Democratizing Elections in Postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe: Echoes of 1989?

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“The large-scale involvement of citizens in political life, images of town squares packed with people, along with occasions of euphoria, brought back memories of November, 1989, when the communist regime in Czechoslovakia collapsed.”

Martin Butora (2007, p. 40) on the 1998 Slovak election

“My Croatian friends should look at the (Slovak) election and learn from our mistakes.”

Marko Fukic and Zjelko Capin (1999, p. 17)

“Diffusion is the process whereby past events make future events more likely.”

Pamela Oliver and Daniel Meyers (2003, p. 174)

“They (foreign agents) thought Iran is Georgia. The problem is that they do not know this great nation yet.”

Ayatollah Khamenei’s reaction to the post-election protests in Iran, June, 2009 (quoted in Fathi, 2009, p. A7)

What did 1989 mean? For students of transitions from dictatorship to democracy, the events of 1989 transformed our understanding of the rise and proliferation of democratic regimes. In particular, the collapse of communism and a number of other authoritarian regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s transformed the “third wave of democratization,” in contrast to earlier waves of democratic change, into a genuinely global dynamic (Huntington, 1992). Thus, the return to democratic governance in southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s (a string of events that led Samuel Huntington to invent the term, “the third wave”) was joined by the rise of new and far more improbable democracies in such far-flung sites as South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Eastern and Central Europe, the Soviet successor states, and a large number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). The events of 1989 also contributed to our understanding of how democratic transitions take place. It became evident, for example, that democracy could arise quickly, rather than through an
evolutionary process; that a democratic past was not a necessary precondition for subsequent democratic development; that mass protests could play a positive and key role in ushering in democratic change; and that international influences, such as diffusion dynamics, could end dictatorial rule and support democratic development (see, for example, Bunce, 2003; Gleditsch and Ward, 2008). Finally, the experiences of Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet successor states after the break with communism reminded scholars that the departure of authoritarianism did not led automatically or, indeed, even usually, to the formation of a fully democratic polity. Instead, in addition to the democratic option, successor regimes could be dictatorships or hybrid regimes that straddled democracy and dictatorship (Bunce, 1999a; Diamond, 2002; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Way and Levitsky, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2008). In fact, the transitions that took place in the postcommunist region began a trend that became increasingly pronounced thereafter over the course of the third wave; that is, the spread not of new democracies, but, rather, of regimes that combined authoritarian political leadership with electoral competition and some of the other institutional mainstays of democratic politics (Roessler and Howard, 2009).

In this paper, we assess these key insights about democratization by carrying out a comparison of two waves of democratic change in postcommunist Europe and Eurasia. The first and better known round consisted of those events that are usually summarized by the short-hand, 1989; that is, the rapid cross-national spread of public protests in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from 1997 to 1992. The second wave of democratization is of more recent vintage and has received less attention; that is, the spread among a number of hybrid regimes in the postcommunist region from 1996 to
2005 of electoral confrontations between authoritarian incumbents and opposition forces that had the unusual consequence of replacing authoritarians with democratic leaders. This round of democratic change began in Romania in 1996 and Bulgaria in 1997; then moved to Slovakia in 1998; and then to the more authoritarian political contexts of Croatia and Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005.

Why carry out such a comparison? One reason is to remind ourselves of two obvious, but often forgotten points— that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the rise of democracy is the removal of authoritarian leaders from office (a dynamic that is represented in both of our waves of democratic change), and that democracy is above all a process, not an outcome. In this sense, while the events of 1989 were pivotal, especially insofar as they expanded region-wide opportunities for democratic change by removing authoritarian leaders from office, they were nonetheless only one chapter in the story of democratic struggles in postcommunist Europe and Eurasia. Second, the study of democracy has increasingly involved the analysis of the evolution of hybrid regimes, which, depending upon the definition deployed, comprise between one-fifth and one-fourth of the regimes currently in existence. These regimes, moreover, are “where the action is” in another respect. Just as this type of regime is, in comparison with other regimes, unusually prone to shifting in more democratic or a more authoritarian directions over time, so it has become since the mid-1990s, the most common site for transitions to democracy (Roessler and Howard, 2009).

Finally, such a comparison has some methodological advantages. One is that it holds region constant and focuses on similar kinds of dynamics (popular mobilizations leading to the defeat of authoritarian incumbents), while varying the particular sites
where democratic change takes place and the mechanisms of change; that is, protests in the streets in the first period and elections, often followed by public demonstrations, in the second. At the same time, by using a controlled comparison, targeting the issue of defeating authoritarian rulers, and bringing a wide range of evidence to bear on the how and why of these waves of change, this study addresses some of the flaws built into studies of the diffusion of democracy—for example, their failure to define the innovation of interest (is it, for example, the idea of democracy, a set of institutional arrangements, or new strategies for ending dictatorial rule?); assess why the innovation is adopted in some places, but not in others (since diffusion is always uneven across time and space); test alternative hypotheses (could similar conditions be giving rise to similar outcomes?); or move beyond speculation to identify the actual mechanisms driving the cross-national transfer of innovation (see, for instance, Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Wehnert, 2005; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan, 2009; Weyland, 2009a, 2009b; and for a more extended critique, see Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a and Jacoby, 2006).

Our analysis begins by defining diffusion and outlining some of its core properties. We then summarize the two rounds of popular confrontations with authoritarian rule, providing somewhat more detail with respect to the more recent and less fully-studied electoral challenges to authoritarian politics (from 1996-2005). In the final section of this paper, we compare the two waves of democratic change with respect

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1 The data we bring to bear on these questions include over 200 interviews conducted with domestic and international participants in the 1996 Romanian election, the 1997 Bulgarian election, the 1998 Slovak election, the 2000 elections in Croatia and Serbia, the 2003 election in Georgia, the 2004 election in Ukraine, and the 2005 election in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, we also interviewed participants in a group of elections that, although featuring significant post-election protests, led to the victory of authoritarian incumbents or their designated successors: Armenia (2003 and 2008), Azerbaijan (2003 and 2005), and Belarus (2006). See Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a, Chs. 3-7, for a more detailed analysis of these elections based in part on these interviews. In addition, our analysis of the 1989 mobilizations is based on not just the large number of studies on this topic, but also our earlier work on communist politics and research in the Open Society Archives in Budapest, carried out in March, 2006.
to such issues as why and how cross-national diffusion took place; the changing nature of
the challenges to authoritarian rule as they radiated outward from the original sites where
they took place; and the uneven geography of diffusion. As we will discover, each of the
two waves followed a pattern typical of diffusion dynamics—for example, the
importance of simultaneous expansion of domestic and international opportunities for
democratic change; cross-national variations in the willingness and capacity of domestic
(and often international) actors to exploit these opportunities; and the role of
demonstration effects, similar local conditions, and transnational networks in transferring
specific approaches to authoritarian rule from one country to others. While similar in
many respects, however, the two waves did diverge from one another in some respects.
If the international system “permitted” diffusion in the first wave, its role in the second is
more accurately summarized as active promotion. Second, while similarities in local
conditions were paramount in the spread of political protests in 1989, transnational
networks loomed much larger in facilitating the geographical reach of electoral
challenges to authoritarian rule in the later cases we examine.

