in the 1950s that contributed to a standoff between the United States and Soviet Union as each country accelerated weapons development and testing. Despite public fears about nuclear weapons, the those most familiar with their capabilities. As more information about atmospheric nuclear testing became known, and; Russell-Einstein Manifesto: Statement of some of the most distinguished/elite scientific concerns about dangers of nw as a rallying point for wider public/elite engagement

Built upon the public’s overarching fear of the urgent threat to human beings; identify offer concrete solutions
Brilliant framing (human costs common ground, solvable problem) from threat of annihilation to personal story/imagery of individual suffering and death.

“No one knows how widely such lethal radioactive particles might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with H-bombs might quite possibly put an end to the human race” (Russell-Einstein Manifesto)

Yes- built upon fears of nuclear war in the alarming hard-lined rhetoric and enormously costly arms buildup of the Reagan administration.

Grassroots opposition

“The abolition of war will demand distasteful limitation of national sovereignty. But what perhaps impedes understanding of the situation more than anything is that the term ‘mankind’ feels vague and abstract....They can scarcely bring themselves to grasp that they, individually, and those whom they love are in imminent danger of perishing agonizingly…”

-most respected physicist and philosopher intended this statement to urge new thinking and gain public support—served to galvanize scientists to consider their social responsibility (Acheson-Lilienthal Report, FAS and Pugwash) to mobilize new venue of discussion and that culminated in series of workshops and conferences that create a space but to rally

changed nature of debate at a key moment that ultimately made a big difference that resonates

No one can win a nuclear war plus nuclear taboo- moral/humanitarian frames

My involvement with the Freeze movement started when I first with attending the Central Park Protest and getting a job at IDDS as publisher and editor for campaign. [share my thrilling experience in the midst off masses of concerned citizens; yes it was largely white/middle class, but it also included remarkable number of women and age-groups]

But the positive experience of the rally only sparked my desire to get more involved. Rather than move to the West Coast after graduating from College, I stayed in Boston to work at IDDS. I was immersed in arcana of a variety of arms control negotiations and treaties

Published the Arms Control Reporter

While started as a US campaign, it had broader implications outside US
Test ban and Nuclear free zones- strategies that work

2-3 sentences

Main takeaway-
Taking on conventional wisdom-
Freeze movement failed to stop arms race
Freeze succeeded in providing crucial pressure on governments and building a base of informed citizenry
How it did this was:

Built Public support for aim of halting n arms race—
Yes its true that that there were intense disagreements over strategy and goals (witness NFU v. Freeze)
UCS- ABM and countermeasures
Scientists and experts-
(elitist and stodgy)

Set the table for the changes that did occur;

Lucky didn’t go to war

Within a year, I became conversant in: ACR, Randy Forsberg's writings and others such as Ruth Sivard, cohort at MIT- diverse in beliefs and backgrounds rather than white males

NUCLEAR FREEZE:

The Nuclear Freeze Campaign: A Legacy of Public Pressure and Policy Shifts

The Nuclear Freeze Campaign, a grassroots movement active in the 1970s and 1980s, aimed to halt the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. While it never achieved its core objective of a bilateral freeze, its impact on leaders and public policy was significant, leaving a lasting legacy in the realm of nuclear arms control.

Leaders and Public Opinion:

- Mobilizing the Masses: The campaign's strength lay in its ability to engage ordinary citizens. Local freeze resolutions were passed in over 400 communities, petitions garnered millions of signatures, and mass demonstrations, like the iconic 1982 June 12th rally in New York City, brought the issue to national attention.
• Shifting the Political Landscape: The Freeze's popularity pressured politicians to take a stance. Notably, Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale embraced the freeze in 1984, influencing the party platform and forcing the issue onto the national agenda.

• Dividing Opinions: Despite widespread support, the Freeze faced opposition from the Reagan administration and segments of the public who viewed it as naive or detrimental to national security. The debate highlighted the deep anxieties surrounding the Cold War nuclear arsenals.

Public Policy and Legislation:

• Influencing the INF Treaty: While a comprehensive freeze never materialized, the campaign's focus on nuclear weapons reduction likely contributed to the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated an entire class of missiles from both sides.

• Sparking Legislative Efforts: The Freeze spurred various legislative initiatives promoting nuclear arms control, including the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Resolution, which garnered significant bipartisan support despite never passing the Senate.

• Laying the Groundwork for Future Agreements: The public pressure generated by the Freeze is seen by some as paving the way for subsequent arms control treaties like START I and START II, which further reduced nuclear stockpiles.

Overall Impact:

While the Nuclear Freeze Campaign's immediate goal of a complete freeze remained unrealized, its broader impact on public discourse, political pressure, and eventual policy shifts cannot be understated. It:

• Empowered the Public: Demonstrated the potential of citizen activism to influence critical national security issues.

• Legitimized Arms Control: Brought nuclear disarmament to the forefront of political debate, challenging the dominant Cold War mentality of deterrence through ever-growing arsenals.

• Laid the Foundation for Progress: by recognizing the dead-end of nws, sparked transnational activists to explore alternative venues that did not require immediate buy-in of all nuclear-weapon states. In the transition from the breakup of the Soviet Union to 9/11, these campaigns helped create a climate more conducive to future arms control agreements, contributing to a significant reduction in nuclear weapons globally.
The Nuclear Freeze Campaign stands as a testament to the power of grassroots movements in shaping public policy and influencing leaders on issues of critical importance. Its legacy continues to inspire activism for nuclear disarmament and a safer world.

Further Exploration:

- The Arms Control Association: https://www.armscontrol.org/
- The Nuclear Freeze Foundation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Freeze_campaign
- The Cold War International History Project: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/cold-war-international-history-project

Anthony Eames Thesis 2020:
The public dimension of diplomacy that flourished in the “nuclear 1980s” altered American and British perceptions of the Cold War, creating space for Western leaders to respond positively to moves by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to deescalate and demilitarize the Cold War. The Thatcher government exploited Britain’s position as an essential conduit for U.S.-Soviet diplomacy and as an independent nuclear actor, even as elements of British society embraced disarmament ideas. Years of competing with the antinuclear movement for public support and the influence of the Thatcher government led Reagan and his second Secretary of State George Shultz, to engage with Gorbachev in efforts to end the arms race and the Cold War. Thus, although the antinuclear movement initially failed to prevent the deployment and development of new nuclear systems, it succeeded in creating a climate in which major nuclear arms reductions agreements could be reached.

Thus, although the antinuclear movement initially failed to prevent the deployment and development of new nuclear systems, it succeeded in creating a climate in which major nuclear arms reductions agreements could be reached.

Since 2000, Confronting Corporate (Military-industrial-Congressional Complex) Co-optation and hashtag activism

50th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs “Eliminating the Causes of War"

We’ve been confronting an Impasse in Nuclear Disarmament efforts

John P. Holdren, 5 August 2000

influencing public opinions, that might resolve the conflict
How do you evaluate this kind of work?
Hoover Institute conference on Track 2 initiatives or diplomacy
How measure what is getting done, having impact
Not so easy if look at outcomes-
Few Ex: organic response of scientists who knew the most about dangers we were facing. Instinctively trying to address, hard to say what is impact or outcome we seek
Manifesto- have scientists meet as well as hours/weeks/months to get people to agree to have names on a joint statement and then gather. All contributed to creating a positive atmosphere
Ex: 1995 meeting in Hiroshima on legitimacy of US dropping atomic bomb (Gar Alperovitz) or some felt physically in danger—personal, courageous commitment
Only works if people have goodwill
Most important piece: Find a common language, find common ground.
Then: scientific language; today: diff dialogue
Ex: effects of nuclear radiation from nuclear testing—no power except intellectual muscle and nevertheless influence thinking on governmental level
Ex: Partial Test Ban Treaty- came up with idea for black boxes. Wasn’t ever used, but it signaled to powers that be that there was a way to verify.
Was it a success? No, some disappointed that it wasn’t a full ban, but it was a partial success.
Planted the seeds for future work. The time-frame is impossible to know.

