Bonding Social Capital in Ideologically Homogenous Churches: An Analysis of Asian American Churches and Congregants' Political Participation

Nathan Chan

University of California, Irvine

Abstract:

Research consistently emphasizes the importance of religious institutions for mobilizing political action among Asian Americans. The social capital literature debates between two theoretical explanations for why churches increase political activity: bridging capital between different groups and bonding capital among similar groups. The latter argues that individuals who attend racially homogenous churches are associated with more participation. This current paper builds off of and contributes to the literature by examining another aspect of bonding. How does similarity in political views among church members affect Asian Americans' political participation? Contrary to bridging social capital theory, results from the 2016 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey show that Asian Americans who attend politically similar, compared to politically dissimilar churches, are significantly more likely to vote and participate in conventional modes of activity. The effects of racial homogeneity are limited once taking political homogeneity into consideration. These findings provide evidence that it is the political homophily within religious organizations that allow for the bonding of social capital between racial/ethnic minorities and is indeed salient to democratic participation.

Introduction

Asian Americans are an increasing proportion of the United States electorate. A 2017 Pew Research Center Report notes that Asians have outnumbered Hispanics in terms of percentage of new immigrant arrivals since the beginning of this decade. This racial/ethnic group reached an all-time high of 38% of all immigrants arriving to the United States. How Asian Americans and newly arrived immigrants, integrate into the host political system is becoming an increasingly important phenomenon; in such, research in the social sciences needs continuing theoretical development in order to explain how Asian Americans are mobilized to participate in political affairs. Existing literature points to civic organizations, but specifically, religious institutions, as a powerful source for motivating racial/ethnic minorities like Asian Americans to participate in politically based activities. My research question falls in this section of the political behavior literature and asks, what are the ways in which religion assists Asian Americans to gain the necessary assets to take political action? Is political participation influenced by whether Asian Americans attend churches among individuals with similar political beliefs? This paper provides two scholarly contributions by 1. Testing previous theories explaining the relationship between religious orientation (notably, racial homogeneity among church members) and political activity among Asian Americans and 2. Providing an additional theoretical framework focused on political, ideological homogeneity among church members which explains how religion mobilizes Asian Americans to take political action. I contribute to the existing literature in these two ways and provide evidence consistent with scholarship that religious institutions have striking consequences, especially among racial/ethnic minorities. Asian Americans are no exception to this phenomenon.

Literature Review

While minority participation has primarily focused on the political behavior of African Americans and Latinos, Asian Americans have certainly not been left out of this discussion. In fact, scholarly work has shown that predictors of political participation that hold for Whites and other racial/ethnic minorities do not necessarily tell the same story for Asian Americans. The political behavior literature emphasizes the importance of socioeconomic status and education as two key indicators for participation in political activities; these resources generally have a stimulating effect on political action (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, and Verba et al. 1995). However, this is not the case for Asian Americans. Asian Americans are on average more educated than other racial/ethnic groups, and in addition, may have a higher income. However, they do not participate at the levels predicted by these two resource indicators (Nakanishi 1991, Cho 1999, Lien 2010, and Wong et al. 2011). In the most comprehensive and current study on Asian American political participation, Wong et al. (2011) report on the 2008 National Asian American Survey and find that there is little association between these SES resources and being registered to vote or having actually voted in elections.

Another mechanism in which existing literature would guarantee more political participation is through recruitment. As a core feature of the Civic Voluntarism Model (Verba et al. 1995) individuals take part in political activities when they are simply asked to do so (also see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Yet, similarly to the socioeconomic models of political activity, recruitment mechanisms may often not work in parallel for Asian Americans compared to other

racial/ethnic groups. Scholars have found that when recruitment happens among Asian Americans, it has a positive effect on the likelihood, frequency, and modalities of political participation. However, research on Asian Americans finds that this racial/ethnic minority, particularly one that is so immigrant heavy, are rarely mobilized by either the Democratic or Republican Party (Wong 2006 and Kim 2007). It is not to say that recruitment is ineffective; it is such that political organizations do not outreach to Asian Americans as frequently. Campaigns that may be in charge of delegating canvassers are focusing their attentions and potentially scarce resources to get other societal groups active-- groups that are perhaps already prone to participating in the first place. Asian Americans seemingly do not participate as much because they just simply are not being asked to do so, furthering perpetuating the political participation gap between Asian Americans and other racial/ethnic groups.

In spite of the limited effects of socioeconomic resources and lack of recruitment of Asian Americans to participate in politics, this group relies heavily on civic organizations. This has been found to be of utmost importance for Asian American integration into the political sphere. Specifically, religious institutions such as the church serve as equalizers for participation (Verba et al. 1995) and fill in partially for the lack of recruitment of Asian Americans (Wong et al. 2005). Churches are instrumental at mobilizing their congregations to be politically active. A vast amount of scholarship has shown that religious attendance is a positive and significant predictor of political activity (Djupe and Grant 2001, Harris 1999, Park and Smith 2000, and Peterson 1992). To add to the analyses of political behavior among churchgoers, scholars have found that there are religious denominational differences between those who are Protestant and Catholic (see for example Jones-Correa and Leal 2001 and Verba et al. 1995 who find that Protestants compared to Catholics are on average more likely to participate in the political life). Religious institutions provide motivation for Asian Americans to participate in civic activities such as volunteering in the community and being active in other civic, voluntary associations (Loveland et al. 2008, Sundeen et al. 2007, and Ecklund and Park 2005). Variants of religious affiliation, activity, and attendance are mobilizers even to strictly political action among Asian Americans (Lien et al. 2004, Wong et al. 2005, Lui 2011, Wong et al. 2011, Ecklund et al. 2013, Cherry 2009, Carnes and Yang 2004, Foley and Hoge 2007 and Ablay 2016). Scholars find that religion mobilizes Asian Americans specifically to vote in elections, whereas the impact of religion on other modes of political activity are a bit less conclusive (Wong et al. 2011 and Cherry 2009). Religion is nonetheless, central for the Asian American community in terms of their politics. The church can serve as a place for practicing political beliefs and a source of political mobilization which benefits Asian Americans' political participation.

Scholars then have provided different theories to explain why certain religious affiliations, frequency of religious attendance, and different types of religious activity stimulate political participation. First, individuals who attend and are involved in church activities are able to acquire civic skills that are translatable to the political life (Verba et al. 1995, Wong et al. 2005, Schwadel 2002, Djupe and Grant 2001, Peterson 1992, Wald et al. 1990, Djupe et al. 2007, and Greenberg 2000). For instance, Verba et al. (1995) speculate that there is a participation gap between Latinos and Whites in part because of their religious affiliation differences. Latinos, who primarily identify as Catholic, are not as likely to gain civic skills. On the other hand, Whites who primarily identify as Protestant, gain more civic skills in their church. These civic skills are instrumental to political participation. For example, churchgoers may gain public

speaking, reading, and writing skills through planning church events or leading church youth groups further giving them the necessary skillset to raise issues about politics to elected officials or speak up at political meetings and townhalls. Addressing the population of interest, it has been shown that Asian American churches are not the exception; these religious organizations are also able to provide their congregants with these practical non-political skills (Wong et al. 2005 and Cherry 2009). The church provides individuals who affiliate with the opportunity to learn and develop a certain skillset that Asian Americans may not be able to get elsewhere. These assets may be used for participation into politics.