**Defining Diffusion**

Diffusion is a process wherein new ideas, institutions, policies, models or repertoires
of behavior spread from their point of origin to new sites—for example, from one
enterprise, governing unit, or non-governmental organization to others (see, for example,
Ackerman and Duvall, 2000; Wehnert, 2005; Lee and Strang, 2006; Beissinger, 2002;
Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Markoff, 1996; Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow and della Porta, 2005;
Bockman and Eyal, 2002; Weyland, 2009a, 2009b; Simmons and Garrett, 2008; Bunce
and Wolchik, 2007a, 2006b, 2009a, 2010b ). Diffusion, therefore, implies a coincidence
of time and geography with respect to adopting similarly new ways of doing things. When applied to the issues of interest here, diffusion refers to a significant shift in mass political behavior—that is, mobilization against authoritarian regimes in the streets and during elections—in one country that then moves to neighboring countries.

In our view, diffusion always involves a conscious decision by local actors, sometimes in collaboration with international allies, to copy innovations introduced by actors in other contexts—a decision that flows from their values and interests and that takes into account expanded opportunities, incentives and capacity for change. How this process plays out, however, varies. One dynamic is what has been termed demonstration effects. This pattern occurs when a new development in one setting alters the calculus of actors in other settings—by redefining what is possible (as astutely observed by Adam Przeworski in an analysis of Solidarity—see Przeworski, 1982), by alerting actors in other settings to a highly attractive course of action, and, as a result, by tilting the ratio of benefits versus risks attached to innovation in the decided favor of the former. Central to this scenario is the appeal of importing change from abroad because of dress rehearsals that establish positive precedents.

A second model of transmission is more structural, emphasizing similar cross-national conditions, including a similar profile of local problems and assets. Here, actors are prone to import a change when they see it as applicable and “doable” in their own circumstances. The key issue in this scenario is a close cross-national fit—at least in the eyes of would-be importers—and the intersection, given structural similarities and, we would emphasize, the reading by both exporters and importers of these similarities,
between two conditions: the relevance of the innovation and positive assessments of its benefits.

Finally and less commonly-noted: diffusion can take place because there are expanding collaborative networks that support change and that fan out from the original point of innovation. In this dynamic, two types of diffusion are at work and interact: the movement of the innovation itself and the movement of a complex array of actors supporting that innovation (see, especially, Bookman and Eyal, 2002; Jacoby, 2006; Muiznieks, 1995; and especially Tarrow, 2005 and Tarrow and della Porta, 2005 on both “rooted cosmopolitans” and the critical role of trust).

Let us now step back from these definitions and transmission scenarios and provide both complications and refinements. First, most diffusion processes seem to combine at the least the first two scenarios and sometimes the third as well (see, especially, Jacoby, 2006; Beissinger, 2002). Thus, innovations in one country often move elsewhere because they are facilitated by structural similarities and because they are seen to be relevant and beneficial, as well as relatively easy to implement, by constituencies in another country—one that is often, for many of the same reasons, in the same neighborhood. Such a combination is particularly important for the movement of highly controversial innovations, i.e., changes that represent not just a considerable departure from past practices, but also a fundamental re-ordering of existing political, social and economic hierarchies. Large-scale confrontations with authoritarian regimes are obvious examples.

For these very reasons, both the introduction of innovations, such as collective challenges to authoritarianism, and their spread across national boundaries, are usually the work of both structural factors conducive to change—for instance, shifts in
international politics that leave regimes more isolated and regimes that become more
vulnerable as a result of economic difficulties and declining public support— and agency
effects—for example, new strategies adopted by both challengers to the status quo and its
resolute defenders (see Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a, 2009c; but see Way, 2008, 2005a,
2005b and Way and Levitsky, 2009). This is one reason why it is a mistake to assume (as
is common practice in retrospective studies of major political events, such as revolutions)
that dramatic shifts in politics are somehow inevitable, because of, say, regime decline,
and why it is also a mistake to attribute major changes to very recent developments
(which was the approach adopted in the earliest studies of the Third Wave of
democratization). Just as “inevitable” changes are usually the product of long struggles
that combine with actors willing and able to exploit short-term shifts in opportunities and
capacities for change, so a preoccupation with proximate causality runs the risks of
mislabeled effects as causes; overlooking the long-term accumulation of learning on the
part of both the regime and its opponents; and exaggerating the power of new ideas,
international actors (who are often portrayed as “dictating” change), and “sudden” events
that transform local circumstances (Bookman and Eyal, 2002; Kitschelt, 2003).

Moreover, innovations themselves are usually the product of diffusion processes. In
the social world, there are precious few examples of “pure” originality. Instead, many
innovations are the product of “mini innovations” in the past, and they are often the
successors to partial, instructive and earlier dry runs. For example, just as the “1989”
protests were strongly influenced by earlier rounds of protest in the region, beginning in
1953 in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, so the electoral model of democratization
(which we will elaborate below)—or what can be summarized as elaborate and well-
planned attempts by liberal oppositions to use competitive elections in semi-authoritarian regimes to defeat dictators in a variety of postcommunist regimes from 1996-2005—built upon the experience of earlier electoral efforts in these countries, including recent victories by opposition parties in local political contests. Moreover, the lineage of the model goes back to the Philippines in 1986 when Ferdinand Marcos was running for reelection and the 1988 Pinochet referendum in Chile. These challenges to authoritarianism in Latin America and Southeast Asia had several consequences that proved to be critical for the subsequent rise and success of the electoral model in the postcommunist region. For example, they contributed to a major shift in U.S. foreign policy from support of dictators to support of democrats. At the same time, some U.S. policy-makers involved in these earlier confrontations with authoritarian rulers became engaged many years later in the efforts to support free and fair elections in Serbia and the defeat of Milosevic in 2000.2

We can now close this discussion of diffusion with a final generalization drawn from the literature on this subject that will prove useful for the discussion that follows. The cross-national spread of innovation follows a relatively predictable pattern. Just as innovations change as they move from their origin to new areas, so they tend to appear first in optimal settings and then move to places less supportive of change. As diffusion progresses, therefore, the lure and logic of demonstration effects can easily outrun local

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2 We are thankful to Ambassador Robert Gelbard, Daniel Serwer and James O’Brien, in particular, for providing insight into these dynamics. However, it is important to recognize, at the same time, that precedents can be abused by policy-makers eager to rationalize their actions and careless about whether analogies are appropriate. For example, 1989 in east-central Europe seems to have informed discussions in the Bush administration about what would happen following American interventions in Iraq. That Poland was culturally homogeneous, the Polish opposition had worked long and hard to develop its political skills and reach, and Poland was located in a region ripe for change in part because of colonial rule were all differences that the Bush administration failed to recognize.
capacity; adopters, eager to import, are prone to under-estimating the difficulties involved; and defenders of the status quo are alerted to possible threats and prepare accordingly. While change can be contagious, then, contagion is uneven.