Thread of being involved in conflict resolution—find ways to decrease, especially when it is involving adversaries
Important Pugwash backchannel during Vietnam War called “Pennsylvania” Kissinger and Ho Chi Minh (Iran, Afghanistan, ....)

Influential work on ABM Treaty—Soviet side argued against idea of limiting defenses, had to work it through Soviet system before supporting. Actually, despite belligerence, those meetings were transformative.
When leave bubble of Track 2, hard to sustain

CFE- Frank Von Hippel and Kokoshin exchange of letters; Pugwash workshops on nonoffensive defense (need to address conventional side) eventually Gorbachevsupported; other orgs such as FAS
BW- Julian Perry Robinson
Sustain effort to pursue:
Person to person contacts, incl gov
Continuity of contacts
Research conducted when needed and communicated results more widely
Other spinoffs suggest the format is a sucess: SIPRI, Academy of Scientists
Skills and capacity building go both ways—friends and contacts in other govs
Q: when Pugwash got it—still suspicion “dupes of Soviet Union” happens all the time in
Middle East and South Asia—listen and deal with all sides (each trying to influence the
process)

**Intergenerational capacity building**

I also draw upon the research of Matthew Evangelista in discussing Pugwash’s impact in
shaping positions advanced by the Soviet leadership (*Unarmed Forces* (1999).
Rotblat tribute “Dialogue across Divides”

Critique: Pugwash is not inclusive, despite supporting the Student Pugwash movement. Participants are vetted before being “invited” and are primarily old elite men with
technical/governmental/academic expertise, rather than citizens and communities
impacted by the nuclear weapons complex. But Pugwash aims to promote nonpartisan expert networks among peers from different countries to interrogate key technical problems and pathways to reduce nuclear dangers; these individuals are encouraged to engage with policymakers and the public.

**Freeze Case Study:**

I draw upon my involvement with the Freeze from 1982-1984 while working at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, continuing to represent IDDS at academic conferences and events in 1980s; subsequently served as Director of GAPW in 1995-6? and on the Board of IDDS in the 1990s); David Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics*; etc. monthly Sunday evening dinners on Goals and Strategies for Peace, Arms Control and Disarmament (file Dec 1985)

Later iteration: International Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons Case Study
[https://www.icanw.org/the_campaign](https://www.icanw.org/the_campaign)

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[6](https://rmc.library.cornell.edu/EAD/htmldocs/RMM08588.html)
I am not going to repeat the insightful arguments presented in David Meyer’s account, Lawrence Wittner’s writing, etc.

On June 12, 1982, an anti-nuclear demonstration in New York City around the theme “Freeze the Arms Race—Fund Human Needs” produced the largest political rally up to that point in American life, with nearly a million participants. When the freeze campaign delivered its petitions to the U.S. and Soviet missions to the United Nations, they contained the signatures of more than 2,300,000 Americans. Moreover, that fall, when freeze referenda appeared on the ballot in 10 states, the District of Columbia, and 37 cities and counties around the nation, voters delivered a victory to the freeze campaign in nine of the states and in all but three localities. Covering about one-third of the U.S. electorate, this was the largest referendum on a single issue in U.S. history.[3]

Instead,

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Lawrence Wittner, Intondi, etc.
To press for change by engaging grassroots/civil society communities

Nuclear freeze, sole authority, Back from the Brink

Pugwash: cross-scientific exchange; credited with being a groundbreaking and innovative "transnational" organization and a leading example of the effectiveness of **Track II diplomacy**.

"The various Pugwash activities (general conferences, workshops, study groups, consultations and special projects) provide a channel of communication between scientists, scholars, and individuals experienced in government, diplomacy, and the military for in-depth discussion and analysis of the problems and opportunities at the intersection of science and world affairs. To ensure a free and frank exchange of views, conducive to the emergence of original ideas and an effective communication between different or antagonistic governments, countries and groups, Pugwash meetings as a rule are held in private. This is the main modus operandi of Pugwash. In addition to influencing governments by the transmission of the results of these discussions and meetings, Pugwash also may seek to make an impact on the scientific community and on public opinion through the holding of special types of meetings and through its publications."[2]

Cites: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pugwash_Conferences_on_Science_and_World_Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pugwash_Conferences_on_Science_and_World_Affairs) [Chatham House Rules]

On a beautiful day, went to NYC—later read an article by Fox Butterfield in NYT Magazine—then and there decided I wanted to work with Randy and IDDS.

On June 12, 1982, one million people demonstrated in New York City's **Central Park** against nuclear weapons and for an end to the **cold war arms race**. It was the largest anti-nuclear **protest** and the largest political demonstration in American history.[6][7]

1980s Citizen action in democracies— Interview in the 1980s: Randall Forsberg: “what people can do together to educate themselves, become involved, volunteer basis (99% nonpaid staff members) how people can work creatively for demilitarization to develop common understandings of first steps.”

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pjGOKby4M](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pjGOKby4M)

For a biography of Forsberg, see: [https://cornellpress.manifoldapp.org/read/toward-a-theory-of-peace-the-role-of-moral-beliefs-5a384f25-c4f9-455b-a46f-f9b34c7ea3a1/section/8a729436-8979-47d0-a1b1-29d1187fe404](https://cornellpress.manifoldapp.org/read/toward-a-theory-of-peace-the-role-of-moral-beliefs-5a384f25-c4f9-455b-a46f-f9b34c7ea3a1/section/8a729436-8979-47d0-a1b1-29d1187fe404)
Intro by Evangelista and Crawford: Randy came to see that a campaign to limit or eliminate nuclear weapons would fail if it did not acknowledge how closely such weapons were intertwined with overall US military strategy.

In 1980, Randy took a leave of absence from MIT to focus on the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), a small think tank she founded in 1979. IDDS was located in two small rooms in a modest office building on Harvard Street in Brookline, Massachusetts, just a few blocks away from her apartment on Longwood Avenue. Randy’s vision for IDDS was to “study the nature and purposes of military forces in order to identify obstacles to and opportunities for disarmament.” Its projects would “develop new types of information and analysis which are critical to the success of efforts for arms control and disarmament.” The Institute’s staff quickly grew, and so did the burden of managing the payroll and other expenses. But as hard as it was to keep a new institution afloat, the Institute embodied Randy’s theory of change: create a popular movement around the goal of confining the military to defense, cultivate new interest in new approaches to defense and disarmament among experts and journalists, and develop new curricula to help people understand military policy and prepare them to make informed choices about it.

Lessons of citizen action: Freeze movement betw 1980-85 blossomed and taught us: Work creatively, become involved. This movement showed how people can work together creatively to grab the attention of Congress/nuclear community/policymakers/ also numerous local groups and affected communities, from ranchers in South Dakota to Oak Ridge, TN

Common understandings of these first-term steps.
While movement was very broad, but movement was also very superficial. First time gov came back slapped on wrist and said, “no you can’t have it” for tech and verif reasons you can’t understand (excerpts from interview with Randall Forsberg)

“The freeze has taught us you have to deepen the roots and the understanding... keep up so you do persist. .. understanding the connections betw nuclear arms race and fear of conventional war...

Deepen the roots of understanding so they don’t have wool pulled over their eyes; so that people persist (distinction betw defending yourself and intervening in others affairs, the connections... I want people to learn about the real goals of US mil spending, understanding where the money is going the connections real goals and what policies are raised; understanding where money going and what policy issues are raised, will give the people the conviction

All about foreign policy and nuclear politics and geopol, not defending the country. When people understand, So people will have the staying power and persisting and get the goal they set out for.

Not about superficial politicians saying we need the defense because our borders aren’t threatened, except by n missiles by which we have no defense; want to learn about where the money is going

Distinction betw defending yourself and intervening in other people’s internal affairs; understanding these connections-- where the money is going and what policy issues are raised by

Understanding.... Will bring the kind of conviction that will give people the staying power.

Include Katherine Magraw’s analysis
Nuclear freeze (David Meyer cites)
Educate the public—almost none of budget is spent on defending yourself...

Include Work with Forsberg in 1990s with Global Action to Prevent War (GAPW) see writeup in Boston Review—with critiques by Lora Lumpe, Mary Kaldor, etc.

