Thawing the Winter Soldier: GI and Veteran Resistance from Vietnam to Iraq and the
Dwindling of Chemistry

by

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GI and Veteran Contributions to the Vietnam and Iraq Antiwar Movements

When the similarities between the Vietnam War and Operation Iraqi Freedom are enumerated, the resulting list is quite staggering. To begin, three parallels may be drawn regarding the instigation of both wars. In each case there was an initial abstract and long-term perception of danger that led to preliminary martial discussions. Then there were the specific and immediate threats that transformed discussion into action. Finally, in each instance a clearly delineated enemy was cited. While the perception of danger that led to debates over the necessity of U.S. involvement in Vietnam was the encroachment of Communism, it was trepidation over terrorism in 2003 that sparked the initial discussions concerning the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, while the specific and immediate threat posed by the Gulf of Tonkin controversy led President Lyndon B. Johnson to escalate the export of ground troops to Vietnam, the concrete and urgent peril of the purported existence of weapons of mass destruction led to the decision to invade Iraq. Finally, while the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations had Ho Chi Minh and his communist followers to tout as the enemies in their securing-the-free-world narrative, the Bush administration had Saddam Hussein and Iraqi terrorists as the evildoers in their America-under-attack storyline (Bromley 1966; Heibert 2003; Laufer 2006).

Although the congruence between the catalysts of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq are impressive, the similarities do not end with the initiation of each war. As the wars in Vietnam and Iraq raged on, antiwar sentiment began to grow at home leading certain segments of the population to engage in antiwar movements. Furthermore, although efforts were made by those in power to align antiwar sentiment with anti-soldier

sentiment – a strategy that was especially effective after 9/11 -, many GIs and veterans of each war became part of each insurgency (Heibert 2003; Laufer 2006; Lembcke 1998).

Before turning to these next three examples of convergence between the Vietnam and Iraq wars, it is interesting to note that the mobilization of public support for war is incredibly similar to the mobilization of public support for antiwar insurgency. Regarding each, there are tactics and mentors to be utilized from previous mobilizations, expanding or contracting opportunities for mobilization, varying levels of organizational strength to carry off either endeavor, collective identities bolstered by narratives and frames that legitimize action and available networks that may be tapped to further build support (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Martin 2013; McAdam 1982; Polletta 2006). Thus it may be helpful to think of the antiwar mobilizations against Vietnam and Iraq as half of the interplay between the movements to end these two wars and the movements to sustain them with GIs and veterans caught up on both sides. Within this perspective of competing movements, it is quite interesting to see why and how GIs and veterans come to be associated with the antiwar effort when they are themselves part of the military institution that is intuitively pro-war.

Antiwar Sentiment, Mobilization and the Participation of GIs and Veterans

As the Vietnam and Iraq Wars raged on, antiwar sentiment originating from two distinct sources continued to climb at home. The first source of antiwar sentiment originated from more pragmatic concerns regarding the tactical efficacy of the U.S. military, issues of morale and the odds of victory. Those expressing pragmatic antiwar sentiments cited rising U.S. casualty rates, guerrilla warfare, difficulty discerning the enemy, no foreseeable end in sight and no escape plan as some of the reasons why they

opposed either war (Laufer 2006; Schreiber 1976). The second source of antiwar sentiment was a concern about the morality of each war. Dissenters who expressed this form of antiwar sentiment remarked upon the imperialistic bent of each war as well as the class and race composition of the lower-ranking troops (Chavez 1994; Jamail 2009; Laufer 2006; Lembcke 1998; Mariscal 2007; Seidenberg and Short 1992; Westheider 2008).

Growing antiwar sentiment against Vietnam eventually led to the cultivation of an antiwar movement. Yet those who mobilized were not from those segments of the population that expressed the highest levels of antiwar sentiment. In fact, most antiwar participants came from those segments of society that expressed the highest levels of pro-war sentiment. Thus, while the majority of antiwar sentiment for Vietnam was found among minorities and the working-class, those who participated in the antiwar movement were white and middle-class. Participants also tended to be students, professionals and intellectuals despite the fact that the youth subpopulation as well as the more educated and affluent strata of society tended to support the war (O'Brien 1974).

While it may seem intuitive to categorize those who possess antiwar sentiment but do not join the antiwar movement as those whose antiwar sentiment stems from pragmatic concerns and those who possess antiwar sentiment and join the movement as those whose antiwar sentiment stems from morality concerns, while some of this is obviously correct, this assumption alone overlooks the fact that certain segments of the antiwar population, namely minority groups, felt alienated from the Vietnam antiwar mobilization on account of their inability to engage in white, middle-class tactics (Epstein 2003; O'Brien 1974; Schreiber 1976; Schuman 1972). This is proven by the fact that

while working-class people tended to be antiwar for pragmatic concerns alone – on account of widespread union support for the war – minority groups involved with the Civil Rights and Chicano Movements were mobilizing on their own to protest the imperialistic nature of the war and the racism and classism of draft deferments (Chavez 1994; Westheider 2008).

