

**Switching from Left to Right:
Ethnic Candidates and Voting for Center and Center Right Parties**

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Abstract

Do ethnic candidates increase ethnic voters' support for center right parties? Until recently, non-Western origin voters in Europe were seen as dedicated left voters. Yet, center right parties increasingly nominated non-Western candidates to attract ethnic voters even in parties with anti-immigration policies. The parties seem to assume as the American literature suggests that ethnic voters are more likely to vote for co-ethnic candidates. The literature is less clear if ethnic voters will cross ideological lines, using the critical case of the 2010 British election, we conclude the parties are partially correct. British Black and Asian equality voters who see ethnic MPs as improving inclusion treat parties differently based on their histories. Voters reward center right parties with little history of representation that nominate co-ethnics and punish left parties when co-ethnic candidates are replaced. Unlike the U.S., co-ethnic candidates shape Asian, but, not Black voters' support for left and right parties.

With rising immigration from non-Western countries, the demographic profile of the European voter is shifting. The political science literature and the popular media often argue that these new ethnic Black, Arab, and Asian voters are and are likely to remain left voters. With these new voters comprising between twenty and eighty percent of some electoral districts, parties with little ethnic support potentially face difficulties winning these districts. Some political scientists such as Anthony Heath and other observers suggest that the deficit ethnic minority support could cost the British Conservatives 20 to 30 seats in the next elections (Dodd and Soysal 2013). Concerned that like the U.S. Republican Party a lack of diversity may it more difficult to win future elections, German Christian Democrat Union deputy party chair Laschet argued: "If we want to show credible diversity in the CDU, we need people with immigrant backgrounds...This must also be reflected in parliament"¹ Despite little evidence that the strategy works, center and center right parties nominated ethnic candidates in an attempt to attract ethnic voters across the ideological divide (Black and Hicks 2006; Bird 2005; van Hellum 2002; Norris 2001, p. 579-580). In the 2010 elections, center and center right parties nominated eighty-seven non-Western origin Swedish candidates and over a hundred and sixty British Black, Asian, Arab, and Turkish candidates.

Some influential members of European left parties also expressed concern that the influx of these new center and center right ethnic candidates may lure away ethnic voters. Labour MP Chuka Umunna argued: "...although Labour has traditionally represented Blacks: We are in

¹ "Wir müssen aus der Erfahrung der amerikanischen Republikaner lernen, die am Ende nur noch eine Partei der weißen alten Männer war", sagt Laschet auf "Welt"-Anfrage und fügt hinzu: "Wenn wir in der CDU Vielfalt glaubwürdig zeigen wollen, brauchen wir Menschen mit Zuwanderungsgeschichte, die sich zu unseren Grundsätzen bekennen. Das muss sich auch in den Parlamenten widerspiegeln." (Frijeli 2013)

danger of falling behind on that if we don't increase representation in the future" (Operation Black Vote 2009). While research in the U.S. indicates ethnic candidates can influence ethnic minority voters, U.S. studies offer limited evidence that the effect operates across ideological lines (Barreto 2007). Are the party leaders correct? Can ethnic candidates lure ethnic voters from the left to the center and center right?

Until recently, few studies discussed what determines how European and other non-Western origin ethnic groups outside the U.S. vote or choose their party identification (Sanders, Heath, Fisher, and Sobolewska 2014; Bird, Saalfeld, and Wust 2011; Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Geddes 2004; Saggar 2000, 2004). While some U.S. quantitative studies find ethnic candidates affect ethnic political behavior (Barreto 2007; Philpot and Walton 2007; Tate 1991, 1994), few quantitative studies tested the effect of the rising number of ethnic candidates in Europe on ethnic minority vote choice. A few qualitative national-level and quantitative local council studies in Europe offer indirect evidence that when given the choice ethnic voters chose ethnic candidates (Curtice 2007, p.120 – 121; Jacobs, Martinello, and Rea 2002; Geddes 2004; Messina 1989). Few studies asked if ethnic candidates make voters more likely to vote for center-right parties in Europe or explain why it might occur.

The current literature identifies issues, party performance, valence voting, and party identification as the primary determinants of voting and party choice in Europe (Sanders, Heath, Fisher, and Sobolewska 2014; Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, and Whiteley 2004; Lewis-Beck 1986; Stokes 1992). Few parties changed their policy to attract ethnic support even though voting models assume party policies and performance determine how an individual votes (Curtice 2007). Given that studies find few issue differences between ethnic and other voters in Europe, shifting policy may have little effect (Sanders, Heath, Fisher, and Sobolewska 2014; Dancygier

and Saunders 2006; Saggar 2000; Welch and Studlar 1985 Layton-Henry 1984). At least one recent study finds that the reasons ethnic minorities identify with and support parties differs from other voters. This difference depends in part on ethnic discrimination and identity (Sanders, Heath, Fisher, and Sobolewska 2014; Dancygier and Saunders 2006). Do ethnic candidates affect these choices as parties seem to assume?

Britain provides one of the best critical case studies with a sizeable, increasing non-Western origin population. A single party, Labour, historically received nearly all ethnic votes. Labour in the past often supported immigration, multiculturalism, anti-discrimination, and other “ethnic issues” while the center right Conservative Party supported strict controls on immigration. Immigration and integration policy differences between Labour and the Conservatives have declined with the former moving right under “New Labour” (Curtice 2007). Like other center-right parties seeking ethnic voters, the Conservatives dramatically increased their ethnic candidates with their number nearly equaling the Labour Party in some elections (Geddes 2004; Norris 2001). As these candidates have increased, a small decline in Labour support has emerged (Curtice 2007, p.120 – 121) with thirty percent of ethnic voters supporting the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats in the 2010 election (Sanders, Heath, Fisher, and Sobolewska 2014).

I argue that parties are partially correct. Ethnic candidate’s influence how ethnic minorities in Europe leading them, in some cases, to cross ideological lines or switch from left to right at least temporarily. Ethnic minorities increase support for co-ethnic candidates from center and center right parties, but, not center left parties. British minorities are responding to perceived rising inclusion in parties with little history of electing or representing ethnic minorities. . The effect occurs because of ethnic voters who value ethnic equality regardless of

the strength of ethnic identity. In fact, “weak-identifiers” respond most to ethnic candidates supporting both co-ethnic candidates and candidates from other ethnic groups. Like other ethnic minorities, they change vote choice for parties where rising nominations of ethnic candidates potentially reflect increased inclusion. Ethnic minorities cross party lines to support Liberal Democrat and Conservative co-ethnic and other ethnic group candidates, but, not ethnic candidates from Labour.

Using the Ethnic Minority British Election Survey 2010, British General Election Ethnic Minority Survey 1997, peer-reviewed sources, media reports, and ethnic and party organization sources, this paper provides direct evidence using individual level data often missing in the current literature that ethnic candidates influence vote choice by British Blacks and Asians.² The effect differs significantly from the well-studied effect of ethnic candidates in the U.S. with voters responding far more to center right than center left candidates. Lastly, I provide a model explaining why ethnic candidates have distinctly different reactions to left and right parties. The first section reviews the current models explaining vote choice for minority and non-minority voters. The second and third sections describe the context in which the British Black and South Asian population vote and presents hypotheses. The next two sections describe the methodology and use multinomial probit regression to test the effects of ethnic candidates and competing

² The British General Election Study: Ethnic Minority Sample (1997) and the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (2010) are available from the UK Data Archive (<http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/>) and University of Oxford (<http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/research/embes-the-ethnic-minority-british-election-study.html>) respectively. The candidate data can be reconstructed from the information provided in the Data Appendix.

explanations on vote choice by British ethnic minority voters. The last section discusses the impact of ethnic and co-ethnic candidacy in Britain and the rest of Europe.

The Origins of Party Choice: Why Labour and not the Conservatives?

