Conflict and Factionalism in Peace Movements

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Draft 1
Introduction

Conflict among activists who share a social movement is a common, painful experience. On first glance, internal conflict seems at best a painful, pointless distraction for activists. Activists have agonized over how to avoid conflict and the best methods of managing it when it does erupt. Scholars have argued that allowing factionalism to develop is a fatal blunder, ending movements early and blunting their political effectiveness. Yet there has been increasing scholarly attention to the diverse and often surprising role internal conflict can play in social movement life and outcomes. Instead of framing internal conflict as a misery to be avoided at all costs, we could understand conflict as an unescapable reality of organized social life. If conflict is unavoidable, what can we learn from it? What are its consequences outside of killing movements? Even if movement factionalism is inevitable, its negative consequences need not be. Movement scholars and activists have something to learn from cases of factionalism that were detrimental, as well as from cases when internal conflict was harnessed and used to propel a movement forward.

Conflict in movements can take different forms and there is diversity in how social movement scholars have defined and used terms like infighting, factionalism, and schism (Balser 1997; Ghaziani 2008; Kretschmer 2019). Generally, infighting refers to the disagreements among activists who share a movement, coalition, or organization as they struggle over the cultural and strategic boundaries of their community (Ghaziani 2008). Factionalism tends to refer to more serious and organized rivals within a movement or group. Schism, as I use it here, refers the formal severing a relationship, as when a group of members breaks away because the internal conflict cannot be resolved (Kretschmer 2019). In the following sections, I use all of these terms and clarify precisely how I am using them.
This chapter will draw from a variety of campaigns and movements to understand the common challenges activists face conflict. I will primarily draw these lessons back to two central phases of anti-nuclear activism to draw on the lessons for peace movements. The first wave of anti-nuclear activism occurred in the 1950s. The Ban-the-Bomb movement was created by a wide assortment of actors, each with different motivations and concerns. This included long time pacifists, scientists, socialists, and religious groups, among others, each offered distinct critiques of atomic weapons. The face of the movement was a new national organization, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE). SANE’s massive size (130 chapters and 25,000 members by 1958) made it the dominant player of the mainstream anti-nuclear movement for the next decades. By 1963, the U.S. and other nuclear powers signed the Test Ban Treaty, and the movement largely disbanded (Harvey 2014; Katz 1986).

When the movement reemerged in the late 1970s, its focus was broader than banning weapons. While limiting nuclear weapons continued as a focus, activists brought a wide range of other concerns to the fore. These include concerns about nuclear power, radioactive waste, missile silos, research laboratories, and military bases, among other things (Harvey 2014). Long running pacifist organizations continued in the movement, as did SANE, which continued to play an integral role in mainstreaming and moderating activist demands. In this era of anti-nuclear activism, the assortment of groups and motivations was a double-edged sword. Diversity made the movement larger and gave more people more reasons to join. But it also gave activists a lot to fight over.

This chapter is an attempt distill the lessons about internal movement conflict for activists generally, and peace activists specifically. In the following sections, I discuss four central arguments about factionalism in movements and illustrate each with examples from anti-nuclear
movements. In the process, and explicitly in the concluding section, I draw out the lessons peace activists can take about how, when, and why factionalism emerges, as well as how it can be framed and managed to produce a more vital movement.

**Key Characteristics of Movement Conflict**

*Conflict within a movement community is probably inevitable.*

Every movement experiences internal tension. Factionalism and other forms of conflict are unavoidable because, as Gamson (1975:99) writes, it is “the nature of the beast.” Activists are by definition passionate about their cause, and this often includes intense feelings about a variety of other things – like the right way to organize and how much they are willing to compromise on their vision. Activists also frequently have a sense of urgency about their work – they are nearly always at a disadvantage, struggling outside of powerful institutions for attention and influence from those who are better positioned. It is rarely clear to activists what the correct strategy is to achieve their goals, and they are worried that the wrong choice means squandering any chance they did have. Working outside of the channels of routine power, activists must correctly predict an unknown future in an environment filled with competing actors, some working directly to oppose you. It is no surprise that individual activists and groups will fight with each other over how to interpret their circumstances, over who is a friend and who is a foe, over what they can hope for and what is out of reach.