Wave One: The Collapse of Communism

There is a sizeable literature on the events of 1987 to 1990 and our summary, as a result, will just touch on the main elements of this diffusion process (see, for example, Bunce, 1999b; Glenn, 2001; Joppke, 1995; Stokes, 1993; Brown, 2000; and Beissinger, 2002). The mass protests that eventually led to the disintegration of communism and communist states began in fact in two places: in the Soviet Union in 1987, with the rise of popular fronts in support of perestroika in Russia and the Baltic states, and in Slovenia, with the rise of a student movement that, by entering the forbidden zone of military affairs, took on both the Yugoslav state and the regime (see Mastnak, 1994). Protests then broke out in Poland in the fall 1988 (much to the consternation of Lech Walesa, who was losing control over his movement), and culminated in an unprecedented roundtable between the opposition and the Party in the early months of 1989 that focused on ending the political stalemate in Poland, in place since martial law was declared in 1981, through the creation of a transitional regime that added some competitive political features to authoritarian rule in Poland. However, semi-competitive elections in June 1989 led by August of that year to an unthinkable development: the formation of an opposition-led government that then laid the groundwork for a rapid transition to democracy.

The Polish precedent, coupled with the considerable loosening of strictures on political change in Eastern Europe as a result of the Gorbachev reforms, was powerful enough to lead in the late summer of 1989 to a roundtable in Hungary, which was
different in important respects from its Polish counterpart—for example, it was not televised; it featured a more complex and focused set of working groups; and it involved more detailed planning for a democratic future, including fully competitive elections in the following year. In the fall of 1989, massive protests broke out in East Germany that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the eventual reunification of Germany. These were followed by similar developments in Czechoslovakia, where, despite the fact that the original demonstrations were organized by dissidents to commemorate the death of a student under Nazi rule and resembled the many relatively small demonstrations the opposition had organized in the past, participants in the larger demonstrations that followed the unprovoked use of force by police on unarmed demonstrators also spoke directly of demonstration effects and similarities in domestic conditions. Protests, albeit smaller and with less direct translation into democratic politics, then followed in Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania. In the course of these developments, moreover, protests within the Soviet Union continued and spread, as they did within Yugoslavia, where the Slovenian developments influenced, by all accounts, subsequent mass mobilization in both Croatia and Serbia in particular. Indeed, even the Hungarians, scarred by 1956, eventually carried out demonstrations of their own on Republic Day—though these protests came later and grew out of renewed debates about what happened during the Hungarian Revolution.

Mass Mobilization and Electoral Revolutions

Let us now turn to the second wave of citizen confrontations with authoritarian rule—from 1996 to 2005 (for a more detailed analysis, see Bunce and Wolchik, 2010a; 2009a, 2009d, 2009e; 2008). In this round, the form of protests changed to some degree (moving
from an entirely street-based activity to an electoral one that was combined, in many cases, with street demonstrations). The regime context also changed: that is, not communism, but, rather, regimes that either fell short of being full democracies (as with Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia) or that were either somewhat or very authoritarian (with the clearest contrast one between Georgia and Croatia in the last years of dictatorial rule, on the one hand, and Serbia, on the other). These distinctions aside, however, the issue on the table was the same, whether in Bulgaria in 1996 to 1997 or Ukraine in 2004: popular challenges to authoritarian rule. Moreover, in most cases, the pivotal elections featured an upsurge in the turnout of voters supporting change—and in Croatia, Slovakia, and Ukraine, an overall increase in turnout, especially in comparison with declining turnout across earlier elections over the course of the postcommunist era.³ For example, in the 1998 Slovak elections, turnout increased nine percent over the 1994 elections and in the 2000 Croatian elections six percent over the 1997 presidential elections and eight percent over the 1995 parliamentary elections. In discussing this wave, we will provide greater detail, largely because these events have been less fully-explored by scholars interested in comparisons among them or the role of diffusion (but see Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Way, 2008; McFaul, 2005; Demes and Forbrig, 2007).

As we noted above, there is rarely a hard and fast answer to the question of when a process of diffusion actually begins. In our view, the emergence of the model of democratizing elections began with four inter-connected political struggles in Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia from 1996 to 1998—countries that provided a regional hot-house for political change, because of the combination of democratic deficits, active

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³ Here, we draw upon the data collected by the Swedish-based organization, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: [http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_turnout2.cfm](http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_turnout2.cfm)
and interactive oppositions and shared borders. From 1996 to early 1997 there were massive three-month-long protests in Serbia—protests that were motivated by Milosevic’s attempt to deny the opposition its significant victories in many of the local elections that took place in 1996 (Lazic and Nikolic, 1999; Pavlovic, 2005; Thomas, 1999). These protests, as in the cases that followed, built on previous rounds of political protest—in the Serbian case going back to the early 1980s and in Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia to 1989 (and even during the communist period, as in the miner’s strikes in Romania during the 1980s). As James O’Brien, who served as the Washington-based coordinator of US assistance to Serbian opposition groups from 1999 to 2000, put it: “We built on the plumbing of the past” (Interview, November 16, 2006, Washington, D.C.). Although the Serbian protests failed in the short-term, they contributed in important ways to the election-based protests in the fall of 2000 (and see Bieber, 2003; Pribecevic, 2004).

The second set of struggles took place in Romania, where the liberal opposition finally came together and ran a sophisticated political campaign that succeeded in 1996 in replacing the former communist incumbent president (who came back to power in 2000) with a candidate with far stronger liberal credentials and commitments (see Bunce and Wolchik, 2009, Ch. 3). The third set of struggles took place in Bulgaria at roughly the same time (see Petrova, 2009). In Bulgaria, Serbian protests next door were influential in particular in bringing labor and other groups out into the streets. While lagging in their response and to some degree shamed by the spontaneity of their own citizenry, Bulgarian intellectuals and leaders of the opposition finally recognized, especially given the poor performance of the incumbent regime, that such protests could lead to a new election and pave the way for the Union of Democratic Forces (which, prior
to this time, would be better characterized as a fractious ensemble) to take power, which they did in 1997. Although the cohesion of the Bulgarian liberal opposition proved to be temporary and their effectiveness limited (as in the Romania story as well), their victory, again as in Romania, served as a decisive political turning point—as indicated, for example, by the consistent improvements in Freedom House scores following these pivotal elections in both countries (and see Kurekova, 2006; Ganev, 2007).