During the Iraq War, antiwar sentiment increased among the educated and young and remained stable among minorities (Burris 2008). Yet despite this continuity in race-based antiwar sentiments, middle-class whites were still those predominantly involved in the antiwar movement against Iraq (Burris 2008). This is perhaps best explained as a continuation of minority alienation from antiwar movements launched by middle-class whites as opposed to minority group antiwar sentiment stemming from pragmatic concerns as Latino activist groups have vociferously fought to demilitarize both predominantly lower-class Latino schools and the DREAM Act, both of which are targets for military recruitment (Mariscal 2007). Furthermore, despite the increase in antiwar sentiment among the youth segment, there were far less young people involved in the antiwar movement against Iraq than there had been in the antiwar movement against Vietnam perhaps on account of the recent trend among youth towards political apathy here exacerbated by the fact that there was no longer a draft (Epstein 2003).

Yet despite the lopsided antiwar mobilization in each period and the decline in youth participation from Vietnam to Iraq, both movements were numerically successful. At its peak, the antiwar movement against the Vietnam War boasted 4 million participants while the largest demonstration to occur during the antiwar movement against Iraq – the internationally coordinated events that occurred on February 15, 2003 –

had an estimated 10 to 13 million participants denouncing the impending invasion of Iraq (O'Brien 1974; Epstein 2003). Both movements were additionally successful in attracting and involving two important segments of U.S. society: the GIs and veterans of each war.

Statement of the Problem

Yet surprisingly, although both antiwar movements framed their wars as unjust and successfully mobilized large numbers of participants, and despite the fact that the antiwar movement against Iraq bragged even larger and more international event turnouts than those garnered by the previous movement, fewer GIs and veterans were involved in the antiwar movement against Iraq than were involved in the antiwar movement against Vietnam (Hunt 1999; Laufer 2006; Lembcke 1998; Jamail 2009). Why is it that the Vietnam antiwar movement boasted greater participation of GIs and veterans than its Iraq counterpart?

Although it is quite difficult to numerically address GI participation accurately for the very good reason that GI resistance is a high-risk form of activism and thus may be a more covert form of resistance, a good proxy for gauging the level of GI participation in each movement is the level of veteran participation in each movement. As many GI activists became veteran activists after being discharged, the number of veterans involved in each antiwar effort can serve as a guide for estimating the number of active-duty GIs involved in each endeavor (Hunt 1999; Laufer 2006; Lembcke 1998; Jamail 2009). Thus to assess the numerical involvement of both GIs and veterans in each antiwar movement, numerical participation of veterans will here be used. Thus as there were more veterans involved in the antiwar movement against the Vietnam War than there were against the Iraq War, it can be concluded that the same holds for active-duty GIs of each war (Hunt

1999; Laufer 2006; Lembcke 1998; Jamail 2009). For example, at its peak, Vietnam

Veterans against the War (VVAW), one of the largest veterans' organizations dedicated

to antiwar mobilization, boasted over 20,000 members versus the copycat organization

Iraq Veterans against the War (IVAW), which boasted about 300 to 400 members in

2005 and about 1,800 in 2009 (Hunt 1999; Laufer 2006; Jamail 2009).

Uncovering why GI and veteran involvement in the antiwar movement against

Iraq paled in comparison to the GI and veteran involvement witnessed in the antiwar

movement against Vietnam is an important sociological task. Since GIs and veterans lend

legitimacy to antiwar movements, it is important to understand why their mobilization is

dwindling (Hunt 1999). As there has been a concerted effort in the U.S. to discredit any

antiwar movement as anti-soldier, without the presence of GIs and veterans in an antiwar

movement this effort only becomes easier (Heibert 2003; Lembcke 1998).

Unearthing the reason behind declining GI and veteran resistance is also an

interesting sociological endeavor as it seems intuitive that GI and veteran mobilization

against the Iraq War would be stronger than it had been previously on account of the

"movement tradition" established by the GIs and veterans of Vietnam and inherited by

the GIs and veterans of Iraq (Martin 2013:20). This movement tradition includes tactics,

narratives, frames, collective identities and movement experts that were cultivated during

GI and veteran insurgency against Vietnam that the GIs and veterans of Iraq have

inherited. As evidence points to the fact that the GIs and veterans of Iraq have indeed

embraced, utilized and built upon this movement, it could be assumed that as this

movement tradition strengthens, GI and veteran insurgency would grow. Yet this is not

the case.

