ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRATIC SANCTIONS ON LEADERS

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Democratic sanctions as forms of foreign pressure are mostly preferred after the Cold War period by the US and its allies to spread democracy. The literature on sanctions which did not distinguish the aims of sanctions has long argued that sanctions have a negative effect on the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian states. However, whether sanctions are effective or counterproductive is still a scholarly debate. In this study, I investigate the impacts of sanctions on leadership change which is one of the crucial antecedents of democratization by distinguishing the aims of sanctions as democratic and non-democratic. Using cross-country time series data from 1990 to 2015, this study contradicts previous research and demonstrates that democratic sanctions lead to irregular leader transition in targeted countries. I also show that regardless of objectives of sanctions, greater economic growth makes irregular leader removal less likely.

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf's coup put the military in control of the government of Pakistan[1]. The United States quickly reacted and demanded elections by imposing sanctions. Although the military rule continued for a while, the US lifted sanctions in 2002 after the general elections led to form the minority government. As this brief example illustrates, the US and its allies have used sanctions against authoritarian regimes as a foreign policy tool to spread democratic values across world in the post-Cold War period. However, there is a vast majority of research discussing the effectiveness of sanctions. Some scholars concluded that sanctions are ineffective (Drury, 1998; Haass, 1998; Pape, 1997), and some scholars even argued that sanctions have an adverse effect on the level of democracy in targeted countries (Peksen and Drury, 2010).

In this paper, I empirically address the question of the effectiveness of democratic sanction, by looking at the effect of those sanctions designed to promote democratization in targeted authoritarian regimes on leadership survival. Are democratic sanctions forceful enough to remove an authoritarian leader and to replace with a new leader who is preferably more democratic? I choose the leadership survival as my main dependent variable because an irregular turnover of leaders represents one of the most common precursors of democratization (Miller, 2012, p. 1002). Such a disruption in a non- democratic institution leads to the emergence of democratic institutions. For instance, normally, in each system, the elites perpetuate their advantage and secure their hold on resources. Hafız al-Asad, leader of the Syrian government (1971-200) relied on the support of two groups throughout most of its existence, military officers of the Alawi sect and al- Asad's family and friends (Ziser, 2001,

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[1] "Pakistan Judges Refuse Oath Demanded by Pakistan's Rulers" Waycross Journal-Herald

chap.2). Whenever there is a disruption the new leader will need to establish a coalition. When looking for alternative coalition partners, those who are normally left out may potentially become attractive allies.

Another causal link between the democratic sanctions and irregular leadership turnover is that economic decline caused by sanctions intensifies the activities of opposition particularly against the leader because the national government should be the institution for addressing economic failures. In the case of authoritarian regimes, since it is characterized by "the predominance of patrimonial rulership on the part of a single leader" instead of a national government (Purcell, 1973, p. 30). All blame in case of an economic failure put on the leaders, and it disturbs the established authoritarian structure in which leader is the center. Also, when a country suffers economic hardship because of democratic sanctions, opposition which is already demanding democratization finds support for its claims from foreign states or international organizations and accuses leaders of being responsible for economic decline in targeted countries.

Previous studies display the reasoning behind the imposition of sanctions and/or the effectiveness of sanctions (Allen, 2005; Drezner, 2011; Drury, 1998; Galtung, 1967; Hufbauer et al., 2007; Kirshner, 1997; Lacy and Niou; 2004; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007; Lektzian and Souva, 2007; Lektzian and Patterson, 2015; Martin 1992; Miers and Morgan, 2002; Morgan et al., 2009; Pape, 1997; Peksen, 2009; Peksen and Drury, 2010; Spaniel and Smith, 2015; Von Soest and Wahman, 2015; Whang et al., 2013), but they mostly do not differentiate the objectives of sanction. By focusing on the democratic sanctions, this paper uncovers the effects of democratic sanctions on leadership survival. The result indicates a strong positive relationship between democratic sanctions and the irregular leadership removal. Further, I