Aside from the civic skills, religion is also able to mobilize their followers through altering psychological determinants which can explain higher propensity toward activity in politics. Religious institutions are able to expose members to more political information and spur greater interest in politics (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001, Wald et al. 1990, and Harris 1994). Political psychological theories of political behavior have most recently been used to explain the participation of Muslim Americans (Jamal 2005, Ayers and Hoffstetter 2008, and Barreto et al. 2018). Jamal (2005), for example, finds that Muslim affiliation and activity within a mosque matters for this minority religious group because their religious institution is able to foster feelings of group consciousness, increasing their probability to participate in political activities.¹

The literature, lastly, emphasizes the importance of religion for developing social capital. That is, those that that attend church together are more likely to develop strong social networks with one another. It is these strong social connections that mobilize individuals to take civic and political action, specifically for racial and ethnic minorities (Lui 2011, Sundeen et al. 2007, Sundeen et al. 2009, and Jang 2012). Theories of social capital have distinguished between bridging social capital and bonding social capital. Taken conceptually from Putnam (2000), personal contact with others can bridge social capital by fostering strong connections between heterogenous groups. Bonding social capital, on the other hand, can occur between homogenous groups. Scholars have argued that bridging social capital between heterogenous (different) members of a voluntary association is more effective for increasing democratic citizenship values such as political participation, while bonding social capital between similar group members is not as effective (Gutmann 1998, Putnam 2000, Huntington 2004, and Schlesinger 1993). Affiliating with homogenous groups may have dire effects for democratic values. However, the opposite has also been argued by Lui (2011), who posits the benefits of bonding social capital on political participation. He argues that bonding social capital can occur in the context of the church specifically for racial/ethnic minorities. He finds that many churches are attended by individuals of the same racial/ethnic backgrounds; Asian Americans and African Americans that attend majority Asian American and African American populated churches are more likely to vote. That is, minorities that are exposed to others of the same racial/ethnic identification in the church are more likely to vote in elections.

¹ Comparatively, religion plays a mobilizing role for political participation through the fostering of political norms and values among East Asians. Chang's (2016) work on how Eastern religious affiliation such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Folk Religions affect political participation takes on a political culture approach. He argues that religion is able to foster certain notions of citizenship, the engaged and duty-based citizen (Dalton 2008). Certain religions are accustomed to values such as "obedience, social hierarchy, social stability, social harmony, and collective interests" (Change 2016, page 259) which motivate participation in conventional activities such as voting. Other religions are more accustomed to engaged citizenship values which mobilize those religious individuals to take on more contentious forms of political participation such as protesting (also see: Chang 2010).

Contribution

To recap, individuals' religious orientation among racial/ethnic minorities such as Asian Americans increase their likelihood to participate in political activities. Theories for how religion mobilizes their congregants can be categorized in terms of the tangible (civic skills) and intangible (psychological incentives and social capital) explanations. However, missing from the religion and political behavior literature is further discussion on how social capital is developed in the context of the church and its consequences on political participation. There has been some indication that social capital in the church develops through racial/ethnic solidarity which boosts propensity to vote. Similarly to Lui (2011), I accept the "demythified" notion of bonding social capital. However, the church is able to help those who are members gain social capital for political participation through an alternative pathway. Extending the existing literature, I consider the potential and ability for churches to mobilize their congregants to be politically active through developing a sense of bonding social capital that might not be developed only on religious and racial/ethnic similarity but also through a common sense of political ideological similarity with other members of the same church. Asian Americans may use the church as a unique opportunity to develop strong social networks among people with the same political views as them. It is this notion of political homogeneity where bonded sums of social capital are developed across similar members of the church. Bonding social capital in this political homogeneity manner allows for a greater likelihood to participate in politically based activities.

Structural, Cognitive, and Relational Social Capital in Politically Similar Churches

In order for social capital to move toward greater political action amongst this network of politically homogenous churchgoers, three aspects of social capital should be noted. Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998) break down the attributes of social capital into a structural, relational, and a cognitive component. I will take them each separately. There first needs to be consideration of just where social ties and network are being developed. Therefore, the structural institution, the physical space that congregants are gathering which may be composed of likeminded individuals, are key. Religious institutions like the church do not only provide a physical space for worship and the practice of religious beliefs, there are inevitably social exchanges that occur among congregants. Without this structure, social networks are absent and do not allow for these politically similar members to even come in contact with one another. Churches as religious institutions proxy as institutions for political mobilization. As noted in the literature review, this has been found to be particularly the case for American Americans (Emerson and Smith 2000, Jeung 2005, among others previously cited).


Surely, Asian Americans cannot develop bonding social capital with one another if the church is not utilized as a physical organization or institution. However, more importantly, is what goes on within the walls of these churches. Another aspect, then, when considering the mobilizing capacity of bonding social capital for political activity is the cognitive component. The existing literature refers to cognition as the development of awareness about "shared representations, interpretations, and systems of meaning" (Klandermans and van Stekelenberg 2013). As Asian American Christians gather weekly in their church and come into contact with other members, individuals have more exposure to various conversations and may come to realize that their

political views may, in fact, align with others in their social, religious circles. They may develop a greater sense of awareness of their shared political values and bond socially in that aspect. It has been found that once an awareness or "consciousness" of similarity is realized, that shared values can mobilize individuals to take political action (Huckfeldt et al. 2013 and Gurin et al. 1980). If those with likeminded interpersonal views are more likely to participate in politics (Mutz 2002), individuals then with likeminded political views are likely to mobilized through the same cognitive mechanism. Gurin et al. (1980) specify that with a certain set of similar political beliefs, political action becomes more likely. Political participation then should be altered and become more probable when one realizes that their politics aligns with many others in their church's social networks.

The last aspect, the relational component (Grannovetter 1973), is a culmination of structure and cognition. Asian Americans use the church as a tangible space for bonding social capital. They also use the church to develop a realization that they may have similar political values with other members in their church. What follows consciousness about members' politics is the ease of developing strong relationships with one another. Grannovetter (1973) notes the strong relational component of social capital and its mobilizing capacity toward more activity. Relationships are developed through re-occurring interaction with one another. Among like-minded individuals, developing strong relationships comes easier than among dissimilar individuals. This political agreement and homophily can further serve as a source of trust and friendship. It has been found that those who develop strong relationships in terms of trust with one another, are more likely to participate in cooperative activity (Lind and Tyler 1998). Individuals that developed respect for one another also participate more (Simon and Sturmer 2003).

