

Local Power, National Activity?
Local Government and Political Participation in
non-Federal Systems

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1 Introduction

How do variations in the power and importance of local or regional government influence the political participation of citizens? Local, participatory democracy has been known to influence how citizens engage in politics since the state since at least *Democracy in America* (De Tocqueville, 2000). More recently, Robert Putnam and his colleagues (1994) showed how variation in local governments contributed to different levels of political participation amongst the citizens. However, these findings were born in federal systems, which may limit their usefulness to all states. In a federal system, sub-national, regional or local governments play a larger role in the lives of citizens as compared to unitary states. As such, we should expect to see the increased impact of local governments in federal systems since these systems ensure local governments play a larger role in producing public policy and providing public goods compared to unitary states.

But what about unitary states, where local governments have typically taken a lesser role in the lives of citizens? This paper argues increasing local authority in non-federal systems *decreases* satisfaction with democracy within that locality but *increases* the likelihood those same citizens participate in the political process. The paper makes this argument by examining public opinion in three European countries, focusing on the difference between expressed support for both the national parliament and the political system as a whole amongst citizens of regions with increased local governmental authority and those in areas with less local authority. I begin by defining some key terms and discussing the literature, then developing and testing a theoretical framework using the European Values Study. (EVS, 2011)

For the purposes of this paper, I use the term “non-federal” to refer to any state where local governments have traditionally lacked formalized or fully-independent policy portfolios. I do not argue that local governments are completely absent in these states, but rather that local government only serves as a conduit for national policy with little ability to generate

policy of their own. In this study, I take a fairly limited view of participation. First, I use an individual's reported satisfaction with democracy as a measure of civic capital, which, while not directly a measure of participation will allow me to examine the differences between particular regions. Secondly I include two indicators of political participation: expressed willingness to vote and an index measuring participation in "non-traditional" political acts. I define region of special local authority as a region in the state that has special levels of local authority afforded to in the legal framework. For example, the Home Nations (other than England) in the UK have been the focus of the "devolution" scheme, increasing local government's authority in public policy arenas. Often, the regions discussed here¹ are considered "semi-autonomous" regions within their respective states.

As discussed above, local and sub-federal governments in non-federal political systems play a reduced role in the lives of citizens, while also being plagued by the same issues (such as low participation) as their counterparts in federal systems. Additionally, given the nature of unitary systems, local governments in these circumstances will also produce little in the way of policy outcomes. Despite these concerns, two key arguments can be made in defense of the study of local governments in non-federal systems. Firstly, although these governments are not a major source of public policy, they are often charged with providing goods and services to local citizens. Secondly, given the increasing decentralization of many democracies leads to larger influence of local governments, the study of local governments in non-federal systems provides a useful baseline from which scholars can evaluate the impact of local governments in other systems.

¹see Table 2, Section 4.3

2 The State of the Debate

This paper speaks to three specific literatures discussing the factors that dictate political participation. One discusses how civic capital contributes to creating “better” citizens who participate more, the second discusses how institutional arrangements impact individual political participation, and finally a third discusses how the political culture in a state may determine the actions of the citizenry.

The first approach discusses individual civic capital as an outcome of particular elements of the society. Robert Putnam may represent the prime proponent of social capital. He argues that one of the major problems for democracies emerges when their citizens loose connections both to the state (Putnam et al., 1994) or to one another (Putnam, 2001), however he is not alone. Gary Marks and his colleagues (2008) argue that the allocation of of authority (ie an institution) gains or loses significance partially depending on the sense of community within the jurisdiction. They argue that a sense of local or ethnic community should enhance the likelihood of stronger local institutions, whereas a stronger sense of national identity enhances the probability a state takes a unitary form. Font and Galais (2011) find that civil society, and social capital more broadly, are the most important factors for the development of participation in local government. These findings have even encouraged policy makers to consider local government, as Wilson (1999) who discusses how the Blair government in Great Britain sought to enhance public participation through many tools, primary among them being enhancing the role of local government.²

Some may argue, however, that Putnam’s conception of social capital, and its effects, does not adequately discuss the impact of particular institutions. (Lowndes and Wilson, 2001) Devas and Delay (2006) argue increased opportunities for political participation are a main cause behind the growth of local governments as opposed to civil society. Other