extend the data on sanctions until 2015 and put 60 countries' leaders into the analysis. It should be noted that missing values for some African countries are one of my limitations of this research. For instance, the names of leaders of Equatorial Guinea are not written in the Archigos data set. Additionally, it is very difficult to know the true intentions of sender states whether their aim is to democratize the country they target or not. Because of that, I will keep what is said officially, and include as either democratic or non-democratic sanctions according to official records. Not knowing the true intentions of senders is another limitation of this paper.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The notion of economic sanctions was paid the highest attention only after the World War I. The common wisdom in international relations literature on economic sanctions is that states and/or international organizations prefer to impose economic sanctions as foreign policy tools to substitute armed hostilities (Most and Starr, 1984; Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan, 2002). Yet, their usage is much wider than use of force as economic sanctions have been utilized to pursue a number of foreign policy objectives such as promoting and/or restoring democratic regimes, preventing human rights violations, settling expropriation claims, countering drug lords, combatting international terrorism, and most recently promoting cooperation with the USA's counterterrorism operations (Hufbauer et al., 2007). Since states and/or IOs do not always involve themselves in armed conflicts and diplomacy is not always an effective tool to reach specific goals, these actors frequently use economic sanctions instead of waging an actual war.

Scholars mostly focused on the effectiveness of sanctions and the conditions under which sender states will likely to achieve intended policy objectives. On the one hand, Marinov

(2005) and Von Soest and Wahman (2015) show that sanctions are effective policy tools. On the other hand, some scholars argue that sanctions are not effective in term of achieving intended policy outcomes (Allen, 2005; Drezner, 2011; Drury, 1998; Galtung, 1967; Hufbauer et al., 2007; Kirshner, 1997; Lacy and Niou; 2004; Lektzian and Souva,2007; Martin 1992; Miers and Morgan, 2002; Morgan et al., 2009; Pape, 1997; Spaniel and Smith, 2015; Whang et al., 2013). Others go further and claim that sanctions are counterproductive and cause unintended political outcomes (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007; Peksen, 2009; Peksen and Drury, 2010). Despite their prevalence as a tool of foreign policy, the overall effectiveness of economic sanctions is one of scholarly debate. According to Hufbauer et al. (2007), when all objectives are accounted, sanctions are successful only in one-third of all cases (p.127). What is more significant is that the success rate of sanctions is 31% when the specific aim of sanctions is geared towards regime destabilization and/or democratization.

George W. Bush the 43rd President of the US in 2005 announce publicly that "it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world[2]." During the post-Cold war period, the most common objective of imposition of sanctions initiated by the US and its allies as "Western liberalism's triumph" (Levitsky and Way, 2002 p.61) has been actively promoting democracy at the global level (Haass, 1998; Von Soest and Wahman, 2015). In particular, the West became the promoter of the free elections in the rest of the world with the end of the Cold War (Marinov and Goemans, 2014, p. 800). The increased number of civil conflicts and the promotion of democracy have created more incentives and

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[2] http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58745 accessed June 2017.

opportunities to use economic sanctions (Cox and Drury, 2006, p. 240). The significant increase in sanction use by both the US and its allies with the end of the Cold war period warrants additional investigation.

Scholars argue that democracies promote accountability (Bueno de Mesquita and Lahman, 1992; Lake, 1992; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Rummel, 1979; Siverson, 1995) and help reveal information about the government's political incentives, and the strength of the leader (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 1998; Siegel 1997) to other states and international organizations. Spaniel and Smith (2015) in their quantitative analysis examine the role of uncertainty in the process of international economic coercion. They argue that when foreign powers are uncertain about the strength of the leader in the target country, they are more prone to impose sanctions. The rationale behind this argument is that since leaders in target countries know their own strength and security better than international opponents, they can bluff and escalate crises even if they are not that secure domestically. Since foreign powers cannot be sure about what is revealed by the target state's leader, they take their chances and impose sanctions in any case to catch potential bluffers. Spaniel and Smith (2015) demonstrate that the longer the tenure of a leader in the target state, foreign powers less likely to impose sanctions on this target state. In addition, being a part of an international organization (Martin, 1992), and being a democratic state lowers the risk of being subjected to sanctions.