The same generalization applies to the fourth participant in the story of the spread of the electoral model of democratization: Slovakia (see Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a, Ch. 3; Bunce and Wolchik, 2009b) It was there that all the components of the electoral model of defeating authoritarian leaders came together, with a variety of players, such as leaders of the Slovak, Bulgarian and Romanian oppositions, the US ambassadors to Slovakia and the Czech Republic, “graduates” of the Romanian and Bulgarian turnarounds, and representatives of organizations such as the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the Foundation for a Civil Society combining forces to create the OK98 campaign that led to the defeat of Vladimir Meciar in the 1998 Slovak parliamentary elections. This model, which can be termed the innovation that diffused throughout the region, included such components as the formation of a cohesive opposition; pressures on election commissions to improve their procedures and render them more transparent; ambitious campaigns to register voters, advertise the costs of the incumbent regime, and get out the vote; and the deployment of both domestic and international election-monitoring, as well as exit polls, to provide quick feedback on turnout during election day, to catalogue election day abuses by the regime, and to provide evidence of actual voter preferences (and see Hyde, 2007 on other consequences)
Once fully articulated and successful when implemented in Slovakia in 1998, the electoral model was then applied in a number of other competitive authoritarian regimes (see Levitsky and Way, 2002 and 2008; Way and Levitsky, 2009; Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2006; Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a). Its first stop in the diffusion process was in Croatia in 2000, where the death of the long-serving dictator, Franjo Tudjman, in 1999 had weakened the governing party and provided an opportunity for the opposition to win power. In this case, as in Bulgaria and Romania, the election was for the Presidency, and as in these cases as well as in Slovakia, where the election was for parliament, the electoral outcome produced a smooth transition. The Croatian opposition also benefited (as would Serbia later in the same year) from assistance provided by the Slovak opposition and the electoral playbook it devised in collaboration with regional and western actors, along with some earlier successes in local elections and earlier actions by the hardline regime to prevent the translation of voter preferences into representative governments. As in Slovakia, and in contrast to the situation in Bulgaria and Romania after these pivotal elections, the electoral revolution had dramatic effects on democratization in Croatia. A political corner was turned.

Later in 2000, the electoral revolution moved to Serbia (see Bunce and Wolchik, 2009b; Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a, Ch. 4). While the implementation of the electoral model was as careful and thorough-going as it had been in Slovakia and Croatia, there were, nonetheless, some differences that distinguish Serbia from these other cases. One was that the struggle against Milosevic was severely constrained by the increasingly heavy authoritarian hand of the regime. Thus, for example, there were no external election monitors in Serbia in the fall 2000 elections, and the media were closely controlled by Milosevic. However, there was one similarity to Slovakia: the key role played by young people and their organizations, such as Otpor.
The Serbian Presidential election of 2000 was a turning point for elections as democratizing agents, because the incumbent regime had been in power much longer and was far more authoritarian than the earlier sites for such revolutions, and because these very characteristics meant that the regime refused to vacate office once the election and the tabulations of the vote, both fraudulent and accurate, had concluded. This led to massive political protests that succeeded in taking control of the capital and forcing Milosevic to resign. While the result, as in Croatia, was a regime change and not just a change in government, the Serbian opposition continued to be plagued by severe divisions that were exacerbated by the continuing border problems represented by Kosovo and Montenegro, both of which eventually became independent states; growing pressures for expanded autonomy in Vojvodina; and pressures on the part of the international community to move quickly in cooperating with the demands of the Hague War Crimes Tribunal (see Bieber, 2003). The assassination of Djindjic in 2003—the most effective and certainly charismatic leader of the Serbian opposition—did not help matters (and see Miller, 2004 and the nuanced appraisal by Licht, 2007).

The Georgian opposition then followed suit in the 2003 parliamentary elections—though their actions resulted, it is important to recognize, in a coup d'état by the opposition, since the long-serving President, Eduard Shevardnadze, left office without in fact having been up for reelection (see Cory Welt, 2009 and Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a, Ch. 6). In Georgia, the political context was less constraining than in Serbia, especially given the lackluster campaign by Shevardnadze’s allies, the defection of so many key players from the ruling group to the opposition (such as Mikheil Saakashvili, the current president), the relative openness of the Georgian media, the formation of a youth group in support of political change (Kmara) that worked closely with the Georgian opposition around Saakashvili, and the presence of a
significant number of local and international election monitors (Karumidze and Wertsch, 2005). As with the other cases, moreover, it was clear that the Georgian opposition modeled its campaign on the previous electoral breakthroughs in the region and benefited as well from various kinds of support from the Open Society Foundation and various US and European groups (see Devdariani, 2003; Cooley and Ron, 2002).

The next successful democratizing election occurred in Ukraine a year later (see, in particular, Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a, Ch. 5; Kuzio, 2005; Kubicek, 2005; Way, 2005a, 2005b; Aslund and McFaul, 2006; and Wilson, 2005). As in the Georgian case, a single charismatic politician—in this case, Viktor Yushchenko—played a critical role. As in both the Georgian and Serbian cases, the successful political breakthrough exploited a record of a leadership that had grown increasingly corrupt, careless and violent; benefited from defections from the ruling circles; built upon earlier rounds of protests and recent successes in local elections; and reached out to diverse groups, including young people who played nearly as important a role as Otpor did in Serbia. Moreover, as in Serbia and Georgia, political protests after the election (which were larger and longer lasting than those in Serbia) were again necessary to force the authoritarian challenger to admit defeat. More distinctive to the Ukrainian case, however, was the breakdown of central control over the media during the campaign and especially during the protests, and the remarkable role of the Supreme Court, which came down in support of the opposition’s argument that the elections had been fraudulent and had to be repeated. As in Serbia, moreover, the unity of the opposition was short-lived, a factor that has blocked a consistent movement toward the creation of a stable and fully democratic polity (but see Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a, Ch. 11).
Significant electoral challenges to authoritarian incumbents, coupled with mass demonstrations challenging the official electoral results, also took place in a number of other countries in the region, including Kyrgyzstan in 2005, where President Askar Akayev panicked in the face of protests following the parliamentary election and left office (see Radnitz, 2009) and in a series of presidential and parliamentary elections that took place in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus from 2001 to 2008, where the common result was that authoritarian incumbents or their anointed successors remained in power in the face of popular protests over electoral fraud (see Bunce and Wolchik, 2010a, 2009a, Ch. 7; 2009d, 2009e, 2008; and see Valiyev, 2006; Silitsky, 2009). What made these cases of election-based protests against authoritarian rule similar to one another, but different from the earlier challenges to authoritarian leaders, were two factors. First, the collaborative networks that brought together graduates of earlier and successful electoral confrontations with dictators, Western democracy promoters, and local opposition groups and that played such a pivotal role in breaking with authoritarian rule in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine from 1998 to 2004 were far less present and influential in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus. Second, the electoral model was not fully deployed in these three countries. This was in part because of a thinning out of transnational networks, but also because of preemptive strikes on the part of authoritarian rulers (who were watching electoral change in the neighborhood with interest equal to that of the opposition) and failures on the part of the oppositions, given their own limitations and those imposed by the regime, to construct sufficiently large coalitions and mount sufficiently ambitious political campaigns and electoral monitoring programs.