- Keylesson adopted by Jody Williams and others in Landmines campaign. Don’t have to wait/rely on governments to adopt your proposal. Essential piece of successful campaign
- Bill Hartung
- Paul Walker
President Obama Prague Speech in 2009. “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons…”

We have to insist, yes we can”. (3 mos in office when got the coveted award)

Obama presented/argued for similar ideas as that of the nuclear abolition movement

Seems impossible to achieve—we know where the road of nw leads.. simple existence of nw leads to doom

1968 NPT- bargain betw nuclear haves and have nots

Promise to pursue “effective measures in direction of n disarmament... other nations agree to forgo the acquisition of nw.

In decades since, number of n warheads mushroomed beyond anyones expectations.

Crucial clause almost forgotten; then the Cold War ended. If CW can be banned, why not NW? Moment of end of CW, it seemed possible.

Nuclear Posture Review (Clinton in 1990; keep nw as a hedge againessed imagined fascism on part of Russia. Like an insurance policy in case things went wrong;

1999 Paul Nitze architect and heart of mil est- reversed his position: renounce nw as a threat to ourselves; called for unilateral disarmament in 1999

George Shultz, Nixon, Sam Nunn- 4 former nuclear high priests

We endorse setting goal of a world free of nw and working energetically on actions required to meet this goal.

Highflown rhetoric v. reality: “retirement syndrome”

Obama’s promise (Nobel Peace Prize)

A core hope of peace movement was in seat of power

Tragically Stalled—Congressional success quickly followed by falloff in media/grassroots pressure and continued mobilization

1. Jonathan Dean , Randall Caroline Forsberg & Saul Mendlovitz (2000) Global action to prevent war: A programme for government and Grassroots efforts to stop war, genocide and other forms of deadly conflict, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 16:1, 108-116, DOI: 10.1080/13623690008409500

2. Boston Review—roundtable of plan and responses
Recently—drop off in mobilization, except for related movements—certainly not to cut military spending/Congressional action (sole authority; TPNW; back from the brink)

Trump admin—bellicose threats and increases in spending (primary focus- NK,..)
Russia- acute threats and alarming rhetoric—even raising possibility of renewed testing/withdrawal from CTBT
Heightened tensions – Russia, China, Gaza

CTBTO Review in NYC Sept 22, 2023, NGOS called for ratification/entry into force and:
- scientific research on the health and environmental effects of nuclear testing, and provide financial support for health monitoring and health care programs for populations affected by nuclear testing; and
- Cooperate with states parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as they begin to fulfill their legal responsibilities under that treaty to provide assistance and environmental remediation to those people and regions affected by nuclear weapon use and testing. We also encourage those CTBT states parties that have not already done so to sign and ratify the TPNW, which reinforces the CTBT’s prohibition on nuclear testing."9

Now, think through what we’ve learned from earlier mistakes of losing public engagement; five quick tips for improving your community outreach:

1. Be clear who you’re trying to reach
First things first, to be effective in community outreach, you need to know who you’re reaching out to. Take time to identify the groups or individuals you want to connect with. Who are they really? What do they need and care about? What are their experiences?

Understanding them on a deeper level will help you tailor your outreach efforts to really speak to them.

2. Offer What They Really Want:
To grab people’s attention, your outreach needs to offer something they truly care about. Make sure what you’re bringing to the table aligns with their needs and goals. If you’re not sure what those are, don’t be shy—just ask them! Tailor your support, grants, and programmes to tackle

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9 https://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2023-09/civil-society-leaders-call-states-reinforce-ctbt
their challenges or match their values and interests. And don’t forget to explain how it benefits them in a way that hits home.

3. Remove the barriers

What are the barriers preventing communities from reaching and engaging with you? These barriers can include things like language barriers, limited access or use of technology, limited available time, overly complicated applications, or ineligible due to application criteria.

**Are you inadvertently excluding the very community you’re trying to reach?**

Finding ways to break down these barriers is critical to successful community outreach. Take each barrier in turn and explore how you might reduce, or ideally remove, each barrier. For example, could you be more flexible with time commitments? Could you simplify your application process? Could your messaging be translated into another language?

Check your funding criteria – Are you inadvertently excluding the very community you’re trying to reach? Funders often require their grant holders to be a legally registered entity making smaller community groups and grassroots movements ineligible. Fiscal hosting allows funders to fund these smaller groups without the associated risks or admin.

4. Partner with local groups, community leaders, and organisations

Unsurprisingly when it comes to community outreach, you’ll find the people who are part of the community know best what’s needed.

Partnering with local groups, community leaders, and organisations can help you reach a broader audience and build trust with the people you want to engage. These groups and individuals have established relationships within their communities and can provide valuable insights and resources.

Collaborate with them to co-create programmes, events, and services that meet the needs of the community. This approach will not only help you reach more people but will also ensure that your outreach efforts are aligned with the community’s values and goals.

5. Build meaningful relationships

Building meaningful relationships should be at the heart of your community outreach strategy.

To build long-lasting relationships, you need to create meaningful connections with the people you are engaging with. This means going beyond surface-level interactions and building genuine relationships based on trust and mutual understanding. Be present in the community, listen actively, and show empathy. Take the time to get to know the people and demonstrate your commitment to their needs and goals.
Effective community outreach is crucial for any organisation or funder seeking to create lasting social change. By being clear on who you’re trying to reach, removing barriers to participation, and partnering with local organisations and community leaders, you can build meaningful connections and make a real impact.

It’s important to remember that community outreach is an ongoing process that requires flexibility, openness to feedback, and a willingness to learn and adapt.

[We hope that these tips have been helpful, and we encourage you to keep exploring new ways to engage with your community and create positive change.

*We’re committed to working with others to create lasting, systemic social change. If you’d like to explore how we can help with your community outreach strategy then get in touch.*

[Section on internal/self-reflection on failures of Freeze/Mobilization… Wittner, Solo, Meyer. Forsberg, religious activists, Quakers….Helen Caldicott,]

Yet—still found many who sustained their commitment and have had tremendous impact:
Share stories/accolades for: FAS, Bulletin, UCS, ACA, Frank Von Hippel and Zia Mian, Bruce Blair/Global Zero/
James Acton- Carnegie

NTI-

1) ICAN and Campaign for TPNW: The TPNW Fact Sheet

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclearprohibition

According to the Arms Control Association, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), negotiated by more than 130 states, is a good faith effort to meet their responsibility as signatories of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue effective measures on disarmament. The prohibition treaty further reinforces the commitments of these states against the use, threat of use, development, production, manufacture, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, transfer, stationing, or installation of nuclear weapons. It reinforces states' commitments to the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the prohibition treaty by itself will not eliminate any nuclear weapons,
the treaty can help to further delegitimize nuclear weapons and strengthen the legal and political norm against their use.

As of December 18, 2023, 93 states have signed the treaty and 69 have ratified it.

Another unique facet of the TPNW is its newly established Scientific Advisory Group. Following the decision taken in the first meeting to establish a group of scientists to advise and “assist States Parties in implementing the treaty and in strengthening the credibility of the implementation process,” the group was formed earlier last year. The group is co-chaired by Dr. Patricia Lewis from Chatham House and Dr. Zia Mian from Princeton University. The TPNW Scientific Advisory Group presented its first report at the meeting and is expected to play an important role in advancing the TPNW, in part because most states parties do not have as significant technical experience and capacity on nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament as do the nuclear-armed states and their allies who play a more active role in other nonproliferation and disarmament treaty regimes, particularly the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Both thematic debate and the Scientific Advisory Group are bringing a “vibrant atmosphere and better collective learning,” according to Elayne Whyte, the 2017 TPNW negotiation conference president and former Costa Rican Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva.

10 https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclearprohibition
Beatrice Finn, who accepted the Nobel Prize for the International Ban Campaign, challenges arms control advocates to stop using euphemisms like “nuclear deterrence,” which she refers to as: “the threat to commit the mass murder of innocent civilians.” I don’t rule out that the Nuclear Ban Treaty may someday be regarded as an important milestone in the de-legitimization of nuclear weapons.