Peksen and Drury (2010) analyze the impact of sanctions on democracy by using time-series cross-national data for the time frame 1971-2000. Their most significant finding is that economic sanctions are seen to have negative impacts on the level of democracy in the target countries. First, economic sanctions cause economic hardship, and the targeted regime can use it as a strategic tool to consolidate its authoritarian rule and to weaken the opposition by

projecting the sanctions as an external threat to legitimate government. Secondly, economic sanctions create incentives to restrict political liberties in the targeted state. They conclude that economic sanctions have both immediate and long- term effects, and they worsen the level of democracy in the targeted state. However, it seems that there is an increasing emphasis on the international relations literature on the linkage between the usage of economic sanctions and the transition to democracy.

Cox and Drury (2006) extend the analysis of Lektzian and Souva (2003) on the connection between sanctions and the democratic peace. Cox and Drury (2016) investigate how democracies initiate sanctions both with each other and with other non-democracies. They employ rare-event logit analysis by using the data from Hufbauer et al. (2007) for the time frame 1978-2000. They conclude that democracies tend to use economic sanctions more than non-democracies; however, as the democratic peace theory suggests, democracies are less likely to sanction other democracies.

Marinov (2005) examines the relationship between economic costs a state suffers and the political costs carried by the political figures who hold office. His main assumption is that destabilization is a must for coercion to work. He argues that economic pressure destabilizes the leader in the targeted regime. He uses the cross-country-time series data, and conclude that economic sanctions have destabilizing effects on governments of its targets.

Lektzian and Patterson (2015) provide a theoretical explanation for the success of sanctions by using statistical analysis of sanctions initiated between 1971 and 2000. They examine how sanctions are successful in trade-open countries and trade-closed countries. Their findings support the argument of Spaniel and Smith (2015). Trade-openness provides information to the countries about their trading partners' domestic affairs. If senders know

owners and the most frequent users of abundant factors such as land, labor, and capital, and specifically target them then the sanctions are more likely to succeed.

Whether sanctions have positive effects on the level of democracy in targeted states or not is a hot scholarly debate in the sanction literature. On the one hand, the political understanding of authoritarian stability and modernization theory argue that economic sanctions do not contribute to the level of democracy it targets, rather they are counterproductive. On the other hand, democratization literature claims that economic sanctions destabilize authoritarian regimes and foster democratization.

The vast majority of previous research on the democratic effects of sanctions did not distinguish the goals of sanctions in particular. This is why they fail to recognize the real effects of sanctions on democratization. Only one study (Von Soest and Wahman, 2015) so far analyzes the effects of democratic sanctions that explicitly aim to promote democracy by constructing new data set which clearly separates democratic sanctions from other demands (963). In this study, I investigate how democratic sanctions correlate with leadership survival by compiling data on imposed sanctions in the period between 1990- 2015 as an addition to von Soest and Wahman's dataset (2015) that clearly separates sanctions according to the explicit goal of the senders, which are the Unites States, The European Union and the United Nations. In the literature, there is no research which investigates the effects of democratic sanctions on leadership change with such recent data.

A Theory About the Destabilizing Effect of Sanctions

Economic coercion as foreign pressure is often chosen over the alternatives on the perception that the use of force is either undesirable or infeasible, and where diplomacy would not be enough (Marinov, 2005, p. 566). I adopt the standard definition of sanctions in the

literature: "government-inspired restrictions on customary trade or aid relations, designed to promote political objectives" (Hufbauer et al., 1990, p. 2). The question "Do economic sanctions work?" is still contested. In this study, I am particularly interested in whether the type of sanction which promotes democratization generates political costs for leaders in targeted countries. When the aim of sanction is democratization or to strengthen the level of democracy, the regime of targeted countries is either autocracies or mixed regimes, and the leaders in these countries are autocratic leaders. I hypothesize that democratic sanctions tend to increase the likelihood of an irregular change in leadership in targeted countries.

Previous research has shown that sanctions which have democratic effects have a negative impact on the tenure of leaders in the country where they are imposed upon. By applying a fixed-effects-model, Marinov (2005) found that sanctions generally increase the probability of leaders' removal. He used the largest existing dataset on the main independent variable, economic sanctions which is Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott's (HSE, 2007). The time interval of the data he used is 1914-1999. For the data on the main dependent variable, leadership succession, he used the Archigos dataset (Chiozza and Goemans, 2004b). Spaniel and Smith (2015) by employing the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions dataset (TIES) shed light on this relationship from a different perspective. According to them, when a foreign power imposes sanctions against newer leaders, sanctions tend to be ineffective both empirically and theoretically because there is not much information about newer leaders. Von Soest and Wahman (2015) articulated what Marinov (2005) found but investigated further. They studied the relationship between democratic sanctions which aim at instigating democratization and the stability of leaders. In order to analyze this relationship, they introduced a new data set of EU, UN, and US sanctions against non-democratic regimes in the period 1990-2010. This time period was particularly chosen because after the Cold-War period, the aim of the US and its