²It should be noted Wilson did not have an entirely positive view of this outcome

scholars point out the electoral system in a state (Jackman, 1987; Powell Jr, 1986) may increase or decrease the citizenry's levels of engagement, however exactly which institutional arrangement is most successful is a focus of debate. (Blais, 2006) Other institutional variables often discussed as prime components of participation include gender quotas (Gray and Caul, 2000), the number and relative strength of houses in the legislature, (Blais, 2006) and the rules regarding voter registration.(Jackman, 1987)

Yet another group of scholars argue that cultural or individual factors play the largest impact on participation. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) argue mobilization (specifically resources and engagement) into politics plays a major role in determining individual participation, Booth and Seligson (2009) argue the individual's perception of regime legitimacy plays a major role, with both those most supportive of and most opposed to the current regime most likely to participate. Inglehart, (1990) argues that the change in culture between generations leads individuals to participate in different forms of political activity than in previous generations. Mobilization of citizens in particular has been shown to play a major role in political participation, and Krishna, (2002) demonstrates the impact of mobilizing factors to be *multiplicative* with levels of social capital.

3 My Approach

In this paper I focus on the second of these arguments: how institutional arrangements impact political participation. In particular, I seek to examine the impact of local government on political participation. I argue the expansion of local government has two related and potentially collinear effects. First, expansion of local government increases the opportunities for individuals to participate both electorally but also in other, broader elements of public policy (Burns et al., 1994, p. 16). This mechanism, I argue, should emerge from two avenues. First, local governments themselves will seek to increase their visibility through methods such

as public meetings or consultation documents. Secondly, we should expect local parties to target local voters based on local issues. Although some evidence suggests local parties are “suspicious” of mass political participation (Gallagher, 2009, p. 533), one would expect political parties who focus on local issues in order to wrest support from national elites (Hopkin, 2003, p. 232). By focusing on local issues, these parties or actors will seek to mobilize local support.

Hypothesis 1: Individuals in areas where local governmental authority has been expanded will participate in politics at higher rates than in areas where local governmental has less authority.

As well as directly influencing the participation of residents, I argue increasing the power of regional government also will increase the efficacy of residents; specifically, I expect residents of special regions to characterize the political system as more democratic than those who live in the rest of the country. Not only are these citizens more likely to participate, and indication of efficacy (Verba et al., 1995, p. 352), these special regions are receiving *disproportionate* amounts of local autonomy, with central authorities “trying to reach socially excluded groups” (Lowndes et al., 2001, p. 215). Although the groups who benefit from local regional authority may be traditionally excluded, a factor that should lessen efficacy, citizens often conceive of the political system as consisting of many parts (Booth and Seligson, 2009, p. 257). This should, I argue, leave individuals to downplay their general dissatisfaction with the national parliament and focus on the benefits provided by local government.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals in areas where local government has special authority will, on average, have higher levels of efficacy.

I do not, however, expect these effects to be independent of influence of other factors, such as the history and culture of each country. Many scholars have acknowledged that

political support for a regime is multi-dimensional, so it logically follows these dimensions can result in different outcomes in different nations. (Booth and Seligson, 2009; Dalton, 1999; Norris, 1999) I am also aware that the cultural and political history of the individual regions may play a major role in determining how the local citizens perceive the national government. I do not argue that cross-country comparisons are impossible and totally endogenous, however I do expect cultural and historical influences to produce different results across countries and regions. As such, I will also test for an interaction between regions of special local authority and country. In particular regards to my argument that increased powers of local government, I expect to observe the largest influence on satisfaction with democracy and political participation in Spain. Specifically, individuals in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia should be *more* likely to participate than their peers in France and the UK. I argue this is due to the Spanish regions having relatively more autonomy than their counterparts in France and the UK, and thus regional government should allow for greater avenues of participation.