Perhaps the failure of the movement tradition could be explained within the framework of the multi-institutional politics approach to social movements (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). Expanding upon McAdam's (1982) political process model of social movements, the multi-institutional politics approach of Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) states that, as power does not occur solely within the polity and economy, social movements may simultaneously target several institutions including culture. As such, McAdam's (1982) conception of political opportunities for insurgency can here be expanded to include all forms of opportunity or lack thereof. By utilizing and combining the insights of Armstrong and Bernstein's multi-institutional politics framework (2008) with that of McAdam's (1982) political process model of insurgency, perhaps it will be discovered that constricting opportunities broadly defined, a lack of organizational readiness and/or a lack of cognitive liberation are the culprits behind the dearth of GI and veteran insurgency witnessed during the movement against the Iraq War.

Or perhaps the relative absence of GI and veteran mobilization has something to do with the shifting demographics of civilian mobilization. As addressed above, while more youth expressed antiwar sentiment during Iraq than Vietnam, they did not contribute significantly to the mobilization against the war in Iraq as they had during the antiwar movement against Vietnam. It is a possibility that the loss of the major contribution of the youth segment has led to a weakening of the "chemistry" between the civilian and GI/veteran components of the antiwar movement that Lembcke (1998) has so adamantly claimed is the reason for the success of the antiwar movement against Vietnam as well as for the high levels of GI and veteran mobilization at that time (40). As it was the students involved in the student movement in general and in Students for a

Democratic Society (SDS) specifically that mobilized the civilian antiwar initiative against Vietnam, it is possible that the lack of youth participation in the antiwar movement against Iraq stifled the chemistry between the civilian and military segments of the more recent antiwar mobilization which hindered the mobilization of GIs and veterans.

A Review of the Literature

Building a Movement Tradition: GI and Veteran Resistance from Vietnam to Iraq

Although the evidence proves otherwise, it would be expected that GI and veteran insurgency against the Iraq War would be greater than had been witnessed during the antiwar movement against Vietnam on account of the fact that the GIs and veterans of Iraq were bequeathed a "movement tradition" (Martin 2013:20). As the GIs and veterans involved in the antiwar movement against Vietnam had already generated a host of narratives, frames, collective identities, tactics and "movement entrepreneurs," and as it has been shown that the GIs and veterans involved in the insurgency against the Iraq War have utilized and augmented these legacies of the Vietnam era, it might be expected that the GIs and veterans of Iraq would be able to build a stronger resistance (Martin 2013:21). In other words, if you do not reinvent the wheel, you can improve upon it.

Movement entrepreneurs

Like Martin's (2013) discovery that the initial tactics, organizational techniques and rhetorical strategies of the burgeoning tax movement in the United States were introduced by movement entrepreneurs who appropriated their repertoires from previous and unrelated movements of which they had participated, so too may the same case be made for the initial GI and veteran insurgents opposed to the Vietnam War. Movement

entrepreneurs are important for any mobilization as they teach insurgents the art of protest (Martin 2013). Some of these movement entrepreneurs came from various socialist and communist organizations including the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and the WEB Du Boise Clubs while others came from the Civil Rights Movement. Upon entering the military, such GIs with previous experience with leftist movements were already opposed to the war in Vietnam and more importantly had movement experience, which included certain frames and tactics, which they brought to the burgeoning GI resistance.

Movement entrepreneurs who came from socialist or communist backgrounds employed frames and tactics they had encountered in their socialist movements to the GI resistance movement. One such entrepreneur, Private Howard Petrick, who had belonged to the YSA before entering the military, tried to mobilize his fellow soldiers against the war by passing out antiwar literature that framed the war as American imperialism. When Private Petrick was court martialed, he went public with his case, which got him the support of the Student Mobilization Committee (SMC) who rallied around him and his First Amendment rights. Upon his discharge, Private Petrick went to work as a veteran activist with SMC and came to form the GI Press Service that printed and distributed antiwar literature to GIs. The GI Press Service had over 300 active duty GI subscribers who would help to disseminate the publications on their bases. The agenda of the GI Press Service was to serve as a link between local GI efforts and national efforts by creating an information and communication network (Lembcke 1998). The first act of collective GI insurgency during Vietnam was actually led by Private Dennis Mora who had been involved in the WEB Du Bois Clubs before being drafted. Mora convinced two

other privates from Fort Hood, Texas to refuse to ship out for Vietnam in 1966. Other

such demonstrations of resistance soon followed suit, including one led by Ronald

Lockman who had also previously been involved with the WEB Du Bois Clubs.

Other movement entrepreneurs came the Civil Rights Movement. One such

entrepreneur was Private Joe Miles who had been a black nationalist organizer prior to

being drafted. Miles brought his black nationalist frame into the service with him, a frame

that observed the war as racist imperialism and a drain on federal money that could

otherwise be used to end poverty and racial oppression at home. Miles, like other black

nationalists and civil rights activists, also saw the hypocrisy of asking oppressed black

men to fight for the country that oppresses them only to oppress other people of color.

