

Developmental States' Social Cleavages on the Conservative Party Dominance:

Why Did Developmental States' Social and Political Cleavages Structure

One Party Dominance in the *Center-Right*, Not the Centrist Position?

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— Abstract —

This research explains why East Asian developmental states—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—formed one party dominance in the *center-right*, not the centrist position, in the industrialization period despite differences in timing of democratization and economic development. The conservative party's dominance in developmental states has been a component of conservative corporatism that makes a conservative welfare state with weak social safety nets and low social expenditures. The conservative party's dominance was maintained for about forty years not only by Japan's LDP and Taiwan's KMT but also by Korea's authoritarian, conservative party, which rebranded its party name but consisted of the same power blocs. Social cleavages in East Asia structured the right-oriented dominant party system. Meanwhile, social cleaves in Western Europe kept balance of power between left and right in general, and brought about the social democratic rule in the long term in some European corporatist states, such as Sweden, Austria, and West Germany. Not only the Cold War and the formation of developmental state, but also rapid industrialization and long-term low inequality, created social cleavages as East Asia's origins of conservative party dominance. These transformations helped East Asian dominant parties win elections ideologically in the center-right position, although dominant parties generally gain advantages as centrist parties in terms of Anthony Downs's median voter theorem. The mixed method between comparative historical case analysis and statistical analysis finds that propositions of the conservative party dominance—economic growth, export promotion, and near-full employment—are generalizable beyond East Asia. In comparison between East Asia and Western Europe, strong nationalism, land reform, rapid industrialization, and long-term low inequality have supported the conservative party's long-term rule in developmental states' conservative corporatism; whereas, moderate nationalism and institutionalized welfare regimes with high social

expenditures have promoted a broad consensus on social markets and a long-term victory of the Social Democratic party in social democratic corporatism in European corporatist states.

Key Words: Dominant Party System, the Conservative Party Dominance, Social Cleavage, Developmental State

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1. Summary

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I. The Conservative Party's Dominance Structured by East Asian Social Cleavages

This chapter explains why East Asian developmental states (henceforth, “developmental states”), such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, created the conservative party's dominance during industrialization periods until the early 1990s despite differences in timing of democratization and economic development. Japan created the dominant party system under a democratic regime, South Korea formed the dominance through—at least institutionally—democratic elections even under authoritarian regimes; whereas, Taiwan monopolized political power since its state building. Regardless of the regime type and the degree of political monopoly, all three states' commonality is the conservative party dominance. Developmental states have succeeded in socioeconomic performances on economic development and redistribution through conservative corporatism—what I define as the state's asymmetric alliance with firms. The success of conservative corporatism in economic development and redistribution brought about the conservative party dominance as an institutional outcome. Of course, regarding ideology, conservative corporatism in developmental states differs with social democratic corporatism in European corporatist states, such as Sweden, Austria, and Germany. However, until the early 1990s, developmental states organized corporatism with the partnership with the ruling party, as European corporatist states did. In particular, this research elucidates the way that developmental states maintained conservative corporatism through the conservative party dominance, as European corporatist states sustained social democratic corporatism with the help of the social democratic party's long-term rule.

Developmental states' party systems have been created under greater influences of nationalism and postwar state building than did those of European corporatist states. For this reason, conservative corporatism has been the fundamental foundation of the conservative party dominance in developmental states. Specifically, the Cold War, the formation of developmental state, rapid industrialization, and long-term low inequality created social cleavages as origins of developmental states' party systems. As the international structure, the Cold War and nationalist competitions created

competitive nation states. As political transformations, the government has built a developmental state where the professionalized bureaucracy achieved sustainable economic development. As economic transformations, sustainable economic development has been led by rapid industrialization and long-term low inequality. These political and economic transformations provide favorable conditions for the conservative party dominance, and they are contrasted with the nineteenth century's national revolution and the eighteenth century's industrial revolution in Western Europe. Lipset and Rokkan (1967; 1990) emphasize that the European party system has been structured and persisted since the 1920s; in their word, this "freezing" of the party system of the 1920s system has been originated from the two revolutions in the relatively symmetric rivalry between capital and labor, between center and periphery. For example, the social democratic party increased its voting and political power in the rivalry between capital and labor. Power-sharing political institutions, such as the federal state, have been developed under the balance between the center and peripheral regions. Meanwhile, developmental states led political and economic transformations in state-led asymmetric coordination with social actors after World War II. Under strong nationalism and postwar state building, developmental states created power-centralizing structure; in particular, the central government and the wartime social mobilization system are main components of conservative corporatism. The main institutional mechanisms of conservative corporatism are conservative welfare states and the conservative party dominance.

By using the prism of conservative corporatism, this research highlights several unexplained perspectives on developmental states' party systems: the conservative party dominance. First of all, because of the different patterns of state building and democratization between Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, comparativists have not highlighted commonalities of the conservative party dominance between the three countries. Apparently, Japan's democratic dominant party system, South Korea's authoritarian ruling parties' long-term rule, and Taiwan's virtual political monopoly differ each other. But these party systems are similar in the conservative party's long-term rule. Secondly, the conservative party dominance in developmental states' can be compared with the social democratic

party's long-term rule in European corporatist states. These two groups' long-term rule has maintained corporatism despite their different ideologies. Lastly, this research translates comparative historical analysis on developmental states into quantitative analysis to generalize the logic of the conservative party dominance. This mixed methods approach evaluates Lipset and Rokkan's (1967; 1990) social cleavage theory in the East Asian context. Eventually, this research finds how conservative corporatism through the conservative party dominance had been sustained under the developmental state model in the industrialization period until the early 1990s, and how conservative corporatism has been inefficient in the post-developmental states after the 1990s.

The next section analyzes the dominant party system from new institutionalism and social cleavage theory. Comparative historical analysis in Section III explains why the Cold War, the formation of developmental state, rapid industrialization, and long-term low inequality created similar institutional outcomes in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as the conservative party dominance despite differences in democratization and economic development. Section IV identifies East Asian social cleavages' political outcomes as the center-right dominant party system. In Section V, mean difference *t*-test finds that propositions of the conservative party dominance—high economic growth, export promotion, and near-full employment—are generalizable beyond East Asia. The Conclusion explains how the conservative party dominance maintained in the developmental state model in the long-term, and how it was dismantled in post-developmental states after the financial crisis or economic recession in the 1990s.

II. Social Cleavages in Conservative Corporatism: Theory and Research Strategies

1. An Analysis on Social Cleavage Theory from New Institutionalism

My institutionalist framework compares social cleavages between developmental states and European states—in particular European corporatist states—to explain the origins of the conservative party

dominance in developmental states. In new institutionalism, the party system as an institutional structure can be analyzed in terms of institutional duration and strength. Regarding duration, path dependence thesis explain not simply social cleavage theory and the freezing thesis but their rival hypotheses—realignment and dealignment theses—as continuity and change of institutions respectively. “Freezing” of the party system structured by social cleavages reveals path dependence, which is locked in the historical trajectory. Discourses of realignment and dealignment revise the strict assumption of the freezing thesis. Realignment inspired by post-materialism (Inglehart 1977) is labelled as positive feedback or increasing returns of a party system. Positive feedback—as a self-reinforcing process—identifies an incremental change of institutions (Pierson 2000; Thelen 1999). Dealignment is a critical juncture accompanied by critical elections with significant impacts or shocks or by structural, societal transformations that may generate new social cleavages. Critical junctures are unexpected, drastic changes that make new institutional arrangements different from previous ones (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). Social cleavage theory, which emphasizes path dependence of institutions, needs to embrace realignment as positive feedback and dealignment as a critical juncture.

This research applies two variants of new institutionalism, such as historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism, to the analysis on East Asia’s center-right dominant party system. This party system is the institutional outcome made by developmental states’ political and economic performances. From historical institutionalism, social cleavages theory emphasizes path dependence of the party system that has been created by social cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan (1967; 1990) claim that national and social revolutions caused four major cleavages: 1) state versus church, 2) center versus periphery, 3) capital versus labor, and 4) manufacturing industry versus agriculture. Their “freezing” hypothesis explains that party systems of the modern period reflect those of the 1920s which were formed based on the two revolutions. While European parties have developed throughout severe class struggles and social revolutions, many parties outside of Europe do not have such backgrounds.