Hypothesis 3: The heightened strength of regional governments in Spain will lead to individuals in those areas participating at higher rates than their counterparts in France or the UK

4 Research Design

To test these hypotheses, I employ the 2008-2010 wave of the European Values Survey, and limit the countries I study to France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. I have chosen these three countries for five reasons. Firstly, all three states are at least nominally unitary, although Spain takes on a more federal character of the three.³ Secondly, despite this

³I argue Spain is at least nominally unitary given Article II of the 1978 Constitution, that describes Spain as the indivisible homeland for all Spaniards, rather than referring to Spain as a federation of communities, however this point could be debated.

history, all three states have recently expanded the powers of their local governments: for example Britain through the devolution scheme, and France by giving larger powers to the local executives (*decentralisation*). Thirdly, despite the growth in local governments, these countries have expanded local government in different ways. In Britain, devolution has led to increased legislative and council powers, whereas in France mayoral and other executive positions have been the major beneficiaries of increased powers. In Spain Catalonia is on the verge of a referendum on independence and has significant local and regional powers beyond the regions in France and the UK. (Wollmann, 2004, 2008)

Fourth, some regions in these two countries are culturally-distinct, and have been classified as distinct ethnic groups, an important indication that these regions may also host a strong sense of collective identity. (Gurr, 1993) This gives my study as an advantage as it will test the degree to whether this potential cleavage plays a role in how individual citizens respond to the central state, especially when institutional arrangements are altered to encourage additional mobilization of these groups. Finally, given all three of these states have histories of effective democratic governance,⁴ the risk that local governments are ineffective *due to insufficient experience in policy implementation* is reduced. I do not claim local governments are automatically efficient or effective, but rather, given the history of democratic success in these nations, failures of policy implementation are less likely to result from a lack of a policy implementation experience among both local and national political elite. I am cognizant of the fact that these countries adopted policies of decentralization at different points, however this variance will be absorbed by control variables for each country, thus not biasing, but potentially influencing, my results.

⁴admittedly this history is longer in Britain and France

4.1 Data

For this study, I utilize the 2008-2010 wave of the European Values Study in each of the three nations. All told, 4562 interviews were conducted with citizens across France, Spain, and the UK. My data include several socio-economic control factors described below, however first I turn to a discussion of my twin dependent variables and the method used to calculate the location of each individual variable.

4.2 Dependent Variables

My two hypotheses require separate dependent variables. First, I must give a clear definition of political participation. Clearly, mere vote reporting is insufficient by itself as a measure of overall political behavior, (Verba et al., 1993) however voting itself is one of the most basic forms of activity. As such, I include reported *intention* to vote in a hypothetical election held the next day (the EVS does not ask previous voting history questions). Additionally, I include as well as an index of five question of “non-traditional” voting behaviors.⁵ Between these two variables, I believe I will leverage a fair test of Hypothesis 1. To test Hypothesis 2, I use the EVS question asking individuals to rate the political system as democratic, fairly democratic, not very democratic or not democratic. In order to test Hypothesis 3, I will interact my key independent variable, residence in a special region, with each country.

The five “non-traditional” participations measured are: signing petitions, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings.⁶ For each, each question asks if the individual would *never* participate in the activity, if they don’t know if they would, or if they had participated. From these, I construct an index,

⁵Especially given the hypothetical nature of vote intention, I may fall victim to potential over-reporting problems (Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2012), however no data is available to suggest a solution to this problem

⁶EVS Questions Q55A, B, C, D, and E respectively

where an individual stating they would never participate in the activity receives a score of -1, and an individual reporting they had participated in the activity receiving a score of 1. I include “Don’t Know”, coded as 0, as a valid response here because it seems logical that, given the other choices of answer for the question, individuals may respond “Don’t Know” to mean they either a) don’t know if they *had* participated in the activity, or b) don’t know if they *would* participate. The second option here seems likely, as almost 20% of the sample responded “don’t know” to the question asking if they had ever occupied a building, which one would believe would represent a memorable event in an individual’s life. Table 1 below shows the responses from the three country sample. Clearly, signing petitions and demonstrations are the most common political acts, with three quarters of the individuals surveyed claiming they would never occupy a building.