Diffusion of Mobilization: General Patterns
We can now step back from the details of these two waves of popular mobilization against authoritarianism and apply the arguments presented in our earlier discussion of diffusion dynamics. We begin at the most general level. Each round of collective action aimed against dictators featured a roughly similar repertoire of innovative behaviors that was adopted by key actors in lagged fashion in a number of countries in the region. What we find, in short, is a diffusion-like dynamic. Moreover, each wave was foreshadowed by a clear expansion in international opportunities for democratic change—opportunities that were exploited, albeit to varying degrees, by local democratic activists and everyday citizens. Here, we refer, for example, to the role of the Helsinki Process and the Gorbachev reforms in the first wave, and in the second the rise, beginning in the early 1990s, of an international democracy promotion community that provided important assistance to democratic activists in the postcommunist region (see Bunce, McFaul and Stoner-Weiss, 2009; Vachudova, 2005; Thomas, 2001; Finkel, et.al., 2006; Bunce and Wolchik, 2006b; Carothers, 2004; Mendelson and Glenn, 2002). Just as important for both rounds was a transnational factor: the development of regionally-based opposition networks that collaborated closely with one another in support of a showdown with incumbent authoritarian regimes. While these networks benefited primarily from what could be termed a more “permissive” international environment in the first round, in the second wave international actors played a more active role—by supporting the development of civil society, an open media, and free and fair elections; encouraging the unity of the opposition; encouraging ties between the opposition and civil society groups; providing training and support with respect to campaign techniques; and offering strong
and very public criticisms of authoritarian incumbents when they attempted to steal elections.

Finally, our overview of the two waves provides strong support for the importance in diffusion dynamics of both structural mechanisms, such as the obvious institutional similarities among regimes during the communist period and similarities after communism in the combination of democratic deficits, yet electoral competition, and an actor-rich process that involved, most importantly, local actors, but also their regional and Western allies, and that was responsible for exploiting domestic and international opportunities for democratic change by defining strategies, applying them, and transferring them to new locales. Moreover, as noted in the discussion of the two waves, we also see changes in the innovation itself as it moved from the point of origin to other contexts, and the declining effectiveness of the model as it proceeded down the country chain from more to less supportive local settings.

Here, two sets of examples are instructive. Just as the protests in Bulgaria at the end of 1989—in contrast to the earlier protests against communism in Czechoslovakia—were carried out by a less experienced and smaller opposition and were more successfully countered by a better prepared and more ensconced communist party, with the result that the breakage with communist party rule was less clear-cut, so in the second wave the electoral challenges to authoritarian rule in Slovakia in 1998 were more successful in consolidating democratic change in that country than the challenges to Milosevic that took place two years later in Serbia. In the latter context, the regime was far more authoritarian; popular protests had been added to the electoral model of democratic
change; and these protests served as an indicator of how difficult subsequent democratic development would be after the 2000 election.

**Beginning the Diffusion Dynamic**

Let us now turn to some more specific questions, all of which are central to the understanding of how diffusion actually works. First, why were particular models of citizen challenges to authoritarianism selected; that is, the focus in the first wave on popular protests and in a few cases roundtables, and focus in the second wave on elections, sometimes combined with popular protests? The simple answer is that these models of change were selected because of historical experiences and the parameters placed on forms of opposition activity by the nature of the regime itself. To elaborate: in the first wave, the focus on political protests reflected the constraints in state socialist regimes on how citizens could register their preferences and their dissatisfaction, along with a time-tested dynamic in the Soviet bloc during the communist era, wherein divisions within the Soviet leadership or a decisive shift by them in a reformist direction had the predictable effects of weakening Central and East European parties and thereby creating opportunities for citizen mobilization. The accumulation of experiences with protest, aided by regimes that, because of their centralization of politics and their control over the economy, forged unwittingly optimal conditions for concerted actions on the part of the public, was also critical. State socialist regimes, for example, identified a common enemy for their citizens, and they introduced major and sudden shifts in policy that affected citizens in similar ways at virtually the same moment (see, for example, Bunce, 1999b). Moreover, while elections under communism could serve indirectly as
instruments of policy accountability, they were too controlled and too ritualized to be used as referenda on communist party rule (Zaslavsky and Brym, 1978).

The selection of electoral confrontations in the second round also spoke to a number of influences. They included successful application of the electoral model in other parts of the world (which US democracy promoters, at least, recognized); the close tie in the popular mind between democracy and competitive elections; the expectations unleashed by the fall of communism about democratic possibilities, yet the continuing power of the communists in these hybrid regimes; and striking similarities between the rigged electoral rituals of the past and the partially-rigged character of elections after communism. Here, we can cite a succinct and telling observation made by Robert Gelbard, who was involved in the discussions in the National Security Council during the Chilean Referendum in 1988 and in US support for the Serbian opposition from 1999 to 2000: “If leaders use the forms of democracy, publics come to expect the substance” (Interview in Ithaca, New York, March 1, 2007; also see Schedler, 2006).

However, perhaps the most important influence was the fact that elections were widely recognized by local and international democracy activists as an ideal mechanism for challenging the regime. All the regimes where electoral revolutions took place allowed oppositions to participate, although with varying constraints. Moreover, elections are understood by citizens as verdicts on the regime’s right to rule. Finally, elections have visible results that speak to power, rights, and policies, and they have the advantages for both oppositions and citizens of being associated with specific activities that are bounded in time and that have scheduled and visible consequences. It is also far harder for regimes
to justify the use of force against their citizenries during elections than at other times (Dawisha and Deets, 2006).

The differences in the particular strategies selected for regime confrontation across the two waves should not blind us to several commonalities. One is that the electoral model was in fact often combined with popular protests—either before the election, as in Bulgaria, or after the election, as in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Another similarity is that we see in both rounds a “selection moment” which reflects a sudden decline in the costs of mobilization and a rise in expected payoffs. In the case of the successful electoral breakthroughs, there was both significant support for democratic change provided by the United States and, to a lesser extent, the European Union—not just longterm investments in civil society and fair elections, for example, but also clear signaling of dissatisfaction with both the incumbent regime and its conduct of the election (though this was less apparent in the Bulgarian and Romanian cases)—and increasingly visible evidence testifying to the vulnerability of the regime and its rejection of political niceties and the democratic rules of the game.