Rational choice institutionalism elucidates that political actors’ coalition formation affects institutional strength of the party system. Jakub Zielinski (2002) assesses that social cleavages do not

translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course. He introduces a game-theoretic micro-mechanism of party system consolidation to explain the politicization of social cleavage, and then suggests two versions of social cleavage theory: strong versus weak. In the *strong* version, all social cleavages become translated into political oppositions. In the *weak* version, coalition formation may influence the final outcome of translation, because alliances for coalition lead to a depoliticization of some social cleavages (p. 187). His revision of the original strong version of social cleavage theory prioritizes accuracy over parsimony. Chhibber and Torcal (1997) apply social cleavage theory to new democracies. Since new democracies provide political actors with opportunities to politicize cleavages, strategic policy choices made by elites can lead to the formation of linkages between political parties and social cleavages. Drastic democratization in new democracies is understood as critical junctures, since the transition from authoritarianism to democracy results in structural change of a party system. When path dependence locks in the institutional structure, actors' choices are restricted. But political elites in new democracies have more autonomy in critical junctures than in normal politics. Therefore, party elites can exert greater flexibility to make strategic choices in societies in which there are no sophisticated secondary organizations (p. 30). Without them, party elites and voters are tied more directly to each other, and the link is unmediated by efforts of other organizations like trade unions.

From the East Asian perspective, social cleavage structures of East Asia have been created in *power asymmetry* between the state and social actors. In the time period, social cleavages of twentieth century East Asia display different historical backgrounds with social cleavages of eighteenth and nineteenth century Western Europe, from which Lipset and Rokkan (1967; 1990) developed their social cleavage theory. In this theory, the national revolution and the social revolution in Western Europe caused four major cleavages of state versus church, center versus periphery, capital versus labor, and manufacturing industry versus agriculture. In developmental states' national development process, traditional elites such as religious groups and landed elites could not resist the societal transformation, because the state successfully achieved rapid industrialization and modernization. Therefore, traditional elites did not play a major role in building political parties.

In the evolution of developmental states, the priority of social cleavages reflect Abraham Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of needs; a society needs to satisfy security—national defense and material survival—first and then seek economic prosperity, democratization, and social welfare in turn, as I interpret East Asians' desires into Ronald Inglehart's (1977) value system between materialism and post-materialism. In East Asia, the state's desire for survival in severe inter-state competitions structured the right-based issue priority. To South Koreans and Taiwanese, the most salient issue in elections was democratization not inequality or social welfare, while high economic growth consistently maintained redistribution during the authoritarian rule from the 1960s to the 1980s. When many authoritarian regimes experienced democratic transitions, conflicts between authoritarian blocs and democratization activists were a primary factor in formation of political parties. As newly democratized countries consolidated democracy more deeply through political institutionalization, democratization issues—such as human rights and freedom of speech, the press, and association—become less important. After democratization, party elites competed for new promising issues like economic democratization and social welfare. From my interpretation of developmental states' social cleavages into Inglehart's (1977) value system, nationalism and postwar state building have limited East Asians' belief systems and ideological distribution.

I conclude that in the rapid industrialization period until the early 1990s, major cleavages in developmental states have been 1) the rivalry between authoritarian ruling elites and democratization activist groups like progressive opposition parties and civil organizations, and 2) the right-biased issue priority between economic development and democratization, between growth and welfare, and between national defense and peace. Conservative parties, which were governing the government and exerted the first mover's advantage, took the lead in economic development and national defense, which were more salient issues in East Asia's domestic politics than democratization and the peace regime, which were proposed by opposition parties or progressive parties as the second mover. Eventually, the absence of previous social cleavages, as well as the ruling party's performances on

industrialization and low inequality, helped developmental states commonly form the conservative party dominance in the party system until the 1990s.

2. Application of Social Cleavage Theory to an Analysis on the Dominant Party System


The party systems of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan can be commonly defined as the conservative party dominance, which is one component of conservative corporatism. The center-right dominant party system is one type of the dominant party system. According to Giovanni Sartori ([1976] 2005: 173), the predominant-party system is in fact a more-than-one party system in which rotation does not occur. In these countries, the conservative party had gained the majority party status extremely for about forty years without concession to the opposition parties. Even though these countries experienced turnover of political power for a short time after the 1990s, the previous dominant conservative party gained the political power again and maintained political power for most periods in modern history. Of course, Sartori's strict definition of the predominant-party system needs to be relaxed, because many dominant party systems like Japanese and Swedish systems experienced power turnover in later periods.¹

Regarding validity, Sartori (1970) advises that conceptualization should precede measurement in comparative politics research. His design defines the degrees of abstraction by conceptual traveling; to explore the middle grounds between unconscious thinking and overconscious thinking, it is desirable to build a middle-ranged theory between extension (denotation) and intension (connotation). Universal conceptualizations cover a less specific meaning and more cases, while configurative conceptualizations have greater extension and less intension. Following the Sartorian framework, Collier and Mahon (1993) pay attention to the line of least resistance, "conceptual stretching," to avoid obfuscating the connotation of concepts. One party dominance extends the concept of the dominant

¹ See Sartori ([1976] 2005: 172, Table 25) to confirm dominance of a single party in these countries.

party system to flexibly apply to the Korean case, while diminishing the intension of the initial concept, as displayed in Figure 1. In South Korea, the conservative party's long-term rule can be labelled as the *quasi*-dominant party system, because this party simply changed their party name without significant changes in ideology, party structure, and party platform (or party program).

Figure 1. The Ladder of Generality: An Example of the Dominant Party System



A = Initial category
 B = Category adapted to more cases
 1 Range of cases
 2 Number of defining attributes

Note: In my example, conceptual traveling moves from A (e.g., the dominant party system) to B (one-party dominance) to include Korea's *quasi*-dominant party system.

Source: Collier and Mahon (1993: 846)

My institutional analysis of social cleavages find the common outcome of the conservative party dominance in developmental states from two kinds of conceptualization. The first conceptualization strategy is to apply the broad concept of one-party dominance rather than the dominant party system. The second is to label the ideology of conservatism. By describing conservative foundations in social cleavages in Section III, conceptualization is applied to generalization through statistical tests in Section IV.

My comparative historical analysis unpacks the origin of a conservative-party-led dominant party system by identifying social cleavages in developmental states. Three-country cases differ in the political regime, electoral competition, and economic development; despite this heterogeneity, the Cold War, the formation of developmental state, and rapid industrialization as common causal factors led to a common outcome as the conservative party dominance. This proposition can be applied to John Stuart Mill's ([1888] 1970) method of agreement displayed in Table 1. Although Japan was a democracy, the ruling party easily won elections for about forty years. Before the 1990s, Korea was a dictatorship, but ruling parties faced consistent challenges from opposition parties in many elections

as well as strong protests from civil society. In many periods ruling parties permitted elections, although they did not allow power turnover. Taiwan's ruling party did not allow participation of opposition parties in elections until the late 1980s.

Interestingly, the dominant party in developmental states maintained the agenda of conservatism of economic development and national defense in the *center-right*, not the centrist position, although the dominant party can maximize its vote share and seat share in the centrist position according to Anthony Downs's (1957) median voter theorem. Strong nationalism, land reform, rapid industrialization, and long-term low inequality have been assets for the conservative party to gain its popularity. Eventually, propositions from qualitative research will be tested through *t*-test, for their applicability to world country cases. This statistical test aims to differentiate the conservative party dominance with the social democratic party dominance in its political and economic variables.

Table 1. The Method of Agreement: The Comparison of Developmental States

	Property	Japan	South Korea	Taiwan
<i>Different factors</i>				
Political regime		Democracy	Electoral authoritarianism (in many periods)	Non-electoral Authoritarianism
Political competition		Weak	Strong (only under electoral authoritarianism)	Absent
Economic development		Developed	Developing	Developing
<i>Common factors</i>				
War and nationalism	IV	Intense	Very intense	Very intense
Developmental state		Strong	Strong	Strong
Rapid industrialization		High	Very high	Very high
Redistribution		Low inequality	Low inequality	Low inequality
<i>Common outcome</i>				
The conservative party dominance	DV	Dominant party system	<i>Quasi</i> -dominant party system	Dominant party system (political monopoly)

III. Origins of the Conservative Party Dominance: National and Industrial Revolutions

1. The International Structure: The Cold War and Nationalist Competitions

The Cold War and nationalist competitions have East Asia's domestic politics skewed to the right. Conservative parties in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have the same goals for national development like export-oriented industrialization. The right-biased issue dominance of security and national defense helped the conservative party—especially in the authoritarian regime—dominant in East Asia's party system. By comparison, nationalist competitions have helped developmental states maintain the center-right bias in their party system, while moderate nationalism has contributed to European corporatist states' social democratic rule.