allies has been actively promoting democracy at the global level (Von Soest and Wahman, 2015, p. 958). In this paper, I will be built upon the data set of von Soest and Wahman by capturing the time interval 1990-2015, and by using the recently updated version of the Archigos data set, so that the external validity of the research on the relationship between democratic sanctions and the tenure of leaders would be strengthened.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

This study utilizes cross-sectional time-series analysis to examine the hypothesized link between economic sanctions that aim democratization and leadership survival in targeted countries. My main analysis includes sanctioned countries, the years in which these countries are targeted with sanctions and each leader just before the sanctions are imposed until the sanctions are lifted.

My unit of observation is sanction episode. As this research aims to test the effect of democratic sanctions on the leader exist, country level analysis emerges as essential dimension of this research design. Leaders of targeted countries and the reasons of their removals are the most essential parts of my analysis.

Nachmias and Nachimas (2000) argue that to avoid the risk of partial explanation of independent variable, control variables should be introduced into the research design to test the casual link between the dependent and independent variables (pp. 50-51). In order to overcome this problem, I include the level of democracy, GDP per capita, log of population, civil war, mass protest, and oil production as control variables in this research design.

Independent Variable

The independent variable is whether or not economic sanctions that aim democratization are imposed by the US, the UN and the EU. To achieve this, I classified the goals of sanctions according to broad categories by combining the commonly used data from Hufbauer et al. (2009) and von Soest and Wahmen's classification (2015, p. 963) (see Table 1). Table 1 specifies the objectives of senders which can be democratic demands or others.

Table 1. Goals of Sanctions

Democratization-related goals	Other goals
*Regime change *Support for human rights connected to electoral competition *Holding of new elections *Restoration of a democratically elected leader *Recognition of rights and freedoms directly linked to the electoral process *Recognition of electoral results *Admission of an international electoral observation mission *Modification of the constitution or the electoral code	*End of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction *Impair another country's military potential *Support for human rights (not directly related to the democratic process) *Termination of hositilies and/or establishment of peace aggrements *Fighting of narcotics *Combat international terrorism *Settle expropriation claims

Source: Hufbauer et al., 2009; Von Soest and Wahman, 2015

I built on Von Soest and Wahman's dataset which clearly separates democratic sanctions from other goals. Their dataset is composed of the entire universe of sanctions imposed by the UN, the US, and the EU in the period 1990 – 2010 (p. 964). I extended the time frame to 2015, the revised version of their dataset now covers all sanctions imposed by the UN, the US, and the EU in the period 1990 – 2015, including those sanction regimes that were already in place in 1990, and those sanctions that are active (see Appendix). I put stars near countries to signify the sanction episodes that are not indicated in previous data set. Figure1 illustrates the point of scholars about the frequent use of sanctions in order to

promote democratization in targeted countries after the end of the Cold-War by the US and

its allies (Haass, 1998; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Von Soest & Wahman, 2015). Furthermore,

this dataset emphasizes not only the end of sanction episodes but also the change in sender's

goals. For instance, the EU imposed sanctions against Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

in the period 1992 -1997 to push for multi- party democracy. With the outbreak of the Civil

War in 1997, the aim of sanctions had been shifted to arms embargo to impair military

potentials of Mutomboki or Nyatura[3] from democratization. In this dataset, the period until

1997 coded under the democratic sanctions for DRC, and after this period is coded under

nondemocratic sanctions. Moreover, since the dataset runs all the way to 2015, whereas

Hufbauer et al. (2009) dataset and TIES (2014) dataset stop assessing sanctions as of 2005,

it gives more cases to analyze and increases the external validity of this study.