A large and growing literature seeks to understand who voters support and why. Most studies argue voters are motivated by issues or perceived party performance (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, and Whiteley 2004; Lewis-Beck 1986; Stokes 1992; Fiorina 1981; Cain and Kiewiet 1984; Downs 1957). Voters choose parties whose issue preferences most closely match their own or spatial voting. Alternatively, they vote for parties who they feel performed best on key issues like the economy, education, crime, immigration, and multiculturalism. Increasingly, voters select the candidates and parties that they “like” best, who they trust most, or who they think performed best on issues where nearly all agree (e.g. lower crime) (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, and Whiteley 2004, p. 58; Schofield 2004). Until recently, class was considered the primary determinant of voting in Europe. In Britain, the working class and poor voting disproportionately for the left, the middle class support center parties, and professionals voted for the center right (Dalton 1985; Evans 2000; Butler and Stokes 1974). In some cases, voters act strategically to counter the likelihood that a party they do not support will win regardless of the choice they might select based on policy, performance, and valence voting (Fieldhouse and Russell 2001).

Ethnic minorities are assumed to vote disproportionately for center left parties for similar reasons. To explain disproportionate ethnic support for left and center left parties, ethnic voters must differ significantly in some way from other voters. Ethnic minorities must have distinctly different issue preferences than other voters. Studies have found few issue differences between European ethnic minorities and other voters (Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Layton-Henry 1984;

Welch and Studlar 1985). Since a significant number of non-Western origin minorities in Europe belong to the working class, strong Labour support may depend on class. The few British studies analyzing class voting by European ethnic minorities find a weak to no effect with disproportionate left voting by middle and upper class minorities (Saggar 2000; Anwar 1986). They must rate left party leaders much higher than center and center right party leaders. Or, their trust of the candidate or party must persuade them to support one party over another. Ethnic candidates might alter perceived trust, performance, or “liking” of a party.

Quantitative and qualitative studies of the American case offer an explanation for why ethnic voters might support certain parties and ethnic candidates more (Barreto 2007; Philpot and Walton 2007; Lublin; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004; Tate 1991, 1994; Tam 1995). Rather than acting solely on issues or class identity, the ethnic identity of voters may alter the vote choice of Black, Asian, and other ethnic voters. These studies argue that ethnic minority voters with strong ethnic identities vote against their individual interests and for the perceived interests of their ethnic group. These ethnic identity voters increase voting when co-ethnic candidates run for office (Barreto 2007; Tam 1995; Tate 1991, 1994). Identity voters hope to improve the circumstance of their ethnic groups by electing candidates who belong to the same ethnic group, descriptive or co-ethnic representation (Tate 2004). They assume “being one of us” means loyalty to “our” interests (Mansbridge 1999, p. 62).

Dawson (1994) argued that ethnic minorities feel their *individual or personal* opportunities and life outcomes are linked with the success or failure of other ethnic minorities—“linked fate”. The concept “explicitly links perceptions of self-interest to perceptions of racial group interests” (Dawson, p. 76). What happens to the group will determine what happens that that individual. He distinguishes this concept from discontent, ethnic identity, and perceived

deprivation or discrimination used by other scholars (p. 76 – 77). They not only identify with the group, but, they feel they have a lot in common with their ethnic group. They see the interests of their ethnic groups as a proxy for their own self interests. Specifically, they feel what happens to their ethnic group determines what happens in their own personal lives—linked fate. Since group interests and self-interest are the same, linked fate voters like ethnic identity remain loyal to the parties for which ethnic minorities have historically voted and who has best represented the interests of their ethnic group, the center left. Alternatively, these voters might also trust co-ethnic candidates or candidates from their own ethnic group more even if they belong to parties that have not historically represented their ethnic group.

The few studies attempt to model the effects of ethnic identity, linked fate, and the related perception of ethnic discrimination in Europe. None have modeled the effect of ethnic candidates in national elections. Dancygier and Saunders (2006) find that strength of ethnic identity affect party identification. A recent paper by Sanders, Heath, Fisher, and Sobolewska (2014) argue that a combination of factors that ask about the relative deprivation of and the extent of discrimination against the group affect vote choice. The authors (Sanders, Heath, Fisher, and Sobolewska 2014) do include one factor that might act as a proxy for linked fate. Ethnic solidarity measures if an individual sees themselves as having a lot in common with other from his or her ethnic group. It measures how much an individual feels they have in “common” with their ethnic group even if it does not explicitly mention interests. But, the authors find no significant effect for this proxy for linked fate. Neither asked about how candidates affect vote choice and whether identity, discrimination, or linked fate voters respond to co-ethnic candidates differently.

An alternative explanation related to descriptive representation (Tate 1991, 1994), ethnic identity, and linked fate (Dawson 1993) may lead to disproportionate support for center and center right candidates, equality voting. Descriptive representation argues that ethnic minorities support ethnic candidates either because their symbolic presence (symbolic representation) positively affects outcomes for ethnic minorities or they will alter policies to be more supportive of ethnic group interests after their election (substantive representation). Equality voters respond to increased inclusion only in parties with little history of representation regardless of strength of ethnic identity. Left parties nominating co-ethnic candidates benefit far less even though they potential provide they have the same or greater potential to represent ethnic policy interests as center and center right candidates. If minorities support ethnic candidates to increase ethnic presence or symbolic representation, then, minorities should support candidates across the ideological spectrum not just center and center right candidates.

Equality voters are seeking signs of change. Increased support reflects ethnic minority voters who reward parties or at least support candidates that represent significant change or improvement. Parties with little or no history of nominating ethnic candidates like center right and some center left parties disproportionately benefit. Center left parties where an expectation exists that ethnic candidates will be nominated are likely to receive a much less benefit unless they nominate far more candidates than ethnic minority equality voters expected. Unlike descriptive representation voters as defined in the U.S., equality voters do not necessarily express strong or even intermediate ethnic identities prioritizing their ethnic identity above other identities or believing their ethnic identity as equal in influence with their other identities. These equality voters react to improving equality as a sign of greater inclusion not to strong ethnic

identities. In seeking greater inclusion, these minorities will cross ideological and party lines to reward parties that appear to have significantly increased their inclusion of ethnic minorities.

The few U.S. studies (Barreto 2007) that included ethnic candidates from multiple parties find that the effect remains similar for candidates of center right parties. These studies do not control for individual issue preferences and party performance ratings that some studies argue directly determine vote (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, and Whiteley 2005; Lewis-Beck 1988; Cho and Endersby 2003; Cain and Kiewit 1984). These studies like Barreto (2007) focus on the presence of co-ethnic candidates without looking at individual voter data that provides insight into a voter's choice as this study does.

A third often untested factor that is widely discussed in the popular media and by the public—disaffection with the traditional party of ethnic minorities. An extensive literature in Europe discusses the rise of protest parties and the decline of party loyalty associated with disaffection with major parties (Belanger 2004; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Voters long loyal to a particular party are according to the theory increasingly dissatisfied with the policy or performance of their party. The result is weakening loyalty or declining party identification. These disaffected voters seek other parties, particularly, newly established parties either as a temporary or one election defection or as a longer term alternative to major parties.

The same may be occurring among ethnic minority voters for different reasons. The popular literature frequently discusses the disaffection of British ethnic minorities with Labour which has shifted to the right on key issues or engaged in policies seen as detrimental to ethnic minorities such as immigration and the Iraq and Afghan Wars. If the process resembles disaffection in the general populace, these voters become “floating voters” with few loyalties to any parties. These disaffected voters may see the nomination of ethnic candidates as a method of

choosing between parties—a sign of increased inclusion. These disaffected voters should in theory respond to candidates of all parties producing increased support for any candidate nominating co-ethnic candidates.

Parties nominating ethnic candidates can alter the vote choice of ethnic minorities with minorities crossing ideological lines to support co-ethnic candidates. Only parties where this increase in ethnic candidates represents a significant improvement in inclusion benefit. Center and center right parties increased the likelihood ethnic minorities will choose to support their parties if they nominate ethnic candidates. Those linked fate regardless of ethnic identities alter their vote choice. Since equality voters seek to reward those increasing inclusion and push those who do not, minorities may even engage in strategic voting or supporting other parties to counter parties where inclusion did not increase significantly even if they nominate ethnic candidates. Center left candidates benefit less since the rise in ethnic candidates may not lead to the perception of a sizeable or significant improvement in ethnic inclusion. If center left parties significantly increase their nomination of ethnic candidates—nominating far more co-ethnic candidates than center and center right candidates—ethnic minorities support for center right candidates might similarly increase.