As individuals develop strong relationships (trust, and/or respect) with one another, attending churches where your political views and beliefs align with others' political values arises an additional norm of reciprocity. That is, politically similar members in a religious organization may have an extended responsibility toward one another. Individuals who bond over political homophily may have the increased incentive to act on these similar political beliefs because their decision to participate is no longer an individually-based decision. Specially for Asian Americans, Kwon et al. (1996) and Chen (2002) argue that the relational ties gained in the church are of utmost importance. Asian Americans who have similar political ideology with other members in their church then will have an increased incentive to maintain these connections through acting homogenously on their aligned political beliefs. Therefore, when deciding whether to vote or not to vote, to participate in politics or to abstain, these Asian Americans have the increased incentive to act not just for the sake of themselves but also for their politically and ideologically-aligned social networks. They make a group-based decision to participate in politics. These politically similar individuals participate in politics as an outlet in order to prove their strong relationships and solidify their trust, and respect for their political allies of whom they found within this religious organization.

Figure 1: Linking Bonding Social Capital to Political Participation among Asian Americans



Note: Political homophily in the church serves as a starting point for bonding social capital to occur. When the church is used as a structure for members to gather, a cognitive awareness and development of strong social networks and relationships are fostered. This allows for greater likelihood of political participation as the decision to take political action moves from an individual to a group-based calculation.

Hypotheses

Asian Americans can gain social capital relevant for political participation by attending a political ideologically homogenous church. It is the bonding of social capital rooted in political similarity that mobilizes individuals to participate. Among Asian Americans, increasing political similarity with others attending the same church should have a positive and significant effect on voter turnout (H1). Second, church political homogeneity should have a positive and significant effect on other non-voting modes of political participation, both conventional (H2) and unconventional political activity (H3). Cautiously, there may be more uncertainty for my second and third hypotheses. Previous literature notes the importance of religion and political participation among Asian Americans but note the differential effects of religious orientation depending on the modes of political action analyzed. For example, Wong et al. (2011) find that being affiliated with Christianity is positively associated with Asian Americans having registered and voted in elections but not necessarily for other forms of participation such as protesting and donating to political campaigns. Along the same lines, Cherry (2009) finds that religious affiliation, attendance, and activity among Chinese Americans are all significant predictors for voting but not for participating civically, petitioning, attending political meetings, or protesting. Lastly, in testing previous theories of racial homogeneity, which claim to also foster bonding social capital, I expect that this too should have a positive effect on voting behavior (H4).²

Data and Methodology

For this analysis, I utilize the 2016 wave of the Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). In all, the 2016 survey is ideal because it contains a recent, nationally representative, and oversample of Asian Americans. The survey was self-administered and conducted online. Surveys were available in English, Chinese (simplified/traditional), Korean, and Vietnamese.

² Lui (2011) does not address non-voting modes of political participation.

Full disclosure on randomized sampling and data collection for the 2016 Wave of the CMPS are available <u>here</u>.

Dependent Variables

The outcome I seek to explain is political participation. I operationalize political participation using a multi-dimensional approach. I look specifically at three separate measures: voting, nonvoting electoral (conventional) participation, and non-electoral (unconventional) participation. My voting variable is a self-reported measure for whether or not an individual voted in the 2016 election. Similarly to Barreto et al. (2018), the anonymity of the respondents do not allow for a cross-validation of whether or not the self-reported measure matches the actual action. Nonetheless, the use of self-reported turnout data follows "a long tradition of political science research," (see also Dawson 1994 and Verba et al. 1995). For voting behavior, only Asian American citizens are analyzed. My non-voting, conventional participation variable is an additive index of political activities which includes working on a campaign, donating to political organizations, wearing political advertisements, contacting an elected official, cooperating with others to solve a community problem, or attending political meetings. This variable takes on the values between 0-6, 1 point for each activity participated in. Non-electoral activities include an aggregate measure of activities including boycotting products for political reasons, protesting, or signing a political petition; this variable takes on the values between 0-3, again, 1 point for each activity participated in.

Independent Variables

I look to two main independent variables: racial homogeneity and political ideological homogeneity both within the context of one's church. In order to measure how an individual's political views align with others' political views in their church, I use the survey question which asks Asian Americans, "How similar would you say your political views are with most people in your church?" Survey response options include Not similar all, Not very similar, Somewhat similar, or Very similar. Responses are coded from 0-4, with 4 being the highest degree of similarity. While it does not specify the direction of political views (liberal or conservative), the measure gives us a clear sense of whether individuals' political stances align homogeneously with others in their church or whether congregants perceive that their political views collide heterogeneously with other members of their church.

A measure of church racial homogeneity is also available in the 2016 CMPS. They ask Asian Americans to "Please indicate the approximate racial/ethnic composition of your place of religious worship or gathering. Responses must add up to 100%." Respondents were left to indicate the percentage of Whites, African Americans, Latinos, Asians, or Other in their church. The variable is coded 1 if the percentage of Asians are the highest compared to Whites, African Americans, Latinos, or Other; if the percentage of Asians are the lower than Whites, African Americans, Latinos, or Other, then the variable is coded 0.

Control Variables

In trying to determine the independent effects of racial and political homogeneity on the political participation of Asian Americans, I build multivariate models that control for key sociodemographic variables generally known to be associated with both religion and political activity. These include an individuals' age, gender, education, income level, party identification,

ideology, and percentage of life not spent in the United States. I also consider indicators of psychological engagement such as political interest, political efficacy, and strength of party attachment. Recruitment into politics is also used as a control. As for other religious oriented control variables, I include a dummy indicator for religious affiliation and frequency of church attendance. Lastly, to determine how other forms of organizational membership aside from religious institutions affect political participation, I include a variable which measures the extent to which individuals are affiliated with and active in other civic organizations. Questions and coding are detailed in the appendix.

Methods of Analysis

First, I test the relationship between racial homogeneity in a church and one's likelihood to participate in politics. Lui (2011) relies on a relatively weak measure of this independent variable. He cites a 2004 Gallup Poll Survey which finds that most Americans who attend church, attend one that is racially homogenous and uses this information as justification for using frequency of church attendance as a proxy for racial homogeneity. Using a more direct measure of this independent variable, I first run models predicting voter turnout as a function of this more valid measure of racial homogeneity while also utilizing a similar set of control variables.³ Next, I test the relationship between church ideological similarity and voting, conventional, and unconventional participation. Due to the nature of my response outcomes for voter turnout, I run logistic regressions. Along with the logistic regressions, I run predicted probabilities specifically looking at the difference when an individual has the highest degree of ideological similarity with other members of their church, compared to an individual who has very dissimilar political views with other church congregants. For the other two dependent variables, conventional participation and unconventional political participation, which take on the values of 0-6 and 0-3 respectively, I run negative binomial regressions.⁴

Results

I estimate the effects of racial homogeneity on voting using a far more robust measure. The results reported in Table 1 come to different inferences than previous work which finds a mobilizing effect of racial homogeneity on likelihood of turning out to vote. Across different model specifications, racial homogeneity tends to have a positive effect but a result that does not reach any close level of statistical significance (p=0.51 when considering the full, 4th model in Table 1). Asian Americans that attend church with other members of the same racial/ethnic identification are not mobilized significantly to vote in national elections. When I move from the assumption that Asian Americans attend churches with other Asian Americans primarily, do away with using church attendance as a proxy, and instead consider whether or not their respondents' churches are mostly composed of Asian identifying individuals, I find no significant effect of this type of bonding social capital. I have no evidence to thoroughly support Hypothesis 4, doubting this notion of bonding.