Figure 1. Number of Sanctions According to Goals of Sanctions

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[3] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/the-origins-of-war-in-the-drc/277131/

Dependent Variable

The main dependent variable is whether or not an irregular leadership change has occurred during sanction episode. I coded as 1 if a leadership turnover in a targeted country occurs in a given year, if not then I coded as 0. The Archigos dataset defines the leadership turnover in four ways: "in (1) a regular manner, according to prevailing rules, provisions, conventions, and norms of the country, (2) an irregular manner, (3) through direct removal by another state, and (4) as a result of a natural death, under which we include illness or suicide" (Goemans et al., 2009, p. 273). Actually, instead of looking at the manner of the existence of a leader, in order to better relate with the dependent variable of this study, the focus should be how the leader has lost power. The reasons for losing power of leaders can be in a "regular manner, via popular protest with foreign support, popular protest without foreign support, rebels with foreign support, rebels without foreign support, military with foreign support, military without foreign support, other government actor with foreign support, other government actor without foreign support, threat or use of force by other state, assassination by unsupported individual, internal power struggle" (Goemans et al., 2009, p.275). The Archigos data set takes each of these manners and the reasons of leadership turnover.

The question is "do democratic sanctions lead to an irregular leader turnover?" in this paper. To answer this question, I isolated the cases in which there are instances of leadership change due to threat or use of force by other states or organizations in countries where sanctions are imposed. In the dataset, I included names of leaders, reasons why they left the office, and years when they left the office in targeted countries, including those leaders that were already in the office in 1990, and those leaders that currently hold office.

Control Variables

For this study, GDP/capita will be controlled because countries which have higher economic growth might compensate their economies for economic coercion caused by sanctions. Population size of a country which is sanctioned will be controlled since transition to democracy in smaller countries tend to be more easily. Another crucial factor to be controlled for is the regime type of a country because regime type determines the structure of political institutions, particularly it is crucial to determine the way how a leader comes to power.

Previous studies in the literature showed that the existence of civil war (Chiozza and Goemans, 2004, p. 611) and popular protests (Licht, 2011, p.11) in a country can have an impact on the leadership removal and increase the likelihood of imposition of sanctions (Von Soest and Wahman, 2015, p. 966; Teorell, 2010). Therefore, I will control for the existence of civil conflict and popular protests in targeted countries. Furthermore, the amount of oil produced in targeted countries will be controlled because oil producer countries can recover easily from economic hardship caused by sanctions so, sanctions do not yield their intended outcomes.

1. **GDP/capita**

The state of the economy in a country tends to determine strongly whether a government survives or falls (Londregan and Poole 1990). On the one hand, classical modernization theory scholars claim that there is a positive relationship between the level of economic development and the level of democracy (Lipset, 1959; Barro 1999; Epstein et al., 2006). The rationale behind this theory is that economic wealth paves the way of a strong, well-educated middle class who are demanding for responsive government, and thus strengthens the level of democracy or increases the probability of transition to democracy. On the other hand, some others find empirical evidence suggesting poor countries as well as rich countries may democratize

(Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Moreover, the level of development may also influence the behavior of sanction senders, because if they expect the probability of transition to democracy to be high and "those of fallback to be low" then they tend to issue sanctions against those targets (Von Soest and Wahman, 2015, p. 966). Thus, I incorporated a measure for GDP/capita[4] in my model.

2. The Natural Log of Population Size

According to Boix (2003), smaller countries are more likely to democratize. In smaller countries capital holders are less afraid of democratization because they can easily transfer their fixed assets out of the country. Furthermore, in countries where population size is large there can be scarcity of economic resources and economic grievances, which may lead government to use repression (Henderson, 1993; Poe et al., 1999). My model thus includes a measure of logged population size. The data for population is mainly from the World Bank's population data[5] (2015) and from Heston et al. (2009) for missing values.

3. Civil War

Sanctions are in some cases used to pressure parties in civil wars to stop internal conflict (Von Soest and Wahman, 2015, p. 966). A sanction sender is more likely to impose democratic sanctions on civil war countries (p. 967). Hence, I included a measure for civil wars, and used data from the UCDP/PRIO dataset (Gleditsch, 2002). I coded as 1 if there is civil war in a targeted country in a given year, if not then I coded 0.

4. The Occurrence of Mass Protest

The existence of mass protests gives immediate signals to potential sanction senders

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[4] I used the World Bank data for GDP/capita (current US $). In addition, I used Gleditsch' s (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP Data for missing values.