Condemning all nuclear weapons threats is of paramount importance right now. The TPNW is the most effective way for any government to do this and to raise the threshold for use. Stationing, as Russia is proposing to do in Belarus, is completely unacceptable.

Analysis:

On July 7, 2017, at the UN General Assembly, 122 states voted to adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This was the culmination of the work of a global network of states and grassroots activists that emphasized the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear-weapons use in order to delegitimize their possession. Advocates of the ban treaty are frustrated with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament through traditional channels. This article traces the history of the ban movement from 2005 to the present. It concludes by highlights six factors that led to the successful adoption of the treaty: a small group of committed diplomats; an influx of new coalition members; the contribution of civil society; the reframing of the narrative surrounding nuclear weapons; the pursuit of a simple ban treaty; and the context provided by the Barack Obama administration.

Political Opinion: the public is crucial to the Nuclear Ban campaign. In an interview, Fihn stated that “politicians are very sensitive to changes in public opinion” and that this would be a mechanism for change. Essentially, the Nuclear Ban movement is premised on an idea of long-term, bottom-up political change.

Whether that mechanism can be success enormous disparities in relative influence of different actors
2010 Nuclear Posture Review- the Pentagon embraced Obama’s position
James Carroll “Who loaded Trump’s gun?”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ZwJ21APhcI
The weapons and delivery systems of US nuclear arsenal were aged in 2010, were getting
to expiration dates
Under Obama, we can finish.. massive reductions in nuclear arsenal
Innovations, tech, expansion of lethality of nw (in effect reignite arms race)
Promise of NPT: Effective measures in steps to n disarmament
Tragedy:
Vladimir Putin emerged- dreaded new program of fascism in Russia
Extremist Republicans took US hostage in DC
Obama lashed like Ahab, the monomaniacal incarnation of all those malicious agencies...
the great white whale 15 minutes: Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, failure of SecDef—the
great white whale was the Pentagon itself (quickened by Putin and Republicans)
Obama’s retreat from goal and policy toward n disarmament.

First great triumph of Presidency: New START Treaty with Russia
But, to get Republicans to ratify—
The golden moment is gone; Pentagon is in league with Republican Congress and Super-
aggressive Trump admin—eliminate any hope of nuclear abolition
Review diff weapons systems:
Hyper stealth cruise missile—more than 1000 weapons—destabilizing because can get
through Russian and Chinese defenses—
USAF- replacement of 40-yr old ICBMs
Until now, on way of being phased out.
Will cost more than $100 billion dollars—starting arms race all over; when near-
consensus 2 years ago
Putin’s modernization—most hawkish impulses of their nuclear priesthood;

Am move to modernize followed by Russian—70 years of nuclear age—US led every
upward step of arms escalation; and that is happening again.
1945: dev atomic bomb; 1949 USSR followed
1947 long range bomber
1958m ICBM
1952 Hydrogen bomb
1960 sub-based ICBM 1968
1964 multiple warhead
1968 MIRV.....
This now will continue; cascade of n prolif—miracle of our lifetime—so few nuclear powers, not so many—
Now the cascade will come in earnest—examples of countries

USA with renewed nuclear arsenal—taking lead in abolition of nuclear abolition

First generation with capacity for species suicide; embarked on that road; as a species doomed...

Title of talk, yet haven’t mentioned Trump; he has reignited nuclear dread—as high as 1962.
NK: nuclear chicken—bluster and level of ignorance is blinding
Possibilities for a nuclear miscalculation

Trump stunned generals by proposing that the number of nukes going forward, should be capped at 32,000—or peak level of 1960s—would take 350 years, given current capacities
Rex Tillerson “fucking moron”
Trump campaign debate—biggest problem is facing nuclear prolif and that some maniac will go out and get a nw—that is gravest problem
Who loaded? Trump is not crime, but the evidence, USA has been taken hostage by great white whale—not the deep state—but Eisenhower’s Military Industrial Complex.

That complex has refused to reduce its demonic power (in Carroll’s lifetime); Obama was its declared enemy, already been taken by Jimmy Carter—even starker emblem of the problem
Firsthand experience of n danger/problem; inaugural address; unlike Trump, self-proclaimed lover of peace.
Here is American tragedy in a nutshell: new class of nw; neutron bomb; initiated across-the-board arms buildup; PD 59 expanded number of nuclear targets in USSR; ordered NATO’s deployment of Pershing II; funding Afghani group (became Al Qaida); Persian Gulf
Carter initiated wars of 21st C; ex, the Navy invited Carter in 2004 to christening of USS Sub Jimmy Carter—n attack sub

But this force is not superhuman and it is not beyond the realm of moral responsibility
Who set the monster loose? WHO feeds the monster, who owns it?
TRUMP SOLE AUTHORITY

But US is not a monarchy, responsibilities for gov rest in the Am people
We the people blame our leaders—why?
Because we the people never forced them to act/lead

Last summer—nuclear dread when Trump threatened to nuke NK
Nukes- sleeping dog we allow to lie; we barely take notice

Yes, some dogged activists have worked to raise n awareness (Physicians, academics...)
Yet almost never penetrated the Am conscience
Early 1980s-n freeze movement—shows can be raised to level of other pressing causes
Climate Change; health reform; BLM

Where is the abolition of nw now? Where on the list of Am concerns is ultimate survival
of human species? It’s hardly there

2017- new treaty to ban NW
Agreed to—did you notice signing ceremony in Sept at UN?

We did hear Trump’s insults to Kim..
No note of this urgent treaty and follow-on today?

Where is the political pressure (even on left) the politicians don’t care about n threat and
press doesn’t care about n threat because the people don’t.
Who loaded Trump’s gun—we did!

Q: What can I do as a person?
Start by attending a talk/rally/listening to a podcast. / check out South Dakota National
Parks information "Hidden in Plain Sight"
https://www.nps.gov/mimi/planyourvisit/parkfilm.htm

Did you hear of Randall Forsberg: she was a grad student in late 1970s, moved by
Carter’s commitment to abolition and crushed by failure to fulfill it. At end of Carter
admin, she drew up a 1 page declaration—like you a student—calling for a freeze on
number of nw
And she got fellow grad students and a few faculty to sign and it turned into a petition
By 1981, it blossomed into a national movement; when conventions met—someone
would move that the meeting/group would go on record supporting n freeze.

Randy set up a clearinghouse of information about the Freeze
and anti-nuclear activism at the Institute and instructed Mark
Niedergang, who was then the staff person for the Freeze campaign, not to tell activists seeking advice what they *should* do to promote the Freeze, but to help them discover for themselves what they *could* do. By providing a clearinghouse for information about Freeze activism all over the country, Randy thus nourished rather than guided the movement. The flexibility allowed activists to tailor their efforts to local conditions and also to keep their sense of agency and enthusiasm high. No one had to give up a pre-existing agenda to join the effort, and the Freeze campaign thus grew from its roots in Massachusetts to a nationwide campaign with links to many older anti-nuclear organizations.¹¹

The Freeze took off politically in the early 1980s, not only as a ballot initiative but also as proposed legislation in the US Congress. The Freeze became a factor in the 1984 presidential campaign, with most of the Democratic presidential contenders, including the party’s nominee, Walter Mondale, supporting it.¹²

Randy thought it a mistake to politicize the Freeze at such an early stage of the public campaign, to make it captive to Washington politics before a more substantial grassroots effort had developed. In retrospect, she seems to have been right. No sooner had the Freeze turned into a legislative proposal than certain politicians attacked it as an extreme position and sought to introduce more “moderate” and “responsible” alternatives. Several senators, including Albert Gore of Tennessee, endorsed the oxymoronic “build down” proposal. Instead of stopping nuclear production and deployment, as the Freeze required, the United States would build a new mobile, single-warhead missile system—the so-called Midgetman—that would ostensibly be

¹¹ [https://cornellpress.manifoldapp.org/read/toward-a-theory-of-peace-the-role-of-moral-beliefs-5a384f25-c4f9-455b-a46f-f9b34c7ea3a1/section/8a729436-8979-47d0-a1b1-29d1187fe404](https://cornellpress.manifoldapp.org/read/toward-a-theory-of-peace-the-role-of-moral-beliefs-5a384f25-c4f9-455b-a46f-f9b34c7ea3a1/section/8a729436-8979-47d0-a1b1-29d1187fe404)
more stabilizing. The problem was that the Reagan administration was happy to build the new system, as long as it could continue to build the destabilizing multiple-warhead MX missiles that it really wanted—and the “build down” proponents acquiesced to that deal. The efforts by Gore and others to invent a centrist position between the “extreme” of the Freeze proposal and the grandiose plans of the Reagan administration only made matters worse, as Randy had feared.