Causes of factionalism can be internal or external to movement groups. Internally, scholars have argued that group structures shape the way conflict emerges and takes course within groups (Kretschmer 2019). Particular structures may be poorly equipped to manage diversity and disagreement among members. Gamson (1975/1990), in his study of 53
challenging groups, found that centralized groups with hierarchical authority were best able to fend off schism, while decentralized groups with flat authority structures were far more vulnerable to factional splitting. The connection between decentralized authority and group splitting has also found considerable support in studies of anti-war and anti-nuclear groups. For example, Miller (1983) argued that Students for a Democratic Society, a prominent organization in the 1960s anti-war movement, experienced detrimental factionalism because it embraced a decentralized authority structure, encouraging broad membership participation in decision-making. However, as membership grew, the organizational structure was ill suited for managing diverging opinions about the direction of the group. Similarly, Downey (1986) found that the decentralized organizational structure of the anti-nuclear power group Clamshell Alliance proved a central problem in managing diverging membership preferences, ultimately leading to its disintegration.

The external environment also shapes group conflicts. External sources of factionalism abound and can introduce sources of conflict or exacerbate the conflicts that already exist. Through a careful comparison of four cases, Deborah Balser (1997) finds that political opportunity structures, social control mechanisms, external resources, and relationships with other organizations can also drive factionalism. Political opportunities can come in many forms, including affecting movement-relevant legislation, gaining influential government allies, unstable electoral alignments. When anti-war group SDS faced a closing opportunity structure, one wing of the group became more willing to use violent tactics while an opposing faction argued that violent tactics, like throwing rocks and bottles and police officers, was ultimately self-defeating because it alienated public support. Changing environmental circumstances forced
the organization to make a choice about how it would carry forward and led to bitter
disagreement (Gitlin 2013)

Even victories in the form of legislation can cause creeping factionalism. Following a
major win, activists must decide what comes next, and this process can expose deep fault lines
within a group. Fundamental ideological differences can be easy to ignore when the group is
united by some basic, necessary goal, like ending a war or achieving passage of necessary
legislation. But when movements do achieve a central goal, activists often disagree with each
other about next steps because they have very different visions of what the next good and
attainable goal is. The literature is rife with examples about the movement depressing effects of a
victory, including slavery abolition, feminism, and the environmental movements. In this way,
victories can surface conflict that had been dormant or non-existent before.

Relationships with allies in government can also lead to internal factionalism.
Governmental allies are attractive to many activists because they increase the likelihood of
movement demands being met. At the same time, building relationships with government actors
often comes with strings that constrain activists, creating pressure to use some tactics and
strategies over others (Balser 1997). Institutional channeling is a perpetual temptation and threat,
depending on how an activist is oriented towards the government. This can mean activists
situated differently can respond very differently to the promise and constraints offered by
institutional agreements. This pressure split American nuclear freeze activists. Moderate
institutionalists maintained a commitment to moderate tactics and polite lobbying campaigns for
incremental decreases to weapon spending, seeing this as the only reasonable approach in
keeping the elected officials receptive to their claims. The grassroots radicals sought a wholesale
change to the conduct of war and defense spending, and they pursued dramatic tactics to
highlight their claims. These included breaking into secure areas to pour their own blood on weapons and hammering at them with common tools. As both wings struggled for control of the movement, progress stalled and distrust grew on both sides of the divide (Meyer 1990).

Government actors can also more directly sow discord and factionalism in a movement by intentionally disrupting actions and organizations. This might include harassing groups, infiltrating organizations, planting negative media stories, and discrediting organizational leaders (Marx 1979; Balser 1997). As groups grapple with these disruptions, members often disagree about how to handle. Because some kinds of strategies are more likely to invite repression, some organizational leaders argue that the movement should avoid these costly choices. Others argue for strategies that they believe will be effective, regardless of the threat of repression.

Relationships among groups within a social movement can also create the conditions for factionalism. A central cause of conflict within movements is disparate strategic visions across groups. This kind of factionalism can occur when a movement is growing or when it is in decline. For example, in the early 1980s, as the nuclear freeze movement was mobilizing, deep divisions opened among groups that wanted a narrow emphasis on nuclear weapons, with “a concerted, moderate campaign” focused on electoral politics. New converts in the movement were more narrowly motivated by nuclear threats. Advocates for a narrow moderate approach argued that attention to other issues could only divide the movement, squandering the chance to achieve one main goal. The older-line radical peace groups felt strongly that the issue could not be limited to a nuclear arms freeze – arguing that the single issue was only a symptom of a deeper problem. Even if the Freeze Campaign were to work, it would do nothing about the other conditions that create war and destruction (Harvey 2014:27). The debate between organizations
over single issue or multi-issue focus sometimes seeps into organizations, dividing members of
the same group over how to proceed.