[5] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL

(Teorell, 2010). When there is mass protest, senders can expect that their measures will contribute to the efforts of protestors to further destabilize the autocrats (Licht, 2011, p. 11). Also, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Boix (2003) identify the possibility of a popular protest s the central threat to a dictator's power. Thus, I incorporated a measure for mass protest in my model. I used the Clark and Regan (2016) data set which include the number of anti-government demonstrations, strikes and riots, and coded as binary variable.

5. Oil Production

I also included a measure for oil production due to the fact that if a country is an oil producer then it can compensate its losses caused by sanctions. Sanctions, at the end, stay a futile effort as being ineffective. Senders may therefore be less prone to impose sanctions on these countries. Moreover, senders often are dependent on oil exports from authoritarian regimes which may be targets of democratic sanctions (Von Soest and Wahman, 2015, p. 967). To illustrate my point with an example, although Nigeria is the 15th among 98 countries[6] in terms of the amount of oil produced in the country, the US imposed democratic sanctions against Nigerian government in the period between 1993 – 1998. For this variable, I used the Ross data set (2015) which measures oil productions in millions of metric tons.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In order to test the effect of democratic sanctions on leadership survival, logistic regressions were conducted. I prefer to use logistic regression because of binary dependent variable. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if a leader of a targeted country was out of office

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[6] https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/crude-oil-production

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through unconventional ways and as 0 if a leader of a targeted country was removed through regular ways such as election or retirement.

Hypothesis: Democratic sanctions tend to increase the likelihood of an irregular change in leadership in targeted countries.

There are two models below to show statistical analysis. The first model shows the regression analysis for all sanctions imposed by the US, the UN, and the EU in the period between 1990 and 2015 without distinguishing aims of sanctions. The analysis reflects that when I include all sanctions into the model, sanctions do not significantly affect the dependent variable. Furthermore, population size, the existence of civil war, and the amount of oil produced in targeted countries do not significantly affect the irregular change of a leader. However, variable economic growth measured by GDP/capita negatively correlates with the likelihood of the irregular change of a leader while the occurrence of popular protests positively correlates with the likelihood of the irregular change of a leader. It means that countries which have higher GDP/capita are less likely to experience an irregular change in leadership. It has a significance level of $p<0.01$. Also, leaders in countries where there are popular protests are more likely to leave office through irregular means such as foreign imposition or removal. It has a significance level of $p<0.05$.

The second model illustrates the combined effect of democratic and non-democratic sanctions on irregular leader change. When I put sanctions with different aims into the same analysis, my hypothesis is proven even further. Furthermore, in order to end the confusion about whether or not democratic or non-democratic sanction causes the irregular leadership change, this analysis is essential to avoid any selection bias. For instance, Haiti was the target of sanctions both for democratic and non-democratic reasons.

Table 2.

	Ruler Exist	Ruler Exist
Dependent Variable: Irregular Leadership Change		
	(1)	(2)
Sanctions	1.016	
	(3.35)	
DM Sanctions		2.348***
		(6.71)
NDM Sanctions		0.482
		(1.00)
GDP/capita	-0.00111**	-0.00112*
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Log population	-0.06	-0.163
	(0.198)	(0.073)
Civil war	0.0411	-0.00330
	(0.505)	(0.28)
Popular protests	1.273*	-0.355
	(2.02)	(0.166)
Log oil production	-0.0663	-0.0382
	(0.049)	(0.0226)
Constant	-0.872	0.837
	(1.32)	(3.31)
N	525	519
R-squared	0.2395	0.163
Note: standard errors in parentheses; * $p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$, ***$p<0.001$		

Discussion

The effect of different kinds of sanctions on leadership survival is tested through three models with the logistic regression analysis. The first model shows that all sanctions which were imposed in the period 1990 - 2015 on the irregular change in leadership in targeted countries which I did not find any significant relationship between the sanctions and the irregular leadership change. This finding is in line with the findings of Hufbauer et al. (2007) on the ineffectiveness of sanctions. Their study demonstrates that the success rate of sanctions even with a specific aim is not strong enough to see sanctions as effective foreign policy tools (p. 127).