In East Asia's state building, war significantly influenced party system formation, because war created *social cleavages* and political parties. Parties and elections played a limited role in the creation and development of nation states, whereas war and commerce as supranational forces contributed to building them (Pempel 1990: 11). War made security issues dominant in domestic politics and let nation states prioritize economic development and security under the severe interstate competition to win their rival states. East Asia's Cold War was triggered by the Korean War between two Koreas and the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP: 中国共产党) and the *Kuomintang* (KMT; 國民黨: the Nationalist Party). The Cold War also precipitated nationalist competitions for regional hegemony between China and Japan. Communist regimes in North Korea and China were direct threats to authoritarian regimes in South Korea and Taiwan. The threat of communism has been also found in Japan as the dominance by the right (Pempel ed. 1990).

Because postwar state building eliminated previous ruling elites, developmental states had weak social cleavages, and winning groups of war created *political cleavages* through wartime mobilization systems. Social cleavages have been created in political games between political elites, and thus those cleavages can be also considered political cleavages. In particular, South Korea purged landed elites most effectively among developmental states not only because of land reform—as a common origin of the developmental states but also because of the Korean War. Political elites have intentionally created political cleavages like regional sentiments (or regionalism) and manipulated new classes like chaebols favorable to them in the political vacuum. The South Korean state's alliance with

chaebols became a potential social cleavage, as chaebols gained enormous economic power and strong influences in domestic politics.

By comparison, Japan's wartime experiences and economic nationalism became the foundation of right-skewed dominant party system by Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), while West Germany established a social state with social markets and a cooperation regime with East Germany. Although both of them were commonly defeated in World War II, only Japan established the dominant party system. German society after the war felt guilt toward European countries, and the Nazi Party as a far-right party was disbanded. Thus, the multiparty system emerged with the relative dominance of both the center-left (the Social Democratic Party) and the center-right (the Christian Democratic Party). Meanwhile, Japanese society was seriously damaged by nuclear bombs at the end of World War II, and hence conservative elites in Japan maintained political power. Japanese people felt a victim mentality rather than a sense of guilt as the outcome of the war. Eventually, the conservative party, power elites, and the emperor of Japan were relatively insulated by the criticism about World War II and its colonial rule in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Japan has established a mobilization system during its imperialist colonialism and World War II, but the mobilization was not demobilized in the postwar process (Woo-Cumings 1999). Ironically, pre-modern Korea (before the division between South and North Korea) imitated the Japanese mobilization system during their protest against Japan's colonial rule. The KMT's party structure has been consolidated since international wars between the Japanese colonial-imperialist power and the Chinese Nationalist-Communist Cooperation (Guo-Gong hezu; 國共合作).

The Korean War—as a total war from Koreans' perspective---induced the severe competition between two Koreas and, by extension, South Korea's conservative party took advantages in long-lasting ideological wars. South and North Korea established the exactly opposite political and economic regimes, although both share same deep-rooted culture, history, and identity, and even though they had been a unified country for a long time before the mid-twentieth century. Political elites of the two Koreas adopted competitively contrasting strategies to achieve political development and

economic development as modernization in their country: South Korea's capitalist democracy and North Korea's socialist totalitarianism.

Political elites in two Koreas competed for their own regime's *legitimacy* in the Korean peninsula. South and North Korea, as alternative states, provoked *recognition struggles* against each other to gain support and loyalty from their citizens. Each Korea advocated its own regime's supremacy to the other Korea, competing with each other in the Korean peninsula. In the severe competition, these states established commonly a mobilization system: the conservative party dominance in South Korea, the totalitarian party system in North Korea. In South Korea, the authoritarian, conservative party has preoccupied agendas like self-reliant national defense capability in order to resolve long-lasting conflicts and tensions between two Koreas and to prepare for unifying two Koreas. Therefore, the Korean War and subsequent political outcome—as a balance of power between the liberalist bloc and the communist bloc—have greatly affected state building and political party formation in South Korea.

In state building in Taiwan, the KMT government under Chiang Kai-shek was not a return of a refugee government, but rather relocation of the whole Chinese government. Mainland Chinese who were key elites or support groups of the KMT immigrated to the island of Taiwan after the defeat from the civil war against the CCP in mainland China. The KMT had its winning coalition consisting of armies, bureaucrats, and congressional representatives, and built a new nation state by this coalition. The Taiwanese state consisted of not simply six millions of native Taiwanese but two millions of mainland Chinese, which include 800 thousands of military personnel (Clough 1991: 829; cited in Kim and Im 2000: 19). The size of mainland Chinese was enough large and powerful to govern a new state with oppressive powers. They had monopolized domestic political hegemony and economic power through the dominant party. The centralized government and the ruling party need to maximize state capacities for national defense and independence from China.

Eventually, all ruling conservative parties in three developmental states held the robust alliance with the United States as a key platform policy in the Cold War era until the early 1990s. Major opposition parties in all three countries have supported the peace regime. In Japan, the LDP has

advocated the strong alliance with the U.S. while progressive parties have been deeply interested in close conversations and cooperation with neighboring countries, such as two Koreas and mainland China. In South Korea, the conservative party has utilized anti-communism or anti-North Korea sentiments in both election campaigns and usual domestic politics, while progressive parties have advocated continuous cooperation with North Korea. Regarding the Cross-Strait relations (Mainland-Taiwan relations [兩岸關係]) in Taiwan, the KMT has supported political cooperation, which is originated from the Chinese Nationalist-Communist Cooperation; whereas, progressive parties prioritized political independence from the mainland China over political cooperation.

2. The Political Transformation: The Formation of Developmental State

Developmental states established the centralized government and the professional bureaucracy with a long-term blueprint, and then promoted rapid industrialization (Johnson 1982; 1999). The intensity of strong nationalism and postwar state building has been stronger in developmental states than in European corporatist states. Under strong nationalism and postwar state building, the conservative party in developmental states established strong mobilization systems, such as the unitary state and the central government. Meanwhile, under open nationalism, European states sought for power-sharing institutions or power decentralization, such as federalism and grand coalitions between left and right parties. In particular, European corporatist states had the social democratic party's rule and social markets in the long term.

Developmental states pushed forward with rational plans on industrial innovation and investment in infrastructures despite opposition and protests from opposition parties and civil society. These states have revealed a strong desire to maximize its national wealth in historically long-lasting hegemonic competitions, particularly between the two Koreas and between China and Japan. In East Asia, the state-society relation was conservative, compared with liberal America and social democratic Western Europe, both of which industrialized early; the developmental process made favorable conditions for

the conservative ruling party to gain electoral power for a long time. In democratic regimes, *political business cycle* as fluctuation of government expenditure in the electoral cycle reveals the behavior of vote buying. But in developmental states, performances on developmentalism and egalitarianism made the ruling conservative party insulated from electoral cycles and turnover between governments.

Chalmers Johnson (1982) analyzes Japan as a prototype of developmental states. Japan established an advanced mobilization system spurred by economic nationalism and the conglomerates' growth. Japan's economy has been mobilized for war with the goal-oriented culture in a communitarian society in the early twentieth century, but never demobilized during peace-time after World War II (Johnson 1999). When Korea and Taiwan were colonies of Japan in the early twentieth century, their protests against Japanese imperialism for independence and state building ironically imitated Japan's statecrafts and mobilization system for national development and economic development (Woo-Cumings 1999).

Despite differences in political regimes, developmental states' political transformations commonly brought about the conservative party dominance: Taiwan's political monopoly, Japan's typical dominant party system, and Korea's *quasi*-dominant party system. Japan's dominant party—LDP—has been under a democratic regime. Meanwhile, in South Korea and Taiwan, the ruling parties are not only the conservative parties but also supporters of authoritarianism under authoritarian regimes until democratization after the late 1980s. In South Korea and Taiwan, major opposition parties were parties that supported democratization. In these countries, one of the major social cleavages had been the division between authoritarianism supporters and democratization supporters. Interestingly, democratic Japan's elections were not competitive, whereas authoritarian Korea's elections were challenged by opposition parties and civil organizations. Authoritarian Taiwan did not allow opposition parties' electoral participation. Japan has already attained advanced capitalism as an East Asian imperial great power before World War II. South Korea and Taiwan imitated Japan's statecrafts and achieved rapid economic growth from the 1960s. These states' national development and economic

performances as well as the pervasiveness of national security and nationalism by war contributed to the conservative party dominance.