Organizations need a variety of resources to survive over the long haul, and these
resources are always in short supply. Groups need to recruit members with both time and money
to support the cause. They also need public attention and the way to get it is through attention
from media. They also need attention from elites with power that can be leveraged for change.
Each of these resources is in short supply and activist groups must compete for them not just
with opponents, but also with other allied movement groups. The factions of a movement or
group that are able to capture the majority of the resources will have greater power set the terms
of action. These better-resourced factions can drive public perception of the movement and its
goals, and the power imbalance creates friction with activists who have diverging preferences.

For example, organizational competition drove factionalism in the Mobilization for
Survival (MFS) – an umbrella coalition formed in 1977 to coordinate anti-nuclear activism in the
U.S. Early on, old-line peace groups dominated the anti-nuclear movement. Leaders of the
movement agreed that they needed an organizing umbrella group that would harness energy from
the local activists who were newly joining the movement. A wider range of issues than the
original peace groups mobilized the new recruits, and many of the grassroots groups wanted to
expand the focus on the movement to include nuclear facilities and the perceived dangers of
nuclear power. Growth was good – more people taking up the cause is more likely to lead to
authority response and movement gains. However, the broadened scope of the movement sowed
dissent when the local activists, motivated by different goals and distinct ideology from the
peace groups, became the majority of the MFS. Local environment groups captured far more
media attention and drove the national coalition to embrace a comprehensive anti-nuclear stance,
rather than one focused on weapons and war. Older groups in the network felt the newer grassroots activists lacked a coherent plan; the newer groups wanted to be unconstrained by routine political concerns. Growth brought diversity, and wrought competition over movement resources, direction, and media attention.

Across movement groups, competition for resources can drive groups to find movement niches at the extremes of movement tactics and ideology. In her consideration of peace movement positions over time, Tamar Hermann (1992) argues that the presence of absolutist pacifist groups – the position that the use of force is prohibited under any circumstance or provocation – regularly led to bitter factionalism across the movement. Pure pacifism, motivated by transcendental and often religious beliefs, left no room for strategic compromises, and these inevitably created difficult relationships with more pragmatic groups in the movement (see Byrn 1988). Others have similarly documented the ways extreme positions drive factionalism for movements, including the anti-war and anti-nuclear movements. For example, Benford (1993) found that factionalism proved inevitable between nuclear disarmament groups when they spread across the spectrum from radical to moderate framing of core issues. Groups clustered at these extremes faced the greatest factionalism, both internally and with other groups, and ultimately fell apart when the issues could not be resolved.

Across waves of the anti-nuclear movement, infighting, factionalism, and schism have been prominent features. Conflict emerged from disputes over messaging and framing nuclear technology, the right balance of moderate and radical goals, the best strategies and organizational styles to achieve those goals. The anti-nuclear movement is not distinct in this respect; every movement that reaches a notable size faces difficult choices about how to manage its growing
diversity and choosing the right path forward. Activists should understand this reality without overreacting to its threat.

**Conflict is more visible (and problematic) at some points.**

Factionalism can emerge at any phase of the movement, but is more obvious and problematic at some points. Sometimes activists manage or resolve their differences through particular organizing strategies – like creating participatory and democratic processes and clear decision-making structures. In smaller collectivist groups, where members are tightly networked and hold a great deal of trust in each other, groups might settle on simple decision-making processes, like majority voting or consensus decision-making, where nothing is done until everyone can agree to move forward. Factionalism is less likely to grow and become a fatal problem for a group when these conditions are present. When these decision-making strategies work well, conflict that routinely comes up can be managed and is less likely to become visible to the outside world.

As groups grow larger, conflict management is more difficult and more likely to result in factionalized splitting. This is because newer members don’t share the same strong social ties, and often bring new values, or preferences, marking them as distinct from original members. Under these circumstances, existing conflict management plans may not be enough to overcome the new differences. Different rules, like majority voting to make decisions, might be more appropriate for larger groups, but can be a poor fit for activists who preferred the consensus decision-making practices of smaller groups. As older and newer members struggle over what the larger group could and should look like, conflict is more likely to spill into open and result in damaging factionalism. From this view, conflict and infighting only appear necessarily fatal to
movements because we only see the factionalism that could not be managed by organizational structures and rules.