³ My analysis of the relationship between racial homogeneity and voting will differ as I take frequentist approach. Lui (2011) uses a Bayesian approach.

⁴ Count models are preferable to ordinary least squares regression as these dependent variables take on integer values. Negative binomial regression coefficients and standard errors are reported in the body of the paper due to potential of overdispersion. However, Poisson regression models are also fitted. The results of the Poisson regressions predicting conventional and unconventional political participation are ran as robustness tests for the negative binomial regressions and are reported in Tables A and B in the Appendix.

[Table 1 about here]

Next, I turn to a test of my main independent variable of interest in relation to voting in national elections. The results reported in Table 2 show various versions of the model which estimate the effects of church political homogeneity on voter turnout. The different model specifications across the board show strong and significant effects of political homogeneity on likelihood to vote. Due to the interpretable nature of logistic regression coefficients, I compute the predicted probabilities considering the difference in voter turnout between individuals that attend churches with individuals ranging from very dissimilar to very similar political views. Figure 1 plots the predicted probability of turning out to vote across different levels of political homogeneity in one's church ranging from the lowest to highest degree of ideological similarity. Asian American citizens who go to a politically aligned church are about 12% more likely to vote in national elections. Additionally, I set out to compare the magnitude effect of church political homogeneity to other control variables on the likelihood of turning out to vote. In Figure 2, I estimate the predicted change in turnout by simulating the difference between the maximum and minimum level of one independent variable while control variables are held constant at their mean. Does the effect of civic organizational engagement, racial solidarity (linked fate), or other religious orientation indicators exceed that of church political homogeneity? Figure 2 notes that the clear answer is no. Not only do all of these aforementioned types of variables fail to reach significance as the confidence levels cross 0, the magnitude effect is weaker than that of our main independent variable of interest. The predicted probabilities from Table 2, Model 4 indicate that a racially homogenous church advantages Asian American citizens by about 2% only; Asian Americans who feel as if their life is tied to others in the same racial and ethnic group are only 5.4% more likely to vote. Attending church most frequently disadvantages this group by 10.5%; being a Protestant increases the likelihood to vote by about 4.6%. The church political homogeneity stands out amongst the other religious orientation, linked fate, and civic association variables in our model. Providing evidence for the enduring validity of Verba et al.'s (1995) Civic Volunteerism Model, only education (resources), political interest (engagement), and recruitment are stronger predictors of voter behavior for Asian Americans than the central independent variable in this article, church political homogeneity. In short, the results strongly support Hypothesis 1.

[Table 2 about here]

[Figure 1 about here]

[Figure 2 about here]

Previous studies on bonding social capital, have mainly looked at its effects on voting. Yet, there are other modes of political participation that matter. I now turn to analyzing conventional forms and unconventional forms of political participation. For instance, does being in a church among others with politically similar views mobilize Asian Americans to donate to political organizations, contact elected officials, sign a petition or attend protests? Table 3 reports negative binomial regression coefficients and standard errors predicting two separate participation measures as dependent variables. The results show that political similarity does

little for Asian Americans to take contentious, unconventional forms of political action. The results are more optimistic when taking into consideration conventional political participation, which are reported in Table 4. Across different versions of the negative binomial models in Table 4, church political homogeneity is always a statistically significant predictor for conventional modes of political participation. Table 4, Model 1, which only controls for sociodemographic variables, shows that for every increase in degree of political similarity, the rate of conventional political participation increases by 1.27. That is, Asian Americans who attend church with individuals in which their political views align more with other congregants elevate their predicted number of conventional political activities by 27.5% ($100 * [e^{0.243}-1] = 27.5$). Considering the full model in Table 4, which controls for socio-demographic, psychological engagement, recruitment, civic involvement, church racial homogeneity, linked fate, and other religious oriented variables, the model estimates that each degree of a church's political similarity increases the rate of conventional political participation by 1.08 or an increase in their predicted number of conventional activities by about 8% ($100 * [e^{0.076} - 1] = 7.8$). The results for unconventional political participation do not show strong support for Hypothesis 3, as negative binomial regressions suggest in Table 4. The degree of political similarity in Asian Americans' churches do not matter much for their unconventional political activities. Nonetheless, the results are in line with previous literature on Asian American political behavior which finds mobilizing effects of religious orientation on voting but more doubtful for non-electoral forms of political participation (Wong et al. 2011 and Cherry 2009). Aside from protesting, signing petitions, or pocketbook activism, Asian Americans who attend churches which are ideologically aligned with their own political views are significant more likely to participate in system-abiding forms of activity such as donating to campaigns, volunteering for political organizations, wearing political advertisements, contacting elected officials, cooperating with others to solve a local community issue, or attending political meetings. The results empirically support Hypothesis 2.

[Table 3 about here]

[Table 4 about here]

Conclusion:

Bonding social capital has the potential to be salient for democratic participation in political affairs. However, not through the same mechanism as previous scholarship notes. Utilizing a more robust measure and more current data set among Asian Americans, the empirical results reported in this paper indicate that racial homogeneity cannot confidently predict voter turnout. That is, Asian Americans who are attending churches with other Asian Americans might not necessarily be participating at a higher propensity. The results from the linked fate variable, which measures the degree to which Asian Americans think their life is somewhat tied to that of other Asian Americans, compliment the testing of racial homogeneity on voter turnout. Looking back to Table 1, Model 4, just like racial homogeneity, linked fate is positive but an insignificant predictor of voting in national elections. The findings on racial homogeneity within Asian Americans churches presented in the current paper are in opposition to Lui's (2011) findings. However, it is not utterly surprising that feelings of racial solidarity are not mobilizing Asian Americans to participate significantly. Previous findings on linked fate and group consciousness are somewhat mixed and inconclusive when it comes to Asian Americans (Lien 1994 and Wong

et al. 2005). How racial solidarity functions, specifically perceptions of linked fate amongst other U.S. racial and ethnic minority groups such as African Americans, do not work in tandem with Asian Americans. Asian American racial solidarity and its potential mobilization of political behavior is doubtful for several reasons as McClain et al. (2013) succinctly summarize. Asian Americans may not necessarily be mobilized to take political action as a function of racial solidarity because Asian Americans may racially/ethnically identify themselves primarily with their subethnic group rather than the pan-ethnic group; Asian Americans, additionally, may not necessarily perceive themselves as a subordinate group in the U.S. racial hierarchy to begin with and may not have the same political goals. In a strong sense, the literature on group identity, group consciousness, and linked fate, compliment the results presented here which also may suggest the lack of power for a church's racial composition to mobilize Asian Americans to participate in politics.