Thus, while stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina Miles organized the GIs United

Against the War in Vietnam (GIUATWIV), a GI antiwar organization dedicated to

spreading awareness of these issues to other GIs and instigating GI resistance (Rinaldi

1974). Yet GI movement entrepreneurs did not just come from prior movements. Others

came from the college educated officer strata perhaps on account of their educations,

skills, and the shifting values of the country (Harrison 1993; Rinaldi 1974). One Harvard

educated officer became involved in the antiwar movement as a veteran on account of the

classism he witnessed within the military. When this officer refused to okay a destroyer

for battle, he was not punished for his disobedience. Yet as he had witnessed enlisted

men put into the brig for far more minor offenses, he became disenchanted with the class

composition of the military's hierarchical structure. As a result, he became an activist for

GI rights with the Lawyers Military Defense Committee to give legal council to active-

duty GIs (Seidenberg and Short 1992).

Hearing the stories of movement entrepreneurs, it becomes apparent that these leaders of the GI and veteran resistance came with prior frames and tactics: often from other movements but also from universities. Some of these entrepreneurs had their first experience in the veteran resistance while others began in the GI movement as leaders only to move over to hold prominent positions in the veteran effort after discharge (Hunt 1999; Lembcke 1998). Furthermore, many of these veteran or GI-turned-veteran leaders of the Vietnam era subsequently came to reach out to the GIs and veterans of the Iraq War becoming some of the movement entrepreneurs for that GI and veteran insurgency (Jamail 2009; Laufer 2006). Interestingly, while many of the movement entrepreneurs to help steer GI and veteran insurgency during Vietnam came from other movements or universities, the GI and veterans of the Iraq War who became prominent leaders in the resistance against Iraq had seemingly virtually no movement or university experience prior to enlistment (Jamail 2009; Laufer 2006).

Narratives of conversion, frames of injustice and a Winter Soldier collective identity

Although it may have been the influence of movement entrepreneurs that led to GI and veteran mobilization against Vietnam, antiwar sentiment was already high among these populations. Many participants in the GI and veteran resistance recall the onset of their antiwar sentiment as a conversion quite like the women Blee (2003) interviewed who had come to participate in organized racism. Yet unlike Blee's (2003) racist women, who had come to impose a conversion story retrospectively upon their more mundane reasons for initial participation in organized racism, these GIs and veterans had truly been converted in combat by what they had witnessed. While these conversion narratives may have focused on killing or the ever-present fear of being injured or killed, these

possibilities are always an understood and anticipated component of war and thus cannot explain GI and veteran insurgency during the Vietnam era. Thus what made these GIs and veterans into converts for the antiwar movement was the fact that they had come to frame the war in Vietnam as unjust (Hunt 1999; Lembcke 1998; Rinaldi 1974; Seidenberg and Short 1992).

The unjustness of the Vietnam War took on several flavors. One such flavor was the notion that the U.S. presence in Vietnam was an instance of American imperialism replete with the dehumanization of those they had come there to colonize. One GI became a part of the movement after witnessing fellow soldiers cutting off the ears and penises of the enemy for trophies while another converted after seeing kids get shot just for swearing at soldiers. Others cited merely hearing about U.S. soldiers committing atrocities such as those that occurred infamously at My Lai (Hunt 1999). For others, their unjust war frame was a mixture of American imperialism abroad and racism and classism at home. One black GI became involved in the veteran resistance after drawing parallels between the racism he had experienced at home, the racism he had experienced in the military and the racism targeting the Vietnamese people. Another GI was converted after hearing that his father had made a killing on the stock market with a munitions company immediately after he had met a 17-year-old working-class black veteran who had gotten severely burned over the entirety of his body while serving in Vietnam (Seidenberg and Short 1992).

These conversion narratives where GIs and veterans came to frame the war in Vietnam as unjust were very important for the generation of a collective insurgent identity. The collective identity of GIs and veterans against the Vietnam War could

perhaps best be summed up by the name "Winter Soldier." Taken from Thomas Paine, the term Winter Soldier referred to those soldiers who always serve their country regardless of the circumstances and was appropriated by the VVAW. Members of the VVAW saw their antiwar stance against Vietnam as proof that they were indeed Winter Soldiers, those who would serve their country to the end by making it known to their fellow countrymen that the war in Vietnam was unjust (Hunt 1999).

Collective identity is important for any social movement as it maintains a distinct sense of community and thus serves to preserve an insurgency (Blee 2003). Maintaining the collective identity of the Winter Soldier allowed GIs and veterans against the Vietnam War to feel bonded to one another, a feeling that sustained group collaboration. Likewise, the collective frame that all Winter Soldiers shared – that of the unjust war – helped to inspire them to action, for as Polletta (2006) states, a movement must frame mobilization as "a necessary solution to an obvious injustice" (35). One of the ways in which the effectiveness of collective identity and framing were to GI and veteran action during the Vietnam era was the Winter Soldier Investigation. Held in the winter of 1971, the Winter Soldier Investigation tried the U.S. for the war crimes it had thus committed in Vietnam. At the Investigation, witnesses to the atrocities testified before the crowd about the atrocities they had seen in Vietnam. Thus while these conversion narratives were quite sincere, they were also utilized as strategic storytelling, for as the witnesses spoke, their narratives "chip[ped] away at the wall of public indifference" and "unsettle[d] the status quo" (Polletta 2006:2,16).