Conflict and factionalism might also become more readily visible in some phases of a movement lifecycle. Activists and scholars are more likely to notice and feel the painful pinch of factionalism and schism at some points than others. Evidence across a variety of movements shows us that in boom times, when movements are popular, public participation is high, and resources are flowing in, factionalism and schism within and between groups is likely to be high. Activists will naturally vary in their opinions about what is right and desirable for their shared movement – what issues deserve the most attention? What strategies are reasonable and effective? What kinds of organizational structures are the correct ones? What kinds of leadership are morally acceptable? When resources and popularity are high, activists have fewer incentives to stay together and figure out the solutions to their differences. When internal fighting besets an organization, a rich environment means that there are plenty of resources to support new groups. New groups form from the splits and spin-offs of existing groups, and in many cases, because the new groups do not cause the death of the initial organization, there is very little external attention to the episode of factionalism (Kretschmer 2019).

When movements are in decline, there is greater attention to what is causing the decline and factionalism and conflict absorb much of the spotlight. In her study of the British anti-nuclear movement, Maguire (1992) argued that the fundamental disagreements among activists about both policy and strategy had been there from the beginning, but they became much more visible when the movement went into decline. In other cases, achieving a critical success can cause membership decline and new episodes of factionalism. When this happens, it is easy to assume the factionalism is driving the decline; but it is also possible that they are two symptoms
of the same underlying phenomenon. Major victories, as desirable as they are for activists, also
prove a crisis for movement communities. People who cared only about the issue that is now
resolved will go home. Activists who want to carry on need to agree on new foci and this can
process can reveal incompatibilities among those left. Movement communities can split under
these circumstances, reformulating into new groups and new campaigns. Rather than a failure to
manage conflict, the conflict plays a role in a kind of natural life cycle of a movement.

**Conflict can be good for movement communities.**

Conflict emerges in movement communities when they are growing. Diversity comes
with growth and brings with it creativity. These are inherently good for movements! When
movements flood with new people, bringing in new ideas, concerns, and preferences, activists
and leaders must find ways to sort out if and how they can all work together. This can be a
difficult process, but the alternative is small and homogeneous movements. Growth means
bringing more people in, increasing the opportunities for conflict, and learning to harness its
potential benefits.

For example, in the early 1980s feminists joined the anti-nuclear movement in droves.
Women from each branch of feminism, including liberal, eco, cultural, and radical feminism,
saw a common threat in the military industrial complex and the threat of nuclear extinction. In a
set of conventions and actions at the Pentagon, feminists struggled with each other over what
common ground they shared and how their common fight should be waged. The overwhelmingly
white leadership was confronted by their racial insensitivity and failures to adjust their preferred
tactics in ways that took into account the needs of different communities. These were painful, but
ultimately necessary fights to have (Harvey 2014).
Growth and diversity also lead to competition and the proliferation of new groups. Sometimes they form because existing organizations split apart, unable to contain the variety of goals and preferences that diverse memberships hold (Kretschmer 2019). Where competition is generated, the result is a wider assortment of participation styles for people to choose from.

In the remobilized anti-nuclear campaign of the late 1970s and 80s, dozens of new groups and thousands of new activists joined long-standing pacifist organizations, including Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and the Fellowship of Reconciliation, among others. The pacifist organizations continued to press for radical disarmament and end war generally. Few of the new activists shared this deeper commitment to pacifism, and instead joined “mainstream, media-friendly, and moderate” organizations that argued for a more limited set of goals (Harvey 2014: 14). Diversity in goals and styles in the resurgent anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s meant that the movement embraced “lobbying, legal action, public education, public demonstrations and rallies, occupations… direction action and civil disobedience” (Harvey 2014:16). A well-mobilized and thriving movement is diverse and can move on many fronts at once. This is what movement leaders want, and should be willing to tolerate factionalism for.

Diversity, and the factionalism that it provokes, can also spur the radical flank effect. The radical flank effect is the notion that public support for moderate groups of a social movement is increased by the presence of more extreme groups. Herbert Haines (1984) wrote about the effect of factionalism within the civil rights movement, when the Black Power wing of the movement rose outside of the mainstream civil rights groups of the 1960s. Elites, viewing the new Black Power groups as a scarier prospect, began to show greater support for the moderate wing of the movement. The positive radical flank effect has been demonstrated in both experimental studies
(Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg 2022) and other movements, including state-level gender equity legislation campaigns in the 1970s (McCammon et al. 2015). The division sowed by this process is quite painful for the organizations and leaders who find themselves at odds with each other. Nevertheless, it also offers a pathway to victories and external support that might not otherwise materialize.