The British case

The rising ethnic population across Europe and other Western democracies has brought increased attention to their political power. Ethnic minorities will or already comprise 26%³ of New Zealand in 2001, 14% of Britain in 2011, and 20% of Canada by 2017 (Smeith and Dunstan 2004; UK Census 2013; Bird 2005). In the past, mostly left and center left parties competed for

³These percentages include all those who identify with Maori, Asian, or Pacific ethnic groups though some identify as European as well (multiethnic population).

the votes of the new ethnic groups formed from immigration. Most ethnic candidates received nominations in left and center left parties (Bird, Saalfeld and Wust 2012; Togeby 2006; Bird 2005). As these groups grew, their potential political influence grew. Left and *right* parties in Germany, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and France increased attempts to win their votes by nominating ethnic minority candidates (Norris and Wlezien 2005; Geddes 2004; van Heelsum 2002; Bird 2005). Parties acted as if they believed ethnic voters will cross party and ideological lines to support co-ethnic candidates.

Britain represents the best example of this phenomenon. Since the start of large scale immigration in the late 1940s, Labour received 70 to 80% of all ethnic votes (Saggar 2000; Anwar 1986; Messina 1989; Welch and Studlar 1985). Conservative voting only occasionally approached 20% (Saggar 2000). This pattern contrasts with the 12 – 15% difference between Labour and Conservative support among all voters. The difference in ethnic and other voters' support for the various parties has decreased since 1992. The change is clearest for the Conservatives. While Conservative support among all voters has declined or remained flat until 2005, the ethnic gap decreased in 2005 suggesting rising Conservative support (Saggar 2000). The decline indicates some new factor may be influencing how ethnic minorities vote.

This new factor may be the rising number of ethnic candidates in left, right, and center parties. The two largest parties argue that they are the “natural home” of at least a significant segment of ethnic minority voters based on their policies. The Conservatives argued they are the “natural party” for Asian voters based on issues and ideology (Norris, Geddes, and Lovenduski 1991; Geddes 1995, p. 279). Labour and Liberal Democrats argue their history shows that they have been the best representative of the issue preferences of Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic (BAME) voters. More recently, Labour moved right by restricting immigration and reducing

support of multiculturalism (Curtice 2007; Geddes 1995, 1998; Back et al. 2002)—a move that should reduce issue-based ethnic support.

There is some evidence of increasing uncertainty and ambivalence toward Labour. The quote cited earlier by Labour MP Chuka Umunna suggests that to retain ethnic support Labour need to change on the issues or improve inclusion. One South Asian journalist has noted the increasingly common comments that ethnic minorities need to see if Labour will provide what is expected. One Asian Parliamentary candidate quoted as saying: “We now have an entire generation born and bred here who don’t think like their parents and grandparents, and actually want to see what the party will offer them” (Hundal 2014).

Parties are increasingly nominating their ethnic candidates to attract ethnic voters. British parties’ actions suggest at least some segment of these parties felt nominating ethnic candidates was essential for gaining ethnic minority support. Former Labour Minister and current Shadow Minister Sadiq Khan referring to the recruitment of ethnic candidates echoes this sentiment: “I want an arms race where the Tories, the Lib Dems and Labour argue and compete over recruiting more Asians, Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, Jews, women disabled, people, everyone” (Hill 2013). The center right Conservatives increased candidates from five (1983) to fourteen (1997) to forty-two (2005) to 46 (2010) (Figure 1). The center Liberal Democrats Party ran eight ethnic PPCs in 1983, nineteen in 1997, thirty-six in 2005, and fifty in 2010. The center left Labour Party increased from six (1983) to fourteen (1997) to 33 (2005) to 60 (2010). The equality voters give parties a reasonable basis for thinking that increasing ethnic candidates will increase their share of the ethnic vote. Are these parties correct in assuming more ethnic candidates will increase support among ethnic voters above and beyond any effect produced by party policy and performance?

{Insert Figure 1 about here}

Hypotheses and Methodology

Ethnic minorities alter their vote choice to support ethnic candidates including crossing party and ideological lines to support center and center right co-ethnic candidates. Ethnic minorities respond to center left, center, and center right candidates differently. The nomination of ethnic candidates by center and center right parties represent a change that potentially reflects increased inclusion in parties with no or a limited history of electing and representing ethnic minorities. Thus, the rising nominations of ethnic candidates likely disproportionately benefit center and center right parties. Ethnic minorities will cross party lines to increase support for co-ethnic center and center right candidates, but, not left co-ethnic candidates. In the British context, this increase support translates into rising support for the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties in districts where the parties nominate co-ethnic candidate.

Several theories predict which parties will benefit and why these parties benefit from increasing the nomination of ethnic minority candidates. The first theory which is the dominant theory in the current literature argues that ethnic minorities with strong ethnic identities will support co-ethnic candidates. They feel that ethnic candidates will represent “their interests”. If ethnic minorities feel co-ethnic candidates better represent their interests as a group, ethnic identity, or as an individual, linked fate, ethnic minorities will choose support ethnic candidates from their own ethnic group or co-ethnic candidates. The result is increased support for co-ethnic candidates across ideological lines. Ethnic minorities will increase support for Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Labour candidates from their own group.

I argue that while minorities will cross party lines to support Conservative and Liberal Democrat co-ethnic candidates the reason they do so is not strong ethnic identity. Rather, British

minorities switch support from left and non-voting to the right to support perceived increases in ethnic inclusion, equality voting. This support arises from ethnic minorities regardless of the strength of their ethnic identity. The nomination of co-ethnic candidates will lead ethnic minorities with weak, intermediate, and strong identifiers to alter their vote choice between the 2005 and 2010 British General Elections. If the response to co-ethnic candidates depends on perceived increase in inclusion or equality voting, parties where nominating ethnic candidate represents an improvement will benefit.

Effectively, parties with a history of inclusion will be less likely to benefit and parties with a less extensive history of inclusion will benefit more. Equality voters will alter their vote choice from Labour and non-voting to the Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties where these parties nominate co-ethnic candidates. The effect will be detectable for all ethnic minorities since a majority of ethnic minorities support descriptive representation regardless of their demographic characteristics or political attitudes (Figure 2). Sixty percent or more of all ethnic groups; minorities with weak, intermediate and strong ethnic identities; and upper and lower class minorities support descriptive representation. Ethnic minorities from majority-minority and few minority neighborhood support equality voting. A majority of British Blacks and Asians that identify with the Labour, Liberal Democrat, and Conservative parties support argue that more Black and Asians in Parliament are need to improve conditions for their communities. Across most demographic and political identification categories, a majority of British ethnic minorities support descriptive representation

Since descriptive representation is important to most British ethnic minorities, we should see is rising support for the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties where they nominate co-ethnic candidates. If the response to co-ethnic candidates depends on believing or trusting that

nominating ethnic candidates reflects rising inclusion. Ethnic minorities will increase Labour support less in constituencies where Labour nominates co-ethnic candidates since they are the “traditional” party of ethnic minorities. British Black and Asians will switch vote choice from left and non-voting to the right with the nomination of ethnic candidates by parties.

If ethnic minorities only “trust” that increased nominations represent inclusion for certain parties, they will choose to increase support where ethnic candidates are members of parties that are seen as being the “representative” of the group or “traditional” parties of ethnic minorities. Given the Labour Party’s history of ethnic inclusion, minorities may only increase support for Labour co-ethnic candidates. Ethnic minorities will not cross ideological lines to support Liberal Democrat or Conservative candidates. Minorities will only choose to participate more often where they are able to support co-ethnic Labour candidates.