If I apply Inglehart's (1977) value system to East Asians' belief systems, East Asians—such as Koreans and Taiwanese—surrounded by great powers still retain survival values, because they are under severe international economic pressures by great powers or security threats such as military conflicts. Even in the post-Cold War era, anticommunist sentiments still prevail in South Korea and Taiwan, which have been still in conflict with their rival country, North Korea and China respectively. Anticommunism and antipathy to pro-North Korea activities have been prevailed in South Korea, under endless nationalist conflicts with North Korea. Progressive parties in South Korea could not gain a significant number of seats in the National Assembly. In Taiwan, threats and independence from China or keeping the same national identity with China has become consistently important agendas in partisan politics and elections. Because of a relative importance of nationalist and security issues, conservative parties in developmental states easily won elections in the rapid industrialization period until the early 1990s.

3. The Economic Transformation: Rapid Industrialization and Long-term Low Inequality

In developmental states, the conservative party succeeded in egalitarian land reform in state building and, by extension, achieved both high economic growth and long-term low inequality in the rapid industrialization period until the early 1990s. Meanwhile, in European corporatist states, long-term low inequality has been promoted by progressive parties. Thus, in developmental states, the conservative party gained electoral victory in the long term. Under nationalist competitions with East Asian socialist states, developmental states promoted egalitarian redistribution of assets through land reform in state building, and then long-term low inequality through near-full employment, public education, and progressive health insurance in the industrialization stage. Because of long-term low inequality, developmental states did not experience significant protests from landowners, peasants, and religious

groups which were major rivals against the state in Europe's national and industrial revolutions, because these states achieved their political and economic transformations by the state's centralization governance and successful economic performances.

With the help of the virtuous cycle between growth and redistribution, developmental states could maintain the conservative party dominance until the early 1990s. Strong nationalism, land reform, rapid industrialization, and long-term low inequality reinforced the ruling conservative party's political authority. State-led coordination with firms, although it excluded the labor class, created a synergy between economic growth and redistribution during the rapid industrialization period (World Bank 1993: 31). This synergy was broken after the 1990s' economic recession, and the conservative party's long-term rule also ended. Nonetheless, authoritarian regimes in South Korea introduced progressive health insurance programs despite their priority of economic development over welfare and also despite the constraint of national expenditure because of excessive security concerns.

In particular, authoritarian regimes in South Korea and Taiwan could consolidate their dominant party systems by gaining their legitimacy through consistent rapid economic development and long-term redistribution mechanisms. Although the oppressive authoritarian regimes faced democratization protests from citizens, labor, and students, the regimes were able to exert high state autonomy in economic and social policies. The reason is that these regimes could execute the state's aims without the citizens' wide consent, and they did not experience significant protests regarding these policies because of outstanding performances on these policies. In Korea, President Park Chung-hee (박정희 in office: 1963-79) permitted elections—under a democratic regime *only in style* but not in substance—in the 1960s, because he was sure to win because of excellent economic performances and hence high rates of popularity. Later, he felt that he would not be safely elected in the presidential election due to the rise of the most influential opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung (김대중), who gained popular support very close to his. He replaced the democratic Constitution with the *Yushin* (維新) Constitution

that abolished the fair, competitive elections and excluded participation of opposition parties (Przeworski et al. 2000: 24-25).

IV. The Conservative Party Dominance Structured by East Asian Social Cleavages

1. Single Country Analysis: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan

1) Japan: Dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (1955-1993)

Turnover of political power occurs by legislative elections (general elections) in the parliamentary system like Japan, whereas power turnover occurs by presidential elections in the presidential system such as South Korea and Taiwan. Japan maintained the dominant party system led by the LDP from 1955 to 1993. Its dominant party system is labelled as the 1955 System (55年体制) and also as *one-and-a-half* party system. While most of the conservative groups were united by the LDP, the left has been divided between the communists and socialists since the first election in the postwar era. However, the two leftist parties gained only 20 percent of the parliamentary seats, while the two major conservative parties won a bare majority of seats (Pempel 1990: 26). In February 1955, two major parties—the Japan Democratic Party and the Liberal Party—were united as the LDP in the same year, which gained the dominant party status about for forty years. In opposition to the LDP, the Rightist Socialist Party of Japan and Leftist Socialist Party of Japan were united as the Socialist Party, which was Japan's largest opposition party in the 1955 system. There were two turnovers by the coalition of progressive parties in 1993 and 2009 in Japan (see Table 2).

Democratic regimes under the dominant party system as seen in Japan and Sweden are called *uncommon democracies*; it is paradoxical that the ruling party had dominated for extremely long periods, although this party allowed the possibility of power turnover by fair, competitive election (Pempel ed. 1990). In Japan, there was a power turnover in 1996 after the long-term seizure of political power by the Liberal Democratic Party (自由民主党; henceforth, LDP) for almost forty years. Although

Japan has been one of developed economies, it had maintained higher economic growth than their comparable developed countries, such as European corporatist states like (West) Germany, until the early 1990s. Eventually, Japan had evolved into the World's second largest economy next to the United States. But from the early 1990s, the economic recession brought about the long-term stagnation, called as "Japan's Lost Decade (失われた10年)." The demise of the 1955 System was accompanied by this long-term stagnation.

Table 2. Elections before and after the Dominant Party System in Japan

Turnover	The Legislative Election			
The Conservative Party Dominance		Majority or Winning Coalition	Minority	Ideology of the Majority
The Rise of the Dominant Party System as the 1955 System				
	1955	LDP (Japan Democratic Party: 185/467 + Liberal Party: 114/467)	JSP (LSP: 89/467 + RSP: 67/467)	Conservative
intermediate omission				
	1990	LDP (Prime Minister: Toshiki Kaifu): 275/512	JSP: 136/512	Conservative
The Demise of the Dominant Party System				
1 st Turnover by the Progressive	1993	Non-Communist Opposition (JSP, center-left opposition & LDP defectors, mainly JNP): 243/511; JSP: 70/511; JNP ² (PM: Morihiro Hosokawa): 35/511	LDP: 223/511	Progressive
The Conservative Party Rule	1996	Ruling coalition: 256/500 LDP (PM: Ryutaro Hashimoto): 239/500	NFP: 156/500	Conservative

Abbreviations: LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; JSP = (Japanese) Socialist Party; LSP = Leftist Socialist Party of Japan; RSP = Rightist Socialist Party of Japan; JNP = Japan New Party; NFP = New Frontier Party; DPJ = Democratic Party; NKP = New Komeito Party (公明党).

Sources: Nohlen et al. (2001: 381); Statistics Bureau of Japan.

2) South Korea: Dominance of the Republican Party and its Successors (1963-1988/2004)

South Korea maintained the *quasi*-dominant party system led by the conservative party which rebranded its party name but consisted of the same power blocs from 1963 to 1988. Except for a short interruption between 1988 and 1990, the conservative party gained the majority status until 2004. The

² Japan New Party(日本新党) is a factional party separated from the LDP. The coalition includes not only a major faction of the LDP, which is conservative, but JSP, which is a left party. Ideologically, the coalition is considered as progressive, non-communist, center-left.

system started when the first military coup leader Park Chung-hee ran the presidential and legislative elections by creating the Democratic Republican Party (commonly “Republican Party”: RP). Since the next ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), was the successor party of the previous ruling elites, the *quasi*-dominant party system was substantially extended just before the 1988 election, where the DJP lost the majority but created the DJP-led new coalition to gain the majority again. In a *narrow* sense, the dominant party system should be the period from 1963 to 1979, when President Park Chung-hee was assassinated and his follower, Chun Doo-hwan, succeeded in another coup. If I define the *quasi*-dominant party system that the substantially same power bloc—for instance, the RP and the DJP—continued to gain the majority for a long time without interruption, the duration of the system should be from 1963 to 1988.

In the presidential system, such as South Korea and Taiwan, the party system should be counted by the legislative election not by the presidential election, although power turnover is proceeded by the presidential power not by legislative power. The conservative parties which had the lineage of the RP as the original hegemonic party maintained the majority in most periods despite the first turnover from the party itself to the progressive party in the 1997 presidential election. Although the progressive party won the legislative election in 2004, the conservative party gained the majority in the next general election in 2008 and continued the majority position in the congress. South Korea experienced the first turnover when the progressive party won the presidential election in 1997. Meanwhile, its democratization started in 1987, when ruling elites and opposition parties agreed to democratization measures including competitive elections under the new constitution. Even though the progressive party in South Korea gained the presidential power for ten years (1997-2007), the conservative party has continuously maintained the majority party status only except for a few years (2004-2007 and after 2016) (see Table 3).