Interestingly, the GIs and veterans of Iraq who became insurgents against the war utilized the same conversion narratives, unjust war frame and collective identity of the

Winter Soldier that were utilized by their Vietnam predecessors. Many GIs and veterans of Iraq who became involved in the antiwar movement recount stories of atrocities quite similar to those told by their Vietnam counterparts including the racialization of the Iraqis, the mistreatment of Iraqi children and the shooting of innocent Iraqi civilians (Laufer 2006). As a result of these experiences, these GIs and veterans were converted to the notion or frame that the war in Iraq was unjust and borrowing from their predecessors, they came to see themselves as part of the Winter Soldier identity. This lends credence to Martin's (2013) theory of the construction of a movement tradition. Furthermore, the GI and veteran insurgents against Iraq also took a page from their predecessors' strategy book and held a series of War Soldier events (Jamail 2009). Thus the GIs and veterans against the Iraq War not only borrowed the narratives, frames and collective identity utilized by the Vietnam GI and veteran insurgents, they also appropriated many of their tactics, the Winter Soldier events being but one example.

A repertoire of resistance

For the most part, GI and veteran insurgency against both Vietnam and Iraq began as individual acts of resistance. During Vietnam, many GIs would refuse orders, go absent without leave (AWOL), search and evade with their units as opposed to search and destroy and even occasionally engage in fragging (Rinaldi 1974). Furthermore, many veterans before veteran mobilization exploded in 1969 would give antiwar speeches at universities and antiwar events (Lembcke 1998). Similar to the personal resistance of Vietnam GIs, many GIs in Iraq who opposed the war went AWOL, engaged in search and evade missions and applied for conscientious objector (CO) status (Laufer 2006).

Others would also use the new technology offered by the Internet to blog about their experiences and antiwar sentiments while in country (Jamail 2009).

More important still are the similarities between collective resistance utilized by the GIs and veterans of Vietnam and that utilized by the GIs and veterans of Iraq. During the Vietnam War, GIs would call sick strikes and peace marches as well as help to spread the GI periodicals being published by the coffeehouses run by civilians and veterans against the war (Rinaldi 1974) Before forming VVAW, Vietnam veterans would engage in protest events sponsored by Veterans for Peace, an antiwar organization that had been founded by World War II veterans as well as work in the coffeehouses initially engineered by antiwar civilians (Lembcke 1998; Rinaldi 1974). After Vietnam veterans began to mobilize themselves, they held their own marches, conventions and events, which included the Winter Soldier investigation as well as street theater performances where they would pretend to raid a village in Vietnam in a public space so as to spread awareness about the atrocities being perpetrated in country (Hunt 1999).

While the GIs opposed to Iraq seemed to have embraced their own tactics, namely blogging about the war while in country, veteran insurgents of the Iraq War borrowed generously from their Vietnam predecessors, holding and attending marches, conventions and events, utilizing updated street theater tactics where veterans engaged in mock public patrols, arrests, house raids and tower watches so spread awareness of the atrocities committed in Iraq, Winter Soldier events and starting their own veteran organizations including IVAW. One group of Iraq veterans even started their own antiwar coffeehouse, Coffee Strong Internet Café, off base from Fort Lewis, Washington (Jamail 2009).

Definite evidence of a movement tradition

There is clear evidence that the GIs and veterans of Iraq who became antiwar insurgents drew from a movement tradition cultivated by their predecessors from the Vietnam era. Not only did the GI and veteran insurgents of Iraq utilize the narrative strategy, frame and collective identity of the Vietnam era, they also benefitted from the repertoire of resistance that had previously been cultivated as well as from the guidance offered by Vietnam veterans. Yet despite the creation and maintenance of a movement tradition, there were less GIs and veterans mobilized against the Iraq War than there had been against the Vietnam War. To account for this, closing opportunities for mobilization, organizational strength and cognitive liberation are examined in the context of the political process model as augmented by the multi-institutional politics approach (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; McAdam 1982).

The Multi-Institutional Politics Model

Expanding on McAdam's (1982) political process model of insurgency by utilizing Armstrong and Bernstein's multi-institutional politics framework, can the GI and veteran antiwar movement tradition's seeming lack of success be explained with an analysis of the opportunities, organizational strength and cognitive liberation available to the GI and veteran insurgents against the Iraq War?