If bonding social capital by similarity in racial/ethnic identification does not matter for Asian American political participation, should it be assumed that only bridging social capital is better for democracy as Putnam (2000) and Gutmann (1998) suggested? The empirical findings in this paper suggest that the answer to this question is no. When individuals come into contact with one another and develop similarities on a political dimension, this does have the potential to mobilize Asian Americans to participate in elections and conventional forms of political activity. I "demythify" the dark side of social capital by presenting a theory which argues that Asian Americans in politically homogeneous churches, not necessarily with the same racial/ethnic backgrounds, are the ones that are more likely to participate in politics. Structural, cognitive, and relational capital mobilize Asian Americans to participate on behalf of their groups rather than just themselves. The larger congregation is not made up of one person, as a result, those that are conservative and attend churches with other conservatives will likely adopt the same political behavior patterns. Likeminded individuals use political participation as an outlet to prove, solidify, and strengthen their reciprocal commitment to their political allies found in the church.

Future research should address whether or not this bonding form of social capital can also assist other U.S. racial/ethnic minorities to be active in politics. Does this phenomenon hold when considering African Americans and Latinos? My suspicion is that due to the prominence of the church as a politicizing agent, African Americans who attend churches with similar ideology to other attendees might be mobilized to participate in political activities. My speculation on the power of ideological homogeneity within a church is more unclear when considering Latinos, who identify more with Catholicism rather than Protestantism. Further, their religious institutional frameworks contrast each other and have differential spillover consequences for political behavior (Verba et al. 1995 and Jones-Leal and Correa 2001). If the Catholic church is a bit more hierarchical as opposed to the more vertically structured Protestant church, bonding social capital among the masses might not have as great of a mobilizing effect on Latino participation than it may for African Americans, who are more so affiliated with Protestantism. Future studies should also consider the potential in which bonding social capital can occur in other civic organizations and institutions besides the church such as ones' job workplace.

Future work can also address whether or not this is normatively good for American politics. A more heavily involved electorate means that more voices are heard in the political process. This is especially needed from racial/ethnic minorities who are often are less involved than dominant

racial/ethnic groups in the United States. Bonding social capital can increase the likelihood of Asian American political voices. Yet another line of argument most recently advanced by Mason (2018) may caution that not all increases in political participation are necessarily good for democracy. Future research may want to further grapple with whether or not bonding notions of social capital, that can develop in institutions such as the church and which may can increase political participation, are normatively good if participants are simply motivated to act in order for their allies to win rather than toward the greater good of American society.

Finally, I have laid out a theoretical framework which suggests the direction of relationship which starts at church political homogeneity and moves to political participation. The study has contributed and provided novel insight into subfields in political science such as racial and ethnic politics and religion and politics. Yet, this current observational study still has not been able to make confident claims about the direction of causality. Future empirical methods such as propensity score matching still utilizing observational data, can more clearly identify the direction of causality. Current scholarship has noted that religion does not solely move to affect political outcomes but can also move from politics to religion; for example, Margolis (2018) finds that partisanship can influence perceptions of religiosity. When looking specially at Asian Americans, existing literature points to the importance of the church as a socializing agent, indicating the relationship moves from religion to politics (Wong et al. 2005, Cherry 2009, and Lui 2011 among others). That is, it is more likely for Asian Americans, specifically this immigrant heavy population, to first come to join churches where their habits of political behavior and not necessarily formed. Asian American immigrants who may be highly unaware of the U.S. political system, use their involvement in inherently non-political, religious institutions to their political advantage. They come to be politically active through joining civic organizations first; not the reverse. Asian Americans, are already a low propensity participating group compared to other racial/ethnic subgroups; it is unlikely that they use their participation first to then influence their religious behavior. That is not to say that, that the direction of causality is impossible, but it is far more likely that Asian Americans move from their pews to their politics.

Figures and Tables

	Dependent variable:
	2016 Voter Turnout
	(1) (2) (3) (4)
Church Racial Homogeneity	0.016 0.058 0.017 0.157
	(0.137) (0.151) (0.153) (0.240)
Age	0.048^{***} 0.052^{***} 0.053^{***} 0.053^{***}
	(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Income	0.008^{***} 0.008^{***} 0.007^{***} 0.007^{***}
	(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education	0.196^{***} 0.192^{***} 0.190^{***} 0.189^{***}
	(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Female	-0.403*** -0.461*** -0.348** -0.346**
	(0.134) (0.141) (0.146) (0.146)
% Life Not in US	0.334 0.199 0.220
	(0.333) (0.342) (0.343)
Party Strength	0.489^{***} 0.421^{***} 0.422^{***}
	(0.070) (0.072) (0.072)
Conservative	-0.054 -0.002 0.004
	(0.190) (0.193) (0.194)
Republican	-0.323 -0.265 -0.256
	(0.199) (0.201) (0.201)
Recruitment	0.611*** 0.504*** 0.506***
	(0.172) (0.175) (0.176)
Civic Engagement	0.100 0.038 0.046
	(0.064) (0.066) (0.068)
Political Interest	0.438^{***} 0.441^{***}
	(0.091) (0.092)
Internal Efficacy	-0.024 -0.031
	(0.069) (0.070)
External Efficacy	0.113 0.120
	(0.074) (0.074)
Linked Fate	0.078 0.082
	(0.065) (0.065)
Protestant	0.221
	(0.383)
Church Attendance	-0.053
	(0.059)
Constant	-4.962**** -5.997**** -6.968**** -6.894***
	(0.469) (0.514) (0.607) (0.612)
Observations	1,348 1,346 1,346 1,346
Log Likelihood	-701.797 -661.306 -646.441 -645.874
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,415.594 1,346.613 1,324.881 1,327.747

Table 1: Racial Homogeneity and Voter Turnout Among Asian American Citizens

Note: Logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01


	Dependent variable:
	2016 Voter Turnout
	(1) (2) (3) (4)
Church Political Homogeneity	0.211*** 0.157** 0.136* 0.171**
	(0.075) (0.079) (0.080) (0.084)
Church Racial Homogeneity	-0.168 -0.071 -0.093 0.125
	(0.153) (0.164) (0.166) (0.241)
Age	0.048^{***} 0.052^{***} 0.053^{***} 0.053^{***}
	(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Income	0.008^{***} 0.008^{***} 0.007^{***} 0.007^{***}
	(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education	0.197^{***} 0.194^{***} 0.191^{***} 0.189^{***}
	(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Female	-0.415**** -0.477**** -0.365*** -0.365**
	(0.135) (0.142) (0.146) (0.146)
% Life Not in US	0.322 0.196 0.233
	(0.333) (0.342) (0.343)
Party Strength	0.482*** 0.416*** 0.416***
	(0.070) (0.072) (0.072)
Conservative	-0.077 -0.023 -0.016
	(0.191) (0.194) (0.195)
Republican	-0.328 [*] -0.269 -0.258
	(0.199) (0.201) (0.202)
Recruitment	0.616*** 0.510*** 0.515***
	(0.173) (0.176) (0.176)
Civic Engagement	0.080 0.022 0.032
	(0.065) (0.067) (0.068)
Political Interest	0.431*** 0.435***
	(0.091) (0.092)
Internal Efficacy	-0.017 -0.027
	(0.070) (0.070)
External Efficacy	0.108 0.118
	(0.074) (0.074)
Linked Fate	0.078 0.084
	(0.065) (0.065)
Protestant	0.247
	(0.384)
Church Attendance	-0.088
	(0.061)
Constant	-5.203**** -6.162**** -7.097**** -7.023***
	(0.480) (0.524) (0.614) (0.618)