Comparativists have not categorized the Korean party system into the dominant party system, because short ages of Korean parties prevent them from recognizing that the system would have been dominated by a single party which often rebranded its name. The RP started its dominance in the party

system from the 1963 legislative election, and then the DJP continued to dominate by the 1988 legislative election. The two parties, the RP and DJP, were originally the same inner circle which was called *Hanahoe* (한하회), led by the military coup leaders and military elites, and shared the same supporters, ideology, and policies. The leader of the DJP, President Chun was the previous intimate subordinate of the leader of the RP, President Park. The successor of the DJP was the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) which the DJP enlarged its size by absorbing the Unification Democratic Party (UDP) and the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) in 1990. In this unification, the DJP and the NDRP were indeed identical power blocs since the rule of President Park. Leaders of the DJP rebranded its party name as the New Korea Party (NKP), the Grand National Party (GNP), and the Saenuri Party in turn. Since South Korea was ruled for a long time by the same power blocs who changed its party name several times, its party system can be considered the *quasi*-dominant party system. Moreover, for most periods, the majoritarian electoral rule of South Korea created two major parties such as the center-left (progressive) and the center right (conservative), but regardless of party names the center-right maintained the majority in the rivalry between the two large parties.

Importantly, South Korea's electoral authoritarianism experienced more intense political challenges than Taiwan's non-electoral authoritarianism and even Japan's democracy; the electoral competition has been one of motives that ambitious party leaders initiate *creative destruction* of their parties. In Korea, electoral competitions between the authoritarian elites and democratization leaders brought about electoral volatility. Both authoritarian and democratization leaders intended to have more chances to increase their power and influences in elections. After the democratic transition, new strategic coordination between candidates and voters increased electoral volatility. Moreover, in the era of consolidated democracy, critical junctures like the financial crisis in 1996 and impeachment toward President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004 increased volatility.

Electoral competitions after democratization have made Korean political elites intentionally create and destruct their parties, and hence party leaders have had strong motivations to rebrand their party name. Party leaders sometimes made alliances with their partners and merged their parties together.

Although they frequently repeated these patterns in critical political periods and before major elections, many parties did not significantly change their members, organizations, ideologies, and policies. In many cases, their rebranding does not show substantial change of parties, but maintain the substance of their previous parties. Only a few cases display substantial change of the party and by extension change of the party system. As for this type of creative destruction, party leaders' strategic *destruction* has been designed intentionally without substantial change of the party system as well as the party *per se*. But their *creation* of party intends to reinforce the previous support or to regain their previous support, and by extension to extend their support up to neutral voters. Eventually, party leaders have hoped to exert *advertisement* effects or campaign effects simply by rebranding their party names—overthrowing old party brands and endowing new brands in political marketing strategies. Thus, I conclude that substantially the conservative party dominance had been maintained since the 1963 election before the 1988 election, and that the majority of the conservative party have continued except for a short period that the progressive party won the legislative election in 2004.

Table 3. Elections before and after the *Quasi-Dominant Party System* in South Korea

Turnover	The Presidential Election				The Legislative Election			
		Ruling Party	Opposition Party	Ideology of the Ruling Party		Majority	Minority	Ideology of the Major Party
The Rise of the Quasi-Dominant Party System								
<u>Authoritarian</u>	1963	RP (Park Chung-hee)(46.6%)	DJP (Yun Bo-seon)(45.1%)	Conservative	1963	RP: 110/175	DJP: 41/175	Conservative
intermediate omission								
Authoritarian	1971	RP (Park Chung-hee)(53.2%)	NDP (Kim Dae-jung)(45.3%)	Conservative	1971	RP: 113/204	NDP: 89/204	Conservative
intermediate omission								
Authoritarian					1985	DJP: 148/276	NDP: 67/276	Conservative
The Demise of the Quasi-Dominant Party System								
<u>Democratic</u>	1987	DJP (Roh Tae-woo)(36.6%)	UDP (Kim Young-sam)(28.0%); PDP (Kim Dae-jung)(27.0%)	Conservative	1988	DJP: 125/299	PDP: 70/299	Conservative
	1992	DLP (Kim Young-sam)(42.0%)	PDP (Kim Dae-jung)(33.8%)	Conservative	1992	DLP: 149/299	PDP: 97/299	Conservative
					1996	NKP: 139/299	NCNP: 79/299	Conservative

1 st Turnover by the Progressive	1997	NCNP (Kim Dae-jung) (40.3%)	GNP (Lee Hoi-chang) (38.7%)	Progressive	2000	GNP: 133/273	MDP: 115/273	Conservative
	2002	MDP (Roh Moo-hyun) (48.91%)	GNP (Lee Hoi-chang) (46.59%)	Progressive	2004	YUP: 152/299	GNP: 121/299	Progressive
Conservative Party Rule	2007	GNP (Lee Myung-bak) (48.7%)	NDP(Chung Dong-young) (26.1%)	Conservative	2008	GNP: 153/299	UDP: 81/299	Conservative

Abbreviations: 1. The conservative parties/ RP = Democratic Republican Party; DJP = Democratic Justice Party; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; NKP = New Korea Party; GNP = Grand National Party. 2. The progressive parties/ DJP = Democratic Justice Party; NDP = New Democratic Party; NDP = New-Korea Democratic Party; UDP = Unification Democratic Party; PDP = Peaceful Democratic Party; UDP = United Democratic Party; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; YUP = Yeollin Uri Party; NDP = New Democratic Party; UDP = United Democratic Party.

Sources: Nohlen et al. (2001: 381); The National Election Commission (NEC) of the Republic of Korea.

3) Taiwan: Dominance of the *Kuomintang* (1950-2001)

Taiwan maintained the dominant party system by the KMT from its state building in 1950 before the DPP's victory in the 2001 legislative election. After the defeat in the civil war between the KMT and the CCP, the KMT delegates elected in 1947 and 1948 in mainland China exclusively constituted the legislative bodies—the Legislative Yuan (立法院; parliament) and the National Assembly (國民大會)—between 1949 and 1969.

The KMT justified its one party rule, not permitting the presence of opposition parties (Tat Yan Kong 2005: 182), because it claimed the necessity to monopolize political power in Taiwan before it recovers mainland China. After migration to Taiwan, the previously elected representatives retained their position under the assumption that representatives of the KMT needed to represent the Mainland until the KMT may restore China.³ This assumption caused the outcome that the ruling KMT representatives from mainland districts had held their seats for life. When the previous representatives

³ This consensus was legitimized by a series of constitutional amendments to the Constitution effective during 1948–91, called as “The Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion (動員戡亂時期臨時條款).” The official rationale for the Provisions was that Taiwan was still in the ongoing Chinese Civil War. But the Provisions were discarded with the demise of the KMT dominant party system.

died or retired, supplementary elections recruited their positions. The first supplementary elections took place for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan in the Republic of China in 1969 (Nohlen et al. 2001). The constitution interpreted that representatives of the Legislative Yuan can continuously hold office until new elections could be held on the Mainland.⁴ Moreover, as Taiwan withdrew from the United Nations (UN) and cut off diplomatic relations with the United States, international isolation intensified the KMT's control over domestic politics and economy. The KMT lifted martial law in July 1987, and permitted the creation of opposition parties in January 1989. There were no presidential elections between 1948 and 1996.

Table 4. Elections after the End of the Dominant Party System in Taiwan

Turnover	The Presidential Election				The Legislative Election (Legislative Yuan)			
	Ruling Party	Opposition Party	Ideology of the Ruling Party		Majority	Minority	Ideology of the Majority	
The Rise of the Dominant Party System; Substantial Monopoly of the KMT since its State Building in 1950								
<u>Authoritarian</u>					1969	KMT: 8/11 (National Assembly: 15/15)	Independents 3/11	Conservative
intermediate omission								
					1989	KMT: 94/130	DPP: 21/130	Conservative
<u>Democratic</u>					1992	KMT: 95/161	DPP: 51/161	Conservative
	1996	KMT (Lee Teng-hui)	DPP (Peng Ming-min)	Conservative	1995	KMT: 85/164	DPP: 54/164	Conservative
					1998	KMT: 123/225	DPP: 70/225	Conservative
The Demise of the Dominant Party System								
<u>1st Turnover by the Progressive</u>	2000	DPP (Chen Shui-bian)	KMT (Lien Chan)	Progressive	2001	DPP: 87/225	KMT: 68/225	Progressive
	2004	DPP (Chen)	KMT (Lien Chan)	Progressive	2004	DPP: 89/225	KMT: 29/225	Progressive
Conservative Party Rule	2008	KMT (Ma Ying-jeou)	DPP(Frank Hsieh Chang-ting)		2008	KMT: 81/113	DPP: 27/113	Conservative

Abbreviations: KMT = The *Kuomintang* (Nationalist Party); DPP = Democratic Progressive Party.