While co-ethnic candidates influence vote choice of all ethnic minorities, ethnic candidates from other ethnic groups will only affect vote choice for those with the strong ethnic identities. For some ethnic minorities, the distinction between different broad ethnic groups (Black, South Asian, Arab, East Asians) and specific ethnic groups (Afro-Caribbean, African, Bangladeshi, Indian, etc.) are critical for political and social decisions and interactions (Younge 1997). British ethnic groups have distinct identities including lobbying for a Bangladeshi rather than Indian or Afro-Caribbean candidate (Saggar 2000; Geddes 2004). In other instances, organizations operate in the combined social and political interests of multiple ethnic groups. Important political and social organizations such as Labour Party Black Sections, the non-partisan Operation Black Vote, BAME Labour, Ethnic Minority Liberal Democrats, UK Black Pride, and the Black Policeman’s Association bring together South Asian, Afro-Caribbean, and Africans. Some ethnic minorities identify with ethnic minorities from other groups. Both co-

ethnic candidates and all ethnic candidates will attract votes from South Asian and Black voters. Minorities with strong ethnic identities will support ethnic candidates from other groups.

Measuring Party Choice

The analysis uses the British General Election Ethnic Minority Sample 2010 (EMBES). The EMBES 2010 is the largest publically available sample of European ethnic minorities with more than a few political variables. These survey conducted as part of the British Election Study include large samples of ethnic minorities (N = 2787 face-to-face interviews and N = 978 mail-back) than the BES 2010 (N = 202 face-to-face interviews, N = 278 face-to-face interviews).⁴ The EMBES is a separate post-election survey conducted led by the principal investigator of the 2010 BES. Fifteen percent of the weighted samples of 2010 voters supported the Conservatives (N = 282) and thirteen percent supported the Liberal Democrats (N = 248). Half of 2010 sample resided in districts with at least one co-ethnic candidate (N = 1,383). This analysis includes only British Indians, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Afro-Caribbeans, and Black Africans (N = 973, N = 237, N=592, N = 428, N = 509).

This paper includes two measures of party vote choice. The first codes 2010 election choices for Labour, Liberal Democrat, Conservative, and non-voting. A second measure combines reported choice in 2005 and 2010 to measure vote switching between the two elections: no change, change toward the right or switching to Conservatives or Liberal Democrats, and switching to the left or Labour. Party-voter issue distance, the spatial voting indicator, is measured with the Euclidean distance between voter j and party k on issue i for five issues (Equation 1): decreasing taxes versus increase spending, individual rights versus fight crime, and need for government involvement to increase opportunities for ethnic minorities.

⁴The analysis uses the weights for the full post-election sample in 2010.

This spatial voting model or the distance between the perceived party stance and the self-reported voter stance is the most commonly used measure of spatial voting (Kedar 2006, p. 509 – 510; Enelow and Hinich 1984). The resulting indicators are three general issue indicators and three equal opportunity indicators for Labour, Liberal Democrats, and Conservatives.

$$Voter - Party Proximity = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_{ij} - x_{ik})^2} \quad (\text{Equation 1})$$

Three self-reported proxy dummy variables measure the party each respondent sees as closest to their views or self-placement in issue space since it does not assume that the three included issues accurately gauge how voters see their distance from specific parties on issues. A second set of three dummy variables identify the party that each respondent thinks best represents the interests of ethnic minorities as a group. Perceived party issue performance is measured by a variable indicating which party the voter thinks performed best on their self-identified most important issue. Valence voting which the literature suggests is key to understand current British vote patterns was measured as it is in the literature by three variables reporting feelings toward the current party leaders for Labour, Liberal Democrats, and Conservatives. Given the strong role of dissatisfaction with Labour leader Gordon Brown played in the 2010 election, this measure is key for understanding vote choice. A dummy variable indicates disagreement with British policy on Afghanistan since a significant percent of British ethnic minorities are Muslims.

Controls for age measured in key categories (18 – 25, 26 – 35, 36 – 45, 46 – 55, 55 – 65, and 66 – 99) and gender as a dummy variable identifying women are included. Ethnicity is measured by a five category variable: Afro-Caribbean, African, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Indian. Multiethnic respondents were coded as belonging to the BME group which comprised as part of their identity since the group was too small to analyze separately (N = 95). Multiethnic

respondents with an Asian background were not included since their subgroup was not identified (N = 5). Education was measured as the percentage of ethnic minorities gaining an A-level qualification (required for admission to university) and greater education or the overseas equivalent in keeping with the measure used by Sanders, Heath, Fisher, and Sobolewska 2014). A dummy variable indicating Muslim respondents controls for religion. Community ethnic diversity is recoded into three categories 0 – 10%, 15 – 25%, 26 – 50%, 51 – 75%, and > 75%. Separate indicators for co-ethnic diversity and ethnic diversity (all ethnic groups) were included. The class variable codes professionals and senior and junior managers since these groups are most likely to support the Conservatives (Sanders, Heath, Fisher, and Sobolewska 2014; Butler and Stokes 1974). An indicator of union membership is included to control for the effects of the close association of Labour with trade unions.

Ethnic candidates were coded from data combined from major British newspapers, respected British ethnic newspapers (Asian Voice, Asian Express, Voice Online), major newspapers from India and Pakistan, Operation Black Vote, Parliamentary Constituency Database (Norris 2005, 2010), Le Lohe (1993), publications from the UK Parliamentary Library, and political party publication and websites. The constituency and ethnicity of all candidates was verified with at least two sources. Insufficient information was available to classify the specific ethnicity (Afro-Caribbean, African, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian, or Asian other) for two of forty-six Conservative, five of fifty-nine Labour, and five of fifty-three Liberal Democrat candidates. Three dummy variable codes all ethnic candidates by party for each constituency (e.g. ethnic Labour, ethnic Conservative, ethnic Liberal Democrat). Three dummy variables identify co-ethnic candidates by party in each constituency (e.g. co-ethnic Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat). The voters and candidates in each constituency were match based on the following

identities: Afro-Caribbean, African, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Indian. One thousand three hundred and eighty-three respondents live in electoral districts with ethnic candidates (49.6% of the full sample). Four hundred and ninety-nine respondents live in districts with co-ethnic candidates.

An ethnic identity variable indicates voters who see themselves as equally British and a member of their ethnic group, exclusively a member of their group not British, and more or only British. The final category is referred to as strong identity voters. A dummy variable identifies respondents who personally experience discrimination in the last five years since Uhlaner () and Maxwell (2012) argue strongly ties voters to support for left parties such as Labour. Group discrimination is an additive index of three dummy variables: perceived prejudice against ethnic minorities, ethnic prejudice in Britain today, and big gap in what ethnic minorities expect and receive (relative deprivation). Those who believe all three have the highest score, three. And those who do not received the lowest score, zero. A dummy variable indicates linked fate or respondents that feel they have a lot in common with their ethnic group— implicitly suggesting individual and group outcomes might be similar.

The analysis used multinomial probit (MNP) since the data does not meet several conditions for logit or OLS regression. The dependent variables, voting, are four categorical variables—too few for OLS. Second, logit does not account for effect of third parties excluded from the regression (IIA assumption) especially if the parties are not fixed but vary by constituency (Dow and Endersby 2004, p. 108) which probit does (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). A fourth party received 6 – 7% of the vote or multiple fourth parties more than 12% in a third of the constituencies in the sample, but, did not run in all constituencies. Probit also accounts for correlated or varying distributions of errors, the IID assumption. This problem can develop if

voters vary in the ability to distinguish different parties as sometimes occurs with the Liberal Democrats. Correlated errors arise since some voters treat the Liberal Democrats as an anti-Conservative party by voting strategically (Fieldhouse and Russell 2001). The effect of the independent variables or marginal effects are estimated a change in the expected probability. The marginal effects indicate the actual probability for each respondent not the means of for all respondents.

Do Ethnic Candidates Matter and to Whom?

The analysis supports the assumptions of parties that ethnic minorities do sometimes cross ideological lines to support co-ethnic candidates. The evidence also indicates that minorities that switch their support for center and center right candidates in parties where increased nomination of ethnic candidates is perceived as increased inclusion since these parties have much less extensive history of nominating and electing British ethnic minorities. The ethnic minorities that respond to ethnic candidates are not the “strong” identifiers suggested in the U.S. research, but, weak identifiers that value the inclusion of ethnic minorities because they still see their individual fate linked to other minorities or linked fate. These equality voters, thus, reward parties where ethnic inclusion is perceived as improving significantly.