Many of the Freeze activists understandably felt a sense of urgency, and politicians were eager to capitalize on that. But Randy’s emerging vision of successful social change was a long-term one. Such change required a more fundamental transformation in people’s moral beliefs about war and weapons than could be carried out by a single campaign, even one as popular as the Freeze. The transformation had to be sufficiently robust not to be undermined by the usual machinations of opportunistic politicians.

... There are two features of Randy’s theory of social change which are worth highlighting, as they were evident already at this early stage: First, such change takes a long time; it is measured in centuries rather than years. Second, change must be pursued in a step-by-step approach, with each step accomplishing something valuable in itself and encouraging further action.

... Highlighting the long-term objectives of Randy’s disarmament strategy is not to understate the influence of the Freeze campaign and other activist efforts. Consider the demonstration that attracted between 750,000 and a million people to Central Park in June 1982 in support of the Freeze,
where Randy gave one of her most moving and effective public speeches. A strong argument can be made that the antinuclear sentiment that brought people to such events produced an impact on public policy. It probably reinforced the antinuclear tendencies in Ronald Reagan himself. It likely made him more open to the initiatives that the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev offered in the area of nuclear disarmament just a few years later. As far as Gorbachev is concerned, we have good evidence that he was emboldened by the anti-nuclear movement in the United States and Western Europe to pursue the unilateral initiatives of restraint that captured the public imagination and convinced the NATO alliance to bring the Cold War to a peaceful end.22

Randy was especially active during the 1980s in promoting some of the ideas that the reformist Soviet leadership later came to champion. Take, for example, the unilateral reductions and defensive restructuring of Soviet conventional forces that Gorbachev announced at the United Nations in December 1988. They bear a strong family resemblance to Randy’s proposal for “confining the military to defense” and the kindred work that she pursued with European colleagues. She had been promoting non-offensive defense for years in her visits to the USSR and in her meetings with Soviet colleagues elsewhere, and the idea eventually found a sympathetic ear in Gorbachev and his civilian advisers on military affairs. And, as Randy predicted, the dramatic reduction in the conventional military threat from the East paved the way for reductions in the nuclear threat.22

The end of the East-West arms race suggested that Randy’s scholarship over the course of two decades had produced the
correct diagnosis of the problem and her activism helped to fill the prescription.

Senator Markey sponsored freeze in US House of Rep; Sponsored by Ted Kennedy in Senate - across decades, now sponsored change in sole authority of president. To launch nw.

Reagan felt the pressure from below—he turned the freeze against itself by saying “I want reductions” in SALT Talks, then START, (START- strategic reductions) Gorbachev

Began with a person and it grew into a campaign/movement/anchored in a theory of social change

It can be done—the freeze lives on as a rebuke to us?
Where was support that Obama needed to push back?
Who supported Obama in his wish to go down road to n abolition—he stopped because there was no demand for it

China and other Countries are all responding to pressures generated by US
Why? Because US committed to changing regimes of countries it has power over; only thing that stops is nuclear power.
Ex: Obvious case—Khaddaf in Libya
Pushback from realpolitick- put at mercy of authoritarian and fascist countries, but
On the road. Let’s see what this world treaty that UN signed this year...
Only hope, change in imagination of American People
Fear of last summer—for a week, fear of Cuban Missile Crisis—our attention was taken away by other events (Mass murder in LV, hurricane, and genius of Pres Trump that takes our eye away from thing we were about to take seriously.
What happened to concern about nw? It’s become part of the routine
-signal of the problem is Bernie Sanders didn’t include in his platform
-Climate Change.. but we wont have time if there’s a massive nuclear exchange
American constitution protects the right of one person to launch nw—end civilization
It is beyond imprudent and insane
Pay attention to legislation – maybe Trump will frighten us into doing something...

Trump is a serious danger—future Japan and South Korea embarking on nuclear precipice which will open floodgate of N prolif; once 25 nw powers on planet, there is no way we will avoid n war;
Bio/chemical/AI and implications of cruise missiles are a terrifying escalation (cheap and easy to build weapons drones)

We are at the beginning of a political season-2024 election and Presidential Campaign Nuclear Abolition has to get back on the agenda alongside abolition, climate justice....

Yes, things look worse than ever in the short-term, but

According to Crawford, “Change occurs through processes of persuasion, social mobilization, and the institutionalization of small gains, so that arguments that recur over the longue durée can begin at new starting points that take for granted the criticisms and alternative formulations that previous generations of activists gained through their work.


You don't have to be a rocket scientist or a nuclear physicist to recognize the daunting and multifaceted dangers we confront today, most notably, the significance of our world-threatening nuclear capabilities on hair-trigger alert that endangers every country, civilization, and much of life itself. To get at our current predicament, it is helpful to start with/understand the legacy of the Cold War mindset and growth of military forces that continue to underpin governmental policies, priorities and spending.

Face farreaching and significant existential threats to our survival—have since 1945—some ebb and flow, but still ridiculously unacceptable. Exhorbitant costs, consequences of ongoing policies to the environment and human health, at expense of addressing wellbeing/domestic needs (deaths from COVID; drug-related deaths; abolition- BLM;....)

The ideas have been floating around for a long time....
[Give my personal bests—Eisenhower, Kennedy, Forsberg, Pugwashite, Obama?]

President John F. Kennedy’s “peace speech” at American University 60 years ago is remembered as both a searing critique of Cold War politics that went on to present a hopeful vision for a world built on cooperation and empathy, even among rival countries. Kennedy called for “not merely peace for Americans, but peace for all men and women — not merely peace in our time, but peace for all time.”

“Some say that it is useless to speak of peace or world law or world disarmament, and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must reexamine our own attitudes, as individuals and as a nation, for our attitude is as essential as theirs. And every graduate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward, by examining his own attitude towards the possibilities of peace, towards the Soviet Union, towards the course of the Cold War and towards freedom and peace here at home. First examine our attitude towards peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many think it is unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. …”

I have believed for a long time that official secrecy and deceptions about our nuclear weapons posture and policies and their possible consequences have threatened the survival of the human species. To understand the urgency of radical changes in our nuclear policies that may truly move the world toward abolition of nuclear weapons, we need a new understanding of the real history of the nuclear age.” (Daniel Ellsberg, p48)

Share/develop new frameworks of security, developed and put into practice through a partnership of governments, civil society, NGOs, and international organizations. (Williams, p.60)

3 points:
First, divide betw peacetime and wartime— now confronting war: On cusp of profound and far-reaching changes (window of opportunity)—Urgent need to illuminate to our generation urgent transnational nuclear threats
and our current predicament, as well as promising paths/steps reduce these dangers. This entails interrogating key focusing events (or black swan); windows of opportunity, the difference between wartime/peacetime national security state (secrecy, exigencies of war, corporate profits, Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex) and technological innovation.

Personally, I see a big weakness in much of coverage and discussion, notably: selective and distorted accounts, overly simplistic/ahistorical/hostile blue/red teaming that us vs. them or expert/professional/college teaching ….. most notably, the gaps in coverage and ethnocentrism/messianic realism

-- tension between elite audience and stakeholders/civil society
Instead: forget about interminable debates about UN authority or whether we can entrust decisions about America’s security to other countries or other international institutions, focus on trusting our experience and impacts of the direct impacts on each of us (not just the golden rule of do unto others… we need retooling to meet new challenges

Myth: Conventional belief in theory of nuclear deterrence/MAD, despite historical fact that nuclear threats are fraught with risks such as during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (confrontations and military insubordination) and the 1973 American DEFCON III nuclear alert—a threat by the President/government to use nuclear weapons lacks credibility. [See more recent experience of Trump’s threats against North Korea and ongoing Russian threats]; more alarmingly, wider sense of doom or complacency that there’s little one person can do to make a difference with respect to this existential threat or to address nuclear dangers, despite our understanding/recognition that nw have a direct impact on all our lives.