Sources: Nohlen et al. (2001: 381); Central Election Commission of the Republic of China.

⁴ The Legislative Yuan gradually transferred its parliamentary power during the 1980s and 1990s. The amended constitution made it a dormant body in 2000 and completely defunct in 2005.

Eventually, the KMT substantially monopolized the legislative power before it permitted competitive elections and participations of opponent parties in 1989. The KMT won landslide victories in supplementary elections between 1969 and 1989. Basically, the KMT as revolutionary vanguard party monopolized domestic politics. Even after permitting elections, it could maintain the one-and-a-half party system like Japan's dominant party system (Halbeisen 1993: 82-85; cited in Kim and Im 2000: 59). Meanwhile, in 1985, candidates began to run under the banner of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Taiwan had the first turnover in the 2000 presidential election, and its dominant party system was disintegrated when the DPP won the legislative election in 2001. But after the electoral victory by the DPP for two presidential terms (2000-08) and two legislative elections (2001-08), the KMT regained both the presidential power and the majority party status (see Table 4).

2. Comparison between Conservative Corporatism and Social Democratic Corporatism

All three developmental states have a commonality of the conservative party dominance for several decades. Additionally, critical junctures, such as economic recession or financial crisis in the 1990s, commonly dismantled the conservative party dominance in all developmental states. In particular after the 2000s, progressive parties had more chances to win elections and to form the government.

Meanwhile, in cross-national and large-*N* statistical analysis, one dilemma is that the conservative party dominance in electorally-contested regimes has a small number of cases in the world. The second issue is that certain variables existed in specific periods in each country. For example, the situation variable of anti-communism existed only until the early 1990s in developmental states. Economic growth and social expenditures vary from year to year. Therefore, my mixed method between qualitative and quantitative research integrate both country-by-country comparison and quantitative analysis of year-by-year dataset, because the dependent variable (the conservative party's dominance) and independent variables (economic growth, export promotion, social expenditures, etc.) are measured in year-by-year basis.

Table 5. The Dominant Party System in Electorally-Contested Regimes, 1950-2006

Country	Party	Start Month/Year		End Month/Year		Tenure (Months)	Tenure (Years)	Ideology
Japan	LP/LDP	Dec.	1954	Aug.	1993	464	38	Center-right
Antigua and Barbuda	LP	Nov.	1981	Mar.	2004	268	22	Unidentified
Austria	SPO	Apr.	1970	Feb.	2000	358	29	Center-left
Australia	LP+CP	Dec.	1949	Dec.	1972	276	23	Center-right
Belgium	CVP	Apr.	1974	July	1999	303	25	Center-right
Botswana	BDP	Sep.	1966		-	483*	40	Center-left
Canada	LP	Oct.	1935	June	1957	260	21	Center-left
Gambia	PPP	Feb.	1965	July	1994	353	29	Center-left
Germany, West ¹	CDU+CSU	Sep.	1949	Oct.	1969	241	20	Center-right
India	INC	Aug.	1947	Mar.	1977	355	29	Center-left
Israel	Mapai/Labor	May	1948	June	1977	349	29	Center-left
Italy ¹	DC	Apr.	1948	June	1981	426	35	Center
Liechtenstein (I)	FBP	July	1928	Mar.	1970	500	41	Right-wing
Liechtenstein (II)	VU	Apr.	1978	Apr.	2001	276	23	Center-right
Luxembourg (I) ¹	CSV	Oct.	1945	June	1974	344	28	Center-right
Luxembourg (II)	CSV	July	1979		-	329*	27	Center-right
Malaysia	UMNO/BN	Aug.	1965		-	496*	41	Right-wing
Mexico	PRI	July	1946	Dec.	2000	653	54	Center
Senegal	PS	Feb.	1978	Apr.	2000	266	22	Center-left
Singapore	PAP	Aug.	1965		-	496*	41	Center-right
South Africa	NP	June	1948	May	1994	551	45	Right-wing
Sweden	SAP	Sep.	1936	Oct.	1976	481	40	Center-left
Trinidad and Tobago	PNM	Aug.	1962	Dec.	1986	292	24	Center-left
Zimbabwe ²	ZANU-PF	Apr.	1980		-	320*	26	Left-wing

Table 6. Comparable Party Systems in Conservative Corporatism and Social Democratic Corporatism

Country	Party	Start Year		End Year		Tenure	Ideology
South Korea	RP and its successors		1963		1988	27	Center-right
			1963		2004	43	
Taiwan	KMT		1950		2001	51	Center-right
Germany, West	SPD		1965		1983	18	Center-left

Notes: Except for ideology, this classification is from Templeman (2012: Table 2.2). * Incumbent still in power; tenure calculated through December 2006. 1. Count begins with first election after World War II. 2. Personalist incumbent: Robert Mugabe the sole leader of ZANU-PF since independence.

Table 5 displays the duration and ideology of the dominant party system (Lasting > 20 years) in 1950-2006. Kharis Templeman (2012) investigates the origins of the dominant party system in the world. Borrowing his investigation, my research additionally displays ideology of this party system. Regarding developmental states, Japan has had an electorally contested regimes since its state building, while the history of electoral contestation is short in South Korea and Taiwan. In South Korea, the electoral competition for the presidential election was limited between 1972 and 1987. In Taiwan, the participation of opposition parties was restricted until the late 1980s. Table 6 exhibits the conservative party dominance in South Korea and Taiwan and the social democratic party's long-term rule in West Germany. In South Korea, the ruling conservative parties—the Republican Party and its successors—continuously had the dominance in the congress, but they had the dominance until 2004 except for a short interruption between 1988 and 1990. Tables 5 and 6 compare the conservative party dominance with the progressive party dominance in the world.

The conservative party dominance in developmental states is compared with the social democratic party dominance in European corporatist states. There are several characteristics in this comparison. The first exceptional component is the *longevity* of the dominance. Developmental states experienced the conservative party's long-term rule of around forty years. This conservative long-term rule is not found in other areas. By comparison, the social democratic long-term rule is found in Western Europe. Sweden had the Social Democratic Party's long-term electoral victory for 40 years. Austria had the social democratic long-term rule for 29 years. West Germany had the social democratic long-term rule for around 18 years including coalitions, while it also had the long-term rule by the center-right for 20 years. Developmental states' long-term rule for more than forty years is more outstanding than that of European corporatist states. In Germany, the coalition between two center-right parties had advantages in state building after World War II as the starting point of the Cold War. This coalition,

CDU/CSU, is the Christian democratic political alliance of two political parties in Germany, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU). Meanwhile, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (German: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) gained the long-term rule not only because of the expansion of social democratic welfare regime but also because of détente between the Liberal Bloc and the Communist Bloc.

The second characteristics is the intra-regional commonality of the conservative party dominance under conservative corporatism. The long-term rule by a same conservative power bloc occurred commonly in all three developmental states, and political and economic coordination patterns—labelled as conservative corporatism—is also shared by these states. Common origins of the conservative party dominance in developmental states are not found in other areas beyond East Asia. Other areas do not have the commonality in both the party system and corporatist patterns in the intra-regional dimension. Regarding the other regions, in Mexico, the long-term rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) is a representative case of the dominant party system, but this long-term rule is not found in neighboring countries in Latin America. Because developmental states shared the common origins and outcomes of the conservative party dominance, this dominance is an East Asia's exceptional phenomenon. Although developmental states' logic of the conservative party dominance is unique, it is important to test whether or not this logic is generalizable beyond East Asia.

Comparing developmental states with European corporatist states, intensity of nationalism, such as anti-communism and external threats in the Cold War, is stronger in developmental states than in European corporatist states. Of course, both East Asia and Europe faced the neighboring Communist power, anticommunism was prevalent in East Asia and Western Europe. But all East Asian states experienced war between liberalist states and communist states, such as the Korean War between two Koreas, the China's civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT, and international wars between Japan and China. Moreover, the conservative party in developmental states maintained its rule in longer periods than that in European corporatist states.

By comparison, social cleavages of European democracies have been historically structured by social divisions mainly between capital and labor, while the historical conflicts between capital and labor are weaker in developmental states than European states, in particular European corporatist states. In particular, South Korea's political cleavages have been formed by political games between political elites rather than by fundamental social conflicts. In Japan, competitions between factions within the LDP were more salient than those between the LDP and opposition parties.