Table 1: Participation in “Non-Traditional” Political Acts

	Sign Petition (3371)	Boycott (4309)	Demonstrate (4441)	Unofficial Strike (4341)	Occupy Building (4387)
Would Never	14.85	48.84	34.37	63.25	75.62
Don’t Know	26.19	38.51	32.83	27.48	19.94
Have Done	58.96	12.65	32.81	9.27	4.44

Note: Figures represent weighted percent

Note: Unweighted N in parentheses

4.3 Regions Defined

In the three countries in this study, I identify eight regions that have experienced increased local authority. Of these, I exclude two, Corsica in France and Northern Ireland in the UK, due to a lack of individual responses. Table 1 below shows the regions described, as well as the number of responses from each region in the data. I was able to identify the location for the interviews due to the inclusion of the Nomenclature for Territorial Units for Statistics (hereafter NUTS) in the European Values Study data. The NUTS system is a method of geo-coding locales in Europe for the purposes of collection of EU regional statistics, socio-economic analysis of the regions, and the framing of EU regional policies. (Eurostat) In order to locate each interview, I use the second level of the NUTS system (NUTS-2) which reports the locations of larger regions within each country.⁷ Table 2 shows that, while relatively few observations were made in some regions, enough data exists to make tentative conclusions about the opinion of individuals in these regions.

Table 2: Regions Classified as Special Local Regions

Country (N)	Region	Number of Interviews
France	Alsace	49
(1501)	Brittany	73
	Basque Country	70
Spain	Catalonia	235
(1500)	Galicia	94
UK	Scotland	92
(1561)	Wales	79

Note: Figures represent un-weighted number of interviewees

⁷For example, the Länder in Germany

4.4 Description of Socio-Economic Variables

I also include several socio-economic and political measures in my data. Firstly, political importance is gathered from EVS's question asking respondents to describe their level of political interest.⁸ This variable has been collapsed into an indicator if the respondent indicated politics was important (somewhat or very important) or did not (little or no importance). Next I use the individual's placement on the Left-Right political scale⁹ to evaluate the individual's political preferences. Next, as a measure of religiosity, I use the respondent's reported church/religious attendance, with those who never or rarely attend classified as non-religious, and those who attend more than once per week as highly religious, with once-per-week attenders in between.¹⁰ Finally, I include controls for educational attainment, gender and income.¹¹

5 Analysis and Results

Bivariate Relationships

I now turn to some key bivariate relationships. First, I examine if residence in a region of specially local authority has any impact on forms of political participation. Figure 1 below shows a bivariate comparison of vote intention and resident in a region of special local authority. It shows individuals who reside in special regions are slightly less likely to report willingness to vote, however this difference is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = .69, p = .40$).


⁸EVS Question e021

⁹EVS Question e033

¹⁰EVS Question f028

¹¹Questions x001, x003, and x028 respectively. The income measure is monthly in purchasing power parity, so this variable is multiplied by 12 to represent yearly income and then standardized to ease possible convergence issues.


Figure 1: Residence in Regions of Special Authority and Vote Intention



Note: Percentages have been weighted

Figure 2 below shows the percentages difference for each activity between individuals from special regions and those from the rest of the nation. A positive value indicates a higher percentage of individuals from special regions gave the response, and negative numbers indicate a lower percentage of individuals from special regions gave the response. For example, the Figure shows individuals from special regions were 11% more likely to say they *would never* sign a petition, and were also 17% *less* likely to claim they had ever signed a petition. Substantively, the figure shows that residents of regions of special local authority were more likely to report having participated in an activity in only two cases: demonstration and unofficial strike.

Figure 2: Residence in Regions of Special Authority and Non-Traditional Participation




Note: Percentages have been weighted
 Positive values indicate higher percentages of responses from special regions

Next, Figure 3 shows that residing in a region of special local authority increases the likelihood that an individual believes the political system is democratic.¹² Specifically, 46% of those residing in regions of special local authority report being either fairly or very satisfied with how democratic the political system in their country was, as opposed to 42% of those in other regions. I do not deny this difference is not enormous, however it is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 8.58, p = .04$) and substantively important: for example, if this relationship holds for Scotland, these findings would indicate an *additional* 210,000 individuals are satisfied with democracy given the increase in local governmental powers.¹³

¹²EVS Question Q66D

¹³That is, if the relationship holds over multi-variate analysis, see below for details

Figure 3: Residence in Regions of Special Authority and Satisfaction with Democratic Qualities of Political System



Thus far the bivariate evidence suggests individuals living in these regions are more likely to believe the political system is democratic but are less likely to participate, providing support for Hypothesis 2 but no support for Hypotheses 1 and 3. Despite these findings being contrary to my hypotheses, I maintain these are potentially interesting insights into the behavior and attitudes of the citizens of the three countries studied. The tests in the tables and figures above, however, do little to account potentially confounding variables. To estimate if the relationships hold when controlling for other factors, Table 3 below shows generalized linear models of both hypotheses.¹⁴ Columns 1 and 3 test Hypothesis 1. Columns 2 and 4 displays tests of Hypothesis 1 and 3, with the dummy variable for special region interacted by country. Columns 5, and 6 repeat these steps testing for Hypotheses 2 and 3.