The second model demonstrates that the effects of sanctions can be identified clearly when the goals of sanctions are classified. As Von Soest and Wahman (2015) establish the relationship between the democratic sanctions and the leadership survival, the results of the second model with the extended data indicate that when the goal of sanction is to increase the level of democracy in targeted countries, the likelihood of the leaders' irregular change also increases. Hence, there is a positive correlation between the democratic sanctions and the irregular change in leadership.

These two models suggest that there is a negative correlation between the level of economic growth and the irregular change in leadership. It means that as GDP/capita increases in targeted countries, the irregular removal of the leaders in these countries becomes less likely. This result contradicts with the argument of modernization theory on the positive relationship between the economic growth and the demand for more responsive government (Lipset, 1959; Barro 1999; Epstein et al., 2006). The relationship between a country's economic prospects and its politics is among the most studied and the most essential subjects in social sciences. Miller

(2012) argues that "greater economic growth provides regimes with greater resources to perpetuate themselves in power and thus makes violent executive turnovers less likely" (pp. 1002 – 1003). When GDP/capita increases in targeted countries even if the country is having a hard time economically due to the sanctions, people might think that it is the leader who is responsible for the economic success, or leaders themselves might take credit for economic growth. At the end, the support for leaders of those countries might increase and the tenure of leaders becomes long-lasting.

CONCLUSION

This paper overviewed main theoretical and empirical findings on the effects of sanctions. It presented results based on quantitative time-series cross-national analysis of the effects of democratic sanctions on the irregular change in leadership for 60 countries' leaders in the period 1990 – 2015. It examined the different goals of sanctions, and particularly focused on the democracy – related goals. The analysis included a set of variables that are affecting removal of leaders, and results of sanctions. GDP/capita, logged population, the existence of civil war, and mass protest, and logged oil production are tested.

The statistical analysis on the effects of sanctions revealed significant differences between the different goals of sanctions. Hence, it is not appropriate to conclude that whether sanctions are effective or counterproductive without properly distinguishing sanctions according to their goals. I included all the sanctions into the analysis, the result showed that sanctions are not effective for an irregular change in leadership. When I distinguished sanctions as democratic and non-democratic and did analysis, the results showed that sanctions have

effects on the irregular change in leadership.

By expanding time interval of the data on sanctions, this paper contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating the relationship between the sanctions with specific goals and the irregular change in leadership. With this research, I can conclude that democratic sanctions have a positive impact on the irregular chance in the autocratic leadership whereas non-democratic sanctions contribute to the tenure of leaders. Furthermore, no matter what kind of sanctions are imposed, leaders strengthen their positions in offices as GDP/capita increases.

Future research might delve more into on the strategic decisions made by senders to increase the effectiveness of democratic sanctions. Moreover, further research is needed to test other possible consequences of democratic sanctions. Also, the question of why some democratic sanctions are more effective in some countries than others remains as a puzzle for future research. For instance, despite China has been the target of the US and EU's democratic sanctions since 1989, and North Korea has been the target of the democratic sanctions by the US since 1950, there is no instance of an irregular leader change in these countries.

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Appendix

List of Sanctions Imposed by the US, the EU, and the UN in the period 1990 – 2015