Not all parties benefit from these candidates. Contrary to the U.S., parties with little or no history of electing ethnic minorities benefited most where these parties nominated ethnic candidates. The Conservative Party with a less extensive history of representing minorities than other parties received the largest increase in support followed by the Liberal Democrat Party. Labour, the traditional party of ethnic minorities, received few benefits from their co-ethnic candidates. The results suggest that ethnic minorities reward parties where the rising number of ethnic candidates is perceived as a sizeable, significant improvement in representation. Not all

minorities alter their vote choice with the nomination of ethnic candidates. Unlike the U.S., only British Asians changed their support between elections where parties nominated ethnic or co-ethnic candidates. The minorities that do respond to these center and center right candidates represent equality voters with relatively weak identities, but, supportive of electing ethnic minority candidates.

Ethnic minorities reported choosing to support the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties significantly more when one of the candidates in their electoral district is a co-ethnic candidate from one of these parties. In the last General Election in 2010, one fifth of all ethnic minorities and one in four Asians supported either the Conservative or Liberal Democrat Party (Table 2). Support for center and center right parties increased in the 2010 election with Thirteen percent of all ethnic minorities and fifteen percent of Asians reported altering their support from non-voting and Labour support to Liberal Democrat or Conservative support between the 2005 and 2010 General Election—switching from left to right.

Where center and center right candidates belonged to the same ethnic group as potential voters, support for the Liberal Democrat or Conservative parties rose to forty percent for Conservative co-ethnic and twenty-six percent with Liberal Democrat co-ethnic candidates. The probability ethnic minorities reported switching their vote choice from non-voting and the Labour party to the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats was greater higher when one of the competitors in electoral district was a co-ethnic Liberal Democrat or Conservative candidates. Much of the increase occurred due Conservative rather than Liberal Democrat co-ethnic candidates. The former increased the probability of switching to the right increased by sixteen percent and the later increase switching by six percent with both which are statistically significant. The reverse occurred with Labour co-ethnic nominees with support declining

significantly for all minorities. Labour co-ethnic candidates led to what appears to be strategic voting—altering vote choice to counter any increased support that occurred with the nomination of co-ethnic candidates.

Only British Asians responded positively to center and center right co-ethnic candidates. British Asians reported large increases with Conservative candidates, much smaller increases with Liberal Democrat candidates, and significant declines in support for Labour candidates. The probability of altering support from non-voting or Labour to the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives was twenty percent higher with co-ethnic Conservative candidates. Support only improved by six percent for co-ethnic Liberal Democrat nominees. Labour co-ethnic candidates produced an unexpected and counter-intuitive result. When the competitors included a co-ethnic Labour candidate, British Asians reduced support by three percent suggesting they acted strategically to counter Labour support in district with co-ethnic Labour candidates. Even considering the in-fighting in some British Asian communities, the low response to Labour co-ethnics starkly contrasts with the forty-six percent support in the 2010 General Election and the twenty percent higher switch to center and center right parties in districts with co-ethnic Conservative candidates. British Asians seem to reward the significant improvement in representation reflected in the rising number of Conservative Asian candidates.

The negative center and center right candidacy effect occurs only for Asians. Where Labour nominated Afro-Caribbean and African candidates, British responded by improving support. The change was substantively small (+1.1%) and statistically insignificant (Table 2). The results suggest most British Blacks do not significantly alter their vote choice to support co-ethnic candidates by increasing electoral participation or crossing ideological lines. The lack of an effect may not indicate a lack of responsiveness to co-ethnic Labour candidates. The already

high support for Labour approximately ninety percent for British of African descent and eighty percent for Afro-Caribbeans means only a small group of Black voters remain who can switch to the left. The sizeable non-voting population (37% of the British Black sample) may mean that co-ethnic Labour candidates may have difficulty mobilizing new voters. The evidence suggests that ethnic candidates nominated by Labour had little influence on their choice. The parties with less of a history of representation benefited most due to British Asians not all ethnic minorities.

Even after controlling for alternative mechanisms that might explain changing vote choice in districts with ethnic candidates, the effects remained the same. Using multinomial probit regression, the analysis controlled for demographic factors including gender, education, class measures as professional and managers, religion, trade union membership, and age. The regression includes valence voting, issue voting, spatial voting on general issues (tax versus spending, crime control versus individual rights), self-placement in issue space (or self-identified party closed to own views), party identification, and party performance on the self-identified most important issue. The analysis accounts for ethnic factors which alter ethnic minority vote choice. The analysis includes indicators for ethnic group, percentage of own ethnic group in the constituencies, percentage of Black and Asians in the constituencies, strength of ethnic identity, perceived representation of ethnic interests by parties, linked fate, perceived personal and group experience with discrimination, spatial voting or closeness of individual and party on whether the government is needed to improve opportunities for ethnic minorities, and disaffection with the lack of opportunities for minorities provided by all parties.

Even after controlling for these factors, co-ethnic candidates affected whether minorities reported switching their support from non-voting and Labour to electoral support for the Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties. The analysis includes both a more compact *primary model*

that includes a larger sample (N = 2092, Table 3), but, fewer alternative explanations, and an extended, *alternative model* that includes more factors, but, resulted in a much smaller sample (N = 1111, Table 4). Both models produce effectively the same results though the *primary model* accounted for fewer factors and the *alternative model* accounted more factors affecting changing vote choice. In both cases, co-ethnic Conservative candidates influence vote choice and vote switching far more than other candidates. While co-ethnic Liberal Democrat candidates affect the outcome less than Conservative ethnic candidates, they, unlike Labour co-ethnic candidates, altered vote choice and self-reports of cross-ideological lines to support co-ethnic candidates (Table 5 and Figure 2).

Only Conservative candidates consistently altered whether British ethnic minorities crossed party lines to support co-ethnics. The marginal effects indicate candidates increased the likelihood of changing support from non-voting and the Labour Party to their own party and the Liberal Democrat Party by nearly twenty percent (Table 5). These candidates reduced the likelihood minorities will switch to supporting Labour or abstain from voting by six percent. The smaller sample, but, more complete model does not indicate a decline of Labour voting in districts with co-ethnic Conservative candidates. This smaller more complete model indicates that Liberal Democrat co-ethnic candidates produced increased support for their own party and the Conservatives even though there is no evidence of this change in the larger sample. Overall, the marginal effects of co-ethnic Conservative candidates are similar in size to other factors that influence changing vote choice (Table 5).

Labour co-ethnic candidates continued to result in strategic voting behavior. Rather than increasing support for their party, these candidates increased the likelihood ethnic minorities will move their support from Labour to the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats (Tables 3, 4, and 5).

These candidates from traditionally left parties did not significantly improve support as current theory and the U.S. predict. Minorities who likely do not prefer Labour or the party to which they eventually switched their supports to limit the chance of a Labour win in districts with Labour ethnic candidates. British ethnic minorities crossed ideological lines to counter support for co-ethnic Labour candidates. Ethnic minorities appear to “reward” increases in Conservative nomination of ethnic candidates more than any other party.

These candidate effects are likely attributable to the impact of co-ethnic candidates on British Asians (Figure 3). Afro-Caribbean and African candidates had no influence on whether British Afro-Caribbeans and Africans changed their support to Labour; their support to the two parties to the right of Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives; or voted for the same party in both elections (No Change). Co-ethnic candidates only influence changes in electoral support among British Asians. Conservative Asian candidates increased the likelihood other Asians chose to switch support from the left to the right by nearly twenty-five percent. The presence of Conservative co-ethnic Asian candidates decreased the probability Asians will remain with the same party that they voted for in the 2005 election or continued to abstain from voting. Liberal Democrat co-ethnic competitors from Asian communities did improve the probability of switching support to the right away from Labour to center and center right parties. This effect is uncertain with only marginal statistical significance in the alternative model, but, a substantively sizeable at ten percent with probability of support rising from approximately ten to twenty percent. Labour co-ethnic candidates did not significantly affect either British Black or Asian vote choice.

Whether co-ethnic candidates affected the decision of British Black and Asians to alter their vote choice depends in part on their ethnic identities and experiences as ethnic minorities.