In the first round, evidence of a growth in regime vulnerability was also important, as was the clear message that the Soviets were unwilling to use force against protesters within the Soviet Union (though there were some exceptions) and certainly in Central and Eastern Europe. However, like US assistance in the second wave, this version of international change was not a purely short-term development. In fact, long before Gorbachev we find a clear decline over time in the Soviet use of force against their allies in Central and Eastern Europe—a pattern that reflected in part Soviet concerns about the longer-term costs of such actions and in part variations in the forms of local resistance to
Soviet intervention. Thus, the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 involved a large number of deaths; the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was far less bloody; and declaration of martial law, rather than armed intervention, in 1981 was the Soviet strategy of choice in Poland in reaction to the rise of Solidarity a year earlier. In addition, there is some evidence that there were in fact significant divisions within the Politburo regarding the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968—divisions that grew out of the fears of the Ukrainian members at the time that Slovak nationalist protests might diffuse to the Ukraine (Hodnett and Potichnyj, 1974). This pattern also explains why the violent transitions in Central and Eastern Europe when communism fell took place in the states that had distanced themselves most from the Soviet bloc-- Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania—and that did not have Soviet troops stationed within their borders. In these three countries, command and control resided in the local party, not in Moscow, and it was the local party (or, more specifically in the Yugoslav case, the Serbian party) that deployed force to protect its privileges.

This observation leads to a second insight about the beginning of the two waves and the sources of innovations in the key countries. In both rounds of mass mobilization, the “lead” states in this diffusion story fit the profile of contexts that exhibited, by regional comparative standards of the time, the optimal conditions for anti-regime mobilization. This was because expanded opportunities for democratic change (or what social movement theorists term a change in the political opportunity structure—see Tarrow, 2005) were joined with two other factors that were much more in evidence in some countries than in others. One was regime vulnerability, which grew out of a variety of conditions, ranging from mounting economic difficulties and recent changes in political
leadership to a history of anti-regime protests and lack of legitimacy from the beginning for rule by the communists, whether local communists or those in Moscow. The other was the existence of substantial resources available for popular mobilization against the regime. Here, the key indicators included the existence of popular grievances, an established tradition of protest, the rise of more liberalized politics during the communist era, and religious and ethnic homogeneity.

Poland in 1988-1989 provides the closest fit to this profile, and Poland became, not surprisingly, a leader in the fall of communism. However, other “early risers” (to borrow from Beissinger, 2002) in the collapse of communism share many of the same characteristics. For example, Armenia, Lithuania, and Slovenia were unusually homogeneous republics; the three Central and Eastern European leaders of 1989 (Poland, Hungary and Slovenia) were distinctive in combining serious economic crises with comparatively liberal politics; and a history of protests or serious efforts to reform the communist system during communism was common to Armenia, Georgia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

In similar vein, the rise of the electoral model in Serbia (1996-1997), Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia is far from surprising. In Serbia, the key issue was the long-term ripening of the opposition. Also critical in all these countries was their close proximity to one another and a domestic context (with the exception of Serbia) that permitted significant room for democratic maneuver. Moreover, as already noted, the Romanian and especially the Bulgarian and Serbian economies were in terrible shape (as is typical of postcommunist regimes that straddled democracy and dictatorship—Bunce, 1999b); the incumbent regimes were extremely unpopular and also corrupt and incompetent; and
US democracy promoters, like the EU, had made democratic change in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia a very high priority (as they were to do a few years later in Serbia, when the Dayton-related pressure for tolerating the Milosevic regime had dissipated).

**Diffusion Mechanisms**

This leads to another question of interest in this chapter: how and why the mobilization models traveled across national boundaries. Both waves of popular challenges to authoritarian rule reflected in fact the impact of all three diffusion models outlined earlier; that is, demonstration effects, similar conditions, and the spread of transnational networks. However, as the domestic and international regime contexts were very different in the two waves, the weight of these three drivers of diffusion was different as well.

Demonstration effects, which were unusually important in the first wave, can be seen most clearly in the changing calculus of opposition leaders and citizens. It was not just that they were aware of successful confrontations in the neighborhood; it was also that these precedents pointed to far fewer costs attached to change than they had come to expect. The role of the Soviet leadership in the events of 1987 to 1990 is a case in point. It was not simply that Gorbachev encouraged the rise of popular fronts in support of perestroika; supported the Polish roundtable and even favorable stories of Lech Walesa in Soviet newspapers; chided the hard-line East German and Romanian regimes (which often censored his speeches), while refusing to back up their demand that the Hungarian government should prevent defection of East German tourists to the West; and stood aside while massive protests broke out in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and other countries. It was also that in the early part of the wave regimes did not use force to
defend themselves—in part because control over force resided in Moscow. Thus, the early mobilizations against communism were both successful and seemingly low cost—which, especially given unusually similar domestic regimes and the common effect of a more permissive environment for political change, encouraged emulation.

For some of the same reasons, demonstration effects were also critical in the spread of electoral challenges to authoritarian rule. While we should not minimize the hard work and risk involved in these struggles, the electoral precedents set by Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia from 1996 to 1998 were quite attractive for several reasons. One was that these early electoral confrontations in the neighborhood had been both successful and relatively cost-free. The other was that competitive elections had become a staple of political life in the postcommunist world. As a result, focusing on elections was seen as an efficient and effective way to get rid of incumbents and, not incidentally, as a winning strategy for opposition leaders to finally succeed in their goal of capturing political power.

**Similar Conditions**

This leads to a second mechanism in play in both waves. As implied in the discussion thus far, a critical factor was also the existence, at least in the minds of opposition leaders viewing their victorious counterparts, of similarities in problems, opportunities and goals. These similarities, however, were easier to draw in the first than in the second wave.

A number of analysts have commented on the ways in which the structure of domestic communist regimes, the Soviet bloc, and even the ethno-federal Yugoslav, Soviet and Czechoslovak states was ideally-suited for the transmission of political and
economic change, whether supportive of Soviet and local party control or threatening to both. The case for structural isomorphism and the ways this eventually undermined the centers in these three constellations—that is, the Soviet Union in the bloc, communist parties in individual countries, and the center as opposed to the republics in the ethno-federations—has been made in detail elsewhere (Bunce, 1999b). However, it is important to recognize the attitudinal side to this story. These similarities were widely-recognized, not just by Soviet leaders intent on homogenization and domination and Soviet generals afraid that one leak could bring the entire ship down (Mlynar, 1980), but also by oppositions and citizens. This is one major reason why, despite political constraints, the oppositions in Poland, Hungary and the Czech lands began to pool ideas and resources in the second half of the 1980s; to issue common manifestos; and to publicize in various ways their support for oppositions in more repressive contexts, such as Romania, Bulgaria, East Germany and Russia. Thus, while oppositions were diverse in size, strategies and goals, they nonetheless assumed that their struggle against authoritarianism was a common struggle (and see Joppke, 1995; Kenney, 2002; Renwick, 2006).