Table 2: Political Homogeneity and Voter Turnout Among Asian American Citizens

Observations	1,348	1,346	1,346	1,346
Log Likelihood	-697.753	-659.310	-644.987	-643.772
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,409.505	1,344.619	1,323.974	1,325.544

Note: Logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01








Figure 2: Change in Predicted Probability of Voting in 2016 among Asian American Citizens

	Depend	Dependent variable:				
	Conventional P	Conventional Political Participation				
	(1) (2)	(3)	(4)			
Church Political Homogeneity	0.243*** 0.101**	0.098^{**}	0.076^*			
	(0.046) (0.042)	(0.040)	(0.042)			
Church Racial Homogeneity	-0.234** -0.111	-0.149*	-0.276**			
	(0.092) (0.086)	(0.082)	(0.110)			
Age	-0.001 -0.001	-0.001	-0.001			
	(0.003) (0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)			
Income	0.002** 0.001	0.0003	0.0004			
	(0.001) (0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)			
Education	0.013 0.018	0.001	0.001			
	(0.018) (0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)			
Female	-0.314*** -0.278***	-0.159**	-0.162**			
	(0.083) (0.074)	(0.072)	(0.072)			
% Life Not in US	-0.136	-0.149	-0.172			
	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.105)			
Party Strength	0.137^{***}	0.075**	0.077^{**}			
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)			
Conservative	-0.291***	-0.257**	-0.260**			
	(0.106)	(0.103)	(0.103)			
Republican	-0.096	-0.027	-0.032			
	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.101)			
Recruitment	0.494***	0.411^{***}	0.410^{***}			
	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.079)			
Civic Engagement	0.394***	0.334***	0.327***			
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)			
Political Interest		0.540^{***}	0.540^{***}			
		(0.051)	(0.051)			
Internal Efficacy		0.042	0.050			
		(0.033)	(0.033)			
External Efficacy		-0.024	-0.029			
		(0.036)	(0.036)			
Linked Fate		0.067**	0.065**			
		(0.033)	(0.033)			
Protestant			-0.015			
			(0.171)			
Church Attendance			0.053*			
			(0.029)			
Constant	-0.601** -1.102***		-1.903***			
	(0.284) (0.259)	(0.278)	(0.279)			
Observations	1,813 1,801	1,801	1,801			

Table 3: Church Political Homogeneity and Conventional Political Participation Among Asian Americans

Log Likelihood	-2,302.304	-2,131.119	-2,064.563	-2,062.865
theta	0.569*** (0.044)	1.136 ^{***} (0.122)	1.520*** (0.186)	1.530 ^{***} (0.187)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,618.609	4,288.238	4,163.125	4,163.731

Note: Negative binomial regression coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

		Dep	endent variable:	
		Unconvention	nal Political Participation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Church Political Homogeneity	0.068^{*}	-0.024	-0.023	-0.011
	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Church Racial Homogeneity	-0.209***	-0.079	-0.110	-0.066
	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.103)
Age	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.004*	-0.004^{*}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	0.002^{***}	0.001	0.0004	0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.021	0.030^{**}	0.011	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Female	-0.093	-0.061	0.056	0.057
	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.065)
% Life Not in US		-0.473***	-0.431***	-0.416***
		(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.100)
Party Strength		0.213***	0.159***	0.158***
		(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Conservative		-0.043	-0.001	-0.003
		(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.096)
Republican		-0.382***	-0.321***	-0.315***
		(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Recruitment		0.360***	0.268***	0.269***
		(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Civic Engagement		0.248^{***}	0.194***	0.196***
		(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Political Interest			0.413***	0.413***
			(0.046)	(0.046)
nternal Efficacy			0.074^{**}	0.069**
			(0.029)	(0.029)
External Efficacy			-0.122***	-0.118***
			(0.032)	(0.032)
Linked Fate			0.153***	0.154***
			(0.031)	(0.031)

Table /l. Church's Political Homogonalty and Unconventional Participation	Among Agion Amoricong
Table 4: Church's Political Homogeneity and Unconventional Participation	AINONY ASIAN AINCLICAUS
- word of end of or one of the offer offer of the offer o	

Protestant				0.113 (0.151)
Church Attendance				-0.025 (0.026)
Constant	-0.832***	-1.292***	-1.825***	-1.790***
	(0.242)	(0.226)	(0.254)	(0.255)
Observations	1,813	1,801	1,801	1,801
Log Likelihood	-1,877.647	-1,726.348	-1,650.086	-1,649.391
theta	2.434*** (0.507)	126.357 (896.235)	5,187.126 (20,744.550)	5,210.066 (20,755.840)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,769.294	3,478.695	3,334.172	3,336.783

Note: Negative binomial regression coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Appendix

Variable Names and Descriptions for the Collaborative Multi-Racial Post Election Survey (Barreto et al. 2016)

I. Demographics

Age: 2016 – birthyear

Percent of life outside United States: 0 for native born; for the foreign born, years since immigrated to the U.S. divided by age years since immigrated to the U.S.

Family income: recoded to midpoint of range in tens of thousands

Education: recoded to approximate number of years of schooling

Female: recoded as dummy variable to indicate female gender

Protestant: recoded as dummy variable to indicate Protestant religious affiliation

Republican: recoded as dummy variable to indicate Republican political party affiliation

Conservative: recoded as dummy variable to indicate (leaning) conservative political ideology

II. Other Control Variables

Strength of party identification (c25, c26, and c27): Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else? Do you consider yourself to be a strong (Dem/Rep), or not? If you had to choose, do you consider yourself closer to the Republican party or to the Democratic party?

Recoded as 0 (Independent), .33 (Leaners), .66 (Weak identifiers), 1 (Strong identifiers)

Organization activity (c53 and c54): Do you participate in one or more than one social, cultural, civic, political group or union or do you not participate in the activities of any such group? Do you regularly attend meetings and participate in the activities of any of these groups?

Recoded as 0 (No memberships), 1 (Inactive), 2 (Active), 3 (Very active), 4 (Most active)

Interest (c33): Some people are very interested in politics while other people can't stand politics, how about you? Are you... Not at all interested (0), Not that interested in politics (1), Somewhat interested (2), Very interested in politics (3)

External Political Efficacy (c106): How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: public officials don't care much (about) what people like me think?