DEMOCRATIC SANCTIONS			NONDEMOCRATIC SANCTIONS		
Target	**Sender**	**Time Frame**	**Target**	**Sender**	**Time Frame**
Algeria	EU	1992–1994	Afghanistan	UN	1999–2002
			Afghanistan*	EU	2011- ongoing
Belarus	EU	2000–ongoing	Azerbaijan	US	1992–2002
Belarus	US	2004–ongoing	Belarus	EU	1998–1999
			Bosnia and Herzegovina	EU	1992-2006
Burundi*	EU	2015 -ongoing			
Cameroon	US	1992–1998			
CAR	EU	2003–2005	Bosnia and Herzegovina	UN	1992–1996
CAR	EU	2013 – ongoing	Bosnia and Herzegovina*	EU	2011 – ongoing
CAR	US	2003–2005	Colombia	US	1996–1998
China	US	1989–ongoing	Croatia	EU	1992–2000
China	EU	1989–ongoing	Croatia	UN	1992–1996
Comoros	EU	1999–2000	DRC	EU	1997–2008
Côte d'Ivoire	US	1999–2016	DRC	UN	2003–2008
Côte d'Ivoire*	EU	2000–2016	Eritrea	UN	2000–2001
Côte d'Ivoire	UN	2004–2016	Eritrea	US	2006–ongoing
Cuba	US	1960–ongoing	Eritrea	UN	2009–ongoing
Cuba	EU	2003–2005	Ethiopia	UN	2000–2001
DRC	US	1990–1997	FRY	UN	1991–1995
DRC	EU	1992–1997	FRY	EU	1991–1997
DRC*	EU	2016 - ongoing			
Equatorial Guinea	EU	1992–ongoing	FRY	US	1995–1999
Fiji	EU	2001–2003	FRY	EU	1998–2001
Fiji	EU	2006–ongoing	FRY	UN	1998–2001
Fiji	US	2006–ongoing	FRY	US	1998–2001
FRY	US	1991–1995	Haiti	US	1991–2006
FRY	US	1999–2003	Indonesia	US	1992–2005
Gambia	US	1994–1998	Indonesia	EU	1998–1999
Gambia	EU	1994–2002	Iran	US	1984–ongoing
Guatemala	EU	1993–1993	Iran	UN	2006–ongoing
			Iran*	EU	2011 -ongoing
Guatemala	US	1993–1993	Iraq	US	1982–2003
Guinea	EU	2002–2006	Iraq	UN	1990–1991

Guinea*	EU	2009–2014	Iraq	UN	1991–2003

Guinea	US	2009–2010	Jordan	US	1990–1997
Guinea-Bissau	US	2003–2004	Liberia	UN	1992–2001
Guinea-Bissau	EU	2012 -2016			
Haiti	US	1991–1994	Liberia	EU	2001–2001
Haiti	UN	1993–1994	Liberia	UN	2001–2003
Haiti	EU	2001–2005	Libya	US	1978–2004
Haiti	US	2002–2005	Libya	EU	1986–2004
Honduras	EU	2009–2010	Libya	UN	1992–2003
Honduras	US	2009–2010	Macedonia	EU	1991–2000
Kenya	US	1990–1993	Macedonia	UN	1991–1996
Libya*	EU	2016 -2017			
Madagascar	EU	2009–2011	North Korea	US	1993–ongoing
Madagascar	US	2010–ongoing	North Korea	UN	2006–ongoing
			North Korea*	EU	2006 -ongoing
Malawi	EU	1992–1994	Peru	US	1995–1998
			Russia*	EU	2014 -ongoing
			Russia*	US	2014 -ongoing
Malawi	US	1992–1994	Rwanda	EU	1994–1995
Mauritania	US	2008–2009	Rwanda	UN	1994–1995
Mauritania	EU	2008–2009	Somalia	US	1989–ongoing
			Somalia*	EU	2002 -ongoing
Myanmar	US	1988–ongoing	Sri Lanka	US	2008–ongoing
Myanmar	EU	1996–ongoing	Sudan	US	1993–ongoing
Nicaragua	US	1992–1995	Sudan	EU	1994–ongoing
Niger	EU	1996–1999	Sudan	UN	1996–ongoing
Niger	US	1996–2000	Sudan	UN	2005–ongoing
Niger	US	2009–2011	Syria	US	1986–2003
Nigeria	US	1993–1998	Syria	EU	1987–1994
			Syria*	EU	2017 -ongoing
Nigeria	EU	1993–1999	Syria	US	2004–ongoing
			Tunisia*	EU	2011 -ongoing
North Korea	US	1950–ongoing	Uzbekistan	EU	2005–2009
Pakistan	US	1999–2001	Venezuela	US	2006–ongoing
Peru	US	1991–1995	Vietnam	US	1975–1994
Peru	EU	2000–2001	Yemen	US	1990–1997
			Yemen*	EU	2015-ongoing
Russia	US	1991–1991			
Russia	EU	1991–1991			
Thailand	US	1991–1992			

Togo	EU	1992–1995
Togo	EU	1998–2004
Turkey	EU	1995–1995
Uzbekistan	US	2005–ongoing
Zambia	EU	1996–1999
Zimbabwe	EU	2002–ongoing
Zimbabwe	US	2002–ongoing