V. Statistical Tests of the Conservative Party Dominance

1. Operational Definitions and Variables

In order to translate qualitative findings of developmental states' conservative party dominance into quantitative measurement, the dependent variable of the conservative party dominance is measured as the conservative party's long-term electoral victory; whereas, simply the dominant party system is the long-term electoral victory of the ruling party regardless of its ideology. Quantitative research design for the dominant party system can be delivered through survival analysis (e.g. Templeman 2012) or logit analysis. As for the conservative party's dominance, this research finds how the conservative party dominance is different with normal electoral politics and also with the social democratic party's dominance. As for origins of the conservative party dominance, the Cold War, the developmental state, and rapid industrialization in three country cases comparative historical research can be measured as anti-communism, economic growth, unemployment rates (as the opposite of near-full employment), and social expenditures (e.g. education) in the quantitative research. The conservative party's dominance include the long-term rule of either the right-wing or the center-right party, while the progressive party's (or the social democratic party's) dominance embraces that of either the left-wing or the center-left party. Social democracy is one type of progressivism in political

ideology, while progressivism is a degree in ideology. Social democracy is not identical with progressivism. But in substance, the social democratic party is regarded as major progressive parties.

To measure the dependent variable, the operational definition of the dominant party system is that the ruling party wins elections consecutively more than 20 years in the electorally-contested regimes, where parties may compete with one another in open elections regardless of the regime type. As a dichotomous variable, the successful duration of the dominant party system is coded as 1, while absence is 0. In test of the conservative party dominance, the successful duration of the conservative party is coded as 1, while the absence—either the absence of the dominant party system or the progressive party's dominance—is 0. This logic is the same as the test of the progressive party's dominance. Definitions and data of the dominant party system and electorally-contested regimes are adopted from Templeman's (2012) research, which investigated periods until the 2006 elections. I define the successful duration as the period from the dominant party's first victory to the last election term before the dominance breakdown.⁵

Regarding causation from political and economic origins to the dominant party system, quantitative test should include only electorally-contested regimes because the ruling party in non-electoral regimes will form the government regardless of political and economic conditions. In South Korea, the authoritarian regime did not permit free and regular elections temporarily between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. In Taiwan, the KMT did not permit the participation of opposition parties in elections until the late 1980s. Therefore, the quantitative test excludes South Korea and Taiwan, including Japan. Quantitative results can provide implications on why authoritarian regimes in South Korea and Taiwan gained popularity or political legitimacy although these regimes limited free and fair elections.

⁵ Because electoral terms are 4-5 years in general, the last term should be excluded. For example, if the dominant party gains power for 25 years, only the former 20 years is the successful duration. In the last 5 years, the dominant party's performances would affect the next election. The last term should not be counted as the *successful* dominance, because it would be the cause of the breakdown of the dominant party system. In every case, I excluded the last five years of the dominance.

Developmental states' conservative party dominance achieved the dual goals of developmentalism and egalitarianism in the industrialization period. Developmentalism is displayed in performances in economic growth and export promotion. Economic growth is measured by *GDP per capita growth rates* (henceforth, GDP pc growth rates). Export-oriented industrialization is measured not only as growth rates in exports but also as the ratio of exports in GDP. In order to identify long-term trends, growth rates in five year interval is displayed in economic growth and export growth.

As for egalitarianism, the conservative party dominance achieved near-full employment under conservative corporatism. Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (ILO), is expected to have a negative sign with the conservative party dominance. Sweden's social democratic party's dominance provided social democratic welfare regimes. Social democratic corporatism has good performances in social expenditures, in particular government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP). These economic and social indicators are derived from the World Bank's world development indicators (WDI). Because all independent and dependent variables are measured in year-to-year basis, all observations are yearly observations of all nation states between 1945 and 2006.

If statistical analysis simply defines the dominant party system as the dependent variable (DV), this DV includes both the conservative party dominance and the progressive party dominance. In this case, it does not differentiate causation of the conservative party dominance with causation of the progressive party dominance. Thus, for comparison between conservative and social democratic corporatism, it is necessary to identify how the conservative party dominance is different with the progressive party dominance in origins of this type of dominant party system.

2. Mean Difference T-test and Interpretation

The conservative party's dominance gains support from economic growth and near-full employment, while the progressive party's dominance achieves popularity from investment in social expenditures. In Table 7, mean difference *t*-test of the conservative party dominance examines significant differences

in the success (coded as 1) or failure (0) of the conservative party dominance. In *t*-test of the progressive party's dominance, 1 is the presence of the progressive party, while 0 is the absence.

Table 7. *T*-test for the Dominant Party System: Conservatism versus Progressivism

	Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf. Interval	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>I. Developmentalism</i>								
<i>A. Economic Growth: GDP per capita, growth (annual %)</i>								
A-1. The Conservative Party Dominance								
GDP pc,	0	2157	2.362	.081	3.775	2.203 ~ 2.522	-4.992	0.000
growth	1	191	3.782	.265	3.667	3.258 ~ 4.305	(2346)	
A-2. The Progressive Party Dominance								
GDP pc,	0	2174	2.443	.079	3.695	2.288 ~ 2.599	-1.548	0.122
growth	1	174	2.905	.362	4.775	2.190 ~ 3.619	(2346)	
<i>B. Economic Growth: GDP per capita, growth (5-year interval %)</i>								
B-1. The Conservative Party Dominance								
GDP pc,	0	2003	12.083	.304	13.601	11.487 ~ 12.679	-8.839	0.000
growth	1	170	21.772	1.157	15.081	19.488 ~ 24.055	(2171)	
B-2. The Progressive Party Dominance								
GDP pc,	0	2017	12.550	.293	13.181	11.974 ~ 13.125	-3.500	0.001
growth	1	156	16.601	1.712	21.388	13.219 ~ 19.984	(2171)	
<i>C. Exports per capita, growth (5-year interval %)</i>								
C-1. The Conservative Party Dominance								
Exports pc,	0	1629	25.993	.652	26.334	24.714 ~ 27.273	-3.478	0.001
growth	1	156	33.717	2.257	28.189	29.259 ~ 38.175	(1783)	
C-2. The Progressive Party Dominance								
Exports pc,	0	1650	27.584	.651	26.438	26.308 ~ 28.861	5.125	0.000
growth	1	135	15.475	2.227	25.878	11.070 ~ 19.880	(1783)	
<i>D. The ratio of exports in GDP</i>								
D-1. The Conservative Party Dominance								
Exports pc,	0	2162	32.912	.375	17.431	32.177 ~ 33.647	-22.934	0.000
growth	1	190	72.388	3.945	54.405	64.602 ~ 80.174	(2350)	
D-2. The Progressive Party Dominance								
Exports pc,	0	2174	36.254	.553	25.800	35.169 ~ 37.339	1.034	0.302
growth	1	178	34.227	1.142	15.235	31.973 ~ 36.480	(2350)	
<i>II. Egalitarianism</i>								
<i>E. Conservative Corporatism: Unemployment rates</i>								
E-1. The Conservative Party Dominance								
Unemployment	0	869	8.400	.163	4.819	8.079 ~ 8.721	6.311	0.000
Rates	1	37	3.384	.288	1.750	2.800 ~ 3.967	(904)	
E-2. The Progressive Party Dominance								
Unemployment	0	876	8.071	.157	4.659	7.762 ~ 8.380	-4.199	0.000
Rates	1	30	11.807	1.422	7.786	8.899 ~ 14.714	(904)	
<i>F. Social Democratic Corporatism: Educational expenditures</i>								
F-1. The Conservative Party Dominance								
Education	0	1059	4.756	.065	2.118	4.629 ~ 4.884	0.833	0.405
expenditure	1	75	4.550	.141	1.224	4.269 ~ 4.832	(1132)	
F-2. The Progressive Party Dominance								
Education	0	1077	4.649	.048	1.585	4.554 ~ 4.744	-6.737	0.000
Expenditure	1	57	6.509	.786	5.931	4.936 ~ 8.083	(1132)	

Note. For t tests, degrees of freedom are noted in parenthesis. Group 1 denotes the success of duration, while 0 is the failure.

Regarding developmentalism, developmental states are exemplars of rapid industrialization and compressed economic development, as seen in high economic growth and export promotion. According to t -test, the conservative party dominance has shown greater performances than the other cases in economic growth and export promotion with a positive sign and statistical significance. Meanwhile, the progressive party dominance show lower performances than the other cases.

As for egalitarianism, developmental states have shown impressive performances on near-full employment, while their social expenditures are limited. The conservative party dominance displays markedly low unemployment rates of 3.38% with a large gap with normal regimes' unemployment rates of 8.40%. The progressive party dominance, such as the Social Democratic Party's rule in Sweden for forty years, is a major component of social democratic corporatism, which is contrasted with conservative corporatism in developmental states. Another t -test finds that the progressive party's dominance has provided generous support of government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP). By contrast, the conservative party dominance does not display higher investment in social expenditures than the other cases.