Recoded as 1 (Strongly agree), 2 (Agree), 3 (Neither agree nor disagree), 4 (Disagree), 5 (Strongly Disagree)

Internal Political Efficacy (c121): How much do you agree or disagree with the statement: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

Recoded as 1 (Strongly agree), 2 (Agree), 3 (Neither agree nor disagree), 4 (Disagree), 5 (Strongly disagree)

Linked fate (c150 and c151): Do you think what happens generally to (self-reported race and ethnicity s2) people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you?

Recoded as 0 (c150=No), 1 (c150=Yes and Not very much linked fate), 2 (c150=Yes and Some linked fate), 3 (c150=Yes and A lot of linked fate)

Recruited by party to register or vote (c81): Over the past 12 months, were you asked to register or to vote by a candidate for office or a person working for a candidate, a representative of a political party, or someone from an organization working in your community?

Recoded as 1 (Yes), 0 (No), 0 (Don't know)

Church attendance (c131): Do you attend religious service or gathering: At least every week (5), Almost every week (4), A few times a month (3), Only a few times during the year (2), Hardly ever (1) or Never (0)?

III. Main Independent Variables

Church Political Homogeneity (c139): How similar would you say your political views are with most of the people in your church?

Recoded as 3 (Very similar), 2 (Somewhat similar), 1 (Not very similar), 0 (Not similar at all)

Church Racial Homogeneity (*c133, if c131=1, 2, or 3*): Please indicate the approximate racial/ethnic composition of your place of religious worship or gather. Responses must add up to 100 percent.

Recoded 1 if Percent Asian > Percent White or Percent Black or Percent Latino or Hispanic or Percent Other, 0 if Percent Asian < Percent White or Percent Black or Percent Latino or Hispanic or Percent Other

IV. Dependent variables

Vote (*c12*): This year a lot of people said they did NOT vote in the election, because they were just too busy, not that interested in politics, or frankly don't like their choice. How about you? Would the official vote records for (state) indicate that you voted in 2016 election, or like many people, did you skip this one?

Recode as 1 (Yes, I voted), 0 (No, I did NOT vote)

Conventional Political Participation: (c57, c58, c59, c60, c62, and c63): additive political participation index between 0-6 for conventional activities including campaign work + wearing political advertisements + donate money to political campaigns + collective community work + attending political meeting + contacting public officials

Unconventional Political Participation: (c68, c67, and c66): additive political participation index between 0-3 for unconventional activities including boycotting products for political reasons + signing a petition + attending a protest march or rally

		Dependent variable:			
	Conve	Conventional Political Participation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Church Political Homogeneity	0.235 ^{***} (0.029)	0.093 ^{***} (0.030)	0.087 ^{***} (0.030)	0.064 ^{**} (0.032)	
Church Racial Homogeneity	-0.234***	-0.099*	-0.135**	-0.253**	
	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.079)	
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	
Income	(0.002) 0.002***	(0.002) 0.001*	(0.002) 0.0004	(0.002) 0.0003	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Education	0.013	0.017	0.001	0.002	
Female	(0.011) -0.302***	(0.011) -0.232***	(0.011) -0.104*	(0.012) -0.108**	
remaie	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	
% Life Not in US		-0.155** (0.078)	-0.154* (0.080)	-0.176 ^{**} (0.080)	
Party Strength		0.115***	0.064**	0.065**	
Conservative		(0.026) -0.274 ^{****}	(0.026) -0.237***	(0.026) -0.243**	
Republican		(0.077) -0.034	(0.078) 0.009	(0.078) 0.008	
		(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.074)	
Recruitment		0.449 ^{***} (0.055)	0.368 ^{***} (0.056)	0.371*** (0.056)	
Civic Engagement		0.362***	0.310***	0.303***	
Political Interest		(0.017)	(0.017) 0.510 ^{***}	(0.018) 0.510***	
			(0.039)	(0.039)	
Internal Efficacy			0.044* (0.024)	0.051** (0.024)	
External Efficacy			-0.023	-0.029	
			(0.026)	(0.026)	
Linked Fate			0.068 ^{***} (0.025)	0.067 ^{**} (0.025)	
Protestant				0.044	
Church Attendance				(0.121) 0.047**	
				(0.021)	
Constant	-0.572*** (0.179)	-1.004 ^{***} (0.186)	-1.772 ^{***} (0.208)	-1.807** (0.210)	
Observations	1,813	1,801	1,801	1,801	

Log Likelihood	-	-	-	-
Log Likelihood	2,626.230	2,250.761	2,143.926	2,141.225
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,266.459	4,527.522	4,321.851	4,320.449

Note: Poisson binomial regression coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table B: Church Political Homogeneity and Unconventional Political Participation Among Asian Americans

		Dependen	t variable:		
	Unconv	Unconventional Political Participation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Church Political Homogeneity	0.066^{*}	-0.024	-0.023	-0.011	
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)	
Church Racial Homogeneity	-0.205***	-0.078	-0.110	-0.066	
	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.103)	
Age	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.004^{*}	-0.004^{*}	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Income	0.002^{***}	0.001	0.0004	0.0003	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Education	0.021	0.030**	0.011	0.010	
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Female	-0.092	-0.060	0.056	0.057	
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.065)	
% Life Not in US		-0.472***	-0.431***	-0.416***	
		(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.100)	
Party Strength		0.213***	0.159***	0.158***	
		(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	
Conservative		-0.043	-0.001	-0.003	
		(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.096)	
Republican		-0.381***	-0.321***	-0.315***	
		(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.098)	
Recruitment		0.360***	0.268***	0.269***	
		(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)	
Civic Engagement		0.248***	0.194***	0.196***	
		(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	
Political Interest			0.413***	0.413***	
			(0.046)	(0.046)	
Internal Efficacy			0.074**	0.069**	
-			(0.029)	(0.029)	
External Efficacy			-0.122***	-0.118***	
2			(0.032)	(0.032)	
Linked Fate			0.153***	0.154***	
			(0.030)	(0.031)	
Protestant			. ,	0.113	
				0.110	

	(0.151)
Church Attendance Constant	-0.025
	(0.026)
	-0.820**** -1.291*** -1.825*** -1.790***
	(0.217) (0.225) (0.254) (0.255)
Observations	1,813 1,801 1,801 1,801
Log Likelihood	1,893.768 1,725.357 1,649.077 1,648.382
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,801.537 3,476.715 3,332.153 3,334.764

Note: Poisson regression coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Works Cited