In contrast to earlier blinders of focusing on a state-to-state level of actors/policy, historians have given increased attention to bottom-up pressures/approaches to explain foreign policy. “Here, much of the focus has been placed on the roles of human rights networks, NGOs, and social movements, emphasizing the collective pressure applied on world leaders. Such works have deepened our understanding of how actors around the world, state and non-state, influenced the Cold War. But the ‘transnational turn’ has come at a price. Lost in the discourse amid the global tide has
been the role of domestic politics. The result is a distorted portrayal of the context in which U.S. policymakers made their decisions. Too much agency is assigned to external circumstances, without a corresponding examination of domestic forces, and the parameters they set for foreign policy. This paper argues that the East-West policy reversals of both Carter and Reagan – and with it, the course of the ‘Second’ Cold War (1979-85) – were driven by ‘intermestic’ politics, where the international and domestic agendas became entwined.” Aaron Donaghy (talk in 2017, The Second Cold War: Carter, Reagan & Intermestic Politics)

2. Today’s civil society can be informed and engaged in issues in exciting new ways that draw upon lessons learned in the past; possible due to expanded access to variety of: perspectives, sources (social media, ChatbotAI, web, other social movements such as Environment/Climate justice, etc) values and-- most notably-- interdisciplinary frameworks: climate justice, racial justice, feminism and economic justice

Threads of means to partner in a common effort to promote concept of human security...will explain this more fully, given time constraints

Diverse Information strategies that work are available—despite secrecy and barriers to access

In essence, I am arguing for scholarship with a conscience

This paper offers ex. From those directly harmed by nw, Manhattan Scientists, President Kennedy, to Daniel Ellsberg, Randy Forsberg, Carol Cohn, John Holdren, to PAUL WALKER, to Ray Acheson

The Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS) was a nonprofit center, founded by Dr. Randall Caroline Forsberg, that studied global military policies, arms holdings, production and trade, arms control and peace-building efforts. It also ran educational programs on current and alternative policies.12

12 https://rmc.library.cornell.edu/EAD/htmldocs/RMM08588.html

Arms Control Reporter and the annual IDDS Almanac: World Arms Holdings, Production, and Trade. The Arms Control Reporter volumes are available online here: https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/00068634
Refer to Intro Theory of Peace

3. Finally, 3rd point: when we impart this info, want to do it in a way that is empowering to people in a variety of communities/social justice movements/studies/careers in the short/medium/long-term?

Not just symbolic and consciousness raising actions, like making paper cranes and sharing pictures of mushroom clouds, we also need to unveil this hidden history by “drawing attention to newly declassified documents and to some realities still concealed” (Daniel Ellsberg “Hiroshima Day” written before 65th anniversary of Hiroshima)

First job out of college was publisher/editor of The Arms Control Reporter—a monthly update on news and developments of about 30 arms control negotiations (open-source; nonpartisan; FBIS and other declassified documents and interviews)

need to understand the legacy of the past, appreciate tremendous achievements of NGOs and activists, but also not be satisfied with ‘business as usual’

challenge conventions and foster new generation of thinking (reframe focus to capture social justice and environmental legacy, indiscriminate killing and gun violence (not just military and states but also impacted communities)

Learned about Palau and its nuclear-free constitution; experience of Marshallese removed from their homes for nuclear weapons tests—other downwinders at other test sites.

Notably, our subscribers tended to be military/arm control professionals and libraries (due to high subscription fee)-- useful service but wanted to expand upon our audience to wider public.

Involved with Freeze movement,big supporter but not a key activist/leader
Saw movement firsthand working with Randy Forsberg and others in movement from 1982-1985. Ultimately sought more expertise and autonomy—not chasing funders.

Extraordinary mass mobilization and engagement—teach-ins, demonstrations, lobbying public officials..... not just bumper sticker politics. (First job out of college so I took it for granted, despite growing pains of IDDS and turnover of staff)
In hindsight, I have come to appreciate how exceptional this movement was in engaging millions around the world.
Cool moment—early days of PCs and fax machines; able to disseminate materials relatively easily at low cost. Still, nothing like current change—Internet and Future of Democracy

On first point: by and large, I believe we’ve been doing a bad job of preparing the next generation about nuclear issues

Kids today launch communication campaigns as a substitute for political action. It’s not enough to just communicate—this is just first step in ed campaign, need political organization (Town meetings, Back from the Brink) need to intersect with real lives of Americans Reps at local and state—churches, mayors, base And, still need DC presence—Congressional staff that bridge the gap between prof/mil/ and activists/ communities Second, problem with activist community—need face time, not net time

(see this in failure to mobilize or pressure for change; take, for example, disputed allegations of WMD in leadup to Iraq War)

First: not for lack of concern and resources...
Definite increased interest on part of youth and heightened media attention during Trump administration in apocalyptic threats/domestic violence and safety (March for our Lives). There indeed a body of key facts/data that everyone should know—thankfully, I don’t have to convince you of its importance—why you’re reading/listening/attending/engaging....

Take my area of expertise: One problem in teaching about issues, need to address reality that:

**The world is awash with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and materials.** Most of these weapons and materials are stored in the United States and Russia, but they also exist in India, China, Pakistan, Great Britain, France, Israel, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Ukraine/Belarus and other nations.

In Russia alone, enough n material to make [TK,000 wpns in addition to existing arsenal of 15,000!]

So—need

But, it’s not just about arsenals, perhaps equally alarming—we’re trapped by tyranny of a so-called national security community/worldview of experts and policymakers (technostrategic discourse and mindset): we are perpetuating a fundamental bias in the field that must be acknowledged and confronted.

It is no longer acceptable to address/frame security in terms of a state’s nuclear weapons capabilities or its ability to deter/counter external threats.

Beyond earlier analysis of weapons systems (MAD; bean counting; Thomas Schelling;) the National Security State; the military-industrial-Congressional Complex, and the exigencies of war (WWI and II, Cold War and Proxy wars) The increasing interconnections tied to climate emergencies, tech/corporate/industrial interests that promote arms sales PROFITS over real security; disruptive technologies such as AI/satellites/forensics...., erosion of state control and expansion of corporate influence (military-industrial-
congressional complex), globalization and diverse risks of nonstate/terrorist actors throughout globe have made this moot!!

Why are key stakeholders still hanging on to this outdated concept of nuclear deterrence and primacy—it’s like the so-called debate over intelligent design. Sure, it’s getting airplay but the scientific evidence pointing to evolution is overwhelming.

*The academic field of security studies is tremendously insular.* Select group of mil/sci/government/policy/media elites with rarified knowledge and access to senior mil/people who have that knowledge and not something that most people have much use for in day-to-day life.

Continue to operate in virtually separate worlds—with all due respect to dedication and expertise of academicians MIT/Harvard/Georgetown/security intellectuals/defense analysts/inside the beltway lobbyists and pundits

Distinctive culture among academic thinkers “inside the beltway”: Acceptance of nw as symbols of strength and security, tools for bargaining.

Information is there

Within this mindset, find a narrow debate that spans the *spectrum of “baby steps” or incremental changes from business as usual (or the status quo), more ambitious initiatives that amount to progress, or specter of losing control and apocalyptic forecasting; and more farreaching critiques.* Wartime critics of dropping atomic bombs on Japan, post-war initiatives, Eisenhower’s outgoing address during Korean War, President Kennedy’s 1963 American University, Gorbachev-Reagan Reyjavik proposals; Movements to ban the bomb/smash the patriarchy and fascist perspectives.