How ethnic identity and experiences with discrimination affect responses to British co-ethnic candidates contradicts current theory. Based on the American case, theories often assumed that co-ethnic candidates often affected those with the strongest ethnic identities most. The evidence suggests the reverse. British ethnic minorities with the weakest ethnic identities responded most to the nomination of ethnic candidates moving their electoral support to parties with co-ethnic and even ethnic candidates from other parties (Figures 4 and 5).

While ethnic minorities regardless of the strength of their ethnic identity were more willing to cross ideological lines to support Conservative co-ethnic candidates, weak identifiers responded far more to Conservative candidates. The probability of shifting support away from Labour and non-voting to the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats increased between approximately fifteen and twenty percent for strong, intermediate, and weak ethnic identifiers when these parties nominated co-ethnic candidates though the first category was only marginally significant (Figure 3). Unlike strong identifiers, weak and intermediate identifiers more often considered switching their vote in response to ethnic candidates from other parties. Intermediate identifiers were significantly more willing (ten percent) to shift their support from the left and non-voting toward the right.

The same is true of believing that ethnic minorities as a group do not experience much discrimination and having little personal experience with discrimination. This group of minorities responded most to co-ethnic Conservative candidates increasing the likelihood of switching support to center and center right parties by nearly thirty percent (Figure 5). Others, even those with who believe ethnic minorities experience the most discrimination are twenty percent more likely to shift support from non-voting and Labour voting to the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. The distinction is not between who alters vote choice with the

nomination of co-ethnic Conservative candidate, but rather, how much they alter their vote choice. Only those who see little discrimination against minorities are the only group to have a statistically significant increase in the probability of switching to the right with the nomination of Liberal Democrat co-ethnic candidates.

Ethnic minorities with weak identities and little personal experience with discrimination also help explain strategic voting against Labour co-ethnic candidates (Figure 5). Not all ethnic minorities decrease Labour support with the nomination of co-ethnics by Labour. While some strong identifies and those who see discrimination against ethnic minorities as relatively pervasive (*discrimination against ethnic group level 3*) marginally respond like strategic voters, the only statistically significant effects occur for weak identifiers with little personal experience with discrimination. This latter group responds to co-ethnic Labour candidates by reducing rather than increasing Labour support as current theory predicts.

A second group with strong and intermediate identification with other ethnic minorities increased support for Conservative and Liberal Democrat ethnic candidates. Ethnic minorities who see themselves as having a lot or a fair amount in common with other member of their ethnic group appearing to link their own individual interests with group interests or linked fate (i.e. what Sanders, Heath, Fisher, and Sobolewska 2014 call ethnic solidarity) also altered their vote choice where parties nominated ethnic candidates. Like weak identifiers, linked fate minorities increased support when the Conservative Party nominated co-ethnic candidates increasing the probability of switching support to the Conservatives by twenty percent (Figure 3). They also responded with increased support with the nomination of Liberal Democrat co-ethnic candidates. Unlike weak identifiers, their support is substantively and statistically significant increasing slightly more for Liberal Democrats than for the Conservatives. They also

reacted to co-ethnic Labour candidates with strategic voting decreasing support where the party nominated co-ethnics. The decline in support was half that of the increased center and center right support and statistically significant.

The question arises as to why these to apparently distinctly different groups respond similarly to co-ethnic candidates for apparently different reasons. Part of the apparent contradiction arises from the assumption that linked fate voters are not likely to have weak ethnic identities. While only sixteen percent of minorities espousing linked fate are also weak identifiers, a large majority of weak identifiers express linked fate (Table 6). Seventy percent weak identifiers also indicate that they have a great deal or a fair amount in common with other ethnic minorities or one hundred and thirty-nine out of one hundred and ninety-three “weak-identifiers”. “Weak identifiers” with linked also support also overwhelmingly agreed that “more Black and Asians in Parliament [are] better for ethnic minorities”. While weak-identifiers with no linked fate (only twenty-eight percent of weak identifiers) are nearly evenly split on whether more parliamentary descriptive representation will help ethnic minorities, more than two in three weak-identifiers espousing linked fate see increasing descriptive representation as important. “Weak-identifiers” are slightly more likely to support descriptive representation than all ethnic minorities regardless of the strength of their ethnic identity. Equality voting or support for descriptive representation regardless of the strength of ethnic identity explains why ethnic minorities alter vote choice with the nomination of co-ethnic candidates and how these co-ethnic candidates affect their vote choice.

The assumed connection between strong linked fate and support for descriptive representation and strong rather than weak ethnic identity that exists in the U.S. literature does not hold for British ethnic minorities. The nature of ethnic identity appears to differ in the U.S.

and Britain. Even among those who indicate they only identify with their nationality, sixty-eight percent indicate they have a great or a fair amount in common with their ethnic group. They are weak ethnic identifiers not non-identifiers. They feel linked fate or ethnic solidarity that leads them to support co-ethnic candidates. Why and exactly how British Black and Asian identity differs from U.S. Black and Asian identity is a question that needs exploration in future research.

The reason that ethnic minorities are willing to switch support from left to right provides a key to whether this change is permanent or temporary. Perceived discrimination and ethnic identity determined the willingness of ethnic minorities to increase support for co-ethnic Conservative and Liberal Democrat candidate. Likely, the converse is also true. If ethnic minorities begin to experience more discrimination personally or perceived discrimination against their ethnic group, the willingness to consider changing their vote choice will decline. Whether this shift is more long-lasting and increases or is temporary and reverses in the next election depends on changing perceived discrimination and likely the perceived inclusion of ethnic minorities by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. Whether this potential decline in the willingness to cross party lines to support co-ethnic center and center right parties means a rise in support for Labour co-ethnic candidates is less clear.

Conclusion

The evidence in this study provided by the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (2010) suggests that parties are correct in assuming ethnic minorities will cross party lines to support co-ethnic candidates. Not all parties benefit from co-ethnic candidates. Only those parties like the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats with a less extensive history of representing and electing

ethnic minorities gain significant support by nominating co-ethnic candidates—switching from left to right. Ethnic minorities appear to be rewarding parties for improving the representation of Blacks and Asians within their party. Thus, parties with extensive history of inclusion benefit less. Ethnic minorities regardless of the strength of their ethnic identity respond to co-ethnic candidates by engaging in equality voting—rewarding parties for increasing ethnic inclusion.

Not all ethnic minorities altered their vote choice from 2005 to 2010 in response to ethnic minority candidates. British Asians not only reported increasing support significantly for the center, Liberal Democrats, and the center right, Conservatives, where these parties nominated co-ethnic parliamentary candidates. They also decreased support for Labour co-ethnic candidates appearing to act strategically by voting for other parties to counterbalance the likelihood of increased support by others for these Labour ethnic candidates. British Blacks responded to center left, center, and center right co-ethnic candidates differently than Asians. They increased support for Labour where the party nominated co-ethnic candidates and decreased support for the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats where these parties nominated co-ethnics. Unlike the changing support of British Asians, the changing British Black support was far smaller and not statistically significant.

Minorities regardless of ethnic identity and perception of ethnic discrimination responded to co-ethnic center right co-ethnic candidates, though the evidence suggests that this group is comprised mostly of British Asians not British Blacks. Two groups increasingly crossed ideological lines to support co-ethnic candidates—minorities expressing linked fate or ethnic solidarity and “weak identifiers”. Ethnic minorities with weaker ethnic identities, experienced less discrimination, or who see less ethnic discrimination altered vote choice the most and alter support with the nomination of co-ethnic candidates from other parties. These “weak identifiers”

reduced support where Labour nominated co-ethnic candidates. Only this group significantly increased their electoral support with the nomination of co-ethnic Liberal Democrat candidates. The same pattern of altering vote choice occurred among minorities expressing “linked fate”. They also crossed party lines to support center and center right parties and reacted with strategic voting to counter the nomination of Labour co-ethnic candidates.