Constricting opportunities

According to McAdam (1982), broad and shifting socioeconomic forces come to expand or contract political opportunities for mobilization at any given point in history. Utilizing this notion but expanding it to include all opening or closing opportunities for the successful mounting of a movement, it is obvious that opportunities for insurgency were quite expanded during the Vietnam era. The Two Great Wars and the Great

Depression in-between produced a cultural opportunity, the beat generation, that came to challenge conventional American values and served as a catalyst for the youth, counterculture and student movements to come (Harrison 1993). Furthermore the racial atrocities witnessed during World War II led to a massive global movement to decolonize, an unfolding that fostered minority insurgency in the U.S. (Omi and Winant 1994). The resulting surge of protest and its media coverage led to consciousness raising, political successes and transformations in the U.S. culture. All of this combined with the expansion of the ground war in Vietnam resulted in the initial stirrings of GI and veteran insurgency (Rinaldi 1974).

While it is obvious that there were expanding cultural, media and political opportunities in the 1960s and 1970s to encourage GI and veteran mobilization, the converse was true in the early 2000s. In the 1970s there was a major conservative riposte to the successes garnered by the previous decade. Two interrelated counterthrusts were the interpretations of the neoconservatives that the U.S. had successfully become colorblind and a true country of equal opportunities. While at first glance this appears quite harmless, such rhetoric came to be utilized to dismantle all of the achievements of the progressive movements of the previous years including bussing, affirmative action and multiculturalism in schools (Omi and Winant 1994). By the 1970s, the draft had also been eliminated on account of the charges that the conscription observed during Vietnam had been racist and classist (Westheider 2008). As a result, an all-volunteer force (AVF) was created, stripping away the prestige of service as it was now based upon competing market opportunities and proffering the appearance of choice although enlistment was still more or less an economic conscription fuelled by the active recruitment of minorities

(Mariscal 2007; Morales 2004; President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force 1970).

Furthermore, while the neoconservatives succeeded in painting a picture of a new, colorblind and equal opportunity U.S., it also succeeded in pushing the country – including the Democratic Party – farther to the right. After the successes of the Civil Rights Movement, Women's Liberation Movement and the like, white men who had previously been committed to the Democratic Party now felt alienated. Seeing their opportunity, Republicans began to utilize the tactics of populism to appeal to their potentially new constituency. Pulling many of these former Democrats over, the Republican Party dominated U.S. politics until Bill Clinton's victory, but by that time the U.S. had been pushed so far right, that Clinton, in order to win, had to embrace the tough love rhetoric against minorities and the poor that had been popularized by Ronald Reagan (Omi and Winant 1994). Thus there had been a successful return to the status quo, one that included a return to viewing antiwar protestors as anti-soldier: a view that exponentially grew in legitimacy after 9/11 and the concerted effort of the Bush Administration to rally American citizens around the flag in the wake of collective shock (Klein 2008; Lembcke 1998).

Thus by the time talks began concerning the invasion of Iraq, opportunities for antiwar mobilization had been constricted in two ways. First, the lack of a draft and the presence of a devalued and seemingly AVF, one that in appearance lacked the racism and classism of the draft, meant that there was no opportunity for people – especially the young – to rally around the injustice of an undemocratic, racist and classist draft. Second, the return to the conservative status quo, exacerbated by 9/11 and equating antiwar with

anti-soldier meant that there was less potential for the cognitive liberation necessary for insurgency. If GIs and veterans of the Iraq War for the most part came to see their service as voluntary, this could be the reason why there was a dearth of GI and veteran insurgency against Iraq. Furthermore, if GIs and veterans came to see antiwar efforts as anti-soldier in the context of the Iraq War, then it would have been harder for these segments to mobilize. Finally, these two factors may in fact be particularly important concerning civilian mobilization, which might be the source of indigenous organizational strength for GI and veteran resistance (McAdam 1982).

A dearth of organizational strength

Not only were opportunities for mobilization constricted in the 2000s, but there was also a lack of organizational strength among GIs and veterans against the Iraq War. While the GIs of the Vietnam insurgency worked together to disseminate antiwar literature and periodicals crafted at the civilian and veteran run coffeehouses off base, the GIs of Iraq instead came to blog individually about their experiences in Iraq (Rinaldi 1974; Jamail 2009). Although blogging efforts were part of an online network where readers including civilians could comment on each blog, it pales in comparison to the network of civilians, veterans and GIs that were involved in coffeehouse schemes. While the online civilian-veteran-GI network forged during Iraq could disseminate knowledge out from Iraq and bring sympathy and solidarity into Iraq, the in-person network forged by the coffeehouses of Vietnam led to organization and action. Furthermore, while both veterans of Vietnam and Iraq were and continue to be active in antiwar endeavors, if one is to go based on peak membership in the largest organizations dedicated to veterans of

each war, VVAW boasted over 20,000 members at the height of its efforts while IVAW only boasted 1,800 members (Hunt 1999; Jamail 2009).