The results show that, for the most part, residence in a regions with expanded local powers makes no consistent difference in the satisfaction individuals feel with democracy or

¹⁴Additional controls not displayed are available in the appendix and discussed below

their likelihood to participate in politics, contra to Hypothesis 1. Column 5 does show that individuals in these regions were in fact more likely to report being unwilling to participate in politics. However, this effect disappears when residence in special regions is interacted with each individual country (Column 6). This model shows that there is little difference in levels of political participation across the different types of regions in France and the UK, however in Spain there is a significant difference in terms of levels of non-traditional participation between residents of special regions and their counterparts in the rest of the country. Hypothesis 3 receives little support, and in fact in the model measuring non-traditional acts individuals in semi-autonomous regions of Spain were *less* likely to report participating.

Table 3: Weighted Generalized Linear Models

	Vote Intention		Non-Traditional Acts		Satisfaction with Democracy	
	Fixed	Country Interaction	Fixed	Country Interaction	Fixed	Country Interaction
Intercept	-1.32*	-1.30*	-1.96*	-1.96*	2.58*	2.58*
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Special Region	-0.12	-0.38	-0.41*	0.11	-0.03	-0.10
	(0.19)	(0.33)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Spain	0.13	0.08	-0.85*	-0.67*	0.26*	0.26*
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.04)
UK	-1.02*	-1.05*	-1.21*	-1.20*	-0.09*	-0.11*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Special Region * Spain		0.37		-1.03*		0.07
		(0.44)		(0.26)		(0.08)
Special Region * UK		0.35		0.03		0.25
		(0.50)		(0.37)		(0.14)
<i>N</i>	2727	2727	2873	2873	2816	2816
McFadden's Pseudo R^2	.44	.44	.52	.52	.57	.57
log L	1244.89	1242.87	1917.59	1916.80	12084.83	11991.84

Standard errors in parentheses * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

However the index provided, which includes stated *unwillingness* to participate in some political actions may be inappropriate. As such, Table 5 presents models measuring *reported* participation in two activities: signing a petition and demonstrating. I have chosen these two variables to examine because they are the two most common forms of participation in the index. Secondly, there is evidence to suggest demonstrating (or protesting more broadly) is a unique form of political participation (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Dalton et al., 2009).

Table 4 below shows the results of logistic regressions for these two types of political activity. Columns 1 and 3 test their respective model with only fixed effects, while Columns 2 and 4 test models with interactions between special regions and country, in order to test Hypothesis 3. The results show greater levels of support for the theoretical impact of living in regions of increased local autonomy, however the results are still mixed. Column 1 shows individuals in these regions are *less* likely to sign a petition, contra to Hypothesis 2, however this effect disappears when we control for the interaction across countries and regions.

Column 3 shows no significant impact of residing in these regions on likelihood to demonstrate, however when the effect is interacted with each country, residing in a region with expanded local autonomy *increases* the likelihood that an individual reports having demonstrated. Once again, individuals in the special regions of Spain were *less* likely to have demonstrated than their counterparts in France, and are still statistically significantly different from their residents of Wales and Scotland. However it should be noted here that the Bayesian Information Criteria for the interaction models is higher than the BICs for the respective models only containing fixed effects indicating larger amounts of error in these models, which may influence the robustness of these findings.