Start by:
Frame perspectives in terms of constructive advances such as: strengthen transparency/equity of military/conventional non-proliferation efforts,
improve safeguards around existing weapons and materials, bolster intelligence gathering and interdiction capabilities, and expand international cooperation in dealing with a threat that affects all governments and peoples.

Very different concerns among civil society and academics at Universities/liberal arts colleges—
Lived experience: BLM and abolition (incarceration, racial injustice, policing)

**Personal experience 40 plus years**
Came of age with fallout shelters and Cold War crises, as a youth: organizing/research/scholarship/undergraduate teaching, notably early years as activist (IDDS, Paul Walker/Pam Solo; Freeze in Geneva
Turning Point: chipped away Berlin Wall/transformation of E-W divide in 1990
At time, I thought my PhD thesis became irrelevant, except as an historical account (EP Thompson, Howard Zinn, Mary Kaldor)

Shift : Human Security and Common Security; climate emergency....

Norms of Humanitarian Intervention and Pugwash at Am Academy
https://www.amacad.org/pugwash-conferences
ISODARCOi.

Taught nuclear/international security topics at: MIT/Wellesley/BC and subsequent years in Pioneer Valley: Mount Holyoke, Hampshire College, and UMass Amherst (organizing faculty workshops on WMD, Am hegemony; student advising/mentoring, etc...

more interdisciplinary group questioning intellectual underpinnings—issues of gender and other critiques....
https://thesocialchangeagency.org/blog/movement-trends-2023/
In light of these parallel worlds, what we should be spending our time teaching?

Does it serve to perpetuate sense of fatalism and complacency?

Need for interdisciplinary and more rigorous/equal participation in shaping the agenda in field security studies.

Recently there’s been a lot of talk about framing and language; in this area, framing it wrong—buying into a fundamentally unworkable and wrongheaded notion of security; i.e. relying on nw and promoting the view that nuclear weapons are the gold standard of great power...

Key notion: devaluing nw and deterrence theory/framing in terms of humanitarian law

Current academic/media attention are missing the boat—

The 3 fundamental issues are:
Need to frame it in terms of human security-- it’s not security, it’s human security

Not to say that states aren’t imp, in fact, security betw states is a necessary condition for security of people: protecting and empowering people;

Key reality: lack of NGO-government cooperation in the human security endeavor (Jody Williams, success of mine ban movement leading up to the Ottaway Convention and Landmines Campaign. (ex of cluster munitions)

Second: Nuclear reductions/safety/security and nonproliferation starts at home!!
Nuclear command and control (NC2); sole authority to launch; need updated/stronger checks and balances on the president’s authority/use of nw

Up to civil society to make sure that gov actions/policies will improve/protect our security

Civil society must “press harder and more consistently, based on a clear understanding of what works and what does not.” (Williams p.60)

One VERY helpful step—what we’ve learned.... That’s what I’m doing. Intersection of other movements- Environment/Climate (360.org, Greta Thunberg), tobacco/merchants of death; gender/women’s rights, march for our lives (Sandy Hook and others),

Need to adopt universal/consistent policy of: No new nukes. Period. This is true for: Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel, France, Britain, China, Russia and the United States
[No new weapons!! Reducing dangers of gun violence – March for our Lives]

This is part and parcel of urgent need to improve n security and de-value nw in U.S. security policy (Holdren). Challenge is—aging of existing arsenals and safety/reliability concerns

Address policies and programs in US—personally, I advocate imp of 1) verification/transparency measures analongside blocking/stopping efforts to develop new nukes and new platforms.

On the other side of coin:

Third: opportunities for working toward removing insecurity throughout the world are greater now than ever!!
Current climate of crisis, instability and globalization all foster new opportunities—equitable and sustainable ec. development, environmental renewal

These should be the biggest, core courses on a college campus:

Every college should require undergrads to take class—not enough to educate about global strife, conflict, roots, and most imp—educate on what we can do about it.

--I ran a Five College faculty institute for several years- not MIT operation, but faculty that teach college undergrads;

suffer from gross ignorance of history and facts of Cold War: not communicating imp things

Hard for undergrads to have a clear sense and appreciation of rest of world (sure lot’s on Iraq but little else)

don’t know how to teach this stuff: what’s changed and what’s enduring from field;

Fed a lot on terrorism but little deep knowledge or understanding of regions/cultures

We’re breeding a bunch of sheep—followers, rather than leaders and trailblazers.
Now at a low ebb: As Zia Mian has explained, “you have to be gloomy, you have to be realistic, but you have to take responsibility and try and figure out what you can do, because it has to be done.” (Zia Mian)

Terrible irony: seem to remain locked in either: apathy or institutional straightjacket of policies developed during the Cold War—people making
same arguments; everybody in field recognizes their intellectual failure at end of CW; being replayed now

Just at a workshop on how to communicate; sad thing is don’t know first thing about how to communicate to wider public in a convincing way....

2) Move on to second point: have to inform people/stakeholders in a compelling way: not just scaring people, but empowering people

Civics—democratic accountability and responsibility (Facing History and Ourselves in the nuclear age)
Time for farsighted approaches to address changing priorities and interests
In essence, I am arguing for scholarship with a conscience

Should be core curriculum of every high school & college American history and college/college class on 20th century history and American foreign policy college and it’s not

Need to be smart about the dangers of current policies and narrowly self-serving nature of U.S. security policy—what are hidden interests ex: loose nukes; arms trade; globalization

--open source model of MIT—using web in open, expanded way

3. Finally, most important aim is to stimulate and empower people; even if don’t accomplish all our goals in our lifetimes, feel empowered/supported as you continue to work/pursue relationships or raise a family/ life journey (list of phenomenal experiences with mentors/leaders, habits, skills, --interests of time, suggest my pitch:

What’s now missing in most academic teaching on security—Rather than promote a theory/argument/policy; important for students to grapple with tradeoffs involved in various choices we face.
To be truthful, face a tradeoff between depth and breadth—should we think deeply about one piece of the puzzle, tackle one part, or attempt to take on the whole ball of wax—and adopt a more comprehensive framework? Should we push for incremental small steps, or one bold sweep?
[Can do both- see example of Freeze Campaign, Pugwash and different types of meetings/statements/lobbying]

This juggling act is the essence of teaching—

*Discuss connections between STEM course work and societal issues

In addition to being aware of how science is connected to current issues, benefits can be drawn from deeper classroom conversations on societal and ethical issues in STEM.

Ex: https://blog.ucsusa.org/alyssa-shearer/6-ways-stem-educators-can-enhance-student-engagement-in-our-democracy/

Aside: key resource—WWW and AI
But also face a potential pitfall of info overload and lack of recognition of various agendas of different sources: among teachers, students and policymakers

Finally, now in an era of multitasking—recognize implications of our partial attention, Sometimes, simplistic, facile argument
But most worrisome, not addressed before an issue becomes a crisis—or in the weather vernacular, a category 4 hurricane—either in terms of mass violence

Urge students to engage in a variety of small group activities... role plays, simulations, or “thought experiments” that grapple with the many short/medium and long-term dangers/threats/trends and then gives students time and a safe space for critical reflection, exploration and analysis.
[ice bucket challenge or app with virtual coins]
Before ending, want to impart few ideas of how to be empowering.

In my ed, empowerment very imp: came of age in the 1970s during public opposition to the war in Vietnam. My whole life work changed when I got involved with IDDS and the Freeze; I was galvanized into action. Now it’s my turn to inspire the next generation to succeed in actions we tried. [see: Never know what might work, take Reagan: Lawrence Wittner, “Reagan and Nuclear Disarmament,” Boston Review 25 April-May 2000 4-6.]