Perhaps the dearth of indigenous organizational strength witnessed among the GIs and veterans of Iraq had something to do with the lack of civilian antiwar organizational strength during the occupation of Iraq. Yet this seems counterintuitive. After all, the demonstration held on February 15, 2003 against the impending invasion of Iraq was the largest antiwar demonstration to date boasting anywhere from 10 to 13 million supporters around the globe. The success of this event was due to the new technology of social media. In fact, in addition to facilitating the demonstration on February 15th, social media assisted in the creation of transnational advocacy networks (TANS) that allowed for the quick and effective international planning of antiwar events that included candlelight vigils, virtual marches, online lectures and petitions and templates to construct letters to elected officials (Carty and Onyett 2007).

Additionally, the antiwar effort against Iraq was comprised of inter-organizational networks that included United for Peace and Justice and Act Now To Stop War and End Racism. These inter-organizational networks and others were comprised of either international or national coalitions of organizations that ran the gamut from political parties, unions, environmental groups, feminist groups, churches, charities, cultural associations and anti-globalization organizations (Carty and Onyett 2007). While this was helpful in pooling resources, movement entrepreneurs, skills and tactics as was witnessed within the anti-genetic engineering inter-organizational effort studied by Munro and Shurman (2008), the downfall of this setup was the absence of an organization or movement committed to the antiwar effort. The GIs and veterans of Vietnam had the

student movement, but the GIs and veterans of Iraq seemingly had no one. The only possible substitute for the efforts of the student movement during Vietnam was the dedication of the organizations that had initially comprised the anti-globalization movement of a decade prior. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration's manipulation of collective shock after 9/11 led many of these organizations to be weary of their efforts (Epstein 2003). As a result, military and civilian antiwar efforts did not seem to take off during the antiwar movement against Iraq.

By contrast, there was "chemistry" between the civilian and GI and veteran segments of the antiwar movement against Vietnam (Lembcke 1998:40). While the initial efforts of civilian resisters were more class-based and consisted of draft dodging, draft resistance and draft counseling, this soon changed when socialist and communist student groups became involved in the antiwar movement (Rinaldi 1974). Knowing well that such tactics were both ineffective and alienating, students aligned with socialist and communist organizations began calling for more inclusive tactics, ones that would encourage GIs to engage in resistance (Lembcke 1998). For instance, when the YSA joined forces with the Student Mobilizing Committee (SMC), a prominent student organization committed to ending the war in Vietnam, they instigated a new tactic of encouraging those drafted to enter the military so as to expand GI rights from within by teaching other GIs to resist the tyranny of the military and the war (Lembcke 1998).

This chemistry between civilian and military efforts against the war could be seen elsewhere as well as the SMC came to work with Vietnam veterans on antiwar marches and events. This effort included the Moratorium Days of 1969, where GI, veteran and civilian participation was coordinated. Another example of GI, veteran and civilian

chemistry in the antiwar movement against Vietnam was the group effort and network created by the coffeehouses established near bases at that time. Initially set up by civilians, these coffeehouses were bastions of the counterculture and antiwar movement. As the coffeehouses invited veterans to come and rap about the war or just relax, many came to patron these establishments and soon became involved in their organization and action strategies that included forging ties with GIs on the bases so that they could disseminate the literature (Rinaldi 1974). These efforts built up civilian-veteran-GI networks or "chemistry" that assisted the war effort in general and the mobilization of GIs and veterans specifically as they came to realize that they had allies and were pulled in by the network (Lembcke 1998). Unfortunately, this does not appear to have happened during the antiwar movement against Iraq, which perhaps accounts for the lack of GI and veteran participation.

Cognitive liberation and oppositional framing

Cognitive liberation was indeed present amongst those GI and veteran insurgents who came to oppose the Iraq War. Like their Vietnam counterparts, they too had come to view the system as having lost its legitimacy as evidenced by their embracement of the unjust war frame. Furthermore, like their predecessors, the GI and veteran insurgents against Iraq believed in their right to demand change as well as in their efficacy as evidenced by their participation in antiwar organizations and efforts (McAdam 1982). Yet what differed in their situation from that of their predecessors is the fact that oppositional framing had become stronger in the decades that followed Vietnam and stronger still after 9/11.

When the antiwar movement against Vietnam initially began, elected officials had attempted to rhetorically oppose the goodness of soldiers against the badness of protestors. Using the strategic storytelling tactic of metonymy – the swapping of one word or image for another-, officials attempted to equate antiwar with communism (Polletta 2006). When that was found ineffective, they tried a different tactic: using antiwar as a sort of "shorthand" for anti-soldier (Lembcke 1998; Polletta 2006:56). The idea behind this tactic was to generate manufactured consent that to be antiwar was obviously to be anti-soldier. Thus, the converse also became true: to be pro-war was to be pro-soldier. This tactic was used in an attempt to reframe the war as something that was being waged by the soldiers for the soldiers: i.e. that the mission had to continue so that soldiers would not have died or fought in vain (Lembcke 1998).