Table 4: Weighted Logistic Regression for Specific Participation

	Sign Petition		Demonstrate	
	Fixed Effects	Interaction	Fixed Effects	Interaction
Intercept	-1.83*	-1.85*	-1.84*	-1.87*
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Special Region	-0.66*	-0.30	-0.20	0.60*
	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Spain	-0.81*	-0.71*	0.08	0.29*
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
UK	0.36*	0.38*	-1.68*	-1.63*
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Special Region*Spain		-0.63*		-1.33*
		(0.30)		(0.29)
Special Region*UK		-0.25		-0.65
		(0.40)		(0.49)
N	2813	2813	2850	2850
AIC	3293.06	3292.76	3292.49	3274.16
BIC	3697.12	3744.35	3697.44	3726.75
$\log L$	-1578.53	-1570.38	-1578.25	-1561.08

Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Baseline: Non-special authority region, left-leaning low-education female in France

Socio-economic and political controls also included in the model, but not displayed.


See Table A2 (Appendix) and above for a discussion of these variables

The differences between models including region of residence are significantly different from a model where region of residence is not included (Working $2LL = 19.66$, $p < .000$) however substantively speaking the difference in the models is by no means drastic. Including special regions in the model results in only a 1% improvement in correct classification of cases, and while I argue this effect is still important, we must take into account the fact that demographic variables only used as controls here play a far greater role in predicting the likelihood that an individual participates politically.

Figure 4 below shows the change in pattern between the likelihood of demonstration. The figure illustrates that for Britain, there is no great difference in likelihood of demonstrating between individuals in different types of regions; the likelihood (and the shaded 95% confidence intervals) between the groups are relatively similar. In Spain, individuals in special

regions were significantly less likely to report having demonstrated, shown by the significant interaction term in Table 4 above and contra to Hypothesis 3. Individuals in France who resided in special regions were *more* likely to demonstrate, as indicated by the significant main effect for special regions in Table 4.¹⁵ This effect, then, indicates the possibility that cultural factors unique to each nation play a role in determining if the difference between residents of different regions in terms of political behavior. However they should be interpreted with some caution, as demonstrations are fairly common in Catalonia, in direct contrast to the data which shows individuals outside of special regions as more likely to participate.

Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities of Demonstrations



¹⁵Because France is the baseline country, the interaction effect is 0

6 Conclusion


This paper has argued local government has the ability to influence how citizens view and participate in the political system. Although some hypothesized relationships are not supported by the data, the results presented allow for some tentative conclusions. Firstly, There appears to be little consistent difference between the residents of regions of expanded local autonomy and the rest of the countries. Although some may claim this finding damages the arguments for increased federalism, I argue this is not the case. On a normative level, we should be encouraged that citizens of these regions, who are often thought of as disaffected, are by no means vastly different from the rest of the citizens of these democracies. Further research should investigate if this result leads to a flattening-out in levels of participation between citizens with varying levels of political interest, especially given the changing orientations of citizens to democracy (Welzel and Dalton, 2013).

Secondly, the residents of these special regions have a curious pattern of political participation: for some activities, they were more likely to have participated, however, in other forms, *they were more likely to express unwillingness to participate*. The *unwillingness* to participate should be investigated further, as it may indicate either a contradiction to the evidence that individuals in these special regions are in fact less likely to participate. Such a finding would be especially interesting if the individuals in these regions are not participating politically out of protest towards the central political system.

The results presented here, however, must be interpreted with some caution for five reasons. Firstly, due to lack of availability of NUTS data from previous waves of the EVS, the findings say nothing about the relationship between increased local authority and political participation *across time*. Second, on a related note, given this study does not include panel data, the potential endogeneity of opinion on national government and the political system as a whole remains largely unexplored.

Third, the questions used in the survey instrument only ask if the individual *has ever* participated politically, and as such does not capture if the participation in question occurred before or after the expansion of local governmental power, nor does it account for how often an individual participates in these acts. The extent of this problem is shown in Figure 5 below, that shows that individuals born prior to 1930 were strongly against any form of protest, however since 1950 individuals are more likely to claim to have protested more than they claim they would never protest. Although this relationship does not hold for regions of special authority, it should be noted that this difference puts serious strain on the inference about demonstrations made above; the demonstrations reported could be a recollection of Vietnam-era peace protests or rallies against government austerity in 2008.