Excerpt from Forsberg sums up the secret sauce for activists today:

Long-Term Vision

An important component of Randy’s disarmament strategy entailed efforts to engage not only the general public but also the community of experts on military affairs. She maintained good relations with mainstream defense intellectuals at Harvard and MIT and in Washington. In the case of the Nuclear Freeze, for example, it was not only a matter of mobilizing popular support. Randy also won over establishment figures, such as John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution, who endorsed the bilateral Freeze. She was particularly pleased at the opportunity to present the case for the Freeze in the magazine Scientific American in November 1982. With an international readership of specialists and laypeople, Scientific American maintained a tradition of presenting technical expositions of key issues related to the arms race, such as nuclear testing and antiballistic missile systems, often combined with innovative proposals for arms control. By inviting Randy to lay out the case for the Freeze, the editors were welcoming her into the ranks of such luminaries as Hans Bethe and Richard Garwin, and recognizing her credibility before both popular and expert audiences. In January 1983, arms control experts, politicians (including then members of Congress
Al Gore and Ed Markey) and leaders of anti-nuclear organizations, attended a meeting at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences to discuss the Freeze proposal in technical, strategic and political terms.21 Randy received further acknowledgment when she was granted a MacArthur Foundation “Genius” award in 1983; funds from the award, distributed over five years, allowed her to continue to expand IDDS.

Despite the popular success of the Freeze, Randy’s scholarly analysis told her that nuclear disarmament would not be possible without dealing with conventional forces as well. In 1984 she published an article in the World Policy Journal called “The Freeze and Beyond: Confining the Military to Defense as a Route to Disarmament.”22 This was the most thorough statement to date of her understanding of how disarmament and an end to war could come about. At the same time, she was developing a theory of social change—the subject of this book—that informed her understanding of how the Freeze campaign and subsequent disarmament efforts should proceed. Randy wrote the first draft of what became the “Confining the Military to Defense” article in the summer of 1979, more than four years before the final version was published. The draft, much longer than the published version, is available in the IDDS archives at Cornell University, and it contains an important passage illuminating her thinking:

[A] difficult aspect of disarmament is that it cannot be accomplished in a single stroke, like the US withdrawal from Vietnam or the ending of above-ground nuclear tests. In this respect, its closest precedent is not the recent victories of the peace movement, but the nineteenth-century abolition of slavery. The abolition of slavery was an equally profound social change, which ended an ancient, pernicious, widespread institution after more than a century of protest and opposition.23
There are two features of Randy’s theory of social change which are worth highlighting, as they were evident already at this early stage: First, such change takes a long time; it is measured in centuries rather than years. Second, change must be pursued in a step-by-step approach, with each step accomplishing something valuable in itself and encouraging further action.

Contrary to what some of its critics on the left implied, the Freeze was never intended to be permanent. This was also a point of misunderstanding with the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement, which had emerged as a major force in the early 1980s. Many European activists favored the de-nuclearization of Western Europe, by unilateral means if necessary, and viewed the Freeze proposal as a barrier to that goal. Randy worked hard to maintain good relations with European peace activists, and it helped that one of the leaders of END, Mary Kaldor, was a fellow SIPRI veteran.24 Randy’s European contacts extended beyond the antinuclear movement into the community of experts working on issues of conventional-force restructuring and the theory of non-offensive defense—approaches quite compatible with Randy’s way of thinking.25

For Randy and its other supporters, the Freeze did not reflect a satisfaction with the status quo. It was a necessary first step towards reductions, and it was appealing in its simplicity. As Randy put it in her 1984 article, “Because people despair of ever achieving the ultimate goal of a disarmed peace, it would be extremely difficult to motivate widespread popular efforts for change without a set of powerfully attractive intermediate goals, each desirable in its own right.”26

As a by-product of her work on the Freeze and her efforts to promote it, Randy helped develop an extensive network of national and international contacts. With strategic foresight and typical generosity, she devoted some of the resources of her Institute to
provide a “public good”—a series of publications listing all of the known peace-related activist groups and educational programs in the United States and beyond so that activists and students could form networks and become more effective in the promotion of peace.  

The Peace Movement and the End of the Cold War

Highlighting the long-term objectives of Randy’s disarmament strategy is not to understate the influence of the Freeze campaign and other activist efforts. Consider the demonstration that attracted between 750,000 and a million people to Central Park in June 1982 in support of the Freeze, where Randy gave one of her most moving and effective public speeches. A strong argument can be made that the antinuclear sentiment that brought people to such events produced an impact on public policy. It probably reinforced the antinuclear tendencies in Ronald Reagan himself. It likely made him more open to the initiatives that the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev offered in the area of nuclear disarmament just a few years later. As far as Gorbachev is concerned, we have good evidence that he was emboldened by the anti-nuclear movement in the United States and Western Europe to pursue the unilateral initiatives of restraint that captured the public imagination and convinced the NATO alliance to bring the Cold War to a peaceful end.

Randy was especially active during the 1980s in promoting some of the ideas that the reformist Soviet leadership later came to champion. Take, for example, the unilateral reductions and defensive restructuring of Soviet conventional forces that Gorbachev announced at the United Nations in December 1988. They bear a strong family resemblance to Randy’s proposal for “confining the military to defense” and the kindred work that she pursued with European colleagues. She had been promoting non-offensive defense for years in her visits to the USSR and in her meetings with Soviet colleagues.
elsewhere, and the idea eventually found a sympathetic ear in Gorbachev and his civilian advisers on military affairs. And, as Randy predicted, the dramatic reduction in the conventional military threat from the East paved the way for reductions in the nuclear threat.29

The end of the East-West arms race suggested that Randy’s scholarship over the course of two decades had produced the correct diagnosis of the problem and her activism helped to fill the prescription.

Include Personal Involvement in social movements/disarmament in Endnotes

Went to 1982 Central Park Protest13

Full disclosure of my background and experience. Highlight: diverse approaches you can take; none offer a magic bullet- important to recognize daunting odds of succeeding— nonetheless, incredible breakthroughs and experiences that included:
-While working as Secretary of U.S. Pugwash, I participated in high-level discussions in Berlin leading up to 1995 Pugwash Conference in Hiroshima (before International Pugwash won the Nobel Peace Prize)
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and one of its founders, Jody Williams, coordinator of the Vietnam Veterans of America, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997

-Attending the Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference in DC when Obama's 2009 Prague speech- was broadcast live.
Academic presenter at CTBT’s Science and Technology Conferences in Vienna 2014 and 2016
2018 Cornell U meeting honoring Randall Forsberg and digitizing IDDS archives
Former IDDS staffer Rae Acheson’s work on TPNW\textsuperscript{14}
-final elimination of US Chemical Weapons stockpile in December 2023
Example of my experience organizing a pilot effort to reinvigorate public participation in
technical government policies by organizing representative panel of civil society to
actively engage in debate and highlight concerns and priorities

When someone gets a big award or honor, you often read about their initial response.
Randy’s MacArthur Genius Grant; the IPIS Common Security Workshop and meeting in
Berlin in 1989; or again when I was sitting at home in Watertown, MA in late 1995 when I
got the unexpected news that International Pugwash had received the Nobel Peace Prize.
I had just left my job managing American Pugwash activities at the AAAS. At the
time, I was fed up with the pervasive sexism and exploitation that I experienced on the
job (see Rae Acheson and Carol Cohn’s work— but that’s a story for another time).

I want to mention my personal story because social movements are made up of various
young people who and that’s what what makes the difference; also worked as staffer at
AAAS early on in the Landmines campaign...
My point is—I was total surprised at the Pugwash Nobel Prize; I hadn’t felt like the small
NGO movements were making a significant difference and I certainly felt frustrated and
ignored in later campaigns.

\begin{enumerate}
\item ISODARCO Cyprus 2019 and ISODARCO January 2024 on the global nuclear order in light of the
Ukraine war, focusing on the states, the policies, and the technologies that will shape the future in a
much more difficult environment.
Venue: Andalo (Trento, Italy) Date: 7-14 January, 2024
\item Annenberg Foundation, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age telecourse.
\end{enumerate}

For decades historians have debated the morality and necessity of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. As one example, here is a lesson plan and has students read four different accounts of the
bombings and then asks them to decide for themselves how we should remember the dropping of the
atomic bombs. https://sheg.stanford.edu/history-lessons/atomic-bomb
\item https://blog.ucsusa.org/alyssa-shearer/6-ways-stem-educators-can-enhance-student-engagement-in-
our-democracy/
\end{document}

\textsuperscript{14} TPNW- SAG Report, October 2023. Scientific Advisory Group