Although this utilization of metonymy was not that effective during the Vietnam War on account of the high number of GIs and veterans engaged in the antiwar movement, the use of metonymy to equate antiwar with anti-soldier has come back with a vengeance. After the discovery of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the image of the Vietnam veteran was rewritten. No longer was his disgruntlement politicized, but rather veteran disgruntlement came to be reframed as an indicator of PTSD. What is worse, popular media soon came to portray the onset of PTSD in veterans as resulting from their negative interactions with anti-soldier antiwar activists (Lembcke 1998). Within this reframing of the disgruntlement of Vietnam veterans combined with the push to the right that began in the 1970s, President Bush Sr. was able to successfully mobilize pro-sentiment in the Gulf War just as his son was able to do so for the invasion of Iraq: especially in the new post-9/11 context (Klein 2008; Omi and Winant 1994). In fact,

Bush Jr. once again introduced the complimentary metonymy to antiwar/anti-soldier; after it was discovered that there were no weapons of mass destruction, Bush's frame became one of a war fought by soldiers for soldiers (Laufer 2006). Thus, it is also a possibility that the growth in potency of the metonymic strategies of pro-war elected officials contributed to the decline in GI and veteran insurgency that was witnessed within the antiwar movement against Iraq.

Methodology

Although it has been demonstrated that a movement tradition of GI and veteran antiwar insurgency had been established by the efforts of the GIs and veterans of Vietnam and continued on by the GIs and veterans of the Iraq War, something hindered this tradition's efficacy during the antiwar movement against Iraq. Indeed, since the Vietnam War, the ingredients for insurgency proposed by McAdam (1982) have waned. First, there has been a constriction of opportunities for mobilization as the draft was retired and the country became more conservative. Second, there was less organizational strength supporting the GI and veteran component of the antiwar movement against Iraq specifically and the movement in general. Third, although cognitive liberation still exists, the potency of the counterframes of the opposition has increased.

Yet while all of the aforementioned is true, what exactly are the specific reasons for the decline in GI and veteran insurgency witnessed during the Iraq War? One hypothesis is that the lack of GI and veteran movement entrepreneurs during the Iraq War affected mobilization. This lack of movement entrepreneurs is most likely due to the fact that opportunities for protest constricted as the country became more conservative. Since the movement entrepreneurs of Vietnam came from other movements or universities, as

there were no large and visible social movements being taken seriously during the 2000s, as the growing conservativism of the nation probably explains the absence of officer entrepreneurs – the war in Vietnam was so unpopular and the countercultural movement so visible that this might be why college educated officers became entrepreneurs during that period – and finally as the enlisted men who became insurgents during the Iraq War were not college educated – having enlisted as a pathway to college – perhaps this explains the absence of movement entrepreneurs (Laufer 2006).

A second hypothesis is that since there was less youth involvement in the antiwar movement against Iraq, perhaps on account of the lack of a draft, this dearth of young person or student participation was the source of weakened organizational strength for both civilian and thus GI and veteran insurgency. I propose that it is a combination of the two aforementioned hypotheses: that there was no "chemistry" between the civilian and GI and veteran components of the antiwar movement against Iraq, that this was on account of the dearth of movement entrepreneurs who were themselves GIs and veterans as well as on the loss of young persons and students – segments of the population with greater reserves of time, energy and resources if they are on college or university campuses – and that this loss of chemistry is the reason why there were fewer GIs and veterans involved in the antiwar insurgency targeting Iraq. This chemistry, I contend, is incredibly important for GI and veteran insurgency as it is instigated by leaders or movement entrepreneurs on both sides and results in higher quantities of movement members, "established structures of solidary incentives" – which does not occur when there is no draft - and a more effective communication network (McAdam 1982:45).

As it has already been established that chemistry existed between the civilian and GI/veteran components of the antiwar movement against Vietnam with the bulk of the civilian effort comprised of members from the student movement and the majority of GI and veteran movement entrepreneurs coming from movement or college backgrounds, I propose to disinter whether or not such chemistry existed during the antiwar movement against Iraq.

Design

I will begin this project in the fall of 2014 in San Diego County. As I am trying to establish whether or not chemistry existed between members of the civilian antiwar effort and members of the GI/veteran antiwar effort, I will interview from each population. I will advertise my project by reaching out to veteran organizations in the area as well as those civilian organizations known to have supported the antiwar effort against Iraq. As many of the latter are national and international in scope, I will most likely conduct some of the interviews as phone interviews.

My interview guide will consist of questions that get at who the movement entrepreneurs were on either side (namely students on the civilian side and persons with prior movement or college experience on the GI/veteran side), how entrepreneurs mobilized support for the movement, how others came to be mobilized and whether or not efforts were made to reach out to other segments of the antiwar movement (GIs, veterans, civilians) and if not why. My interview guide will also consist of questions that probe respondents for their perceptions of constricted opportunities for mobilization.

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