The multiplication of states and types of regimes that took place in the region from 1989 to 1992, in contrast, erected boundaries among regimes in the postcommunist period that, in theory at least, should have weakened considerably the regional impulse for cross-national diffusion of political change. However, there were nonetheless some factors that rendered these new boundaries more porous than they might have seemed from a purely structural perspective. One was widespread awareness on the part of oppositions and citizens throughout the region as a result of the political and economic performance of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia in the 1990s that
there was an optimal approach to transition, and that it consisted of a sharp political (including electoral) break with the authoritarian past followed by a rapid transition to democracy and capitalism (Bunce, 2006). At the same time, to downplay the potential for diffusion on the basis of growing dissimilarities after communism is to ignore the existence of many parallels among the regimes that served as the sites of democratic change through application of the electoral model.

Just as these countries shared a communist past, with its similar ledger of obstacles to transition, so they shared a similar postcommunist profile. This profile included in most cases a recent transition to independent statehood; earlier rounds of political protests, both accompanying state disintegration and more recently focusing on such issues as corruption and threats to democracy; former communists in power who used familiar and similar ploys to maintain their political positions; and heterogeneous populations which, while often providing a pretext for authoritarian leaders to maintain power by accentuating cultural and ethnic differences, also made consolidation of authoritarianism difficult as a result of the politicization of difference. With the exceptions of Bulgaria and Slovakia, moreover, the regimes that experienced these pivotal elections tended to be hybrids of democracy and dictatorship that featured regular elections, limited opportunities for political competition and some civil liberties and political rights, but also (in every case) fragmented liberal oppositions and corrupt authoritarian incumbents. Moreover, most of them suffered from serious economic problems—though this was less true of Slovakia and Croatia.

Collaborative Networks
The third mechanism by which innovations move from place to place is the existence of transnational collaborative networks that fan out from the original site of the innovation and that “carry” the new model with them. It is easy to forget that the history of communism was not just the history of the spread of a regime type and its eventual decline; it was also a history of the spread of networks that first supported the diffusion of communism and then another set of networks that poked holes in its legitimacy and that eventually were responsible for ending its political hegemony. In the course of this chapter, we have already said a great deal about these networks under communism and postcommunism. However, it is important to recognize that these networks featured different structures in the two waves and played a far more important role in the cross-national diffusion of electoral confrontations with authoritarian rule.

During communism, the networks were primarily contained within the region, though the Helsinki Process and periodic linkages with various Western European groups did occur (see, for instance, Wolchik, 1980; Thomas, 2001; Wylie, 1999; Kenney, 2002; Evangelista, 2003). However, these ties with groups outside the region were difficult to forge, given the closed borders of most of these countries and ideological tensions between a Western left focused on issues of peace and divided over the Soviet experiment and the politics of dissent in the communist region, which was less taken with the over-arching importance of peace and certainly not divided over the meaning of the Soviet experiment (Kenney, 2002; Joppke, 1995; Wylie, 1999). Moreover, cross-national linkages among dissident communities within the region were hard to assemble and solidify, both because of border controls and because dissident cultures varied from place to place (see, for example, “Budapest;” “Eastern Europe Dissidents Appeal;” “Eastern
European Dissidents Join;” and “Polish Solidarity”). As a result, it was primarily in the 1980s that dissidents from various countries in the region began to make common cause.

The transnational networks that arose in support of the electoral model of democratization, by contrast, brought together an unusually complex array of players, including local and regional dissidents, a range of non-governmental organizations, “private” players, such as the Open Society and its founder, George Soros, the Mott Foundations, and Rockefeller Brothers, and democracy promoters from both Europe and the United States (such as USAID and their funded projects and groups, such as Freedom House, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, the German Marshall Fund of the U.S, and IFES) (see Bunce and Wolchik, 2008a; Carothers, 2004). Although authoritarian leaders tried to prevent these networks from ending their rule, especially in the more authoritarian contexts of Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, and while they have been especially successful in this endeavor in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan, for the successful electoral challenges to authoritarian rule at least there were far fewer barriers to the expansion and geographical extension of transnational networks supporting the defeat of dictators after communism than during it. Moreover, the West, in direct contrast to the situation during much of the communist era, had shifted in the decided direction of full support for democracy abroad — especially, it is important to recognize, in the postcommunist region (although even there, concerns about oil and gas, as well as security, sometimes trumped this priority).

Two other factors were critical. One was the rapid proliferation of the non-governmental sector in postcommunist countries, beginning in the late 1980s—a
proliferation that served as a focus of both Western assistance and opposition activities. At the same time, the electoral model itself facilitated transnational organization. Political protests do not always invite support, even from purportedly committed democrats, but free and fair elections do. And electoral assistance, it can be argued, is far less complex to administer and far easier to frame as legitimate activity to leaders in target states than, say, external support for mass demonstrations against the government.

We have addressed elsewhere the role of the United States in the democratizing elections we are examining and the role as well of regional networks bringing together “graduates” of these “electoral revolutions” with local oppositions and non-governmental organizations (Bunce and Wolchik, 2010b, 2009a, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). Suffice it to note here that the electoral challenges to authoritarianism depended upon a convergence among US verbal and financial support of free and fair elections; committed and energetic regional exporters armed with valuable lessons about strategies; and energetic local oppositions and NGO communities. While it is fair to argue that the first wave of mobilization from 1987 to 1990 was assisted by transnational networks, the second wave of electoral revolutions was fueled by such networks.

This comparison of the drivers behind the two waves of mobilizations against authoritarianism carries several key lessons insofar as diffusion and the role of domestic and international factors in regime change are concerned. One is that perceptions—and not just objective conditions—matter. As our interviews with participants in both waves indicated, the assumption by opposition groups of similar political contexts and opportunities played a key role in the cross-national spread of challenges to authoritarian rule. Another is that the spread of subversive innovations has stiff requirements. Similar
conditions, demonstration effects, or transnational networks are not sufficient in
themselves to transfer highly controversial innovations from one country to others.
Finally, the weight of our three mechanisms nonetheless varied across the two waves,
given changes in both domestic and international regime contexts

The Uneven Character of Diffusion

This leads to the final issue of interest in this paper—the finite reach of diffusion. In
both waves, some countries participated in the process, but others did not, and diffusion
itself came to a close. Why did this happen? We would argue that similar factors came
into play, whether we look at the first or the second wave, the uneven spread of
challenges to authoritarian rule across time and space within each our waves, or the fact
that both waves of democratic change ended. First, as we argued earlier, the diffusion of
controversial innovations in particular moves from more to less optimal circumstances—
which is one reason why some countries emerge as leaders in this difficult process and
others as followers. Thus, from a purely structural standpoint, some regimes are more
vulnerable than others, given differences in, say, economic performance, the size and
experience of the opposition and civil society organizations, and the political capacity of
authoritarians to build durable coalitions and institutionalize their rule (see, especially,
Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a, Ch. 2, 2009c; Way, 2005b, 2008; Stoner-Weiss, 2009; and
Levitsky and Way, 2009). Not all hybrid or authoritarian regimes, in short, are equally
good candidates for major and successful challenges to their continuation in power.