**Internal Conflict Can be fatal, but not always.**

You do not need to look hard for arguments that factionalism and schism are bad for activists. After all, common sense will tell us that groups embroiled in internal fighting are going to be less cohesive in their goals and unable to strategize about goals they do share. The literature is littered with examples across history of how internal conflict stunted or killed movements. William Gamson (1990), in his famous cross movement comparison of what leads to movement success, argued that factionalism is written on the epitaph of movements across history. He argued that groups who failed to manage conflict failed in their overall aims, and that factional splits were direct precursor to failure. Movements are caught in the quicksand of conflict with each other and waste valuable energy and momentum fighting with each other.

Other scholars have argued that factionalism is not so linear in its relationship with movement failure. While factionalism might be inevitable, its outcome for a group might depend on factors beyond the group itself. Balser (1997) argues that external threats are a critical piece of understanding whether factionalism will be fatal. In a stable environment, decentralized movements and organizations tolerate internal diversity and dissent quite well. Each subgroup has the freedom to pursue their own strategies and tactics, and even to be critical of factions without causing a full breakdown of the larger movement. When external pressures multiply, factions face greater internal pressure to unify against those threats. Under these conditions,
managing internal dissent and diversity is much more difficult, and factionalism is more likely to turn to schism and organizational death.

There are also plenty of examples in which factionalism can be vicious yet the movement finds important success anyway. For example, in the 1981, in preparing for the June meeting at the United Nations that would focus on the problems of the nuclear arms race, activists created and then factionalized the June 12 Coalition, an umbrella organization meant to manage the movement response to critical opportunity. Coalition members divided over whether a narrow message focused only on an arms freeze was more likely to succeed, or if they should create space for a far wider set of concerns. Partisans in favor of a big tent approach argued that this was a “golden opportunity” to demonstrate how nuclear technology threatened every aspect of society and connected to a wider set of injustices. Those who argued for a narrow frame contended that focusing public attention on a specific goal – the arms freeze – was the best way to achieve a tangible win for the movement. The groups jostled for control, with each wanting credit for movement leadership, and deep factions emerged between radicals and moderates. The opportunity to focus the growing public concern about nuclear technologies on gathered elites and demonstrate the movement’s power put heightened pressure on leaders. Leaders fought each other over the questions, jeopardizing the movement’s moment in the spotlight during the UN events. Yet, despite the fighting, the resulting demonstrations were massive and brought tremendous public attention. Despite the raucous turmoil among leadership, the factionalism did not impede the movement or its public support.

What lessons can be learned about factionalism and schism?
Peace movement activists are probably going to contend with factionalism in their work because it is built into activism work itself. People arrive at activism with distinct motives, values, and preferences and these often clash with others in the movement. However, successful movements find a way forward despite the conflict. We can draw from a wide set of movements including anti-nuclear activism, to distill lessons for peace activists in the future.

First, factionalism is inevitable and painful for insiders, but it need not be deadly for a movement. For activists in the heat of fighting with each other over the best path forward, their differences probably feel insurmountable. But movements that achieved important cultural and legislative victories have also faced internal factionalism and found a way through it. In fact, internal conflict can help build a stronger foundation when managed. Amin Ghaziani (2008), in his study of national LGBTQ+ protest events over time, found that conflict processes offer a way for activists to surface their differences, hear from marginalized groups in the movement, and find a more inclusive plan. This requires careful management by leaders who will resist the temptation to ignore criticism or sweep it under the rug. Infighting requires that movements answer key strategic questions about what the movement groups have in common and collaborate on, and what must be pursued separately because there is no common ground. These conflicts, and the solutions created to solve them, become part of the template activists use in making decisions in the next wave of organizing. In this way, internal conflict can be productive, creating new common ground to work from next time and new values that support the movement diversity that caused division before.

Second, conflict can be managed and framed to minimize the harm that activists experience because of it. What is the right way to handle conflict? Good leaders recognize that there is room for everyone. Factionalism can be a significant source of pain for activists and it
can slow down progress, but some of these negative outcomes emerge from activist anxiety about what the “right” path is. When it’s not clear what strategy will work to achieve their goals and the stakes are high, activists can fall victim to the desire to expel or minimize the those in the movement that feel the most extreme. There is significant evidence across movements that diversity – in demographics, in tactics, in goals – is a strength, rather than a hinderance. Activists within a movement, or even a single organization, do not have to agree on everything - only on some set of overarching goals. There are concrete ways to organize both within and across movement groups that make use of diversity and conflict in ways that strengthen the communities rather than diminish them.