How can we explain the similar response by these apparently different groups—those with “weak” identities and those with linked fate who are presumed to have “strong” ethnic identities. Counter to current theory and the U.S. case, these “weak” identifiers still feel strongly connected to their ethnic group with a sizeable majority (two out of three) expressing linked fate or ethnic solidarity. British ethnic minorities with “weak” identities can and do express linked fate and equally strong support of descriptive representation. These British equality voters reward greater inclusion by altering their vote choice to support parties that are perceived to significantly increase political inclusion of ethnic minorities. In the British case, equality voters reward the center Liberal Democrats and the center right Conservatives, but, not the traditional party of ethnic minorities, the Labour Party. With rising nomination of ethnic minorities across Europe, the question arises as to whether these new ethnic minority groups that arose from non-Western immigration will respond like British or American ethnic minorities.

Table 1


Variables		Primary Model		Alternative Model	
Variable	Categories	N	%	N	%
2005 to 2010 Vote Change (Dependent)	No Change	1366	74.8%		
	Switch to Left	230	12.6%		
	Switch to Right	231	12.6%		
Ethnic Candidates	Conservative				
	Labour				
	Liberal Democrat				
Co-ethnic Candidates	Conservative	182	8.7%		
	Labour	164	7.9%		
	Liberal Democrat	226	10.1%		
Ethnic Group	Afro-Caribbean	320	15.3%		
	African	376	18.0%		
	Pakistani	439	21.0%		
	Bangladeshi	175	8.4%		
	Indian	782	37.4%		
Professionals/Managers					
Education (A-level/equivalent or above)					
Trade Union member					
Party ID	Conservative	237	11.3%		
	Labour	1318	63.0%		
	Liberal Democrat	210	10.1%		
	None	328	15.7%		
Party Closest to Pol. Views	Conservative	186	8.9%		
	Labour	832	39.8%		
	Liberal Democrats	138	6.6%		
Party Performing Best on Most Important Issue	Conservatives	411	19.7%		
	Labour	904	43.2%		
	Liberal Democrats	128	6.1%		
Party Best Ethnic Sub. Rep.	Conservatives	320	15.3%		
	Labour	1233	59.0%		
	LD	161	7.7%		
Ethnic Identity	Strong ID	682	32.6%		
Disaffected		1032	50.1%		
Linked Fate		963	46.1%		
Personal Discrimination Experience					
Discrimination against Ethnic Group					
		Sample Mean			
Age			2.8		
Gender (female = 2)			1.5		
Muslim (= 0)			0.4		
Ethnic Minority Community			2.9		
Valence Voting	Cons. Leader		1.8		
	Labour Leader		2.2		

LD Leader

1.7

Spatial Distance on General Issues—Labour		
Spatial Distance on General Issues—LD		
Spatial Distance on General Issues—Conservatives		
Spatial Distance on Equal Opportunities—Labour		
Spatial Distance on Equal Opportunities —LD		
Spatial Distance on Equal Opp. —Conservatives		

Figure 1: Changing Ethnic Candidates and Voting by Ethnic Minorities



Data: Ethnic Candidates Database. PPCs are the party's candidates for seats in each constituency. By-election winners were included in the year they were elected and total number of candidates for the by-election year is the candidates from the last general election plus any new by-election candidates. LD had one ethnic MP elected in a by-election in 2000 who was defeated in the General Election in 2001. Jonathan Sayeed was included as a Conservative MP.

Figure 2: Ethnic Minorities and Equality Voting




Table 2: Change in Conservative and Liberal Democrat Support between 2005 and 2010 General Elections

Group	Conservatives + LD Support 2010 (%)		Change to the Left (%)	Change to the Right (%)	
All Minorities	21.6		+12.3	+12.8	
Asian	27.5		+12.5	+15.8	
Black	10.7		+12.1	+7.1	
	With Cons. Co-ethnic Candidate (%)	With LD Co-ethnic Candidate (%)	(With – Without Labour Co-ethnic Candidate)	(With – Without Cons. Co-ethnic Candidate)	(With – Without LD Co-ethnic Candidate)
All Minorities	39.1	25.7	-1.7**	+16.9***	+5.8*
Asian	46.1	29.9	-2.7*	+19.9***	+5.6
Black	7.9	6.1	+1.1	-1.9	-0.9
	With Cons. Ethnic Candidate (%)	With LD Ethnic Candidate (%)	(With – Without Labour Ethnic Candidate)	(With – Without Cons. Ethnic Candidate)	(With – Without LD Ethnic Candidate)
All Minorities	26.9	23.3	-1.7	+7.8**	+4.0
Asian	33.5	30.0	-1.8	+9.2**	+4.7
Black	14.3	11.6	-1.8	+5.6*	+3.4

EMBES 2010 and Ethnic Candidates Database. N(Conservative Co-ethnic, Vote 2010) = 207, N (Liberal Democrat Co-ethnic, Vote 2010) = 273, N(Labour Co-ethnic, Vote 2010) = 201. N(Conservative Co-ethnic, Vote Switching) = 189, N (Liberal Democrat Co-ethnic, Vote Switching) = 250, N(Labour Co-ethnic, Vote Switching) = 187. Significance based on Pearson Chi-squared value calculated from the cross-tabulation. ***p < 0.00 **p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 †p < 0.10

Table 3: Effect of Co-ethnic Candidates on Probability of Changing Vote Choice

Independent Variables	No Change/ To Right	No Change/ To Left
Co-ethnic Candidates		
Conservatives	-0.56(0.25)*	0.24(0.28)
Liberal Democrats	0.28(0.22)	-0.02(0.29)
Labour	-0.44(0.28)	0.01(0.32)
Age	0.04(0.14)	0.30(0.06)***
Class--Professionals	-0.14(0.16)	-0.11(0.16)
Ethnic Group	0.03(0.05)	-0.03(0.05)
Muslim	-0.30(0.15)*	-0.31(0.14)*
Ethnic Diversity (Own Group)	-0.07(0.16)	-0.11(0.06)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.11(0.07)	0.07(0.07)
Party Identification	-0.34(0.10)**	0.08(0.10)
Party Closest to Views (Self-placement in Issue Space/Spatial Voting)		
Conservatives	0.32(0.30)	0.13(0.36)
Liberal Democrats	-0.52(0.25)*	-0.08(0.36)
Labour	0.60(0.19)**	0.22(0.16)
Issue Performance		
Conservatives	-0.16(0.20)	0.46(0.28)
Liberal Democrats	-0.10(0.28)	0.37(0.35)
Labour	0.93(0.21)***	0.03(0.17)
Valence Voting (Party Leader)		
Labour	0.08(0.11)	-0.08(0.10)
Conservative	-0.26(0.11)*	-0.02(0.10)
Liberal Democrat	-0.22(0.10)*	-0.17(0.08)*
Best Rep. Ethnic Group		
Conservative	-0.13(0.30)	-0.47(0.38)
Liberal Democrat	0.52(0.36)	1.08(0.46)*
Labour	0.03(0.19)	-0.38(0.18)*
Ethnic Measures		
Ethnic Identity	0.21(0.10)	0.04(0.11)
Disaffected Voters	-0.05(0.15)	-0.33(0.13)*
Linked Fate	0.06(0.21)	-0.19(0.20)
Discrimination		
Personal Experience	-0.24(0.18)	0.06(0.14)
Constant	0.13(0.7)***	2.09(0.58)***
N		1826
Log-likelihood		-1168.61
Chi ²		307.21***

EMBES 2010 and Ethnic Candidates Database. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, ***p 0.00, †p 0.10