Figure 5: Mean Response: Demonstrations by Date of Birth



Fourth, although proxied by political interest¹⁶ the findings say little about how levels of

¹⁶and possibly by education, at least to some degree

political knowledge influences public opinion on national institutions or the political system as a whole. Finally, although the study does compare across cases, further investigation must shed light on if the patterns described here are true of all non-federal, or indeed all federal and non-federal, systems before any conclusions about the impact of local government on the civic capital of citizens can have much weight. As is, the data reveals no great difference between the residents of special regions and their counterparts in the rest of the country. While this null finding may be a disappointment, it does have some normative benefits; it provides evidence that the residents regions, some of which seek to separate themselves from the main country, are not wholly dissatisfied with the system, suggesting other institutional or political pressures behind the moves for separatism.

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7 Appendix

Table A1: Weighted Generalized Linear Models: Full Table

	Vote Intention		Non-Traditional Acts		Satisfaction with Democracy	
	Fixed	Country Interaction	Fixed	Country Interaction	Fixed	Country Interaction
Intercept	-1.32*	-1.30*	-1.96*	-1.96*	2.58*	2.58*
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Special Region	-0.12	-0.38	-0.41*	0.11	-0.03	-0.10
	(0.19)	(0.33)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Political Importance	0.78*	0.78*	0.54*	0.54*	0.13*	0.13*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religious Importance	0.09	0.09	-0.21*	-0.21*	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Left-Right	0.02	0.02	-0.22*	-0.22*	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PM Mixed	-0.17	-0.17	0.51*	0.50*	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Post-materialist	-0.21	-0.21	1.01*	1.02*	0.14*	0.14*
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male	-0.01	-0.02	0.27*	0.28*	0.04	0.04
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.03	0.03	0.07*	0.07*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age Squared	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income (log)	0.27*	0.27*	0.19*	0.19*	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education Less Than Secondary	0.23	0.23	0.61*	0.63*	0.18*	0.18*
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education Some University	0.85*	0.85*	1.00*	1.01*	0.27*	0.27*
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education University	1.19*	1.20*	0.79*	0.80*	0.30*	0.30*
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Have Kids	-0.10	-0.10	-0.37*	-0.36*	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Spain	0.13	0.08	-0.85*	-0.67*	0.26*	0.26*
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.04)
UK	-1.02*	-1.05*	-1.21*	-1.20*	-0.09*	-0.11*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Special Region * Spain		0.37		-1.03*		0.07
		(0.44)		(0.26)		(0.08)
Special Region * UK		0.35		0.03		0.25
		(0.50)		(0.37)		(0.14)
<i>N</i>	2727	2727	2873	2873	2816	2816
McFadden's Pseudo R^2	.44	.44	.52	.52	.57	.57
$\log L$	1244.89	1242.87	1917.59	1916.80	12084.83	11991.84

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table A2: Weighted Logistic Regression for Specific Participation: Full Table

	Sign Petition		Demonstrate	
	Fixed Effects	Interaction	Fixed Effects	Interaction
Intercept	-1.83*	-1.85*	-1.84*	-1.87*
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Special Region	-0.66*	-0.30	-0.20	0.60*
	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Political Importance	0.27*	0.28*	0.46*	0.47*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Religious Importance	-0.05	-0.05	-0.12*	-0.13*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Left-Right	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.15*	-0.15*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
PM Mixed	0.30*	0.29*	0.31*	0.30*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Post-materialist	0.65*	0.65*	0.64*	0.65*
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Male	-0.25*	-0.24*	0.09	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Age	0.09*	0.09*	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Age Sq	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income (log)	0.27*	0.27*	0.16*	0.15*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education Less Than Secondary	0.64*	0.66*	0.58*	0.61*
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Education Some University	1.05*	1.06*	1.32*	1.34*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Education University	0.79*	0.79*	1.04*	1.06*
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Have Kids	-0.12	-0.11	-0.42*	-0.40*
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Spain	-0.81*	-0.71*	0.08	0.29*
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
UK	0.36*	0.38*	-1.68*	-1.63*
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Special Region * Spain		-0.63*		-1.33*
		(0.30)		(0.29)
Special Region * UK		-0.25		-0.65
		(0.40)		(0.49)
N	2813	2813	2850	2850
AIC	3293.06	3292.76	3292.49	3274.16
BIC	3697.12	3744.35	3697.44	3726.75
log L	-1578.53	-1570.38	-1578.25	-1561.08

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Baseline: Non-special authority region,
leftist, low-education female in France