Within organizations, some structures are better equipped to manage diversity without it devolving into catastrophic schism. Bureaucratic groups are defined by their segmented structures, arranged hierarchically, that allow local, state, and national layers of decision-making and autonomy. Even in seemingly very formal organizations, local activists can pursue the movement’s agenda in the ways that make sense for their local culture and community. Local activism looks very different across the nation, even when all are a part of the same larger national structure. As long as national leaders don’t exert too much control, local activists are free to find the form and function that keeps grassroots activists committed to the cause. At the national level of formalized groups, leaders are often able to form semi-autonomous committees that focus on particular issues that matter to them. They also frequently have the freedom to engage in the tactics that make the most sense to the particular people doing the work. This structure is common across social movements, and has proven a durable and effective vehicle of sustaining movements over time.
Formalized bureaucratic structures are not a panacea for factionalism; some organizational splits are inevitable. However, even formal schism does not necessarily lead to movement decline. It is possible to understand organizational splitting as a boon to movements. Factionalized splits are led by people passionate about the issues and committed to their vision of social change. Where these distinct visions cannot all coexist in a single structure, they strike out independently to create new places for potential activists to join. This is evident across movements and nowhere more clearly than in the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s. Many groups sprung up, motivated by a wide host of nuclear concerns - threat of war, threat to the environment, threats of military spending and the cost it incurs to civil life in America, among others. While leaders expressed their anxiety about the distracting nature of so many claims, the wide array of reasons to participate also brought many, many more people to the movement than any single issue could. Big movements need more than a few organizations; peace movement leaders and activists need not be afraid of diversity in styles and approaches to activism.

Third, coalition work is difficult and it is best to focus on what unites the groups. Diversity is valuable in a movement, but in coalitions, compromise is critical. Large coalitions cannot represent all positions of every member group. Activist infighting over how expansive or narrow to make a coalition platform is a well-worn tradition across the movement sector (For example, Ghaziani 2008; Rojas and Heaney 2008; Rucht 2004; Staggenborg 1986; Tarrow 2005). The anti-nuclear movement is no exception, and this dynamic is well exemplified by the June 12 Coalition. Patrick Lacefield, a leader active in several of the coalition’s member groups, feared that conflict had been counterproductive, leading to too many issues and too many policy preferences, and squandering the chance to accomplish concrete and widely shared goals. While focusing on only a freeze in nuclear spending might be too narrow for the whole anti-nuclear
movement, it was a better choice of this coalition event. Lacefield noted that the coalition could include groups with a wide range of positions – on nuclear arms, on Cuba, on military budget transfer to civil spending, on abortion – but there was a limit to how many of these issues could be effectively emphasized by one coalition (Harvey 2014: 102-103). Evidence from across the movement industries demonstrates that coalitions are vulnerable to failure when they are beset with ideological conflict and framing disputes that members refuse to put aside (Jones et al., 2001; Rochford, 1989; Staggenborg, 1986 cited in Rojas and Heaney 2008). Narrowing to a common denominator issue is one way to manage these disputes.

*When conflict cannot be overcome, it can still be used to pry open closed political opportunities.* Sometimes activists cannot overcome divisions within their movement. This might be because, while they are share overarching goals, they do not share enough other common ground to agree on strategies, tactics, or values. There are many cases in anti-nuclear activism across the late 20th century where differences divided the movement so deeply that it was hampered in achieving what it might have. However, the broader social movements literature also contains examples of campaigns in which activists effectively used factionalism to sway legislators to support their goals. In their study of the campaign to enshrine women’s equality in the Texas constitution, McCammon, Bergner, and Arch (2015) found that self-proclaimed moderates were able to convince lawmakers in the deeply conservative state to work with them after leveraging the threat of “radicals” in their movement. Moderate feminists consciously created a false-dichotomy between the two branches of the movement, framing them mutual enemies. Under these circumstances, conflict built support among legislators for the narrow bill the moderates’ proposed, which had faced steep opposition before. Importantly, the authors theorize that this strategy should not be the first that activists turn to. United movements with
healthy, diverse, functioning coalitions are more likely to find political success in open political contexts. In closed and hostile political contexts, movement leaders must consider whatever tools they have; leveraging internal conflict might be preferable to accepting that no progress is possible.

The big picture of peace activists is that within movement conflict is inevitable, but it does not equate to movement failure. History is replete with movements that successfully harness conflict, reaping its benefits and managing its costs. Where conflict within a community is not manageable, groups can split amicably, working together when it makes sense. Diverse communities will have conflict, and conflict can be a sign of vitality and passion.

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