- Ablay, Sheilamae. "Three Essays on Immigrant Political Incorporation in the US." PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2016.
- Ayers, John W., and C. Richard Hofstetter. "American Muslim political participation following 9/11: Religious belief, political resources, social structures, and political awareness." *Politics and Religion* 1, no. 1 (2008): 3-26.
- Barreto, Matt A., Karam Dana, and Angela X. Ocampo. "The American Muslim voter: Community belonging and political participation." *Social Science Research* (2018).
- Carnes, Tony, and Fenggang Yang, eds. Asian American religions: The making and remaking of borders and boundaries. NYU Press, 2004.
- Chang, Wen-Chun. "Buddhism, Taoism, Folk Religions, and Rebellions: Empirical Evidence from Taiwan." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 45, no. 4 (2010): 445-459.
- Chang, Wen-Chun. "Culture, Citizenship Norms, and Political Participation: Empirical Evidence from Taiwan." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 17, no. 2 (2016): 256-277.
- Chen, Carolyn. "The religious varieties of ethnic presence: A comparison between a Taiwanese immigrant Buddhist temple and an evangelical Christian church." *Sociology of Religion*63, no. 2 (2002): 215-238.
- Cherry, Stephen M. "Engaging a spirit from the East: Asian American Christians and civic life." *Sociological Spectrum* 29, no. 2 (2009): 249-272.
- Cherry, Stephen M. "Exploring the role of Catholicism in Filipino American community volunteerism and participation." *Sociological Spectrum* 33, no. 1 (2013): 36-56.
- Cho, Wendy K. Tam. "Naturalization, socialization, participation: Immigrants and (non-) voting." *The Journal of Politics* 61, no. 4 (1999): 1140-1155.
- Dawson, Michael C. "Behind the mule." *Race and Class in African American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press* (1994).
- Dalton, Russell J. "Citizenship norms and the expansion of political participation." *Political studies* 56, no. 1 (2008): 76-98.
- Djupe, Paul A., and J. Tobin Grant. "Religious institutions and political participation in America." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 40, no. 2 (2001): 303-314.
- Djupe, Paul A., Anand E. Sokhey, and Christopher P. Gilbert. "Present but not accounted for? Gender differences in civic resource acquisition." *American Journal of Political Science*51, no. 4 (2007): 906-920.
- Ecklund, Elaine Howard, and Jerry Z. Park. "Asian American community participation and religion: Civic model minorities?." *Journal of Asian American Studies* 8, no. 1 (2005): 1-21.

- Ecklund, Elaine Howard, Yi-Ping Shih, Michael O. Emerson, and Samuel H. Kye. "Rethinking the Connections between Religion and Civic Life for Immigrants: The Case of the Chinese Diaspora." *Review of religious research* 55, no. 2 (2013): 209-229.
- Emerson, Michael O., and Christian Smith. "Divided by faith." *Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America*(2000).
- Foley, Michael W., and Dean R. Hoge. *Religion and the new immigrants: How faith communities form our newest citizens*. Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1360–1380.
- Greenberg, Anna. "The church and the revitalization of politics and community." *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 3 (2000): 377-394.
- Gurin, P., Miller, A. H., & Gurin, G. (1980). Stratum identification and consciousness. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *43*(1), 30–47.
- Gutmann, Amy, ed. Freedom of association. Princeton University Press, 1998.

Huddy, Leonie, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, eds. *The Oxford handbook of political psychology*. Oxford University Press, 2013.

- Kim, Thomas P. *The racial logic of politics: Asian Americans and party competition*. Temple University Press, 2007.
- Harris, Fredrick C. Something within: Religion in African-American political activism. Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Who are we?: The challenges to America's national identity*. Simon and Schuster, 2004.
- Jamal, Amaney. "The political participation and engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque involvement and group consciousness." *American Politics Research* 33, no. 4 (2005): 521-544.
- Jones-Correa, Michael A., and David L. Leal. "Political participation: Does religion matter?." *Political Research Quarterly* 54, no. 4 (2001): 751-770.
- Jeung, Russell. *Faithful generations: Race and new Asian American churches*. Rutgers University Press, 2005.
- Lien, Pei-te. "Ethnicity and political participation: A comparison between Asian and Mexican Americans." *Political Behavior* 16 (1994): 237-264.
- Lien, Pei-te, M. Margaret Conway, and Janelle Wong. "The politics of Asian Americans: Diversity and community." (2004).
- Lien, Pei-te. Making of Asian America: Through Political Participation. Temple University Press, 2010.
- Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). The social psychology of procedural justice. New York: Plenum Press.

- Liu, Baodong. "Demythifying the "Dark Side" of Social Capital: A Comparative Bayesian Analysis of White, Black, Latino, and Asian American Voting Behavior." *American Review of Politics*32 (2011): 31-55.
- Loveland, Matthew, Keely Jones Stater, and Jerry Park. "Religion and the logic of the civic sphere: Religious tradition, religious practice, and voluntary association." (2008).
- Margolis, Michele F. "How Politics Affects Religion: Partisanship, Socialization, and Religiosity in America." *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 1 (2018): 30-43.
- McClain, Paula D., Jessica D. Johnson Carew, Eugene Walton Jr, and Candis S. Watts. "Group membership, group identity, and group consciousness: Measures of racial identity in American politics?." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009): 471-485.
- Mutz, Diana C. "The consequences of cross-cutting networks for political participation." *American Journal of Political Science* (2002): 838-855.
- Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational advantage. *Academy of Management Review*, 23(2), 242–266.
- Nakanishi, Don T. "The next swing vote? Asian Pacific Americans and California politics." *Racial and ethnic politics in California* 1 (1991): 25-54.
- Park, Jerry Z., and Christian Smith. "'To Whom Much Has Been Given...': Religious Capital and Community Voluntarism Among Churchgoing Protestants." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 39, no. 3 (2000): 272-286.
- Peterson, Steven A. "Church participation and political participation: The spillover effect." *American Politics Quarterly*20, no. 1 (1992): 123-139.
- Putnam, Robert D. "Bowling alone: America's declining social capital." In *Culture and politics*, pp. 223-234. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2000.
- Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Hansen. *Mobilization, participation, and democracy in America*. Macmillan Publishing Company,, 1993.
- Schlesinger, Arthur Meier. *The disuniting of America: Reflections on a multicultural society*. WW Norton & Company, 1998.
- Schwadel, Philip. "Testing the promise of the churches: Income inequality in the opportunity to learn civic skills in Christian congregations." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41, no. 3 (2002): 565-575.
- Sundeen, Richard A., Sally A. Raskoff, and M. Cristina Garcia. "Differences in perceived barriers to volunteering to formal organizations: Lack of time versus lack of interest." *Nonprofit Management and Leadership* 17, no. 3 (2007): 279-300.
- Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim. "Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Study." (1978).

- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Harvard University Press, 1995.
- Wald, Kenneth D., Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel S. Hill Jr. "Political cohesion in churches." *The Journal* of *Politics* 52, no. 1 (1990): 197-215.
- Wong, Janelle S., Pei-Te Lien, and M. Margaret Conway. "Group-based resources and political participation among Asian Americans." *American Politics Research* 33, no. 4 (2005): 545-576.
- Wong, Janelle. *Democracy's promise: Immigrants and American civic institutions*. University of Michigan Press, 2008.
- Wong, Janelle S., S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Taeku Lee, and Jane Junn. Asian American political participation: Emerging constituents and their political identities. Russell Sage Foundation, 2011.
- Yang, Fenggang. *Chinese Christians in America: Conversion, assimilation, and adhesive identities*. Penn State Press, 2010.