VI. Summary and Evaluation

1. Summary

This research explains why developmental states formed one party dominance in the *center-right*, not the centrist position, in the industrialization period despite differences in timing of democratization and economic development. The conservative party's dominance in developmental states has been a component of conservative corporatism that makes a conservative welfare state with weak social safety nets and low social expenditures. The conservative party's dominance was maintained for about

forty years not only by Japan's LDP and Taiwan's KMT but also by Korea's authoritarian, conservative party, which rebranded its party name but consisted of the same power blocs. The Korean party's rebranding, which is described as an act of *creative destruction* in style, did not change the substance of the party itself. Therefore, its party system should be considered as a *quasi*-dominant party system. Social cleavages in East Asia structured the right-oriented dominant party system. Meanwhile, social cleaves in Western Europe kept balance of power between left and right in general, and brought about the social democratic rule in the long term in some European corporatist states.

Not only the Cold War and the formation of developmental state, but also rapid industrialization and long-term low inequality, created social cleavages as East Asia's origins of conservative party dominance. These transformations helped East Asian dominant parties win elections ideologically in the center-right position, although dominant parties generally gain advantages as centrist parties in terms of Anthony Downs's median voter theorem. The mixed method between comparative historical case analysis and statistical analysis finds that propositions of the conservative party dominance—economic growth, export promotion, and near-full employment—are generalizable beyond East Asia. In comparison between East Asia and Western Europe, strong nationalism, land reform, rapid industrialization, and long-term low inequality have supported the conservative party's long-term rule in developmental states' conservative corporatism; whereas, moderate nationalism and institutionalized welfare regimes with high social expenditures have promoted a broad consensus on social markets and a long-term victory of the Social Democratic party in social democratic corporatism in European corporatist states.

This research examines that institutional inertia through the dominant party system or the governing party's long-term rule is commonly found in both East Asian developmental-corporatist states and European corporatist states. It explores how the conservative party's dominance or the conservative party-led dominant party system around for forty years between the 1950s and the early 1990s has institutionally supported conservative corporatism in the alliance between the government, the ruling party, and large or public firms without incorporation of labor. Similarly, the social democratic

party's long-term rule for around or more than twenty years is also found in social democratic corporatism in some European states, such as Sweden, Austria, and West Germany. The social democratic party-led long-term rule is associated with social democratic corporatism, represented by social markets and social democratic compromise in Western Europe. Of course, both East Asian developmental-corporatist states and European corporatist states differ in ideology, such as conservatism and social democracy, respectively. However, a single party's dominance or its long-term rule has made the partnership between the state and firms robust, and then made these corporatist states commonly pursue redistribution policies through long-term blueprint.

2. Evaluation: The Rise and Fall of the Conservative Party Dominance

Developmental states' social cleavages commonly structured the conservative party's dominance in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Cold War has provided favorable conditions for the conservative party to seize political power. The developmental state has played an essential role in national and economic development. Lastly, rapid industrialization enhanced the conservative party's popularity and legitimacy. Despite the conservative party's issue priority of economic growth over welfare, its progressive land reforms and the virtuous cycle between growth and redistribution made these states did not experience citizens' intense pressures for advanced welfare regimes, and did not have strong desires to spend extensive social expenditures. Paradoxically, this redistribution helped the conservative party maintain its growth-oriented regime for several decades without a universal welfare regime of the West European style and led to the conservative party dominance in the party system, although developmental states had low social expenditures and weak welfare regimes.

Although a dominant party tends to gain advantages as centrist parties in the ideological distribution, East Asian dominant parties could win elections in the *center-right* position because of the right-biased issue priorities of security and economic development. Specifically, Japan maintained the dominant party system led by the LDP from 1955 to 1993. South Korea maintained the *quasi*-dominant

party system led by the conservative party which rebranded its party name but consisted of the same power blocs from 1963 to 1988. Taiwan maintained the dominant party system by the KMT before the 2001 legislative election. Commonly, these countries maintained the conservative party dominance for several decades. Even after a few power turnovers by progressive parties, the conservative party which was the previous dominant party recovered its majority party status in most times. This center-right bias in the East Asian party system must be a legacy of the conservative party dominance.

As a comparative-historical case research strategy, the method of agreement finds developmental states' commonality of conservative party dominance beyond differences in the regime type and the stage of economic development. My mixed-methods approach intends historical findings in qualitative research into quantitative measurement and statistical analysis. It aims to generalize the propositions of the conservative party dominance, which is uniquely found in developmental states. Mean difference *t*-test finds that the origins of East Asia's conservative party dominance can be generalizable to world country cases. Economic growth, export promotion, and near-full employment are common origins of the conservative party dominance.

From the logic of the conservative party dominance, this research evaluates Lipset and Rokkan's (1967; 1990) social cleavage theory from historical institutionalism. To explain change of the party system, social cleavage theory needs to consider the strength of party system, which is mainly consolidated by party system institutionalization. Of course, realignment caused by democratization and the post-Cold War *détente* gave more chances of seizing electoral power, of gaining political power turnover, and of forming the government by progressive opposition parties. But these countries have been still influenced by the previous center-right party dominance and conservative corporatism; conservative parties have still advantages in elections even after the disintegration of developmental states and the breakdown of the dominant party system.

The Cold War, the developmental state, rapid industrialization, and long-term low inequality helped East Asian conservative parties win elections consecutively even in the *center-right* position; whereas, dominant parties generally gain advantages in the centrist position in terms of Anthony Downs's (1957)

median voter theorem. Kenneth F. Greene (2006) claims that the key reason of the opposition party failure is that challengers from as niche-oriented parties and finally form as non-centrist parties. Magaloni and her colleagues (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001; Magaloni 2006: 191) find that the exceptionally long-lasting reign of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has been caused by the PRI's capability to utilize favorable ideological distribution where the PRD is libertarian and the PAN is conservative, and therefore the PRI is placed between the other two parties. Meanwhile, all dominant parties in East Asia—the LDP of Japan, the KMT of Taiwan, and ruling parties of South Korea—retained the oligopoly of political market in the center-right position.

A virtuous cycle between economic growth and redistribution has been a common socioeconomic origin of the conservative party dominance in the party system, and the state's dense coordination with firms. Conservative corporatism is characterized as the state's vertical coordination with firms but without labor, and it had been prevalent under strong nationalism and developmental state building and development. Institutional inefficiencies of conservative corporatism had been concealed by the redistribution mechanism until these states' financial crises in the 1990s; after this period, the disintegration of developmental states led to the breakdown of conservative party dominance.

Lastly, as the problem of endogeneity, one party dominance or institutional inertia may be an outcome, not a cause, of successful governmental performances. Developmental states' conservative party dominance has shown a distinguished performances on land reform, export-oriented industrialization (EOI), near-full employment, and high economic growth. These policy outcomes have generated sequentially positive feedbacks, for example initial distribution from land reform to plan rationality in EOI, and by extension near-full and lifelong employment for consistent economic growth. These increasing returns have produced a synergic effect between economic growth and long-term redistribution. These consistent performances have brought about the conservative party dominance in developmental states. Meanwhile, the financial crises or economic recessions in the 1990s and also low economic growth in the subsequent periods dismantled the conservative party's long-term rule in all developmental states.

In developmental states, the conservative party dominance is not only an institutional outcome not only from rapid industrialization but also from redistribution. The long-term redistribution mechanism consists of egalitarian redistribution through land reform and also long-term low inequality through employment and public education. The conservative party dominance was one component of the developmental state structure. In postwar state building, progressive land reforms initiated by the conservative party created egalitarian distribution of income and assets; the subsequent virtuous cycle between growth and redistribution reinforced *political legitimacy* of the conservative ruling party. As politico-economic outcomes, long-term low inequality debilitated citizens' desire for a universal welfare regime and made them support conservative parties consistently, although these states had low social expenditures and weak welfare regimes. Eventually, they created the dominant party system or one party dominance in the center-*right*, not centrist position. Lastly, this research provides implications on why the conservative party dominance in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan was disintegrated in the recent stage of advanced economies after the post-Cold War era. A short answer from propositions of this paper is that not only the disintegration of the developmental state model but also the end of the virtuous cycle between growth and redistribution led to the demise of the conservative party dominance. This integration of the developmental state model also the economic recession or financial crisis in the 1990s were caused by the inefficient alliance between the state and firms. The next chapter explains the formation of state-led alliance with firms.

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