At the same time, agency effects play a key role as well. As the wave progresses and
as a result of variations in, say, the electoral calendar in the second wave, authoritarians,
especially if they are vigilant, have more and more opportunities to learn from the
experiences of their neighbors. Thus, they are able, because of the luxury of being “structural laggards,” to fashion strategies that protect their rule—for example, courting the police and security forces; increasing their control over public spaces, the media, civil society organizations, and electoral procedures; harassing, dividing and demobilizing the opposition; cracking down on allies who might consider defecting; and even using the economy to court citizens in general and difficult groups, such as students, in particular (as Nazarbayev did on the eve of the 2005 elections in Kazakhstan; as Yel’tsin did in 1996; and as Putin and Medvedev did as well in the 2007 to 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia—see Stone, 2002, pp. 116 to 168 and Koshkovsky, 2007; Benard and Neier, 2006; Silitsky, 2009; Chivers, 2006; Kimmage, 2005; Fish, 2005; Hassner, 2008; McFaul and Stoner-Weiss, 2008; Weier, 2006; NED, 2006; Spector and Krickovic, 2007; Bunce and Wolchik, 2008). At the same time, because these actions make mobilizations more difficult and because oppositions often assume in light of the run of electoral victories in the neighborhood that successful challenges to authoritarian rule are not so hard to orchestrate, challenges to authoritarian rule that take place later in the wave tend to be far less planned and elaborate and, therefore, weaker in their impact than mobilizations that occur earlier in the wave. For instance, just as the size of the protests in Armenia in 2008 were much smaller than what we saw in Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, so the Armenian opposition, like the oppositions in Belarus in 2006, Azerbaijan in 2005 and Russia in 2008, while forging greater unity than in the past, nonetheless fell considerably short of forming the broad electoral coalitions that were victorious in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. Also striking is the fact that electoral mobilizations failed to unseat dictators when the elections lacked the full-scale
deployment of external and/or internal election monitors—a failure that prevented
democratic oppositions in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus from being able to document
for all citizens to see, once the votes were tabulated, a clear contrast between the “real”
election results and the ones announced by the regime. Yet another constraint on the
ability of each of these waves to blanket the region as a whole was the accumulation over
the course of the wave of less and less attractive political outcomes associated with
mobilizations against authoritarianism. For example, just as authoritarian leaders in both
Armenia and Azerbaijan have been very quick to legitimate their rule and cast serious
doubt on the wisdom of mounting popular protests against them by highlighting (and
usually exaggerating) the chaos next door as a result of the Georgian electoral
breakthrough in 2003, so Lukashenka in Belarus and Putin/Medvedev in Russia have
done the same with respect to developments in Ukraine after the victory of Yushchenko
in 2004. Put succinctly: nothing supports the continuation of authoritarian rule like
nearby examples of the costs involved in challenging such rule.

In the case of the second wave, moreover, two additional constraints on collective
action against regimes presented themselves as the wave of electoral confrontations with
authoritarian leaders moved from the Balkans to the post-Soviet space. One was, as
already noted, a fraying of the transnational network as it spread to locales further and
further removed from Central and southeastern Europe, where it had originated and
where it had benefited from shared borders, established contacts among oppositions, and
the accumulation among US democracy promoters in particular of rich experiences
drawn from multiple postings in the states of eastern and central Europe. The other was a
change in US policies regarding democracy promotion. Energy politics, strategic
geopolitical location, and the victory of Hamas in Palestine in 2006 together reduced the priority the United States attached to, say, the defeat of dictators in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia and Kazakhstan.

Conclusions

The purpose of this paper has been to compare two waves of democratic change—that is, the protests that brought down communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from 1987 to 1992 and the mobilizations against authoritarian rule in mixed regimes that took place from 1996 to 2005 in postcommunist Europe and Eurasia—in order to revisit our understanding, in the wake of 1989, of transitions to democracy and the cross-national diffusion of democratic change. We discovered, first, that elections and protests, separately and in combination, can serve as important modes of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. Second, international influences play an important role in democratic change, because they affect the distribution of power between authoritarians and democrats. However, the form these influences take varies considerably, ranging from withdrawal of external support for authoritarian regimes and the creation of new and subversive political precedents in the neighborhood to the transfer of ideas, money, technical assistance, and strategies. Third, the defeat of authoritarians, whether through popular protests, elections, or a combination of the two, was a collaborative venture, bringing together domestic, Western and regional democratic activists. However, in the final analysis, local actors, including, ordinary citizens, who broke with past practices, and leaders of opposition parties and movements, as well as civil society organizations, were the ones who exploited the opportunities provided by a supportive international environment. It was their hopes, risks, and creative and
sometimes dangerous actions that made the difference. Finally, there were differences between the two waves in political contexts (which ranged from dictatorial to mixed regimes), the strategies and behavioral repertoires challengers to the political status quo used, the degree and kinds of international interventions that facilitated regime change, the role of planning for change versus a more spontaneous dynamic (albeit one that built directly upon earlier efforts), and, finally, the relative weights of demonstration effects, similar conditions, and transnational networks in the transfer of the democratic innovation. However, the diffusion process in both waves of democratic change was nonetheless somewhat similar. For example, in each wave expanded international opportunities joined with focused and demanding local struggles; challenges to authoritarian rule moved from more to less optimal circumstances, a pattern that explains in turn the limits to diffusion and the uneven geography of diffusion; and the forms of these challenges shifted in response to changing international and domestic regime contexts. However, perhaps the most important similarity was the fact that authoritarian leaders did not simply lose power; they were removed from power by the pointed actions of large numbers of mobilized citizens.

We can now step back from these conclusions and highlight several implications. One is that some regions of the world, such as the postcommunist area, are unusually prone to diffusion dynamics—a pattern that in the region of interest in this paper goes back in fact to the revolutions of 1848 (Weyland, 2009a, 2009b; Gitelman, 1974). We would suggest that this regional tradition speaks to a history of shifting political borders in this region, on the one hand, and, on the other, the powerful effects on oppositions and their political repertoires of the shared experiences with communism. Another
implication is that diffusion is always a matter of both structure and agency. While structural conditions can support political change at home and encourage its cross-national transfer, it is the purposive actions of individuals that are responsible for seizing opportunities, fashioning effective strategies, bringing down authoritarians, and sharing their experiences with neighbors. Finally, if democracy itself is always an unfinished project, subject to revision, expansion and contraction, so struggles against authoritarian rule are necessarily ongoing enterprises as well. They are struggles, moreover, that, while changing in form and regime location over time, nonetheless profit from both domestic experiences and opportunities, and international assistance and precedents.

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