Table 4: Co-ethnic Candidates and Changing Vote Choice—Alternative Model

Independent Variables	No Change/ To Right	Changing Vote Choice 2010 No Change/ To Left
Co-ethnic Candidates,		
Conservative	-0.79(0.32)*	0.03(0.34)
Liberal Democrat	0.14(0.28)	-0.26(0.37)
Labour	-0.09(0.35)	0.32(0.38)
Gender	0.33(0.18) †	-0.18(0.18)
Age	-0.03(0.07)	0.32(0.08)***
Professional/Manager	-0.37(0.21) †	-0.13(0.20)
Education	0.16(0.20)	0.22(0.20)
Trade Union	0.15(0.25)	0.16(0.27)
Ethnic Group	-0.01(0.07)	-0.01(0.06)
Muslim	-0.17(0.20)	-0.24(0.20)
Ethnic Diversity (Own Group)	0.14(0.22)	-0.30(0.21)
Ethnic Diversity	0.15(0.10)	-0.10(0.19)
Party Identification	-0.25(0.14) †	0.19(0.15)
Spatial Voting—General Issues		
Conservative	0.001(0.05)	-0.02(0.05)
Liberal Democrats	-0.07(0.05)	0.03(0.05)
Labour	-0.03(0.04)	-0.04(0.05)
Spatial Voting—Govt./Equal Opportunities		
Conservative	-0.02(0.05)	0.02(0.04)
Liberal Democrats	0.12(0.06)	-0.05(0.05)
Labour	0.03(0.06)	0.02(0.06)
Issue Voting		
Afghan Policy	-0.36(0.27)	-0.07(0.18)
Party Closest to Views (Self-placement in Issue Space/Spatial Voting)		
Conservatives	0.65(0.37) †	-0.03(0.46)
Liberal Democrats	-0.63(0.31)*	-0.12(0.43)
Labour	0.51(0.26)*	0.11(0.22)
Issue Performance		
Conservatives	-0.10(0.27)	0.58(0.31)
Liberal Democrats	0.72(0.46)	0.44(0.39)
Labour	1.04(0.26)***	-0.03(0.22)
Valence Voting		
Labour	0.14(0.15)	-0.03(0.14)
Conservative	-0.29(0.16)	-0.19(0.15)
Liberal Democrat	-0.26(0.12)	-0.19(0.12)
Best Rep. Ethnic Group		

Conservative	-0.51(0.41)	-0.16(0.54)
Liberal Democrat	0.72(0.46)	0.75(0.59)
Labour	-0.41(0.27)	-0.17(0.24)
Ethnic Measures		
Ethnic Identity	0.10(0.14)	-0.12(0.13)
Disaffected	-0.18(0.19)	-0.42(0.18)*
Linked Fate	0.25(0.26)	-0.12(0.26)
Discrimination		
Personal Experience	-0.21(0.20)	0.32(0.19)
Group Experience	0.11(0.11)	0.12(0.11)
Constant	2.92(0.93)**	2.23(0.81)**
N		986
Log-likelihood		-642.14
Chi ²		222.79***

EMBES 2010 and Ethnic Candidates Database. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, ***p 0.00, †p 0.10

Table 5: Marginal Effects of Co-ethnic Candidates on Changes in Electoral Support

Co-ethnic Candidate	Change to Right	Change to Left	No Change
	dPr	dPr	dPr
Primary Model			
Conservative	+0.19***	-0.06*	-0.13*
Liberal Democrat	---	---	---
Labour	+0.09*	---	---
Alternative Model			
Conservative	+0.21***	---	-0.17*
Liberal Democrat	+0.10*	---	---
Labour	+0.11*	---	---
Alternative Model—Comparison Factors			
Age	---	-0.18**	
Party ID	+0.28***	-0.13*	-0.11*
Labour Closest to Views	-0.14***	---	+0.09†
Liberal Democrat Closest to Views	+0.21***	---	---
Labour Perform on Most Important Issue	-0.19***	+0.19*	+0.09*
Valence: Liberal Democrat Leader	+0.17***	---	+0.16*
Valence: Conservative Leader	+0.18***	---	-0.24***

EMBES 2010 and Ethnic Candidates Database. Party ID lists parties in the following order: none, Labour, Liberal Democrats, and Conservatives. ***p 0.00, ** p 0.01, * p 0.05, †p 0.10

Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Co-ethnic Candidate and Ethnicity—Alternative Model








Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Co-ethnic Candidates and Ethnic Factors—Alternative Model



* p 0.05, ** p 0.01, ***p 0.00, ^p 0.10. Marginal effects of the interaction terms for the two listed variables calculated with STATA margins algorithm based on the regression results reported in Table 4.

Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Co-ethnic Candidates and Ethnic Factors—Alternative Model



* p 0.05, ** p 0.01, ***p 0.00, [^]p 0.10. Marginal effects of the interaction terms for the two listed variables calculated with STATA margins algorithm based on the regression results reported in Table 4.

Table 6: Weak-Identifiers, Linked Fate, and Support for Descriptive Representation

Strength of Ethnic Identity			
Linked Fate	Weak	Intermediate	Strong
No	27.6	10.6	7.5
Yes	72.4	89.5	92.5
Descriptive Representation (Weak Identifiers Only)			
Linked Fate	More Black + Asians in Parliament Not Needed	More Black + Asians in Parliament Needed	
No	48.0	52.0	
Yes	32.5	67.5	
Descriptive Representation (All Identifiers)			
	More Black + Asians in Parliament Not Needed	More Black + Asians in Parliament Needed	
No	42.3	57.6	
Yes	36.8	63.2	

EMBES 2010 with sampling weights and Ethnic Candidates Database. N(Weak Identifiers, full sample) = 193. N(Weak Identifiers, mail-back sample) = 79. N (Descriptive Representation + Weak Identifiers, mail-back sample) = 92. The size of descriptive representation supporters is small since the descriptive representation was only included in the much smaller mail-back survey sample. The percentage of “weak-identifiers” in the mail-back survey expressing linked fate is 71.2%.

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Appendix: Data Analysis Tables

Appendix Table A.2: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Experiences and Identities —Alternative Model

<i>Co-ethnic Candidate</i>	<i>Change to Right (dPr)</i>	<i>Change to Left (dPr)</i>	<i>No Change (dPr)</i>
<i>Strong Identity</i>			
<i>Conservative</i>	+0.13†	---	---
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>	+0.22†	---	---
<i>Labour</i>	---	---	---
<i>Intermediate Identity</i>			
<i>Conservative</i>	+0.19**	---	-0.16*
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>	+0.11*	---	---
<i>Labour</i>	---	---	---
<i>Weak Identity</i>			
<i>Conservative</i>	+0.34***	-0.08†	-0.27*
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>	---	---	-0.08†
<i>Labour</i>	+0.33*	---	---
<i>Linked Fate</i>			
<i>Conservative</i>	+0.21***	---	-0.17*
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>	+0.22*	---	---
<i>Labour</i>	+0.11*	---	---
<i>No Linked Fate</i>			
<i>Conservative</i>	---	---	---
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>	---	---	---
<i>Labour</i>	---	---	---

***p 0.00, **p 0.01, *p 0.05, †p 0.10 Marginal effects of the interaction terms for the two listed variables calculated with STATA margins algorithm based on the regression results reported in Table 4.

Appendix Table A3: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Experiences and Identities—Alternative Model

<i>Co-ethnic Candidate</i>	<i>Change to Right (dPr)</i>	<i>Change to Left (dPr)</i>	<i>No Change (dPr)</i>
<i>Personal Experience with Discrimination</i>			
<i>Conservative</i>	+0.22**	---	-0.18*
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>	+0.22†	---	---
<i>Labour</i>	---	---	---
<i>No Personal Experience with Discrimination</i>			
<i>Conservative</i>	+0.21*	---	-0.18*
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>	+0.10†	---	---
<i>Labour</i>	+0.13*	---	---
<i>No Discrimination Against Ethnic Group</i>			
<i>Conservative</i>	+0.27*	--	--
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>	+0.20*	---	---
<i>Labour</i>	---	--	--
<i>Discrimination Against Ethnic Group Level 1</i>			
<i>Conservative</i>	+0.20*	---	--
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>	---	---	---
<i>Labour</i>	---	---	---
<i>Discrimination Against Ethnic Group Level 2</i>			
<i>Conservative</i>	+0.22*	---	-0.18*
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>	---	---	---
<i>Labour</i>	-0.15†	---	---
<i>Discrimination Against Ethnic Group Level 3</i>			
<i>Conservative</i>	+0.20*	---	-0.18*
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>	---	---	---
<i>Labour</i>	+0.12†	---	---

***p 0.00, **p 0.01, *p 0.05, †p 0.10 Marginal effects of the interaction terms for the two listed variables calculated with STATA margins algorithm based on the regression results reported in Table 4.